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Introduction 
Quand tu regardes avec des jumelles, tu tiens un instrument de precision et tu vois tres nette 
une petite cabane qui serait Houe sans jumelles. AussitOt tu dis: 'Tiens, elle ressemble a 
telle autre, elles sont a peu pres pareilles/, deja tu ne la vois plus, dans ton esprit tu la 
compares a celle que tu crois etre avant alms qu/elle est apres, l'autre cabane. C'est une 
manie. [ ... ] Le mieux seraH de ne jamais comparer. On seraH sur d/aimer comme il fau!. 
Mais peut-etre que c'est impossible. Voila Ott on en est. 
(Robert Pinget) 
i. The point of comparison: Dostoyevsky and "notre modernite bouleversee" 
Henry James once wrote of the series of relations an artist creates in his work: 
Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the 
artist is eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which 
they shall appear to do so) 
James's definition of art is not inappropriate for the activity of criticism, especially 
when the critic is on the threshhold of a comparative study for which there is no certain 
justification, but much hypothesis and speculation, and much, too, that is the product of a 
"geometry of one's own". Stephen Heath has suggested that continuity is the "backbone 
of the natural attitude",2 a warning against projects which rely on undemonstrable 
assumptions about coherence and universality that writers like Alain Robbe-Grillet, for 
instance, would contest. But if we accept, with Henry James, that "relations" in 
literature "stop nowhere" and need not, therefore, be limited to the terms of a single 
definition or tradition, then the problem of discontinuity Heath emphasizes may be 
I 
read, not as a deterr~nt to comparative literature, but as an invitation to broaden and 
diversify its scope. This study is not an attempt to establish "influence" or "identity" so 
much as a following through of certain interpretative configurations in which 
Dostoyevskyand Robbe-Grillet's novels may be read. 
Acknowledging the element of the arbitrary implicit in the comparative project, it is 
nonetheless intriguing to discover the network of interconnecting links which already 
exist between Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet - the two writers who are the object of 
Cited in,The Rhetoric of Fiction, p42. 
2 The Nouveau Roman and the Practice of Writing, p29. 
1 
this 'comparative' study - suggesting an affinity between them that merits critical 
attention. I wish, therefore, to begin by retracing some of the lines of communication 
others have established before defining my own particular "circle" of interest, within 
which I hope to draw these two different writers into dialogue. 
Dostoyevsky's importance as a reference point for contemporary French writing has been 
affirmed repeatedly by theorists and philo~phers as well as by other novelists. 
Kaufmann notes the significance of his work to existentialism, describing Notes from 
Underground as "the best overture for existentialism ever written",3 while Richard 
Kearney extends this link to include the phenomenologically-inspired thinkers (RicCEur, 
Levinas, Derrida, Marcuse) who have dominated the French philosophical scene in 
recent decades: 
It is clear [ ... J that both groupings of first-generation existentialists -
phenomenological and non-phenomenological alike - shared a common debt [ ... J to 
such nineteenth-century existentialist writers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or 
Dostoyevsky, writers whose primary concern it was to challenge the impersonal 
and reified systems of traditional, speculative philosophies in the name of the 
concrete freedom of each individual's existence.4 
Dostoyevsky's place in the arena of literary theoretical debate has been further assured 
by the revival of interest in Bakhtin in France, largely due to the reworking of his 
thought by Julia Kristeva. Bakhtin's thesis on Dostoyevksyean polyphony is central to 
Kristeva's theory of a revolutionary writing practice in Desire in Language; and in 
Pouvoirs de l'horreur, Dostoyevsky's The Devils is referred to, without the Bakhtin"in 
mediation, as an example of the psychology of abjection.s Finally, in Le soleil noir, 
Kristeva devotes a whole chapter to 'Dosto'ievski, l'ecriture de la souffrance et Ie 
pardon'. Initially appropriating him to testify to the contemporary crisis in 
representation and subjectivity, Kristeva increasingly refers to Dostoyevsky's attempts 
to transcend this crisis through art, and a religious quest for wholeness and healing, as 
these are interpreted by psychoanalysis. 
In twentieth-century French literature, Dostoyevsky's name is linked with both Gide's 
and Camus's (Gide's critical study was influential in bringing Dostoyevsky to the 
attention of French readers; Camus adapted several of Dostoyevsky's novels for the 
theatre, and there is a considered, and intensely personal, reading of his intellectual 
rebels in L'homme revolte). More recently, Dostoyevsky has proved a significant 
3 
4 
S 
Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, p14. 
Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, pp5-6. 
See my Chapter 2 for a definition of abjection and other terms of reference in 
Kristeva. 
2 
reference point for writers of the New Novel group, to which Alain Robbe-Grillet. 
belongs.6 Sarraute (in L'ere du soupl;on) and Butor (in Repertoire n both discuss him in a 
collection of essays, and Philippe Sollers draws attention to what he sees as 
Dostoyevsky's special relevance to the problems facing contemporary thinkers: 
Dosto'ievski, a la fin du XIXe siecle, ouvre, avec Poe, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, 
Lautreamont, Mallarme, Nietzsche, l'espace sans garanties de notre modernite 
bouleversee, modernite qui replonge abruptement dans les plus immemoriales 
interrogatoires de l'espece? 
It is, above all, the persistent and even maniachal questioning to which Sollers refers, 
and which arguably permeates the whole of Dostoyevsky's writing, that is a starting 
point for Robbe-Grillet's own interest in Dostoyevsky. Robbe-Grillet includes 
Dostoyevsky in an evolutionary line of nineteenth-century writers, all of whom who he 
believes foreshadow the tenor of New Novel uncertainties. Thus: 
Non seulement l' evolution a ete considerable depuis Ie milieu du XIXe siecle, mais 
elle a commence tout de suite, a l'epoque de Balzac lui-meme. Celui-ci ne releve-
t-il pas deja de la 'confusion' dans les descriptions de la Chartreuse de Parme? [ ... ] 
Et depuis, l'evolution n'a cesse de s'accentuer: Flaubert, Dosto'ievsky, Proust, 
Kafka, Joyce, Faulkner, Beckett... [ ... ] 
Et de puis vingt ans, sans doute, les choses s'accelerent, mais ce n'est pas dans Ie 
domaine de l'art uniquement, chacun en conviendra. Si Ie lecteur a quelquefois du 
mal a se retrouver dans Ie roman moderne, c'est de la meme fa<;on qu'il se perd 
quelquefois dans Ie monde meme ou il vit, lorsque tout cede autour de lui des 
vieilles constructions et des vieilles normes.8 
In a recent public address, Robbe-Grillet strengthened the connection further by using the 
novels of Dostoyevsky, along with those of Sartre and Flaubert, as examples of writing 
which represent the relation between world and consciousness as problematic. The play 
of absence and enigma that constitutes Dostoyevsky's character Stavrogin, in particular, 
and the resistance of the latter's confession to analysis, makes a portion of The Devils 
6 
7 
8 
I am accepting the term 'New Novel' here as a useful if limited rubric for the group 
of experimental novelists writing in the 1950's-1970's and who all, in some way, 
challenge past literary practice. Perhaps the best 'definition' of the new Novel, 
however, is offered by Claude Simon: "[ ... ] we have mentioned the characters of 
the Nouveau Roman. What does this mean? Which characters? And which New 
Novels? [ ... ] The status of the characters in Robbe-Grillet, Butor, Pinget, Nathalie 
Sarraute, or myself is as different as a carp from a rabbit, a hummingbird, or a 
cauliflower. So what are we speaking about?" (Three Decades of the French New 
Novel, p193). When I use the term in this thesis, therefore, I will be principally 
"speaking about" Robbe-Grillet. This, moreover, seems to be the way in which 
Robbe-Grillet uses the term in Pour un nouveau roman. 
pl0. 
Pour un nouveau roman, pp115-116. 
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"une espece de nouveau roman" in Robbe-Grillet's eyes.9 Dostoyevsky's shattering of 
conventional codes and responses, his troubling juxtaposition of nihilism and religion, 
conservatism and eccentricity, and refusal to clarify the obscurities which result, make 
him an exemplary figure to novelists writing in an era of suspicion. 
Some of these lines of approach can easily be unravelled, or shown to be misleading. 
When Dostoyevsky was first introduced to French readers, for example, he was 
considered too alien, too hysterical and heavy-handed, and hence not particularly 
relevant to their style of literature. As Robert Andre explains: 
In contrast to our literature, which was notable for its analytical spirit and 
elegant and orderly composition, his works seemed to be obscure, loquacious and 
chaotic; his characters appeared to be extravagrnt, and their behaviour often 
incomprehensible,lO I 
Ironically, if Dostoyevsky was at first thought to be too "Russian" for the French, he was 
also, in some quarters, considered to be too "French" for the Russians. He was regarded 
with suspicion and hostility by some of his compatriots, like Count Kutchelev-
Bezborodko, who, "reading one of the early novels, The Insulted and the Injured, 
exclaimed that the author could not possibly be depicting Russians; the behaviour of such 
outlandish characters would be admissable, and perhaps true to life, in France or in 
Belgium, but certainly not in Russia."ll Nabokov's more recently expressed dislike of 
Dostoyevsky and eagerness to "debunk" him in his Lectures on Russian Literature 
completes the sense of a discontinuity between Dostoyevsky and the French or even the 
Russian traditions as these have sometimes been defined. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these anomalie~, (highlighted by the fact that Nabokov 
reputedly admired the novels of Robbe-Grillet, the other term in my comparison), I wish 
to pursue the thesis of Dostoyevsky as a forerunner for avant-garde writing with its crises 
of meaning and value: a thesis already implicit, in fact, in Julia Kristeva, Philippe 
Sollers, and Alain Robbe-Grillet. But I wish to approach this moment of crisis not, 
9 
10 
11 
'Le vide comme generatuer du texte': an oral communication given by Robbe-Grillet 
at the University of Canterbury, March 1986. The idea for the thesis originated in 
this lecture. 
'The world-wide significance of Dostoevsky', p123. This opinion is also expressed 
in French Literary Imagination and Dostoevsky and other essays, p14. Note, 
however, that Andre acknowledges the changes that have occurred in French 
literary tastes, and hence, in responses to Dostoyevsky. Although he does not 
elaborate, he remarks "how great indeed must be the changes that have occurred 
in literature in comparison with the situation at the beginning of the century, for 
Dostoevsky to have become [ ... J a forerunner of the avant-garde writers!" (p12S) 
French Literary Imagination and Dostoevsky and other essays, p3. 
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initially, though the "bouleversements" of modernity, but through the writings of 
ancient Greek scepticism - also, in its way, a discourse constructed in response to a 
crisis.l 2 Scepticism could be described as the technique of argumentation which 
corresponds, philosophically, to the mood of suspicion with which contemporary writers 
are preoccupied. The fact that scepticism, since its inception by Pyrrho, has flourished in 
various periods throughout history, is testimony to the fact that the concern with 
discontinuity of which Heath writes, and the loss of confidence in systems of 
representation reflected in the New Novel, are not new, but old anxieties reformulated in 
different terms and in different historical conditions. In my discussion of Dostoyevsky 
and Robbe-Grillet's novels, therefore, I wish to propose a definition of the scepticism 
which informs them, and of the way in which their novels inform, or reformulate, 
scepticism. Do they belong to the same "ere du soup<;on", and how does their scepticism 
relate to the 'tradition' many see as having been established by Pyrrho of Elis (circa 360-
275 B.C.) and later formalized by Sextus Empiricus? (circa 160-210 A.D.).13 In applying 
criteria which are in some respects arbitrary, but not irrelevant, I shall also attempt to 
assess each novelist according to their own understanding of the phenomenon of 
uncertainty, least my chosen "instrument de precision" obscures each writer's distinctness. 
ii. Scepticism: the philosophical context 
Classical scepticism is thought to originate in the Hellenistic period of ancient Greece. 
While the development of scepticism as a philosophy may have a number of 
forerunners,14 Pyrrho of Elis is the most common reference point in histories of the 
sceptical attitude, even though Pyrrho himself left no written record of his reflections.15 
It was Timon of Athens and Sextus Empiricus who were to later verbalize Pyrrho's views 
and present them as the coherent philosophical outlook that has come to be known as 
Pyrrhonian scepticism.16 
In the process of defending the sceptical discipline, the Pyrrhonist draws attention to two 
things, namely, the unreliability of the senses, and the contradictory ways in which 
sense-impressions may be received and interpreted by the mind. Without a reliable 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
See Edwyn Bevan's account of scepticism as a response to the disruptive 
controversies of the Greek schools over matters of dogma. (Stoics and Sceptics, 
p124) 
These dates are given in the introduction to the English translation of Sextus 
Empiricus by R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library edition. 
Sedley quotes Metrodorus of Chios, Diogenes of Smyrna and Anaxarchus of Abdera 
in this regard, see Doubt and Dogmatism, p10. 
Stoics and Sceptics, p123. 
pp142,146. 
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source of information in the senses, or a single satisfactory method of assessing 
information through the reasoning, the thinker is without criterion with which to 
determine what he knows, or even to establish if he knows, with certainty. In this case, 
argues the sceptic, the only option is to suspend judgement. Thus sceptical epoche, the 
reservation of judgement, is seen to be a logical response to contradictions in sense-data 
and in how they are to be interpreted. Since conflicting interpretations may be equally 
valid, and there are no authoritative grounds for preference, the result is presumed to be 
an "equilibrium" of evidence (isostheneia). By means of this argument the sceptic 
justifies his position, which is to suspend judgement on all matters, and enjoy the mental 
tranquillity (ataraxia) which results from abandoning an impossible quest for certainty. 
As Sextus Empiricus summarizes: 
Scepticism is an ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, 
appearances and judgements, and thus - because of the equal force in the objects 
and arguments opposed - to come first of all to a suspension of judgement and then 
to mental tranquillity,17 
Despite the apparent simplicity of this working definition, however, Sextus 
acknowledges differences amongst sceptics that are perhaps as significant as those 
which separate sceptic and dogmatist in matters of philosophic inquiry. In the same 
work cited above, he contrasts the attitude of the Pyrrhonist sceptic, for example, with 
that of the Academic sceptic, who in his view subscribes to a form of dogmatism by 
denying outright the possibility of gainful inquiry: 
It is a fair presumption that when people search for a thing the result will be 
either its discovery, a confession of non-discovery and of its non-apprehensibility, 
or perseverance in the search. [ ... J There are some who think they have found the 
truth, such as Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. These are, in a 
special sense of the term, the so-called dogmatists. Clitomachus and Cam eades, on 
the other hand, and other Academics, claim it is a search for inapprehensibles. 
But the Sceptics go on searching.18 
Sextus's distinction underlines the fact that inquiry is, in principle, as important to the 
sceptical endeavour as are doubt and the suspension of judgement. The very term, 
scepticism, derives from the Greek, skepsis, meaning inquiry. 
iii. Sceptical dilemmas 
At the same time, Sextus Empiricus isolates two potential dangers that undermine the 
inquiry that is the aim and starting point of sceptical endeavour, namely, dogmatic 
17 
18 
Sextus Empiricus. The Major Writings, pp32-33. 
p31. 
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assertion and dogmatic negation. In point of fact, this is a dilemma implicit in the 
sceptical method itself, arising from the tension between inquiry, on the one hand, and 
the practice of suspending judgement, on the other. For in so far as inquiry presupposes 
the readiness to discover, it may also lead in the direction of affirmation, while the 
suspension of judgement which disallows affirmation may harden into a predisposition to 
deny all theses on principle. Burnyeat and Striker both draw attention to the anti-
sceptical tendencies inherent in the Pyrrhonian argument of isostheneia, which insists on 
the equal weight of contrary statements and relies, therefore, on a certain amount of 
faith in the reason's ability to assess evidence (or the lack of it). Ironically this same 
argument could be used by the sceptic to discredit other belief-statements, whether or not 
there was sufficient justification for doing so. As Bumyeat explains: 
Certainly it appears to [the sceptic] that dogmatic claims are equally balanced, 
but this appearance, so called, being the effect of argument, is only to be made 
sense of in terms of reason, belief and truth - the very notions the sceptic is most 
anxious to avoid. 19 
Striker further notes how the same Pyrrhonian argument: 
eventually acquired the paradoxical status of a dogma of Pyrrhonian scepticism, 
which could be invoked against a theory even in the absence of strong 
counterarguments.20 
Thus, scepticism, which may be defined as a "thesis" that nothing can be known, and a 
"recommendation" that judgement should be suspended,21 reveals its propensity to 
develop into a negative form of knowledge and a perversion, therefore, of its own 
programme of inquiry. Yet by Sextus's own admission, systematic doubt is inconsistent 
with the sceptic's self-representation as one who "[keeps] on searching". To maintain the 
balance inherent in his position the sceptic must doubt "even that he doubts" .22 
If scholars are agreed that dogmatic assertion and negation are equally inconsistent with 
scepticism, they differ as to whether the Pyrrhonists or the Academics were the more 
predisposed to dogmatism, and vary in their estimation of what a sceptic can affirm (or 
negate) before s/he lapses into this 'unsceptical' frame of mind. Richard Popkin upholds 
Sextus Empiricus when he attributes negative dogmatism to the Academics and the more 
constructive approach to the Pyrrhonists, who, he claims, avoided the false certainties 
19 
20 
21 
22 
'Can the sceptic live his scepticism?', Doubt and Dogmatism, pSO. 
'Sceptical strategies', pS8. 
p54. 
As Emerson phrases it, cited in The Subtle Knot, p22. 
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associated with the maxim that nothing is certain.23 David Sedley, on the other hand, 
contrasts Pyrrho, who "seems to have held purely and simply that nothing can be 
known", with one of his forerunners, Metrodorus of Chios, who was prepared to turn "his 
profession of ignorance against itself", and so concede "that inquiry was still 
worthwhile" .24 Gisela Striker and Andrew Long both seem to see the Academic 
Carnaedes's theory of probability as promoting a more flexible form of scepticism than 
that proposed by Pyrrho of Elis.25 And Striker implicitly reverses the categories 
proposed by Sextus Empiricus when she suggests that the reluctance to admit the 
possibility of forming "reasonable" opinions within the sceptical framework "really 
misses the point by identifying Academic scepticism with the more radical Pyrrhonist 
position, which does indeed exclude the possibility of justified belief" .26 
This intellectual dilemma marks the history of scepticism, from its beginnings in ancient 
Greece, right through the Reformation period, and up until its present renaissance in the 
labyrinths of postmodernist scepticism. How much can be affirmed before intellectual 
caution is sacrificed and how much negated before inquiry is threatened by nihilism? 
One of the most influential of the Reformation sceptics, Michel de Montaigne, 
apparently combined sceptical doubt with religious faith, thus achieving a 'sceptical' 
balance between negation and affirmation. Consequently, Popkin places Montaigne in the 
fideist tradition of scepticism, which allowed for "complete doubt on the rational level" 
while maintaining "a religion based on faith alone, given to us not by our own 
capabilities but solely by God's Grace".27 As might be expected, critics differ in their 
estimation of Montaigne's self-doubting faith: was doubt an extension of his faith or 
faith a cover for private inclinations toward doubt? While it is impossible to build 
windows into a man's soul, or unravel the complexities of intentionality, the arguments 
obtainable from Montaigne's writings suggest some interaction between faith and doubt is 
envisaged. More particularly, the Essais demonstrate the latter's awareness of the 
dangers inherent in an uncritical doubt, and Montaigne's readiness to judge his scorn for 
the credulous as unworthy of an inquiring mind could be taken as a plea for 
counterbalancing doubt with faith: 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
condamner ainsi resoluement une chose pour fauce et impossible, c'est se donner 
l'advantage d'avoir dans la teste les bornes et les limites de la volonte de Dieu et 
The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, ppxiii, xv, 126. 
'The Protagonists', Doubt and Dogmatism, pIO. 
See A.A. Long's Hellenistic Philosophy for a helpful discussion of Academic 
scepticism. 
'Sceptical Strategies', p57. 
The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, pp52-53. 
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de la puissance de nostre mere nature; et qu'il n'y a point de plus notable folie au 
monde que de les ramener a la mesure de nosrre capacite et suffisance.28 
Montaigne thus argues the case for a doubt that is qualified by a sceptical corrective, 
equatable in this instance with the readiness to believe what is as yet unproven. 
Particularly germane to postmodern expressions of the sceptical position is Montaigne's 
referral of the philosophic dilemmas of scepticism to problems of language. Having 
drawn attention in the' Apologie de Raimond Sebond' to the difficulties of interpretation 
plaguing legal and theological debate, Montaigne goes on to outline the problems that 
confront the sceptic when attempting to formulate his arguments: 
Je voy les philosophes Pyrrhoniens qui ne peuvent exprimer leur generale 
conception en aucune maniere de parler; car, illeur faudrait un nouveau langage. Le 
nostre est tout forme de propositions affirmatives, qui leur sont du tout ennemies. 
De fa<;on que, quand Us disent: 'Je doute', on les tient incontinent a la gorge pour leur 
faire avouer qu'au moins assurent et s<;avent ils cela, qu'ils doubtent.29 
The sceptic's problem, Montaigne argues, is that he is attempting to express hesitancy 
and doubt in a language which operates in a primarily affirmative manner, making it 
impossible to question the adequacy of a concept without bringing in another equally 
dubious one in the formulation of the difficulty. Such 'suspicion' of language and its 
function in relation to the way we represent the world might well appear extremely 
'modern', although it equally demonstrates that the questioning of forms of 
intelligibility is not an exclusively modem phenomenon. 
The radical linguistic scepticism of Jacques Derrida in more recent decades, could be seen 
as a logical development of the reservations of earlier philosophers like Montaigne.30 
28 
29 
30 
'Cest folie de rapporter Ie vray et Ie faux a nostre suffisance', Essais I, pp227-228. 
Note Dostoyevsky's more extreme formulation of this thesis, as discussed in my 
Chapter 5, pp218-224. 
'Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Essais II, pp192-193. 
The relationship between ancient Greek and postmodern scepticism is a matter of 
debate amongst critics and philosophers. Jay Cantor argues that "Deconstruction is 
a classical skeptical argument, recast using linguistic metaphors" (cited in Stanley 
Cavell and Literary Skepticism, p7), and this view is shared by Christopher 
Norris (Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, pxii) and Howard Felperin (Beyond 
Deconstruction, p131). Steven Fuller specifies "the deconstructionist, in his 
dedication to indeterminacy, is probably the long-lost descendent of our classical 
skeptics - only instead of 'nature' we should now read 'text' in his assaults on 
intentionality" ('Is there a language-game that even the deconstructionist can 
play?'pl06). 
However, Glidden believes the ancient sceptics elaborated their philosophy in 
response to the requirements of social needs and realities whereas for the post-
modernist, scepticism is an "academic form of sport" divorced from "life" ('From 
pyrrhonism to post-modernism', p265). Cascardi suggests there is an important 
difference between "skeptical doubt" and "deconstructionist indeterminacy", the 
9 
Unlike Montaigne, however, Derrida is prepared to place not only the Western 
philosophical framework in question - "sous rature" as he phrases it - but also the 
subject in whom this discourse has previously been cen~¢red. This means the thinker is '0<' 
denied that sense of mastery over his own doubts which is still implicit in Montaigne 
when he insists in 'Du repentir', for example, that nothing lies outside the scrutiny of his 
personal judgement.31 For Derrida, everything, including the subject and his own self-
consciousness, is caught up in the determinations of language so that the thinker as well 
as the object of his reflections is never entirely the same, never entirely representable 
(being re-presentable in a number of different contexts), and hence not in a 'position' to 
make statements about truth and error, certainty and doubt. The thinker owes his very 
self-concept to the effects of language within which he operates.32 This refusal to set any 
boundaries on doubt results in a more radical indeterminacy than that envisaged by the 
Pyrrhonist sceptic, who is still prepared to make categorical distinctions in his 
formulation of the arguments which prompt him to reserve judgement. Chapter 1 of the 
thesis will thus attempt to define these different modes of uncertainty, conflictual and 
indeterminate, as they are reflected in the style of a narrative. 
The mutual fallibility of language and language-users, which post-modernists such as 
Derrida indicate, could be said to complete the negative 'evidence' of the early 
Pyrrhonists who began by emphasizing the fallibility of sense-impressions. Indeed, so 
negative does this recent manifestation of scepticism appear that it could easily be 
31 
32 
latter calling into question the terms and boundaries of sceptical debate as well as 
its object ('Skepticism and deconstruction', pp2-3). Wolfgang Fuchs amplifies both 
these views, concluding that 'Post-modernism is perhaps more correctly 
approached as a temperament or tendency of thought rather than a philosophical 
school' (Tost-modernism is not a scepticism', p395). He summarizes the different 
forms of relativity resulting from the epistemological reservations of the ancient 
sceptic and the ontological doubts of the post-modernist thus: "Being is what it is 
[for Pyrrho], but the knower is not adequate to know it. Thus, the relativity of 
knowledge. For Derrida however, it is not that based on this relativity there are 
possible varying interpretations of reality, but rather, that interpretation is 
originary". (p398-399) 
See p28 of TIu Repentir': "je n' ai guere de mouvement qui se cache et desrobe a rna 
raison, et qui ne se conduise a peu pres par Ie consentement de to utes mes 
parties"(Essais III). Compare, however, the 'deconstructionist' tenor of the 
remarks in the I Apologie' p267: "Car [ ... ] si nous demeurons tousjours mesmes et uns, 
comment est-ce que nous nous esjouyssons maintenant d'une chose, et rnaintenant 
d'une autre? [ ... ] Ainsi, quant et l'estre tout un, change aussi l'estre simplement, 
devenant tousjours autre d'un autre." 
See A.J. Cascardi for a brief discussion of this view and the way in which it 
contrasts with Pyrrhonism: "The skeptic remains always in possession of his own 
consciousness [ ... ] The skeptic's greatest worry is that what he thinks he sees as the 
external world may also be a product of his consciousness. [ ... ] By contrast, the 
deconstructionist who loses the world in a web of language is saying that it would 
do no good to try to get 'behind' the Cartesian (or Husserlian) Cogito, because there 
is no such place in which to aspire" ('Skepticism and deconstruction', p6). 
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interpreted as the ultimate in negative dogmatism, encouraging a "jaded resignation to 
the impossibility of truth".33 But like many sceptics before him, Derrida rejects the 
nihilist label others would apply, stressing his intention, rather, to defer the nihilist 
impasse by opening the text to a more rigorous assessment of its assumptions and a greater 
diversity, therefore, of interpretation. This reading of the activity of deconstruction is 
confirmed by sympathetic critics of his work, such as Norris (Deconstruction: Theory and 
Practice, p2), Felperin (Beyond Deconstruction, pllS) and Hart (The Trespass of the Sign, 
p19). What could be called a creative proliferation of meaning is arguably a corollary of 
negation in Derrida's play of differance , the Pyrrhonist ideal of suspended judgement 
thus being reformulated in a new way. 
iv. The sceptic disposition in literature 
f 
Where do Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet fit into these ongoing intellectual manotvres? 
~ '" 
Both writers have a philosophic turn of mind which enables them to play with ideas 
that are more formally debated by philsophers and theorists, and this means that their 
novels are susceptible of analysis in semi-philosophic terms. However, both enjoy the 
maddening grace of inconsistency, so that no one system of reference is adequate to 
encompass the patterns of meaning and indeterminacy in their novels. This is largely 
because of their commitment to the imaginative rather than the analytical adventure in 
their writing. Where a certain form of philosophic scepticism, for example, aims to 
foster "not a passion to create values, but a calm acceptance of, and detachment from, 
whatever happens" ,34 Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's whole raison d'etre as novelists 
springs from this passion to create alternative worlds, and from the desire to then defend 
the validity of those worlds in the face of more conventional habits of thinking. 
Despite the distinction which needs to be made between novelist and philosopher, 
however, I would suggest that many of the dilemmas common to the formulation and 
defence of the sceptic philosophy are also reflected in Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's 
33 
34 
See Terry Eagleton'S remarks to this effect in Literary Theory: an Introduction, 
pp143-144. 
'Post-modernism is not a scepticism', p398. According to the terms of reference in 
W.F. Fuchs's article this makes Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet not sceptics but 
post-modernists, after the style of Nietzsche. Fuchs quotes Nietzsche's Will to 
Power: "What inspires the Skeptic? Hatred of the dogmatist - or a need for rest, a 
weariness, as in the case of Pyrrho". (p396) And he comments: "That this doctrine 
clashes with the Nietzschean intention is obvious. It is not tranquillity of the soul, 
but the will to power that is the measure of life; it is not the avoidance of 
disturbances that is the way, but rather its embrace that is proposed when 
Zarathustra says, 'one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a 
dancing star'". (p398) The relevance of Nietzsche's will to power to literary 
scepticism is something I wish to explore in my fifth chapter. 
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works. The sceptical interplay of doubt with belief, for example, and the attempt to 
sustain a critical discourse while casting aspersions on the terms in which this discourse 
is articulated, creates special problems in Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's narratives, 
and these will be examined in Chapter 2. 
The difficulty of maintaining a critical perspective is compounded when scepticism about 
truth-claims and meta-narratives extends to the ability to know and respond to other 
minds. The problem of responding to the challenge of other minds is arguably implicit in 
the epistemological scepticism of Pyrrho (in other words, things exist and have their 
own particular nature, but this nature cannot be known with certainty), as it is in the 
ontological doubts of post-modernism (the 'essence' of things is itself the product of 
conventional modes of perception and linguistic expression). The basis of Pyrrhonist 
speculation is not the thing-in-itself, which is presumed inaccessible,35 but the object as 
perceived, and more especially, the object as perceived by me as an individual. M.F. 
Burnyeat argues that this attitude risks closing off important avenues for dialogue about 
the object, allowing the thinker to take refuge in subjectivism: 
When Sextus says that a man's impression is azetetos, not subject to enquiry [ ... J the 
claim is that his report that this is how it appears to him cannot be challenged 
and he cannot properly be required to give reason, evidence or proof for it. [ ... J It 
follows that the sceptic who adheres strictly to appearance is withdrawing to the 
safety of a position not open to challenge or enquiry.36 
Of course the Pyrrhonist's reponse to this is that a readiness to reflect on the object, 
whether this be the external world in general or a personal other in particular, is no 
guarantee of an escape from the idealist enclosures of the mind. How can the thinker be 
sure s/he is gaining in understanding of the other and not simply exploring his/her own 
projected interpretations? Robbe-Grillet emphasizes this very difficulty through the 
obsessive mentality of his hero-narrators, who seem only to confirm the subjective 
idealism for which Pyrrhonism lays some of the groundwork. Dostoyevsky, on the other 
hand, interprets this sceptical deadlock as a challenge, not an impossibility, 
representing a form of personal interaction in which the hero-narrator is still conditioned 
by perceptual habits, but where the other retains the power to interject, and so, to 
challenge the narrator's perceptions. The transferral of sceptical dilemmas into the 
arena of characterization in Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet, and the implications this 
has for the nature of their scepticism, are topics I will examine in Chapter 3. 
35 
36 
Hellenistic Philosophy, p81. 
Doubt and Dogmatism, p36. 
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Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's narrators are subject to a challenge from without in the 
other. But they are equally undermined from within, as their own imaginations threaten 
the stability of their narratives. In Chapter 4 I will consider the ways in which 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet extend their representation of scepticism beyond its 
philosophical aspects to include its psychological dimension, depicting the impact on 
the imagination of the phenomena of doubt and unknowing. While Robbe-Grillet 
theoretically responds to uncertainty playfully, seeing in the absence of authoritative 
meanings a licence to create without reserve, he, like Dostoyevsky, demonstrates the 
fragility of the consciousness as it confronts its own nothingness and realizes its capacity 
to 'undo' itself ina vertigo of doubt and insecurity. The sceptic Montaigne has already 
recognized the imagination's power to disrupt man's relation to himself and his world in 
a manner that may be more disturbing than the most subtle philosophic sophistry: 
Nous tressuons, nous tremblons, nous pallissons et rougissons aux secousses de nos 
imaginations, et renversez dans la plume sentons nostre corps agite a leur bransle, 
quelques-fois jusques a en expirer.37 
This 'flaw' of consciousness constitutes a source of vulnerability to which Dostoyevsky 
and Robbe-Grillet's hero-narrators seem, nonetheless, irresistably attracted, flirting 
uneasily with their own destruction. The surfacing of an anxiety that is so contrary to the 
Pyrrhonist ideal of ataraxia (mental tranquillity), helps define the tenor of 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's scepticism, while complementing a lack in empirical 
philosophical scepticism, which sidesteps the challenge of the irrational. 
In the manner of Plato's pharmakon, however, it is the imagination in Dostoyevsky and 
Robbe-Grillet that helps 'cure' the dis-ease it provokes, as the order of words and 
narrative structures gives form to nameless terrors and acts as a reminder of authorial 
control. Mastery over psychological uncertainty is partially assured through the process 
of its articulation. At the same time, the imagination, with all its uncertainties, is a 
defence against what is perceived by the novelists as a greater threat, namely, the 
restrictions of institutional order. The kind of dogma that confines belief to formula, and 
orders doubt according to categories, cramps intellectual freedom and imaginative 
whimsy. Doubt and uncertainty are seen as positive in so far as they help stimulate 
reformulations of preconceived ideas while provoking the kind of restlessness that is 
often a prelude to creativity. In Chapter 5, therefore, the rationale behind Dostoyevsky 
and Robbe-Grillet's scepticism will be contrasted with what appears to have been a 
strong motivation for Pyrrhonist scepticism, namely, the desire for tranquillity, both 
mental and emotional. Bevan describes the scepticism of the ancient Greeks as an 
37 
'De la force de l'imagination', Essais I, pp143-144. 
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attempt to withdraw from the disturbance of Academic controversies over dogma: "this 
was just what Pyrrho's wisdom came to, ataraxia, not to bother oneself. The unhappy 
desire to know was the cause of all the fever and fret, the polemical passion and torturing 
doubt". Hence Pyrrho's scepticism could be conceived as "the expression of weariness, of 
disgust with the endless strife of tongues, of the relief found in mere ceasing from 
effort" .38 
The Pyrrhonist's desire to draw back from heated controversy is what sets him apart 
most decisively from the mood of the two novelists' scepticism.39 In Dostoyevsky and 
Robbe-Grillet's case scepticism is conceived, in part, as a defence against an anticipated 
lack of controversy, and against the stasis represented by intellectual and psychological 
limitation. Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet could therefore be said to be affirming a 
value through their "torturing doubt", namely, creative freedom. 
In each of the ensuing chapters several works by Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet will be 
examined in the light of the sceptical dilemmas and possibilities outlined above: the use 
of contradiction to represent uncertainty in Chapter 1; the balance between negation and 
affirmation and the difficulty of formulating a critical discourse in Chapter 2; the 
encounter with the other and activation of self-doubt in Chapter 3; the resurfacing of 
anxiety and its partial transcendence through the imagination in Chapter 4; the rejection 
of tranquillity and cultivation of sceptical doubt in defence of freedom in Chapter 5. The 
choice of several texts by each novelist to explore these avenues of inquiry allows for a 
more balanced presentation of the problems in question and enables some of the 
distinctions between novelists, and between their texts and the framework I have 
imposed on them, to be maintained. Literary and/ or philosophic theory is used in the 
definition of terms of reference employed in each chapter, particularly since terms such 
as 'other' and 'dialogue' come with the 'trace' of their diverse and often complex usage in 
contemporary theoretical discourse. In the final analysis, however, the literary texts 
provide the most convincing response to the scepticism that informs them. If doubt is 
insufficient grounds for a systematic philosophy it proves a rich field for imaginative 
fantasy and speculation. 
38 
39 
Stoics and Sceptics, p124. 
I am, therefore, rejecting the unqualified association of Robbe-Grillet with Sextus 
Empiricus found in Dominick Grundy's nonetheless lucid study, Sceptical 
Consistency: Scepticism in Literary Texts of Montaigne, Sir Thomas Browne and 
Alain Robbe-Grillet (concentrating on Montaigne's essay, 'De la vanitE~', Sir 
Thomas Browne's 'Urne-Burial', and Robbe-Grillet's Dans Ie labyrinthe). In 
particular, Grundy's comparison of Robbe-Grillet and Sextus Empiricus with respect 
to ataraxia (p8S) seems to me inappropriate for reasons given in my Chapter 5. 
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1 Pro and contra: contradiction and difference as 
indices of sceptical uncertainty 
Now, the principle fundamental to the existence of Scepticism is the proposition, "To 
every argument an equal argument is opposed/' for we believe that it is in consequence of 
this principle that we are brought to a point where we cease to dogmatize. 
(Sextus Empiricus) 
1. i. Contradiction or difference? The problem of definition 
The ability to formulate contradictory statements makes deciding on a single point of 
view, or reasoning one's way to an authoritative truth, a neverending exercise. Meeting 
argument with counter-argument is thus endenic to sceptical tactics since it provides a 
demonstration of the reasons for suspending judgement and embracing nescience. In a 1986 
lecture Robbe-Grillet made a similar connection to the sceptic between contradictions and 
more contemporary uncertainties about the mind's relationship to itself and the world 
around it. Hegel, Flaubert, Sartre, Dostoyevsky were all cited in the lecture as writers 
responsible for questioning the mind/world relationship through their acknowledgement 
of mutability, lacuna in evidence, discontinuities in chronology, contradiction in 
interpretation. The exploration of the phenomenon of uncertainty in their writing 
distinguished them from confident essentialist and rationalist writers and allied them, 
in Robbe-Grillet's mind, to his own writing practice and experiments with what one critic 
has called "Ie doute systematique") Without making any direct reference to the 
tradition of scepticism Robbe-Grillet's discussion of contradictions and uncertainty seems 
to lead in the direction of the sceptic, given the latter's relation of contradictory 
arguments to epoche, or, the refusal to make definitive judgements. It is my intention to 
use the sceptical framework I believe is to some degree implicit in Robbe-Grillet's lecture 
(and elsewhere in his essays and addresses),2 as a means of reading his own and 
Dostoyevsky's novels, concentrating in this chapter on the dramatization of sceptical 
uncertainty through the two writers' use of contradiction in the narrative. 
1 Olga Bernal, in Alain Robbe-Grillet: Ie roman de l' absence, p9. 
2 See for example the comment in a 1961 essay: "les significations du monde, autour 
de nous, ne sont plus que partielles, provisoires, contradictoires meme, et toujours 
contestees". (Pour un nouveau roman, p120) Note also Robbe-Grillet's insistence at 
a 1982 colloquium on the importance of "severances, faults, ambiguities, mobilities, 
fragmentation, contradiction" in the novel, to demonstrate the incomprehensibility 
of the world in the author's as well as the character's mind. (Three Decades of the 
French New Novel, p24) 
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In the same way Robbe-Grillet interprets the use of contradiction as the hallmark of a 
sceptically-oriented literature, his remarks on this and other occasions suggest that, 
similarly, the absence of contradiction indicates a dogmatic and reassuring view of the 
world. Balzac is often cited in this regard, his Comedie humaine being associated by 
Robbe-Grillet with the image of "un univers stable, coherent, continu, univoque, 
entierement dechiffrable".3 The 1957 judgement is confirmed in Le miroir qui rement 
(1984), where Robbe-Grillet contrasts Balzac's texts, "sans contradiction ni manque", 
with the writings of those who seek to explore "les oppositions insolubles, les 
eclatements, les apories diegetiques, les cassures, les vides [ ... J".4 
A distinction is thus set up between two kinds of writing, the contradictory and 
intellectually challenging versus the non-contradictory and intellectually complacent, 
Robbe-Grillet's preference being clearly for the former of these two categories. Like most 
definitions, however, Robbe-Grillet's is exclusive while also implying a hierarchical 
and potentially misleading value-judgement. The reading of Balzac, for example, as a 
straightforward and ideologically naIve writer is itself ideologically blinkered, 
overlooking the painful ironies in such works as Sarrasine that Barthes has responded to 
with such infinite and inventive subtlety. Contrary to Robbe-Grillet, Barthes represents 
Balzac's Sarrasine as having potentially revolutionary ideological implications because 
of the challenge to conventional opposites inherent in its theme of castration and (sexual) 
absence which transgresses the "mur des contraires".5 In Barthes' commentary Balzac 
becomes a highly ambivalent writer, not because he avoids contradictions, nor because he 
exploits them, but because he unsettles the logic on which they traditionally depend. 
If Robbe-Grillet is too glibly dismissive of Balzac as a writer "sans contradiction ni 
manque", and so without ambivalence, there is a possibility that he also misidentifies 
the import of contradictions in Dostoyevsky, and with that the supposed affinity 
between them. For Barthes' discussion of the theme of opposites in Sarrasine underlines a 
second difficulty introduced by the lecture on contradiction which has to do with the 
contemporary interest in challenging the law of contradiction because of its dependence on 
certain philosophical unities. These categories of thought are no longer accepted 
uncritically by writers such as Barthes, Derrida and Deleuze, who have attempted to 
expose their artificiality and authoritarian exclusiveness. The process of freeing the 
3 
4 
5 
Pour un nouveau roman, p31. 
Le miroir qui revient, p212. 
5/2, p221. Barthes's definition of the text's revolutionary aspects is, however, a 
definition against ideology in so far as "la valeur ideologique d'un texte [ ... J est une 
valeur de representation, non de production". (5/2, pIO) 
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literary text from its subservience to formulae must therefore begin, according to Barthes, 
"par simple debarras de ce vieux spectre: la contradiction logique".6 
In fact, Barthes is expounding a view Robbe-Grillet himself has expressed in essays and 
novels with respect to art's subversion of classical antinomies and, more especially, of the 
ideological systems that subtend them.7 And where Barthes's reading of opposites in 
Balzac opens the text, not only to pluralism, but also to the threat of nothingness by 
virtue of a negation of its own themes (see p220 of 5/Z), Robbe-Grillet, too, establishes a 
connection between the play of contradictions in literature and a movement of erasure, or, 
"vacuih~", whereby grounds for formulating concepts are negated rather than 
problematized. This was a point made in the same lecture where he instituted the 
comparison with Dostoyevsky, and reinforced in works such as Le miroir qui revient.8 
Instead of complexity, then, contradictions may signify absence, instead of many paths, 
no paths. Given the fact that Dostoyevsky employs a form of binary opposition in his 
novels, and that his writing is informed by a recognizable ideological perspective, a 
superficial examination of terms leaves the grounds for dialogue between the two writers 
looking unconvincing. 
In the first instance the apparent inconsistency between Robbe-Grillet's preference for 
contradictions and his (Barthesian) desire to subvert them highlights the need for a 
more detailed account of what may be meant by the term 'contradiction'. Aristotle's 
classical definition of contradiction, invites comparison with its critical reevaluation by 
Barthes, Robbe-Grillet and others, after which its function in the literary text can be 
more readily assessed. A preliminary definition of terms suggests the link between the 
use of contradiction in a literary text and the philosophical attitude known as scepticism 
is by no means an automatic one. In practice, both Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet move 
outside of their philosophical assumptions, so there is something approaching 
traditional contradiction as well as Barthesian "glissements" of meaning in both their 
texts. The novels selected for this discussion - Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment and 
Notes from Underground, Robbe-Grillet's La jalousie and Projet pour une revolution a New 
York - demonstrate this shifting philosophical allegiance. At the same time, the 
novels question the categories we apply to experience in a manner suggestive of sceptical 
6 Le plaisir du texte, p9. 
7 See Pour un nouveau roman, p143, where Robbe-Grillet represents the novel as 
working to undermine "antinomies categoriques" like "fond-forme, objectivite-
subjectivite, signification-absurdite, construction-destruction", etc. 
8 See p216 of Le miroir qui revient for a passing remark on the void at the heart of Le 
voyeur in contrast with the uncertainty prevalent in Dostoyevsky. See also my 
Chapter 3 (pp106-108) for further comment on Robbe-Grillet's views of 
consciousness in relation to radical absence. 
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concerns, thus reopening the channels for dialogue first suggested by Robbe-Grillet, and 
which the two writers' theoretical differences appear to obstruct. 
I. ii. The challenge to Aristotle's law of contradiction (Nietzsche, Derrida, Barthes and 
Robbe-Grillet> 
In Aristotle, a contradiction occurs when a statement in the affirmative is followed by 
one in the negative. If the affirmative and negative statements refer to the same aspect 
of the same thing, it is assumed that one or other of the statements is false. This is known 
as the law of the excluded middle. If a different aspect of the thing is referred to, or if 
the application is different in either case - if, for example, it is universal in one and 
particular in the other - then both positive and negative statements may be true at the 
same time. Aristotle sets this out clearly in his 'De Interpretatione' : 
Of contradictory statements about a universal taken universally it is necessary for 
one or the other to be true or false; similarly if they are about particulars [ ... J But 
if they are about a universal not taken universally it is not always the case that 
one is true and the other false. For it is true to say at the same time that a man is 
white and that a man is not white, or that a man is noble and a man is not noble 
(for if base, then not noble; and if something is becoming something, then it is not 
that thing) [ .. :J 9 
There is nothing inherently problematic about the classical definition of contradiction. 
It is a consequence of the laws of logic and can be resolved accordingly. The difficulty is 
that the laws of logic according to which the contradiction is formulated and resolved in 
Aristotle are not themselves open to question. The law of contradiction thus rests on the 
confidence that the categories of thought with which we understand and interpret the 
world are adequate, and that true knowledge is attainable. On the basis of such 
confidence, anything that does not fit in with the agreed categories may be judged 
anomolous and, in this guise, be reassimilated on the periphery of the chosen system of 
reference .10 
In his essay, Rhetoric of Persuasion, de Man quotes Nietszche's response to the 
"ontological confidence" which supports Aristotle's treatise on contradiction: 
9 
10 
If, according to Aristotle, the law of contradiction is the most certain of all 
principles [ ... J then one should consider all the more rigorously what 
presuppositions [ .. .J already lie at the bottom of it. Either it asserts something 
about actual entities, as if one already knew this from some other source; namely 
'De Interpretatione', The Complete Works of Aristotle, p28. 
Note that Sextus Empiricus includes Aristotle amongst those "dogmatists" who 
"think they have found the truth" in Sextus Empiricus. The Major Writings, p31. 
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that opposite attributes cannot be ascribed to them [ ... J Or the proposition means: 
opposite attributes should not be ascribed to it [ ... J In that case, logic would be an 
imperative, not to know the true [ ... J but to posit [ ... J and arrange a world that 
should be true for us.ll 
The point that Nietszche argues and contemporary theorists have since pursued is that 
nothing in our habits of thought can be assumed reliable, and what seemed to be a 
reasonable foundation for thinking is itself the product of a limited system of concepts 
rather than a given that precedes it. Nietszche questions whether thought has any 
demonstrable foundation, and whether it is even possible to justify the notion of an 
overall unity called 'Being', divisible into the categories which enable something like 
normative knowledge to be posited. This reflection is shared by a number of post-
modernist theorists like Barthes, Derrida and Deleuze, and anticipated by the ancient 
Pyrrhonists whose awareness of the fallibility and diversity of human judgement 
motivated their mistrust of thought-systems that seek to disguise this fundamental 
difficulty. Pyrrho, for example, argued that there is no way of knowing whether our 
perceptions are true or false because we cannot be sure of what things are "really" like". 
In other words, there is no touchstone for testing and proving the truth of our perceptions. 
The diversity of interpretation that ancient and modern sceptics see as arising from the 
absence of any philosopher's stone implies a number of different contexts for thought, in 
which all categories of meaning, including those of true and false, are constantly 
displaced. For the sceptic, whether ancient or modern, the truth or falsehood of contrary 
statements lacks its Aristotelean self-evidence. 
Nietzsche suggests an alternative to classical logic by replacing the notion of 'being' 
with that of 'becoming'. This last reflects not merely the changeability of things, but 
also their evasion of our attempts to contain and identify them. "Becoming", Nietzsche 
argues, never achieves a "final state" and so cannot be authoritatively named and 
categorized. It is: 
of equivalent value every moment; the sum of its values always remains the same; 
in other words, it has no value at all, for anything against which to measure it, 
and in relation to which the word 'value' would have meaning, is lacking.12 
Nietzsche thus foregrounds what was a parenthetical reference in Aristotle ("if 
something is becoming something, then it is not that thing"), pushing it to its extreme 
conclusion, and making it the shifting ground on which philosophic maps can be drawn 
and redrawn indefinitely. 
11 Cited in Allegories of Reading, p120. 
12 The Will to Power, p378. 
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Assuming, like Nietzsche, the absence of a "master word" that could act as an 
authoritative starting point for reasoning and interpretation, Derrida is another thinker 
who, more recently, has placed the Aristotelean concept of being "under erasure", and 
challenged the philosophical oppositions that such a concept makes possible.13 "Car ce 
qui s'y met pnkisement en question", argues Derrida, "c'est la requete d'un commencement 
de droit, d'un point de depart absolu, d'une responsabilite principielle [sic]",14 Where 
there is no place to begin, no reliable perspective on what is being 'thought', there is 
nothing to ensure that the distinctions used in cognition are the 'right' ones. For 
Aristotle's law of the excluded middle, therefore, which does not allow a statement and 
its contrary to be true at the same time, Derrida proposes the practice of "differance", 
which occupies the forbidden middle ground and posits, not the equal truth of contrary 
statements, but their mutual dependence on a differential system that lacks "positive 
terms" with the power to fix the value of its elements. Opposition may thus be 
reappraised as a "theoretical fiction"15, and the attempt to represent it as anything else 
is viewed as an unjustifiable act of authoritarianism: 
[La differanceJ ne commande rien, ne regne sur rien et n'exerce nulle part aucune 
autorite. [ ... J Non seulement il n'y a pas de royaume de la differance mais celle-ci 
fomente la subversion de tout royaume.16 
Roland Barthes occupies a similar position to Derrida with respect to the categorical 
antinomies of philosophy, and echoes Derrida's reluctance to define this position as 
anything but a refusal of all positions. Barthes does elaborate the twin notions of 
"plaisir" and "jouissance", however, (ironically dependent on some hard and fast 
boundaries of Barthes' devizing, such as wholeness/fragmentation, legalism/anarchy) 
by means of which he affirms his preference for a style of writing which, like 
"differance", subverts opposites and the ideological framework in which they might be 
seen to operate. The law of opposites, Barthes contends, relies on blind faith in some 
unchangeable essence outside the slippages of language and which Barthes calls an 
"alterite originelle".17 Without this "alterite originelle", the categories by which 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
See pxxix of Gayatri Spivak's introduction to the English translation of Derrida's 
Of Grammatology for a comparison of Nietzsche's subversion of classical 
opposition with Derrida's practice of "differance". 
'La differance' in Marges de fa philosophie, p6. 
p20, quoting Freud in the essay 'La differance'. 
p22. 
5/Z, p47. cf Derrida's rejection of the transcendent signified implicit in Levi-
Strauss's conception of the 'other' culture as a model "de la bonte originelle et 
naturelle [ ... J l'index d'une bonne nature enfouie [ ... J par rapport auquel on pourrait 
dessiner Ia structure, Ie devenir et surtout la degradation'de notre societe et de notre 
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moral as well as philosophical judgements are made are broken down, and the conflict 
that might arise from a difference in opinion or a transgression of certain laws is evaded, 
"frappe d'insignifiance".18 In the "texte de plaisir", writes Barthes, " les forces 
contraires ne sont plus en etat de refoulement, mais de devenir: rien n'est vraiment 
antagoniste, tout est pluriel",19 
As the lecture on contradiction demonstrates, Robbe-Grillet is ambivalent on the subject, 
seeming to argue equally for the dissolution and reinstatement of contradiction in the 
text. In addition, he displays a marked enjoyment of anything resembling conflict and it 
is perhaps this as much as any thought-out philosophical objection that finally 
distinguishes his thinking from Barthes, for example, for whom avoidance is a strategy 
for dealing with, and, perversely, triumphing over, conflict.20 Otherwise, Robbe-Grillet 
raises some of the same objections as Barthes on the problem, arguing, in 'Pourquoi j'aime 
Barthes', that contradictions in the classical tradition (in which he includes Hegel as 
well as Aristotle) are rigidly controlled by the belief in a higher reality whose nature is 
presumed fixed, once and for all. He contrasts this and its potential closure of the sign 
system with the openendedness of meaning theoretically achieved by the play of 
"glissements" : 
la pensee conceptuelle pouvait trembler, mais trembler autour d'un axe fixe, ... elle 
a besoin d'un noyau de sens solide qui va l'empecher de couler ... la structure de 
glissement est complNement opposee, dans la mesure ou elle abandonne sans cesse 
les positions qu'elle fait semblant d'avoir conquises.21 
Like Derrida and Barthes, Robbe-Grillet objects to the authoritarian implications of the 
attempt to impose unity on interpretation through dictating its boundaries and terms of 
expression, and he reflects a Nietzschean preference for "un devenir sans projet"22 to 
account for the mutations in the text and in human experience generally. These 
fluctuations are too subtle to be formally categorized or related to a purposeful movement, 
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culture". (De la grammatologie, p168) See also Mieke Taat's comments in Nouveau 
roman: hier, aujourd'hui I , "Dieu est Ie maitre des disjonctions exclusives [ ... ]". 
(VGE 1972, p28) 
Le plaisir du texte, p27. 
p52. 
The perversity resides in refusing the language of conflict (see p50 of Le plaisir 
du texte :"Le plaisir du texte (la jouissance du texte) est au contraire cornme 
un effacement brusque de la valeur guerriere, une desquamation passagere des ergots 
de I' ecrivain [ ... ]") while using, at the same time, the language of victory and 
triumph, affirming the certainty, in other words, of always winning (in the Sadean 
text there are "rien que des triomphes"). 
p255, 'Pourquoi j'aime Barthes'. cf Gilles Deleuze on the pairing and resolution of 
opposites in Aristotle and Hegel: "Ia contradiction se resout, et se resolvant, resout 
la difference en la rapportant a un fondement". (Difference et repetition, p64 ) 
Pour un nouveau roman, pl08. 
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or telos (such as absolute Spirit in Hegel's dialectic, for example). In the novel they may 
create little more than a: 
glissement d'une scene a la meme scene qui se repNe sous une forme a peine 
detournee, a peine contournee, a peine retournee.23 
This is a far remove from Aristotle's law of contradiction. As I hope to show with 
reference to La jalousie and Projet, Robbe-Grillet's "structure de glissements" frequently 
involves quite minor alterations in the details of a repeated scene, or in the gradual 
metamorphosis from a banal object to a figure of fantasy. 
I. iiL"coexistence without confusion of opposite voices" in Dostoyevsky 
Dostoyevsky seems to operate within a frame of reference that is foreign to both 
Aristotle and his post-modem detractors. A single character in his novels can be both 
''base'' and "noble", "true" and "false", thus contravening Aristotle's ruling on the 
exclusiveness of contradictory statements when applied to particulars. Yet at the same 
time, the use of such true/false distinctions suggests a degree of acceptance on 
Dostoyevsky's part of terms that have no philosophic or moral validity in Derrida, 
Barthes or Robbe-Grillet. The title of Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment sets up a 
clear opposition in the mind of the reader between the law and its transgression and 
further creates an expectation of some kind of moral resolution which the novel goes some 
way towards realizing. This is consistent with the patterns of duality and conflict that 
give Dostoyevsky's novels their particular ambivalence and help create the tragedies of 
their characters as they are tom in contrary directions between the ideal they will not 
relinquish and the degradation that prevents them from achieving it. 
Dostoyevsky frequently refers to these tensions in his novels,24 while Bakhtin recognizes 
their importance in his theory of polyphony in which he makes a distinction between 
the "coexistence without confusion" of opposites in Dostoyevsky, and the sublimation of 
difference in Hegel, for example, where contrary forces in history are ultimately 
23 
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'Pourquoi j' aime Barthes', p258. 
See, for example, Mitya's comments on beauty in The Brothers Karamazov: 
"Beauty is a fearful and terrifying thing! [ .. .] Here the shores meet, here all 
contradictions live side by side.[ ... ] It makes me mad to think that a man of great 
heart and high intelligence should begin with the ideal of Madonna and end with 
the ideal of Sodom. [ ... ] beauty is not only a terrible, but also a mysterious, thing. 
There God and the devil are fighting for mastery, and the battlefield is the heart 
of man". (pp123-124) Contrast this with Nietzsche's definition of beauty according 
to which conflict is overcome through the "will to power": "'Beauty' is for the 
artist something outside all orders of rank, because in beauty opposites are tamed; 
the highest sign of power, namely power over opposites [ ... J". The Will to Power, 
p422. 
22 
absorbed in the unity of Absolute Spirit. Significantly, some of the rationale behind 
Bakhtin's theory of polyphony derives from the Orthodox dogma of the trinity in which 
unity is represented as a community of difference, as distinct from a mono logic and 
uniform totality. In so far as Dostoyevsky extends this basic notion of difference within 
unity (schisms in the one character, personal differences juxtaposed in a community), the 
semantic 'unity' within which contradiction operates in his novels could be described as 
already divided within, and even against, itself, and hence cannot be said to be centred 
on what Robbe-Grillet calls a "noyau de sens solide". Equally, the philosophic terms 
generated by this shifting framework in Dostoyevsky do not guarantee anchorage for 
textual instabilities and are, moreover, shattering in their effects on the psyche of 
Dostoyevsky's main characters. 
This in itself shows the inadequacy of the view that thinking within a given belief-
structure must always end in the affirmation of what Robbe-Grillet calls a "monde 
plein", "solide", and "rassurant". On the contrary, it is largely because of his much-
debated allegiance to Christian thought that Dostoyevsky is able to "pervertir de 
l'inh~rieur", or, subvert and question terms of reference from within a given framework, a 
process which leaves that framework vulnerable. 
In addition to these qualifications are reservations about some of the binary oppositions 
which support the case against contradiction. Barthes, for example, offers no alternative 
to authoritarianism, on the one hand, and anarchy, on the other, in Le plaisir du texte, 
while Robbe-Grillet often sets the slippages of meaning associated with "glissements" 
against the strawman of "la pensee conceptuelle", incapable of any dislocation from its 
"axe fixe". Modifying their case, however, is the parenthetical admission in Barthes, 
for example, that while the pleasure of the text "ne fait pas acceptation d'ideologie",25 
it still needs the shadow of ideology - "un peu d'ideologie, un peu de representation, un 
peu de sujet" 26 - to give its subversive games meaning. So if ideology as an abstract and 
detailed totality is rejected, then the need for some kind of framework to think in (and 
undermine), and the inevitability of the subjects' having a particular perspective on the 
world, are both acknowledged. Robbe-Grillet qualifies the case for "glissements" more 
decisively when he argues that deviations in meaning have a greater impact when they 
come after a logical sequence. 27 In other words, while it may be desirable to free the text 
from black and white polarities the erasure of distinctions may also forfeit the qualities 
of ambivalence and uncertainty Robbe-Grillet values as a writer. Constant "glissements" 
25 
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Le plaisir du texte, pS2. 
pS3. 
See 'Order and disorder in film and fiction', pIS. 
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of meaning may herald the conservatism of predictable disruptions where what is 
wanted is that ongoing sense of the incalculable in the text as the reader is confronted by 
that which almost conforms to the rule, but not quite. Accordingly, in a 1982 colloquium, 
Robbe-Grillet seems to return to a quasi-dialectical understanding of contradiction when 
seeking for terms to describe the tensions he hopes to foster in his novels: 
the fact that in the dialectic, thesis and antithesis are incompatible, that they 
are at odds with each other, is [ ... J essential [ ... J for literature is precisely the 
place where those struggles between incompatible poles take place. [The text is] 
the place, the site of this contradiction between irreconcilable things.28 
Though the possibility of synthesis is still rejected, and with it the idea of subservience 
to ideology, the clash of opposites Robbe-Grillet outlines here is conceivable only against 
a background of coherent, and therefore ideological meaning, which is what 
Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment and Robbe-Grillet's La jalousie in some measure 
provide. By ideological, however, I refer to ideology in the general sense of a framework 
for thought, a perspective on the world, rather than in the sense of an abstract body of 
knowledge that operates as a system, independently of what Jameson has called "the 
positing of the individual subject" .29 The distinction is helpful to a study of the novels 
although it is not one Robbe-Grillet makes in his essays. Robbe-Grillet, like Barthes, 
tends to define ideology as an inflexible totality or body of doctrine in which, "if a single 
point is contested, everything immediately collapses".30 
In Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground and Robbe-Grillet's Projet pour une revolution a 
New York, however, contradictions are more likely to be "frappe d'insignifiance" in the 
manner envisaged by Barthes in his attack on traditional opposites. At the same time, 
these two texts reveal one of the more fundamental discrepancies in the anti-
authoritarian impulses informing the refusal of contradiction. Dostoyevsky and Robbe-
Grillet's experiments with the laws of logic in these works seem to give weight to 
Nietszche's elliptical comments on the deconstruction of opposites in art, which is, he 
claims: 
28 
29 
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the highest sign of power, namely power over opposites; moreover, without 
tension: - that violence is no longer needed; that everything follows, obeys, so 
Robbe-Grillet in Three Decades of the French New Novel, p190. 
See p91 of Jameson's article 'Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late 
capitalism' for a helpful discussion of Althusser's distinction between existential 
and abstract knowledge, following the Marxian distinction between ideology and 
science. 
'Order and disorder in film and fiction', p 11. 
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easily and so pleasantly - that is what delights the artist's will to power.31 
The "will to power" is a theme I wish to explore in my final chapter. But it is not 
inappropriate to begin my analysis of Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's scepticism with a 
reminder of the ambiguity which characterizes the plea for freedom from authoritarian 
dogma. 
Crime and Punishment 
II. i. Unity and fragmentation 
The terms of the hero's dilemma in Crime and Punishment are clearly linked to an 
overall vision that informs, and to some extent unifies, all of Dostoyevsky's works, thus 
enabling Panichas to say of him that while he "may be contradictory", Dostoyevsky is 
"never confused" .32 One of the paradoxes of the novel, however, is that this unifying 
vision, which Panichas links to Dostoyevsky's spirituality, has the very opposite to a 
unifying effect on the mentality of the novel's main character. It could be argued that 
Raskolnikov murders to escape the polarity implicit in the knowledge of good and evil, 
only to expose himself to this conflict on a more fundamental level, as his own conscience 
and instinctive compassion battle it out with his desire for a freedom without limits. 
Although the sense of moral value is undermined, it continues to be problematic and can 
be neither dismissed nor assimilated by each successive fragmentation. If, then, the 
novel fails to achieve that particular "trouble metonymique" Barthes looks for in texts 
which refuse ideological definition it nonetheless records the impact of the confrontation 
between the law of the sacredness of life and Raskolnikov's thesis that "everything is in 
a man's own hands". (p20) An ethical vision confronts the symmetry of a private value-
system, and neither emerges unscathed from the encounter. 
One of the reasons for the dramatic tensions engendered by the ethical dimension of the 
novel is that this aspect of Dostoyevsky's thought is not, strictly speaking, conceived as 
a totality at all. "Divine truth and justice", as Dostoyevsky terms it, does not impose 
itself ineluctably on the consciousness of the characters any more than its imprint can be 
erased with impunity from their conscience. It is more appropriately defined as an 
ongoing experience of difference that opposes, in Raskolnikov's case, a desire for 
wholeness. Hence, Raskolnikov's ethical awareness in the novel concerns intermittent 
reminders of the divine other of Dostoyevsky's "truth and justice", and of the other who 
31 
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The Will to Power, p422. 
The Burden of Vision, p9. The latter part of this remark was made by Joyce Carey. 
25 
is his neighbour, which constantly disrupt his attempt to take things into his "own 
hands". Since his determination to pursue this end persists in the face of weakness he is, 
in truth, "jete sur un champ de bataille"33 rather than positioned in an arena of 
negotiable difference. 
Unexpected feelings of compassion, for example, prompt gestures that contradict 
Raskolnikov's Napoleonic ambitions and throw him off his chosen course. His impulsive 
gift of money to the Marmelodovs (p44) and his concern over Sonia as she walks the street 
(p66) are a source of particular annoyance, since they seem to spring from impulses that 
escape his rational control and assessment. ("What the hell made me interfere? Who am 
I to help her?") The fact that he is moved to tears over his mother's letter, the "small, 
slanting handwriting, so familiar and dear to him, of his mother who once taught him to 
read and write", (p47) further betrays the extent to which Raskolnikov feels bonded 
with others, despite the mood of cynical malice he assumes after reading the letter, 
perhaps in unconscious defence against this exasperating vulnerability. It is the deeply 
ingrained sense of his ties with his family that Raskolnikov finds he has betrayed when 
he murders the rapacious old moneylender, with her greasy hair "twisted into a rat's 
tail plait, and gathered up under what was left of a broken down hom comb, which stuck 
out at the nape of her neck". (p96) 34 When his mother and sister greet him after a long 
absence with a "rapturous cry", therefore, Raskolnikov "stood like one dead: a sudden, 
unbearable realization of what he had done struck him as though by lightning". (p212) 
An experience of separation from others and of inner division, then, are the consequences 
of Raskolnikov's crime as "Insoluble questions arise" and he is, in Dostoevsky's words, 
tormented by "unsuspected and unexpected feelings" .35 Ironically this experience of 
disunity is the result of Raskolinokov's refusal to recognize difference in the form of the 
other of the law, and the other for whom the law makes him responsible. Soon after the 
murder Raskolnikov feels he is "losing his grip", (p95) experiences "disgust at what he 
had done", (p99) and is forced to concentrate his mind on trivia to protect himself from 
the shattering impact of the memory of what he has done. When Zossima, Rasumikhin 
and Nastasya begin to discuss the murder in his room (where he has physically 
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Difference et repetition, p74. Note Deleuze's distinction between the resolvable 
differences of "des malentendus" and the contradictions which remain ''les luttes 
inexpiables" . 
The sickening, nightmarish quality of this physical description of Alyona, 
observed just as Raskolnikov is about to bring down the axe, are also an instance 
of Dostoyevsky's judicious use of detail to sharpen the focus of a scene or character 
and reflect his hero's state of mind. Such passages challenge Nabokov's sweeping 
criticism of Dostoevsky as being interested in his characters only as abstractions 
and not as particularized beings. (See Lectures on Russian Literature, pI29.) 
In a letter to Mikhail Katkov, September 1865. Dostoevsky Letters, p175. 
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collapsed), he desperately focusses his attention on a "rather unshapely flower with 
brownish veins" on the wallpaper, examining "how many leaves it had and what kind of 
serrated edges and how many veins each little leaf had", in an effort to maintain self-
control. (p153) 
Yet if the crime generates violent schisms in Raskolnikov this does not mean he was 
single-minded before it, nor even that such untroubled personal integrity is an ideal from 
which he has fallen. For this reason I question the use of Hegel's concept of unity and 
difference in Zarader's analysis of Crime and Punishment. Hegel, explains Zarader, 
considers that the other "n'est que en realite que Ie masque du Meme, que la vie vivahte 
n'est pas multiple mais une, et que l'on ne saurait tuer une vie mais seulement s'exclure de 
la vie [ ... ]".36 While there is undoubtedly a sense of organic linkage between characters, 
so that Raskolnikov wounds himself and his family in killing the old woman and her 
sister, Dostoyevsky's whole conception of unity and difference in the novel are, it seems 
to me, quite different from Hegel's. Raskolnikov's crime could be said to arise out of a 
failure to recognize the other always and already in himself as well as the other in the 
old woman. And the other he fails to recognize is not a unity in disguise as in Hegel (or in 
Zarader's reading of Hegel, as Zarader summarizes, "la vie est une avant de se 
particulariser dans des vivants distincts. Elle est la Mere primordiale [ ... ] la totalite 
premiere dont l'individu n'est qu'un 'morcellement"'),37 but an other which can never be 
reduced to sameness. Far from being an "axe fixe" that can only tremble without being 
shaken from its position of dominance, then, 'ideology' in the sense of an ethical 
awareness, is a source of schism and fragmentation in the novel that is activated as a 
result of the hero's attempts to impose his own unity on the world. 
There are arguably two contrasting orders of unity and schism in the novel: the first, the 
ethical order and the contradictions this generates, the second the order associated with 
Raskolnikov's fixed idea about the Napoleonic superman. This last increases 
philosophical and psychological uncertainty as Raskolnikov questions the meaning of 
the ethical tension and worries over whether he will be strong enough to suppress it in 
the interests of carrying out his plan. Raskolnikov's plan principally involves the 
pawnbroker Alyona, whose murder is to be the first test of his worthiness to belong to the 
class of man who has the right to overstep the ethical law in pursuit of individual 
genius. As Nietzsche observes, the "highest sign of power" is "power over opposites", 
following which everything falls into place "so easily and pleasantly". So, in 
preparation for his act, Raskolnikov must do what he accuses his sister Dunya of doing in 
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'La dialectique du crime et du chatiment', p351. 
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marrying Mr Luzhin: in other words, he must deliberately channel his thoughts to the 
one end, screening out everything that contradicts it, and so "persuade [himself] that 
there is no other way, that [he] really [has] to act like that for the sake of the good 
cause." (p61) He follows the lead of the students in the cafe ("'Well I have nothing 
against duty or conscience, but are you quite sure we know what these words mean?'''), 
(p8S) turning the words crime, duty and conscience over in his mind to the point where 
they lose their self-evidence and "there was [ ... ] no danger of his reason or will-power 
being in any way affected during the carrying out of his plan, simply because what he 
intended to do was 'not a crime"'. (p90) Yet in seeking to escape the restrictions imposed 
by the ethical dilemma, Raskolnikov transforms murder into a perverse form of ideology, 
in so far as it represents for him a definite course of action with a definitive meaning, 
which will supposedly lead to the sense of coherence and purpose more readily 
associated with the ethical element in the novel. The contradiction between conscience 
and lawlessness is thus temporarily displaced. 
However, as Nietzsche has also observed, "One should beware of assessing the value of a 
man according to a single deed" .38 The statement, taken by Kaufman as a reference to 
Dostoyevsky, certainly gains an ironic significance when applied to Crime and 
Punishment, as Raskolnikov discovers the act of murder does not define him beyond reach 
of change or contradiction. He is not thereby redeemed from the underground of 
speculation in which there is a Derridean "reciprocal contamination" of the terms of his 
dilemma (''What do duty and conscience mean?", "Crime, what crime?"). But nor is he 
redeemed from the schisms created by his awareness of these terms, which, unlike 
Derrida's, emerge intact after each dislocation, "coexisting without confusion", in 
Bakhtin's phrase, so that the agonizing process of 'punishment' revives all over again. It 
is from this disorder, provoked in part by an order of his own devizing, that Raskolnikov 
eventually seeks respite, wanting, pleading almost, to be apprehended and sentenced: 
"Arrest me", he begs Porfiry, "search me, but do it please according to the regulations and 
don't play with me" (p364) Dostoyevsky's contradictory hero thus seeks relief in an 
unthinking legal conformity that will not require his intellectual assent to the spirit of 
the law, as represented by the face of the other (and ultimately the divine Other) and 
its discomforting demands. 
II. ii. "life" versus "dialectics" 
Porfiry's response to Raskolnikov draws the reader's attention once again to the two 
sources of order and schism in the narrative - namely, the ethical and the speculative -
38 The Will to Power, p392. 
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and further makes some important qualifications regarding their nature. The 
significance of the first, it is implied, is borne in on Raskolnikov only as a result of his 
interaction with others, while the second grows out of, and is convincing only in, the 
underground of mental and social isolation. As Porfiry phrases it: 
how much experience have you had of life and how much do you really 
understand? He's invented a theory, and now he's ashamed that it has proved a 
failure and turned out to be so very unoriginal [ ... J What you have long needed is a 
change of air [ ... J give yourself up to life without thinking. (p471) 
Porfiry's advice also indicates the direction in which the narrative will be oriented in 
the final pages where conflict on the experiential and ethical level is to displace the 
doubts and contradictions of underground sophistry to which Raskolnikov, "a sceptic [ ... J 
fond of abstract reasoning", (p338) is so addicted. "Life" rather than an abstract ideology 
or moral code, is to take the place of "dialectics". (p558) The moral or spiritual vision 
that informs the novel is thus qualified and shown not to be an ideology in the way this 
is sometimes understood by Robbe-Grillet or Barthes, namely, as a coherent and 
totalitarian system. It has more to do with Dostoyevsky's perception that life's greatest 
problems and challenges, as well as life's true 'meaning' and 'value', arise out of the 
context of relationships. This is the "corrective of reality" that is "too contradictory and 
heteroglot" to be systematized, and of which Bakhtin writes in The Dialogic Novel. Or, 
as Bakhtin specifies elsewhere in a definition of the Dostoyevskyean concept of 
'worldview': 
The truth about the world, according to Dostoevsky, is inseparable from the truth 
of personality [ ... ] Therefore the loftier principles of Weltanschauung are the 
same as the principles of the most concrete personal experience. 39 
As Dostoyevsky demonstrates and Bakhtin attests, systems and theories about life can 
. too easily become abstractions, "sums in arithmetic", that buckle under the strain of life's 
contingencies, or mask the realities of weakness and need. Raskolnikov could not forsee 
that he would be 'forced' to kill the meek Lizaveta as well as her sister, nor could his 
dreams of power meet the need for companionship, which first drove him to the tavern 
where he met Marmelodov, and later compelled him to seek out Sonia. 
Dostoyevsky thus attempts to take the question of contradiction implicit in the title of 
the novel outside its philosophic context. In stressing the value of "life" over reasoning, 
and by making the consciousness of life's sanctity one of the indicators of Raskolnikov's 
39 Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p63. Italics mine. 
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humanity, Dostyoevsky departs from the scepticism of some of the early Greeks and 
their Reformation followers (such as Montaigne), who insisted that human action should 
ultimately be governed by custom and convention. For the good, argued Diogenes 
Laertius, is unknowable, relative, and judgement must therefore be suspended about the 
nature of morality as well as about the nature of material things.40 Dostoyevsky would 
argue that the good entails responsibility for one's neighbour, and, although this may be 
undemonstrable as a philosophic concept, he shows Raskolnikov's attempts to discredit 
it as casuistry that only experience of life and love - and not conformity to custom - can 
amend. 
Dostoyevsky's apparent preference for life over dialectics in this novel also 
distinguishes his conception of contradiction and uncertainty from the Barthesian notion 
of "difference". Barthesian "difference", as defined in Le plaisir du lexle, for example, 
belongs to the abstract and attractive domain of an aesthetics of pleasure. Of Sade's text, 
which is "hors de tout code puisqu'il invente contimlment Ie sien propre et Ie sien seul", 
Barthes emphasizes that "il n'y a pas de conflits: rien que de triomphes".41 Such 
endlessly pleasurable readjustments and manceuverings are, in a sense, what 
Raskolnikov, as a self-defined "aesthetic louse", engages in, playing about with the 
words "crime", "duty" and "conscience". But these things, too, are "hors de tout code", 
belonging to the domain of the "most concrete personal experience" that must be struggled 
. with rather than simply relegated to the realm of philosophic undecidables. 
II. iii. The question of the resolution 
Does the fact that the nature of the conflict in Crime and Punishment is nonetheless 
conservatively defined mean that the novel falls into the category of texts in which, as 
Deleuze phrases it, "la difference est Ie fond, mais seulement Ie fond pour la 
manifestation de l'identique"?42 Is there, in other words, a resolution of the contradiction 
in the novels by virtue of the fact that the terms of the contradiction have been defined, 
as in crime/law, life/casuistry? As George Panichas observes: 
Sin that in any form leads to internal suffering and to the slightest reactivation of 
conscience is never without hope of redemption.43 
The moral terms in the narrative, however divided they leave the hero, would appear 
to ultimately invoke the hope of unity. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Hellenistic Philosophy, p8S. 
Le plaisir du texte, p28. 
Difference et repetition, p74. 
The Burden of Vision, pIS. 
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Yet it does not automatically follow that crime attended by suffering is a guarantee of 
redemption. Dostoyevsky's own comments on Crime and Punishment are potentially 
misleading in this regard, when he says that: 
Divine truth and justice and the law are triumphant in the end, and the young man 
finishes up by giving himself up against his will.44 
For the point is that although events in Crime and Punishment conspire to bring about 
this end - namely, the triumph of divine truth through repentance, confession and 
salvation - the young man who gives himself up against his will never gives up his 
will, and is thus always ready to take back any decision he may have made, even after 
having apparently accepted, once and for all, his need for atonement. He leans towards 
repentance with tears only to swing back with renewed defiance: 
I won't go [i.e. to give himself up]. Perhaps I am a man and not a louse. I have been 
in too great a hurry to condemn myself. (p434) 
Raskolnikov's final uncertainty does not necessarily constitute an evasion of the question 
either (as Magarshack seems to imply when he writes that Dostoevsky "dismisses 
[Raskolnikov's conversion] in a few words as being merely the subject of another novel").45 
Rather, Raskolnikov's conversion, which has at least been foreshadowed throughout the 
text, is finally phrased as a question, a question whose terms have been unequivocally 
defined, but a question for all that: "Is it possible that her convictions can be mine, too 
now?" (p558) Crime and Punishment shows the limits of the view that because a 
contradiction can be identified it ceases to be problematic. The opposite poles that 
qualify Raskolnikov's fate also leave it open. But if Dostoyevsky represents his hero as 
a theatre of contradiction in a manner inconsistent with Aristotle, he also represents the 
process of 'becoming' in which he is caught up as having certain consequences and results. 
The kind of indefinite deferral of meaning preferred by opponents of classical 
contradiction, and attempted to some measure by Raskolnikov, is thus undercut by a sense 
of ethical and existential urgency. It is perhaps the knowledge that his characters may 
ultimately prefer the dazzling convolutions of the intellect, the "crooked winding wayes, 
wherein [they] live, wherein [they] die, not live",46 that constitutes the real "burden" of 
Dostoyevsky's spiritual vision. 
44 Dostoyevsky, in the same 1865 letter referred to on p26, Magarshack's 
translation in the introduction to the novel, p13. 
45 p16. See, however, my defence of this idea in Chapter 5, pp206-207. 
46 From George Herbert's poem, 'A wreath'. 
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Notes from Underground 
III. i. Contradiction as negation 
Dostoyevsky's use of contradiction in the first part of Notes from Underground comes 
closer to the post-modem practice of difference than the contradictory tensions in Crime 
and Punishment. In the later novel, the motives of the main character remain obscure, but 
his prevarication does not negate the terms of his dilemma, nor does it dissolve all 
personal attributes in the morass of indecision. Raskolnikov's mercurial personality is 
the unity that is qualified, but not erased, by contradiction and can be seen as an 
illustration of Dmitri Karamazov's assessment of man as "too wide" to be defined and too 
dynamic to be a non-entity. In Notes, on the other hand, contradictions seem to sabotage a 
sense of personal identity altogether, leaving the reader empty-handed and the narrator 
without a face. For this reason the text comes closer than perhaps any other of 
Dostoyevsky's novels to Barthes' ideal of contradictions "frappes d'insignifiance" and to 
Robbe-Grillet's notion of contradictions functioning in relation to narrative lacunae. It is 
Notes, then, and not Crime and Punishment or even The Devils, which may be considered 
as the real New Novel avant la lettre in this respect.47 
After setting up a particular thesis concerning his 'character', for example, -"1 was a 
bad civil servant" (pIS) - the underground man negates his statement, not in order to 
qualify an attribute or resolve a contradiction in logic, but to erase what he has said, 
forcing the reader to abandon any hypothesis she might have been formulating and to 
start the interpretative game again from degree zero: 
I was lying just now that I was a bad [zloikivil servant. I was lying out of 
spite[zlost] [ ... ] in reality I never could make myself malevolent. I was always 
conscious of many elements showing the directly opposite tendency. [ ... ] Not only 
couldn't I make myself malevolent, I couldn't make myself anything: neither good 
nor bad, neither scoundrel nor an honest man, neither a hero nor an insect. (pI6) 
Julia Annas questions Coulson's translation of the words zloi/zlost here, on the grounds 
that it has too definite a quality to adequately convey the negative import of the 
narrator's grievance.48 Certainly, the effect of his reasoning leads to an undermining of 
47 Stavrogin's confession is, more precisely, the portion of The Devils which Robbe-
Grillet highlighted in the lecture 'Le vide comme generateur du texte'. For 
comment on this character see my Chapter 3, ppI24-I33. 
48 'Action and character in Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground', pp267-268. 
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"humanness" as a concept which can be talked about coherently. In the manner of the 
sceptic who questions the validity of origins and causes and finds he is without 
foundation even for his own arguments, the underground man sets out to talk about himself 
and finds he has no self to talk about once he has created a sense of such acute mental 
vertigo: 
Where are the primary causes on which I can take my stand, where are my 
foundations? Where am I to take them from? I practise thinking and consequently 
each of my primary causes pulls along another [ ... ] what can I do if I don't even feel 
resentment? (This was my starting-point of a short time ago). My anger, in 
consequence of the damned laws of consciousness, is subject to chemical 
decomposition. As you look, its object vanishes into thin air, its reasons evaporate, 
the offender is nowhere to be found [ ... ]. (p27) 
This relentlessly destructive use of contradiction has something of the gleeful anarchy of 
certain passages in Barthes' Plaisir du texte where difference challenges the 'paternal' 
legalism of institutionalized knowledge beyond the possibility of dialogue to the "mort 
du Pere", with: "Le plaisir en pieceSi la langue en pieceSi la culture en pieces [ ... ] hors de 
toute finalite imaginable".49 The Underground Man derives his own "strange pleasure" 
from the philosophical wasteland he has created, the shimmer of ideas which continue 
to fascinate without taking definite shape. Thus he sinks "voluptuously into inertia" 
reflecting that there is no one even "for [him] to be angry with". (pp22-23) 
ITI. ii. Contradiction and the revolt against limits 
But Dostoyevsky's narrator is dissatisfied with the limitation implicit in negative 
certitudes and tires of the pleasures of textual sabotage. He seems to offer the reader a 
glimpse of something which both motivates his rejections of the laws of nature, science, 
and self-interest, and compels him, in turn, to deride those rejections as mere 
pettifoggery. For on one level the underground man's rejection of conventional rules of 
conduct is pure gratuitous display, Barthes's "plaisir du texte", practised with acidic 
zest. But on another, the gratuitousness in the display is shown to be the whole point of 
the exercise, signalling the beginnings of a definition of his humanity that must never be 
completed. In other words, Dostoyevsky's narrator wishes to defend his right to 
gratuitousness, his right to change and inconsistency, all of which make him a man and 
not a predictable machine or the "sprig on the cylinder of a barrel organ", as he puts it. 
(p34) 
49 Le plaisir du texte, pp75 and 82 respectively. 
33 
Negation in Notes from Undergound thus appears to function as a back-to-front admission 
of something positive, suggesting the existence of certain criteria motivating the 
narrator's protests. The problem of the criterion is the subject of my next chapter, but may 
be briefly defined here as the defence of an anarchic creativity which is preferred in the 
novella to the totalitarianism implicit in systematic thought. Systems, with their 
reliance on categorical definition, offer security. But they also impose limits. They 
familiarize, but they also enclose. In voicing reservations concerning philosophic and 
ideological systems Dostoyevsky's narrator joins forces with Derrida (differance 
"fomente la subversion de tout royaume"); Barthes (the pleasure of the text resists "toute 
finalite imaginable"), and Robbe-Grillet ("it is never a question of replacing the Tsar's 
statue by a statue of Stalin. It is a question of never placing any statue in position [ ... J").50 
All three contemporary writers, in their argument for difference over traditional 
contradiction, are concerned with the problem of intellectual constraints implicit in 
axiomatic thinking, and in this respect, all three could be said to share the undergound 
man's refusal of a world where "everything will be so accurately plotted that there will 
no longer be any individual deeds or adventures left [ ... J". (p33) Systems and theories are 
inevitable, and even necessary, from a practical point of view. But, implies 
Dostoyevsky's underground anti-philosopher, they require constant qualification since 
their very ambition to explain and summarize, paralyzes the dynamism of the rational 
processes that initiated them. By negating one thing after another, Dostoyevsky's 
narrator seeks to withstand what he sees as the real minus sign of bleak determinism. 
III. iii. Contradiction as uncertainty 
Does this circuitous affirmation through negation, then, represent the last reversal of 
meaning to be performed in the narrative? May it be viewed as the axis about which all 
the other contradictions turn and derive their meaning? In fact, true to the ironic tone of 
the novella, even the "free and unfettered volition" it seems safest for the reader to 
applaud, is mocked and shown to be unreliable as a 'foundation' for thought. For 
Dostoyevsky exposes the weakness and despotism inherent in the anti-institutionalism 
of his narrator, whereby a man may "always and everywhere [ ... J act as he chooses". 
(p33) This is partly brought about through a life versus dialectics opposition similar to 
the one developed in the novel Crime and Punishment. In the first part of the narrative, 
for example, the underground man's caprice goes unchallenged because his "doubts and 
agitations" are safe from the criticism and "caprice" of a second party. In the second part 
of the novella, however, where he records his forays into society, the grand tirades of 
50 'Order and disorder in film and fiction'. See my comments on this in relation to the 
problem of the criterion in Chapter 2, pp63-65. 
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the first part deflate, in retrospect, into a rhetoric of escapism and self-aggrandizement. 
Hence in Chapter 1 the underground man defies law and system. In Chapter 2, he notes 
how in company he "slavishly observed the ordinary conventions"; (p48) while his 
attempts to prove his independence of others' opinions of him - "I will sit and drink [ ... ] 
and sing, if I want to, yes, sing" - fall pitifully flat. "But I didn't sing. I merely tried 
not to look at any of them. I put on the most independent air I could manage". (pp77-78) 
The narrator's determination to do as he pleases, therefore, and his sense of superiority 
to the "man of character" (who, he argues, is "essentially limited" in thought and action 
simply because he has a character), (p16) is qualified by the awareness of his own 
vulnerability, irrespective of his revolutionary philosophizing. His anarchic bravado is 
wounded by the "wretched inadequacy" and "unbearable humiliation" (p55) he falls 
prey to, despite his convictions, or lack of them. 
Equally inconsistent with the affirmation of self-will, is the narrator's inability to grant 
others the freedom of definition he demands for himself. Hence, while insisting on the 
fluidity of his own personality, he applies inhibiting labels to others, calling one "a 
nasty insolent little braggart" and "abject little coward", and another, "an ordinary sort 
of person [ ... ] kowtowing to every kind of success and incapable of discussing anything but 
promotion". (p64) The tendency to make exclusive value judgements of this sort is 
associated by Dostoyevsky's narrator (and his post-modem counterparts), with the 
guardians of philosophic and ideological systems. Dostoyevsky's narrator, however, 
demonstrates that the instinct to exclude and simplify in the promotion of one's own point 
of view may distort the most libertarian of impulses, turning even the desire for freedom 
into a power-game. The philosophic rebellion of the first part of the novella begins to 
look like a study in self-deception, as the show of strength exposes an underlying 
pettiness and narrowness of mind. 
These "glissements" between freedom and determinism in Chapters 1 and 2 of Notes are 
arguably the key to the structure of the novella as a whole, which may then be seen to be 
constructed around a fundamental irony. This, to some extent, answers Julia Annas's 
criticism that the work, when considered in its entirety, lacks coherence: 
Part I [ ... ] is written by a man who embodies the condition he is talking about; part 
II is not. At the literary level one may conclude that Dostoyevsky has made his 
point [ ... ] From the philosophic point of view, however, the transition is 
somewhat problematic.51 
In the light of the decreased use of verbal contradictions in the second part and the 
51 'Action and Character in Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground', p271. 
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underground man's increased preoccupation with specific character traits as he comes into 
contact with other people, Annas suggests he may be acting out of envious imitation of 
the "normal" man he disparages in part one. He has, in other words, abandoned his 
unpredictable persona in the search for a face. Annas also considers the significance of 
certain passages excized from the original publication (containing a religious motif that 
would fit in with the narrator's stronger sense of personal need in the second section) as 
providing a possible clue to the novella's missing unity. But Annas finally dismisses 
these possibilities as unsatisfactory, concluding that: 
All the same, if one interprets part I as illustrating, in the way it is written, a 
philosophic point basic to Dostoevsky's design, then it is hard to see the whole 
book as a unity. 52 
Yet if we accept, as Annas does, the central importance of the defence of inconsistency in 
part I, on the grounds that "if a man's desires can be predicted then they can be 
manipulated",53 then surely it is vital to this whole principle to show that one 
individual's right to caprice may be contradicted and limited by another's least the 
latter become "no more than a piano key" for the former's tune. From using concentrated 
"glissements" of meaning on the level of the individual statement in Chapter 1, 
Dostoyevsky then goes on to employ a contrast in style and theme to effect a subversion of 
one part of the novella by the other, so as to problematize and enhance the overall theme 
of contradiction in relation to human unpredictability. 
What finally emerges from a study of contradiction in Notes is the apprehension that all 
ideas and imaginings, even the most enticingly flexible, contain the seeds of their own 
mortality. The weapon with which the narrator sets out to oppose recognized forms of 
oppression reveals its doublesidedness. And it is perhaps the implicit recognition of the 
inescapability of limits, as well as the desirability of challenging them, that gives this 
contradictory discourse something of what Gide has called the "anxieuse complexih~" of 
human experience.54 For in the end we are as uncertain what to make of the narrator as 
he is himself, reader and. narrator alike tantalized by unnameable shadows that both 
invite, and elude, expression. On p24 the narrator declares himself to be troubled by 
something he can never put a name to: 
52 
53 
54 
nobody knows what, nobody knows who, but in spite of all the mysteries and 
illusions, you ache with it all, and the more mysterious it is, the more you ache. 
p273. 
p263. 
Dostoi'evsky, p53. 
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This residue of unease, however, is shown to be unsatisfied either by wilful negation or by 
the theories the narrator sets out to discredit, remaining other to his discourse, haunting, 
beckoning and troubling him. Like Raskolnikov's crime, then, but without the hint of a 
resolution, the underground man's rhetoric is susceptible of different interpretations: it 
negates, it affirms, but also, it perpetrates a morass of doubt, longing and fear, fear of the 
other, and fear of his own underground also: 
Although I have said that I am green with envy of the normal man, I wouldn't 
like to be him in the circumstances in which I see him (even though I shall not 
cease to envy him, all the same). No, no, the underground is better, in any case. 
There one can at least ... Ach! The fact is I'm lying even now! I'm lying, because I 
know, as sure as two and two make four, that it isn't the underground that is better 
but something different, entirely different, which I am eager for, but which I 
shall never find. Devil take the underground! (p43) 
While considerably closer in philosophic terms than Crime and Punishment to the logic 
of "glissements", Notes nonetheless situates the problem of contradiction in an 
experiential context in which, irrespective of their philosophic validity, contradictions 
are symptoms of stress and malaise. The problem of definition is thus contingent on the 
problem of existence. 
La jalousie 
IV. i. Contradictions and the "pleasure of the text" 
Robbe-Grillet's La jalousie follows a similar pattern to Notes from Underground in that 
it uses contradictions on different levels in the narrative to both negate and to affirm. On 
one level, for example, contradictions relate to a capricious negativity that creates what 
Barthes has called a "silence of meaning" in the novel: in other words, both the object 
and the logic of contradiction are erased by a series of conflicting statements. On another 
level, however, a quality of intense suggestiveness shadows the descriptions in the 
narrative, provoking an ongoing, contradictory tension between surface and subjective 
readings, between silence and what could be called the discourse of jealous suspicion. 
Because of this duplicity in interpretation, and the atmosphere of manic uncertainty that 
results, the contemporary text could be said to offer its own version of the openended 
question that constitutes the "anxieuse complexitE~" of Dostoyevsky's Notes. La jalousie 
contradicts to erase, but in erasing, annihilates only habitual and complacent readings of 
a world whose strangeness may be disturbingly familiar, reminding readers of the 
fragility of their own hold on rationalizing discourse about 'reality'. 
A recurrent example of conflicting statements which negate both the object and the 
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contradictions employed in its description begins with the temporal reference, 
"maintenant", in the opening sentence. Time is an abstraction, not an object, but its 
coherence as a concept is sufficiently established in most Western minds to ensure that 
references to the present will be automatically related to a past and a future, and so on, in 
orderly succession. Initially, "main tenant" in La jalousie seems to be an indicator of just 
such a 24 hour time-scale, its first appearance coinciding with a reference to the sun being 
"haut dans Ie ciel", (p9) while a later mention is coupled with a reference to lengthened 
shadows on the terrace and preparations for an evening meal, (pp15-16) suggestive of the 
end of the day. But successive entries erode this quality of banal chronology, as it 
becomes less obvious whether the time referred to comes after or before the previous 
sequence. As the time-frame of the novel grows increasingly complex, it emerges that 
"main tenant" refers to whatever moment is in question and, moreover, that all moments 
have the same value in so far as there is no normative reference point that would permit 
meaningful comparisons between them. Thus, when the young boy serving in the house is 
asked when he received an order from his mistress, his reply and the ensuing comment-
" 'Main tenant', ce qui ne fournit aucune indication satisfaisante" (p50) - is applicable to 
all the temporal references in the novel. "Main tenant" is not an unequivocal indicator of 
meaning so much as a refrain in a carefully orchestrated formal arrangement (note its 
successive appearances as a textual marker in the table of contents). Consequently, the 
contradictions and discrepancies that exist between its various appearances in the 
narrative are emptied of logical significance, or, as Barthes would phrase it, "frappe[es] 
d'insignifiance" .55 
Perhaps the most blatant example of contradiction employed as a technique of erasure in 
La jalousie occurs in the mock resume of the African novel A ... and Franck have been 
discussing: 
55 
Le personnage principal du livre est un fonctionnaire des douanes. Le personnage 
n/est pas un fonctionnaire, mais un employe superieur d'une vieille compagnie 
commerciale. Les affaires de cette compagnie sont mauvaises, elles evoluent 
rapidement vers l'escroquerie. Les affaires de la compagnie sont tres bonnes. Le 
personnage principal - apprend-on - est malhonnete. II est honnete, il essaie de 
retablir une situation compromise par son predecesseur, mort dans un accident de 
voiture. Mais il n'y a pas eu de predecesseur, car la compagnie est de fondation 
toute recente; et ce n'etait pas un accident. II est d'ailleurs question d'un navire (un 
grand navire blanc) et non de voiture. (p216) 
The same reasoning could be applied to the minor discrepancies concerning the 
numbering and position of the windows, for example, which Deneau notes, 
observing that "a few purposeless contradictions seem to have escaped the 
watchful eye" of the writer and are "the result either of carelessness or of 
downright perversity". (Non-functional contradictions in Robbe-Grillet's 
Jealousy, pp62-63) 
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After such a relentless cancelling out of opposites it seems impossible to derive any 
coherent information at all from the novel within the novel, and the reader is left, 
literally, with nothing. 
It is significant, however, that the "silence de signification" which this passage so 
admirably demonstrates is related by Barthes in his discussion of Robbe-Grillet's 
"fameux objets" in the novel, to a mise en valeur of the text itself. In other words, the 
paring away of anecdotal and psychological interest, in this apparently devastating 
fashion, is "au profit d'un etre-la du texte" (and not of "la chose"),56 the construction and 
re-construction of sentences becoming the focus of attention once the readerly activities of 
deciphering and recognition have apparently been made redundant. If the resume of the 
African novel is a rather circumscribed example of virtuoso experiment, other passages in 
La jalousie make clear the creative prerogative which informs Barthes' argument, and 
which, on occasions, gives the reader a role also in making something inventive of 
logical cul-de-sacs. In A ... and Franck's discussion of the novel, contradictions have an 
obvious creative function as they are used to erase one hypothesis preparatory to the 
formation of another. Hence: 
D'autres bifurcations possibles se presentent [ ... ] qui conduisent to utes a des fins 
differentes. Les variantes sont tres nombreuses; les variantes des variantes encore 
plus. Ils semblent meme les multipler a plaisir, echangeant des sourires, s'excitant 
au jeu, sans doute un peu grises par cette proliferation. (p83) 
This, then, is the process of erasure and invention that follows the pattern of Barthes' 
"plaisir du texte", in which contradictions are not conflictual or informative so much as 
indicative of a wayward proliferation of meaning that is (theoretically) without limit. 
It has something in common, too, with the "caprice [ ... ] inflamed [ ... ] to the point of 
madness" of Dostoyevsky's underground narrator, and is a confirmation of Robbe-Grillet's 
theoretical comment on the role of description in the contemporary novel, which is to 
negate, or contradict itself, in order to affirm its creative function: 
[la description] affirme a present sa fonction creatrice. Enfin elle faisait voir les 
choses et voila qu'elle semble maintenant les detruire, comme si son acharnement a 
en discourir ne visait qu'a embrouiller les lignes, ales rendre incomprehensibles, a 
les faire disparaitre totalement.57 
IV. ii. The hypothesis of jealousy 
56 
57 
See Les romans de Robbe-Grillet, plO. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p127. 
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But the kind of text that makes of every incongruity a creative opportunity is not as 
vulnerable to the spectre of incomprehensibility as a text which attempts to designate 
something specific. For in the latter case contradictions create genuine interpretative 
problems, while in the former case any hesitation can be incorporated into one of the 
bifurcations of the narrative which, not being bound by the need to represent can make a 
virtue of digression. The pleasure of the text is thus free of ideological or philosophical 
friction. As Barthes explains, after the erasure of conventional opposites, "iI n'y a pas de 
conflits: rien que des triomphes".58 To the extent that its bifurcations become normative 
it might also be added that the pleasure of the text excludes a certain kind of 
uncertainty. 
This is where Robbe-Grillet's text does not perfectly conform to the Barthesian model, 
since the pleasure in verbal play in La jalousie is made additionally ambiguous by a 
suggestion of jealous suspicion which threatens the "silence of meaning" in the novel with 
the rhetoric of neurosis. Because the latter never declares itself unequivocally it can do 
no more than threaten the text with this extraneous burden of signification. Yet the 
threat of meaning is sufficiently powerful to create an ongoing interpretative conflict 
between surface and subjective readings that simultaneously revives the logic of 
contradiction undermined elsewhere in the narrative. The remark made by Robbe-Grillet 
at a recent colloquium, and cited in the introduction to this chapter,59 acknowledges the 
continued relevance of contradiction in his novels, his conception of contradiction on this 
occasion seeming to approximate the idea of a dialectic, but without the possibility of a 
resolution: 
the fact that in the dialectic, thesis and antithesis are incompatible, that they 
are at odds with each other, is [ ... ] essential [ .. ] for literature is precisely the 
place where those struggles between incompatible poles take place. [The text is] 
the place, the site of this contradiciton between irreconcilable things.60 
The novel, published more than 20 years prior to this remark, anticipates the theory in 
this regard. 
Despite Robbe-Grillet's insistence here on the impossibility of resolving contradictions, 
it must be reiterated that such conflict as he envisages is only conceivable against a 
background of identifiable, coherent meaning which is anathema to the writer of Le 
plaisir du texte, and, to a lesser extent, to Robbe-Grillet himself, who once spoke of 
"l'ennemi du sens". Coherent meaning, as Barthes points out, is what permits us to draw 
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Le plaisir du texte, pp27-28. 
See p24. 
Three Decades of the French New Novel, p190. 
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the distinctions that may also turn out to be ideological battle-lines. As it is, systematic 
meaning in La jalousie makes significant inroads on textual contorsionism whose triumph, 
as a result, is no longer assured. A focus on certain repeated scenes and gestures, and an 
exaggerated concentration on A .. , and particularly on A ... and Franck together, means 
that the proliferation of incongruous measurements and descriptive detail, which seem to 
underline the etre-liI. of the text, are drawn into a frame of reference that is 
psychological as well as aesthetic. Things, it would seem, can mean as well as be in La 
jalousie. 
The hypothesis of jealousy is established early in the narrative in the repeated 
suggestions of companionship between A. ... and Franck as reflected, for example, in their 
physical proximity on the terrace. Despite qualifying phrases like "sans doute" and 
"peut-etre", which prevent the hypothesis from developing into a statement of fact, the 
descriptions of the couple, taken in conjunction, are highly speculative. On p18 A ... is 
said to have "approchee Ie plus possible du fauteuil ou est assis Franck", and the discreet 
exchange of words between them, though attributable to courteous pleasantries, is 
equally translatable into something more intimate; on p19 it is again noted that A ... has 
arranged the chairs in such a way as to place herself and Franck next to each other; on 
p20 A. .. is observed listening attentively and encouragingly to Franck recounting his 
various (and surely tedious?) plans for, and difficulties with, the neighbouring 
plantation where he lives; A ... asks for the lamp to be removed from the dinner table and 
Franck agrees that the general effect will be "Plus intime bien sur". (pp22-23) Such 
delicate hints, as innocuous as they are insinuating, are transposed into bold type when it 
is recorded on p30 that: "L'espace entre la main gauche de A ... et la main droite de Franck 
est de dix centimetres, environ". The etre-lil of the text is suddenly jolted out of 
alignment by another kind of preoccupation. 
Responding to this lead, the reader may deduce the presence of a third party, someone 
who, like the reader, is confined to guesswork, but for whom the possible relationship 
between A ... and Franck is of sufficient importance to warrant such minute attention. The 
implied observer who is seeing things from a particular visual perspective (and hence 
"Ce coin de terrasse") (plO, italics mine) is presumably also seeing them from a particular 
psychological perspective, one that is identifiable with the experience of jealous 
suspicion. Once this suspicion has in turn taken hold of the reader's mind, many of the 
objects and events of the narrative acquire a double shadow that mocks their anodine 
appearance, transforming it, momentarily, into evidence of a woman's infidelity. The 
metamorphosis of neutral surfaces into "pieces de conviction" in this way creates an 
ongoing contradiction in interpretation comparable to the optical trickery in an Escher 
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etching in which, through near-imperceptible adjustments in linear detail, a fish 
becomes a bird, yet without immediately ceasing to be a fish. A "rapport louche" is 
generated between two different things which suggests that, contradictory tensions 
notwithstanding, Robbe-Grillet is still concerned to challenge the boundaries of 
Aristotelean contradiction in which no such cross-over, or confusion, of categories, is 
envisaged. The act of counting banana trees and measuring distances between objects, for 
example, can be interpreted both as a fascination with formal order and precision, and a 
form of therapy to counteract nameless fears, as was also seen in the way Raskolnikov 
concentrates his attention on a detail of the wallpaper to ward off the hysteria he fears 
will expose him to his friends. Using the terms Robbe-Grillet himself has provided in an 
essay on film and fiction, order in this instance becomes disorder, geometrical precision 
acting as mask and magnifying glass for obsessive passion. 
To sustain this ongoing interpretative illusion Robbe-Grillet tends to employ his 
characteristic technique of "glissements", which relies less on a clear-cut "struggle 
between incompatible poles" than on what Genette has likened to the Greek notion of 
"semblablement-mais-differement", where elements are presented both "au contraire" 
and "de nouveau, de la meme fac;on mais d'un autre point de vue [ ... ]".61 A ... and Franck's 
trip to town and the centipede incidents are both submitted to this theme and variations 
treatment, and this has the effect of intensifying the surface/suspicion tension at the 
same time as it undermines the foundations of interpretation altogether by failing to 
supply a definitive version with which variants can be compared (cf the temporal 
refrain, "maintenant"). The time of the trip to town changes from "la semaine 
prochaine" to the immediate 'present' where A ... is seen getting out of the car with the 
opportunity of giving Franck a kiss, unobserved. The trip is then projected into the future, 
after which it becomes the subject of conversation as a past event, without any 
intervening causal links. The excursion is greeted by the narrator as a sensible idea for 
A ... , whose usual means of getting to town is not particularly agreeable ("celle du camion 
charge de bananes"), (p91) and suspected as an opportunity par excellence for sexual 
betrayal: a suspicion that seems to be confirmed when A. .. and Franck are described 
returning the next day, having spent the night in a hotel due to 'engine' trouble. In the 
course of all these narrative wanderings, however, it is not clear whether the trip to 
town ever takes place, or whether it is merely an anticipated and dreaded eventuality in 
the mind of a jealous third party. 
The centipede incident similarly combusts in flights of fancy in the course of its numerous 
reappearances. The centipede is first referred to as a mere stain on the wall, then as a 
61 'Vertige fixe', p89. See footnote on same page. 
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large and live insect climbing the dining room wall. One version has Franck crushing the 
centipede with a table napkin, after which the insect falls to the tiled floor of the 
dining room; (p64) another has Franck killing an insect of enormous proportions, on an 
unidentified bedroom floor, with the aid of a bathroom towel. (p166) The latter is 
followed by a rapid succession of images overlapping one another: Franck's hand closing 
over a white sheet; a mosquito net around a bed; a faulty driving performance by Franck 
and a car accident; the burning of the wrecked vehicle (and its occupants?), the crackle of 
flames being transmuted into the rustling of the centipede's legs and the sound of a brush 
moving through A ... 's hair. The whole reads both as a demonstration of textual 
dexterity and evidence of mounting passion from the perpective of a desiring and 
suspicious third party. 
IV. iii. Jealousy: a fictional unity 
It would seem, then, that despite the obliqueness of its signifiers, the experience of 
jealousy is established as a likely interpretative key by means of which the novel as a 
whole can be explained. This, at least, is what Morrissette and Leenhardt both seem to 
conclude in their readings of La jalousie. Morrissette, concentrating almost exclusively on 
jealousy in terms of the narrator's desire for A. .. summarizes the novel in his 1963 study as 
a psychological study of "le 'contenu mental' d'un narrateur jaloux [ ... J" .62 Hence: 
la succession des scenes dans l'esprit du narrateur n'est ambigue que 
superficiellement; si lui-meme ne se rend pas compte de la necessite qui relie les 
scenes qu'il subit, il obeit cependant, en les accueillant en tel ou tel ordre, a des 
regles psychologiques implicites, mais nettes.63 
Leenhardt argues even more forcefully than Morrissette for the semantic and ideological 
coherence of the work, suggesting that: 
tous les elements de signification, a tous les niveaux, s' ordonnent au point de 
produire une signification globale qui les contient et les rend intelligibles.64 
For Leenhardt this global signification concerns not so much the exclusively sexual 
passion of a third party as the distress of a Western imperialist ("angoisse des blancs 
confines en leur refuge"),65 losing control of a world he has sought to dominate. 
Although a comment by Robbe-Grillet in 1976 suggests the two readings are vastly 
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Les romans de Robbe-Grillet, p114. 
pp125-126. 
Lecture politique des romans de Robbe-Grillet, p24. 
p25. 
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different,66 Morrissette and Leenhardt's analyses equally hinge upon the narrator's 
(jealous) state of mind, incorporating in a similar fashion the double vision that such a 
state of mind would induce. The psychological experience of jealousy that Morrissette 
stresses is acknowledged by Leenhardt, but integrated into a wider psycho-sociological 
picture in which the desire for possession is inscribed in intellectual and territorial, as 
well as sexual, attitudes. In either case the results are a double-edged discourse that 
indicates at once a neurotic insecurity and a fastidious love of order. As Leenhardt 
elaborates: "Tout Ie probleme de la vision du narrateur est de mettre de I' ordre la ou Ie 
desordre lui parait contenir une menace liee a l'incertitude".67 This tallies with Robbe-
Grillet's own exposition of the dual influence of order and disorder in the novel, implying 
that although Robbe-Grillet is uneasy with some of the terminology used in Leenhardt's 
analysis, the discrepancies between this reading and his own critique of the novel are not 
as dramatic as might be supposed. The common denominator in interpretation suggests a 
high degree of semantic coherence in a work that, as Robbe-Grillet humorously records, 
was initially judged impossibly fragmented by the critics.68 
Robbe-Grillet's real objection to Morrissette's and Leenhardt's readings, however, has to 
do with the degree of recuperation such readings seem to make possible, with the 
reductionsim that is thus involved for a work of literature, and with the inevitable loss 
of that quality of uncertainty Robbe-Grillet values in writing. As a result of Morrissette's 
and Leenhardt's labours, "The book", Robbe-Grillet points out, ''became readable; it was 
subject to recuperation [ ... ] and at the same time it was to a certain extent destroyed" .69 
Yet these protests, if understandable, are unnecessary, since the text itself ensures that 
such a recuperation is never completely realizable, always remaining, despite its 
plausibility, in a state of suspension. This is not to say that Morrissette's and 
Leenhardt's readings are irrelevant to the preoccupations of Robbe-Grillet's text. On the 
contrary. It is simply that neither critic has sufficiently stressed the role of 
discontinuities in the narrative and the way in which this results in the whole fabric of 
La jalousie being constructed around an illusion. 
The title, of course, contains its own punning reference (which Robbe-Grillet insists was 
not deliberate at the time), to the relationship between broken vision and speculation. 
What cannot be seen must be imagined, and thus a significant link is forged between the 
"jalousie" of the venetian blind and the "jalousie" of obsessive suspicion. The novel as a 
whole goes on to confirm this idea: namely, that because it is composed entirely of 
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See 'Order and disorder in film and fiction' (published 1977), p17. 
Lecture politique des romans de Robbe-Grillet, pp112-113. 
'Order and disorder in film and fiction', p3. 
p17. 
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fragments there canbe no 'proper' or 'true' method of assemblage for the narrative. The 
narrator looks out of the window at "les elements d'un paysage discontinu"; (p5l) his 
partial view of A ... permits him to see only "Ie haut de la chevelure noire", (p52) or "le 
profil gauche du visage"; (p66) obstructed vision of Franck's car disallows verification of 
loverlike behaviour from A .. when she says goodbye through the window. The hotel 
bedroom where A .. and Franck have supposedly spent the night, on the understanding 
that they have, in fact, left for town in the first place, is, of necessity, out of sight 
altogether, and hence jealous suspicion at this point in the narrative reaches its 
maximum degree of intensity (see pp 166-167). 
But there is never anything like real evidence that would justify this suspicion, as 
opposed to merely making it seem plausible. In this respect, the novel perfectly 
illustrates the dilemma of sceptics from Pyrrho right through to Montaigne, Pascal and 
present-day sceptics, which is that parts without the whole are open to 
misinterpretation. The addition of 'new' information can entirely alter the composition 
of a picture, however painstakingly the former has been assembled to reflect the 'facts' 
as known or surmized. At any moment schemes and systems may be cast aside, or 
modified, when the problem they are designed to address proves to be quite different 
from the way it was initially conceived. La jalousie merely reflects, with rare and 
manic consistency, the philosophical openendedness that attends the realization of the 
phenomenon of incompleteness, and it does so even when it indulges in the most blatant 
manCEuvres to close the gaps. Jealousy convincingly facilitates the "tis sage" of narrative 
fragments, providing the kind of semantic unity in which contradictions and doubleness 
can be seen to operate. But the unity of jealousy remains a demonstrably fictional one, so 
that meaning in the novel is as threatened by silence as silence is by meaning. 
One passage that betrays the text's foreknowledge of the delicacy of its own balance 
between silence and signification is the description of A ... looking out the window: 
EIIe dit 'Bonjour', du ton enjoue de quelqu'un qui a bien dormi et se reveille 
d'agreable humeur; ou de quelqu'un, du moins, qui prefE~re ne pas montrer ses 
preoccupations - s'il en a - et arbore, par principe, toujours Ie meme sourire; Ie 
meme sourire ou se lit, aussi bien, la derision que la confiance, ou I' absence totale de 
sentiments. (p42) 
Phrases such as, "s'il en a", and, "l'absence totale de sentiments", are sufficient to 
indicate that while A ... may be guilty or innocent, the whole question of her guilt or 
innocence, and with it the contradictory tensions in the narrative, may themselves be 
utterly gratuitous. Nietzsche puts the philosophic distinction such a text ultimately 
reflects very nicely: "We need 'unities' in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we 
45 
must suppose that such unities exist".70 Barthes echoes this thought in more poetic vein 
at the end of his preface to Morrissette's essays,71 and Robbe-Grillet rephrases it in the 
1986 lecture, where he suggested a relation between contradictions and a void at the 
heart of the narrative. Because contradictions require meaningful patterns for their 
disruptions in the narrative to be appreciated, there is no guarantee that the meaningful 
patterns are any less arbitrary than the disruptions themselves. 
In La jalousie, therefore, Robbe-Grillet revives the logic of opposites with its reliance on 
a controlling term, or foundation, at the same time as he exposes the fictionality of that 
controlling term, and hence the instability of the whole network of perceptions which it 
makes possible: a truly sceptical manceuvre. 
Projet pour une revolution a New York 
V. i. The spoof on contradiction: critical concern or philosophic indifference? 
Projet pour une revolution a New York contains several allusions to the law of 
contradiction it rejects, although the purpose of these allusions is obscure, if indeed they 
have any purpose beyond the affirmation of textual caprice, and the suggestion of a 
particular kind of meaningfulness the text has no intention of fulfilling. One overt 
reference to contradiction occurs in the pseudo-revolutionary meeting described on p38, 
where the subject of discussion is what Morrissette has called the "burlesque Hegelian 
trinity"72 in the novel: 
Le theme de la le<;on du jour paraH etre 1a couleur rouge' envisagee comme solution 
radicale a l'irreductible antagonisme entre Ie noir et Ie blanc. 
A second allusion to contradiction features in the semi-philosophic discussion between JR 
and her executioner: 
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Supposons que vous affirmiez d'abord une chose, puis son contraire; l'ensemble des 
deux reponses comporte alors a coup sur I'expression de Ia verite dans Ia moitie des 
cas. A partir de cette certitude, tout Ie reste n' est plus qu'une question de ca1culs 
mathematiques, executes par Ie cerveau electronique auquel on soumettra votre 
deposition. (pl03) 
The Will to Power, p358. 
For an allegorical image for the suspension of meaning in Robbe-Grillet Barthes 
refers the reader to the statues of Charles III and his wife in Robbe-Grillet's 
Marienbad, who are pointing out "d'une fa<;on certaine un objet incertain [ ... ] ceci, 
disent-ils. Mais quoi, ceci? Toute la litterature est peut-etre dans cet anaphorique 
leger qui tout a Ia fois designe et se tait." Les romans de Robbe-Grillet, p16. 
Bruce Morrisette, The Novels of Robbe-Grillet, p266. 
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The first of these passages could be read as a reflection on the novel's predominant theme 
of violence which is advanced as the ironical solution, not so much to racial tension 
between black and white (which does not feature in the nove}), as to the imperatives of 
black and white thinking, and so to the whole apparatus of chronology and causality 
against which the novel is manifestly in revolt. More particularly, Projet's logical and 
verbal irregularities (or formal 'violence'), its incendiaries and sadoerotics (thematic 
violence) could arguably be represented as displacing the well-ordered niceties of 
conventional thinking about the world?3 This is one way of interpeting the passage 
which, however, contains no real indication of its thematic or symbolic significance. A 
similar lack of conviction must attend attempts to translate the second passage into a 
philosophic or aesthetic statement. The invitation to interpret is there but in taking it 
up the reader is forced to import with it something extraneous to the text in a way 
readers of La jalousie are not. 
One could speculate, for example, whether the reduction of contradiction to an expression 
of mathematical probability ("l'ensemble des deux reponses complete alors [ ... ] 
l'expression de la verite dans la moitie des cas"), contains a humorous criticism of the 
rational confidence underlying Aristotelean (or Hegelian) contradiction. Classical 
contradiction would thus be judged a fake dilemma that merely involves a more indirect, 
but nonetheless sure, route to "la verite". If this were the case, one would expect the 
implied criticism to lead to the formulation in the novel of an alternative form of 
reasoning, more fitted to generating the uncertainties Robbe-Grillet values as a writer. 
As I hope to show the novel is indeed constructed according to its own 'alternative' logic. 
But whether this is more ambiguous in its results than the conventional logic it displaces 
is unclear. Equally unclear is whether Robbe-Grillet is at all concerned with sceptical 
questions of representation and interpretation in the novel. The passages cited above are 
just as likely to be what they seem on the 'surface', in other words jokes calling for a 
particular sense of humour, as in the case of the latter reference where the juxtapostion of 
pseudo-philosophic discussion with physical torture results in mutual mockery. This 
tends to confirm the function of the text as a 'pleasure'-ground rather than an arena for 
philosophic debate or existential comment. 
Focussing on the problem of contradiction in this way highlights one of the ongoing 
difficulties of interpreting Robbe-Grillet, especially when there is, in addition, an 
attempt to identify him with a philosophical position - even one as speculative and 
73 The violence of "parole" in collision - or collusion- with the writing of 
"langue"? See my comments on "langue" and "parole" in Projet pour une revolution a 
New York in Chapter 2,'The problem of the criterion', pp83-90. 
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hypothetical as the sceptical position is thought to be. Flippancy, deliberate 
superficiality, and what sometimes reads as a naIve desire to shock (or titivate) must be 
weighed against the author's repeated insistence that his novels are not simply games or 
escapist fantasies but provocative and critical commentaries on contemporary 
experience.74 Is Robbe-Grillet to be taken seriously philosophically, ideologically? Or 
is he too concerned to foil attempts to interpet and 'make sense' of his novels because of 
the danger of reductionism involved? The two aims are not incompatible but they do not 
necessarily go together in the narrative of Robbe-Grillet's Projet. 
V. ii. "Ie passage du mur des contraires": the associative logic of "glissements" 
The kinds of irregularities that characterize the narrative of Projet have to do with the 
small adjustments in the detail of a repeated scene or image that occur with some 
frequency in La jalousie. In the later novel, however, "glissements" are used almost 
exclusively as the means by which the narrative proceeds from one thing to another. This 
method of presentation has chiefly to do with the fading of one thing into another - as 
opposed to the interlocking extremities of 'order' and 'disorder' in La jalousie - and a 
form of associative logic commonly associated with poetic or oneiric discourse. Both 
these aspects of the technique call for a degree of agility in their following through, but, 
strictly speaking, neither produces a logical impossibilty or contradiction since excessive 
use of the technique means there is no logical norm in the novel with which the perpetual 
dislocation of images can be contrasted. Chaos thus becomes normative, creating an 
atmosphere in which the reader is ready to be surprised by everything, and nothing. 
One of the more noticeable ways in which the logic of "glissements" establishes itself in 
Projet is in the fading of one narrative voice into another, ensuring that no one perspective 
dominates but also that none of the narrative voices assumes a distinctive character. The 
resultant burgeoning of different narratives creates the impression of continual movement, 
even though the direction of this movement is constantly diverted so none of the 'stories' 
in the novel is ever 'finished'. Due to the intermittent use of names, it is possible to 
partially unravel this narrative enmeshing into various entities, although these are too 
changeable to function as 'characters' in the usual sense. The anonymous 'je', for example, 
74 Robbe-Grillet's reactions to accusations of escapist fantasizing are as forthright as 
his responses to heavily meaningful analyses of his work: 
"justement Ie nouveau romancier est celui qui a choisi de parler Ie monde, donc 
exactement Ie contraire de se refermer sur soi-meme bien a l'abri. [ ... ] Notre parole 
Iudique n'est pas faite pour nous protc~ger [ ... J mais au contraire pour nous mettre en 
question nous-memes et ce monde, et par consequent Ie transformer." Nouveau 
roman: hier, aujourd'hui, pp95 and 97. See my comments on this in the following 
chapter, pp63-65. 
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on pp7-15 could be identified as a primary narrative voice who takes on the ambivalent 
character of Laura's brother-lover-assailant. The narrative quickly switches from his 
perspective to Laura's, to the voice of an impersonal interrogator, from the 'je' narrator 
again watching his pursuers, to them watching him. The 'je' narrative is then taken over 
by Laura watching the chase out the window, until Laura is displaced by JR. Because 
these switches are carried out without the usual indicators of personal difference the 
impression is one of an almost seamless, formal perfection. The whole process is neatly 
encapsulated, in mise-en-abyme fashion, in the description of the pseudo-revolutionary 
meeting where three people conduct a ritualized discussion, and are said to exchange 
"leur rOle par une permutation circulaire a chaque articulation du texte". (pIOO) 
The pattern of overlapping narrative voices, in which one voice seems to grow 
organically out of the previous one, is repeated in the way action is developed in the 
novel. Just as there are no clear divisions between voices, nor is there any abrupt division 
between the narrative as conjecture and the narrative as physical action. For example, 
the narrative adopts a conjectural tone on pl4, where attention is focussed on the 
zigzagging of the fire-escape on the outside wall of the buildings. The reflection that 
these would provide an ideal means of access for burglars and assassins is then 
crystallized in the mind of Laura - "C'est du moins ce que pense Laura" - before 
triggering a series of action shots in an experimental playing out of the mental 
hypothesis ("Le bruit du carre au brise dont les eclats tin tent en retombant sur Ie dallage, 
au bout du couloir, l'a reveillee en sursaut"). (pIS) 
Conjecture generates action, outside becomes inside, pursuer pursued, and, later in the 
narrative, white hands peal off to reveal black skin, masks uncover faces or other masks, 
as Aristotle's categories are submerged in the continual upheaval of 'becoming'. But the 
sense of instability created by the realization that nothing ever remains the same, and 
may metamorphose into something (or someone) else is counterbalanced in the novel by 
the logic of association that governs the process of "glissements" in Robbe-Grillet. The 
changes of scene and narrative voice may seem erratic but they are, in fact, marked by a 
strong sense of continuity as something from each image is carried over associatively into 
the next. The close inspection of a varnished door, for example, with which the 
narrative opens, triggers an erotic scene as curves in the wood-grain suggest the contours of 
a woman's body. A few pages later, the imagination wanders, by association, from the 
outside to the inside of a building and back again. A small steel key that might have 
been left behind (but has not been) is pictured lying on some appropriate surface, 
suggesting, by inference, the existence of a marble-topped console just inside the vestibule. 
The thought is sufficient to produce the object ("II ya donc une console dans cet obscur 
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vestibule"), (p12) and to translate the narrator, as is the fashion in dreams, to the place 
with which his mind is occupied. 
V. iii. "Glissements": absence or intensification of interpretative dilemmas? 
The principle question, as far as the present discussion is concerned, is whether the logic 
of "glissements" displacing the more conventional forms of contradiction in the novel 
finally produces a higher degree of ambiguity. What is the text's capacity, for example, 
to generate the double meanings and intepretations - "les oppositions insolubles, les 
eclatements, les apories diegetiques, les cassures, les vides" - defended by Robbe-Grillet 
in essays and other writings and which are theoretically linked to his sceptical bias? It 
has already been established that there is no structure of opposition, insoluble or 
otherwise, in the novel. This makes Projet a closer approximation of what Barthes calls 
"jouissance" than the earlier La jalousie. For, as Barthes explains, the text which has 
freed itself from the law of contradiction also evades the possibility of conflict: 
Le texte n'est jamais un 'dialogue': aucun risque de feinte, d'agression, de chantage, 
aucune rivalite d'idiolectes; il [ ... J manifeste la nature asociale du plaisir [ ... J, fait 
entrevoir la verite scandaleuse de la jouissance: qu'elle pourrait bien etre, tout 
imaginaire de parole etant aboli, neutre.75 
The question is whether this absence of "rivalites d'ideolectes" also lessens the sense of 
uncertainty communicable by the text? Can what is "neutral" provoke interpretative 
dilemmas, as opposed to vague feelings of readerly bewilderment? 
In so far as the objects and events in the narrative lack the ambivalent quality which 
provokes readers of La jalousie to see double, the response would seem to be in the 
negative. The colliding discourses of geometry and desire from the earlier novel work 
together in easy harmony in Projet, producing a fastidious (but violent) eroticism, in 
which logical discrepancies have more to do with the finer details of bodily posture 
than with the introduction of material for different interpretative possibilities (See for 
example ppS and 9 in this regard: "Ie seul detail indiscutable est la bouche genereusement 
ouverte, dans un long cri de souffrance ou de terreur. [ ... J la bouche, en effet, qui conserve 
trop longtemps la meme position grande ouverte, doit plutot se trouver distendue par une 
sorte de baillon: quelque piece de lingerie noire fourree de force entre les levres.") 
Equally restrictive on the level of ambiguity sustainable in the text is the very 
changeability that appears one of the novel's more 'revolutionary' aspects. There is a 
75 Le plaisir du texte, p28. 
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sense, in other words, in which the constant use of metamorphosis in narrative and scene-
changes is self-defeating, since it potentially creates a high degree of complacency in the 
reader: change is what the text conditions the reader to expect. Or, in a deformation of 
Husserl's phrase, "if there are always changes, there are no longer any changes",76 The 
text thus demonstrates the problem Robbe-Grillet once identified concerning the 
importance of establishing identifiable coded patterns as a background to, and means of 
highlighting, deviations. This is something information theorists have argued, and 
Robbe-Grillet has recognized the difficulty and summarized it accordingly: 
The information theorists have discovered that it is necessary that the redundant 
elements be sufficiently important, sufficiently numerous, so that we not attribute 
to noise what was truly an element of communication, a piece of information. 
He goes on to stipulate that: 
the length of the fragments is extremely important, for at the opposite end you 
have the experiments of certain groups - the Tel Quel group, for example - in 
which the ideological fragments are so small that in the time that they last one 
does not recognize them. One then falls into the other danger of completely 
escaping from the world as if one were outside of society, outside of ideology, as if 
the revolution were already accomplished,77 
It could be argued that while the different fragments in Projet are recognizable, their 
length is insufficient to throw into relief the formal modifications which occur. Apart 
from any prior models the reader may retain in her mind concerning literary norms, the 
novel in itself provides what appears to be an exaggeratedly obscure coded horizon (from 
the formal point of view), against which its deviations are to be appreciated. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that despite all the formal changes which produce 
a sense of movement in the text, the narrative preoccupation with sado-erotics tends to 
empty these formal changes of much of their impact. From the ideological point of view, 
which I wish to explore more fully in the following chapter, the text is conservative. 
Ilona Leki's comments on the novel's challenge to humanism seem to me to ascribe a bogus 
meaningfulness to a text that is, in this respect, unashamedly "neutre" and, in the 
76 
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Cited by Claude Perruchet at the 1975 Cerisy colloquium: "S'il n'y a que des profils, 
il n'y a plus de profils". (p42) 
'Order and disorder in film and fiction', pp15 and 16 respectively. cf Renato 
Barilli's comments in Alain Robbe-Grillet: analyse, theorie, p442: "Le modele de 
l'absence ou de la difference doit se defendre de deux risques opposes: d'une part Ie 
danger de recouvrer l'unite, la totaIite et, d'autre part, Ie danger de la 
pulverisation. [ ... ] II faut se placer a l'interieur des deux pOles, d'un cote Ie bruit et 
de l'autre cote la redondance". BariIIi expresses similar reservations about the 
practice of "difference/ differance" to Julia Kristeva. See my footnote to this effect, 
p53. 
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Barthesian sense, "asocial". Thus, with reference to its logical and formal 
fragmentations, and in its treatment of the pornographic code which represents the level 
of its socio-ideological engagment, Projet pour une revolution a New York is less 
revolutionary than its title might suggest. The structure of "glissements" in Projet 
fragments the narrative to a point beyond conventional contradiction but at the expense of 
a certain level of reader/text engagement also, leaving the reader with only a very 
limited space in which to imitate its manCEuvres. Projet is therefore, to my mind, less 
ambivalent than La jalousie. 
VI. Conclusion 
Both Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet could be said to provide a critique in their novels of 
the simplifying categories that potentially underscore contradiction and binary 
opposition. The unsettling of rationalizing formulae in their works is concurrent with the 
shifting moods and perspectives of mental worlds that are unpredictable and perillous 
without the controls of fixed definitions. Neither narrator nor reader can easily orient 
themselves in such a world. 
However, if a certain quality of uncertainty characterizes all four novels, the nature of 
the framework in which this uncertainty operates varies considerably. In Dostoyevsky, 
the opposition between the law and its transgression acquires all the force of an ethical 
and spiritual imperative over and above its legal definition. Contrary to what might be 
expected, however, the fixed points of the novel's mental compass tend to exacerbate 
rather than regulate the agonized reflections of the novel's hero, who relinquishes 
neither term of the contradiction that divides him. The torments Raskolnikov suffers 
would appear to confirm Barthes' objections to the murderous authoritarianism of binary 
logic, although Raskolnikov's plunge into the bliss of moral (and philosophic) anarchy 
also leads, literally, to murder, as he attempts to ratify his own authority. 
In Robbe-Grillet's La jalousie the narrator's struggle to impose his own logical order on 
the environment, and to tabulate the movements of A ... within that environment, are also 
undermined from within; in this case, by his own imagination and jealous desire. An 
ongoing exchange is created between contrary impulses which is never finally resolved. 
As in Crime and Punishment, the result of oppositional tensions is one of acute mental and 
emotional instability, although the terms of the opposition in La jalousie are shown 
quite pointedly to be illusory. 
Dostoyevsky's Notes and Robbe-Grillet's Projet seem to occupy the other end of the 
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philosophic spectrum to Crime and Punishment and La jalousie in their use of 
contradiction. Instead of the creation of tensions between irreconcilable things, engaging 
the characters in a frantic wavering between one thing and another, Notes and Projet 
involve a more radical dismantling of the logic of identity and difference. A near manic 
readiness to negate, however, nudges both texts in the direction of nihilism, or, what 
Kristeva in her critique of Derrida's practice of difftrance has called, "un irrationalisme 
atomiseur".78 In other words, the link between contradictions and erasure in these texts 
at some point implicates a break with the process of critical reformulation, whereby 
categories may be rephrased as well as challenged. The latter kind of flexibility 
involves a readiness to rethink and suspend judgement rather than to abandon 
specula ti ve inquiry. 
Part of the impulse to contradict in order to erase is, of course, related to the specifically 
literary, imaginative nature of the texts in question. By flagrantly rejecting conventional 
patterns of meaningfulness Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's narrators are also confirming 
the priority of caprice over argument and reasonableness - a priority which reveals the 
nature of their criteria as novelists rather than as philosophers. This is a point I wish to 
develop in my next chapter. The interesting thing, however, is that while they show 
the rejection of formulae as a creative prerogative, the texts in question also demonstrate 
that the too eager espousal of the truth-that-there-is-no-truth maxim may lead to the 
stuffy mental atmosphere of Dostoyevsky's underground narrative, as despotic and 
exclusive in its way as the most rigidly systematic of philosophic discourses. In Robbe-
Grillet's Projet a similar outcome may be inferred from the repetitious nature of his 
narrators' fantasies and the predictable patterns of the latter's disruption. 
The novels of Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet examined here do more than provide a 
critique of what might be termed the academic, philosophic convention of contradiction. 
They also dramatize the potential limitations involved in the move away from 
contradiction, and the consequent loss of ambivalence once the logical colour wheel is spun 
too fast. The endless formulation of contradictions is as much a two-edged sword in post-
modernist hands as it was in the hands of the early sceptics who, being "brought to a 
point where [they] cease to dogmatize" were at the same time brought closer to the point 
where they cease to inquire,79 
78 
79 
La revolution du langage poetique, p80. cf Kristeva's criticism of Derrida's 
"differance" on similar grounds, p13I, and her discussion of scepticism and the 
avant-garde in the section entitled 'Scepticisme et nihilisme selon Hegel et dans Ie 
lexte' in the same work, pp163-I71. 
One conclusion that can be drawn from Pyrrho's views on the impossibility of 
knowledge is that "speculation about the world" is "a time-wasting source of 
anxiety". See David Sedley, 'The protagonists', in Doubt and Dogmatism, pIO. 
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The problem of the criterion 
What Hume's "Pyrrhonian illumination" has shown was that there was no Archimedean 
point outside common life from which it can be either certified or criticized. This [ ... J is 
the same point currently being made under the banner of "postmodernism". [ ... ] Each 
opposes the quest of Western philosophy for a metanarrative, a foundation [ ... J and each 
has been criticized for eliminating the possibility of rationally grounded critique. 
(David Hiley) 
I.i. The problem stated: Pyrrhonism and post-structuralism. Criteria "under erasure" 
The sceptic, as defined by Sextus Empiricus, suspends judgement as a result of conflicting 
arguments, none of which, however, "can take precedence over another on grounds of its 
being more credible"'! In other words there are no criteria for justifying a preference for a 
particular belief or point of view. Yet in spite of this, the Greek sceptic systematically 
opposes the philosophic doctrines of his age, formulating, after Aenesidemus, ten modes 
of procedure for critical negation.2 Re-enacting this ancient paradox is post-structuralist 
Jacques Derrida, who denies the power of any "unique word" to validate a system of 
reference while using his own signature words, "differance", "ecriture", to invalidate 
concepts like speech and writing, activity and passivity, cause and effect.3 Both 
Pyrrhonian scepticism and the post-structuralist theory some see as its contemporary 
equivalent thus appear to be engaged in refutation without the grounds for doing so. And 
in so far as rigorous critical activity is accompanied by a reluctance to formulate a basis 
for criticism, the latter appears to be motivated by the indiscriminate denials of 
negative dogmatism. 
Sextus Empiricus and Jacques Derrida would refute such reductionism, just as they would 
reject the charge of nihilism. In the first chapter of his work on scepticism, Sextus makes 
a point of distinguishing between the dogmatists, who "claim to have discovered the 
truth", the negative dogmatists, who "declare that finding it is an impossibility", and 
the sceptics, who "go on searching".4 If, then, full assent and denial are withheld, this 
evidently does not prevent the sceptic from exploring phenomena and advancing 
hypotheses on how things appear to him ("[ ... ] we do not make any positive assertion 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Sextus Empiricus. Selections from the Major Writings, p34. 
See Selections from the Major Writings, pp42-87. 
See, for example, 'La differance' in Marges de Ie philosophie and ' ... Ce 
dangereux supplement. . .' of the second part of De la grammatologie on the 
activity of writing. 
Sextus Empiricus. Selections from the Major Writings, p31. 
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that anything we shall say is wholly as we affirm it to be. We merely report accurately 
on each thing as our impressions of it are at the moment").5 At the same time, however, 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism contains a reminder of the scope and function of sceptical doubt 
which is largely concerned with matters of dogma. Matters of dogma for Sextus 
Empiricus are associated with the realm of metaphysics, or, the "non-evident things", 
(p36) rather than with the world of everyday appearances in which he lives.6 About 
the former, the sceptic makes no pronouncements while attempting to show the folly of 
those who do. About the latter, the sceptic proposes certain criteria, practical and 
conservative, as a guide for behaviour: namely, moderation of feeling and conformity to 
current social practice in the interests of a peaceful life. (p4I) 
According to this definition, scepticism is not a defence of negative dogmatism so much as 
a plea for intellectual caution, which does not preclude the formulation of criteria for 
dealing with everyday matters. Two of its limitations are, firstly, its apparent lack of 
curiosity about things metaphysical. The sceptic is the man "who leaves undetermined 
the question what things are good and bad by nature. He does not exert himself to avoid 
anything or to seek after anything, and hence he is in a tranquil state". (p41) Secondly, 
this cordoning off of things metaphysical, together with the nature of the practical 
criteria, mean that the sceptic is ill-equipped to challenge the institutions of the day in 
so far as he has made their practices his principle guide for action. Without having 
recourse to a value outside the system, the sceptic is without grounds for passing 
judgement on it, and is thus, potentially at least, in the position of the acquiescent 
relativist'? The activity of criticism and formulation of conservative criteria, 
remembering that "anything we say" may not be "wholly as we affirm it to be", does not 
lead the Pyrrhonist in the direction of negative dogmatism but in the direction of 
relativism and acquiescence to the status quo. 
The scepticism of Jacques Derrida is more radical than the scepticism of the Pyrrhonists 
in so far as it is applied to the very language of inquiry and doubt which, Derrida claims, 
always and already implies a metaphysics, in other words, opinions about "non-evident 
things". Our customary use of language, says Derrida, rests on unthinking assumptions 
5 
6 
7 
p31. 
pp39-40, cf also pl77. 
Hiley suggests acquiescence may still be tempered by criticism, however, as in the 
case of sixteenth-century Pyrrhonist Montaigne as opposed to some of his followers: 
"Though Montaigne would tum a critical eye toward the practices and values of 
ordinary life, in the hands of his followers the defense of ignorance became an 
apology for the existing order". (Philosophy in Question, p23) But when private 
reservations are translated into social action the hiatus between the sceptic's 
reservation of judgement and his implicit affirmation of value through action, is 
more clearly seen, thus exposing a fundamental difficulty in the sceptical position. 
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about the fixed nature of the signifieds to which language refers and on a certain 
confidence in their repeatability as intelligible concepts in discourse. Derrida shows 
how language can be used both to feed this illusion, of being able to talk about things as 
they really and always are, and to dispel it, by exposing the way the signifier creates 
the impression of substantiality through an intricate system of self-reference. Despite 
this extra-cautionary note, however, Derrida refuses the tag of nihilism as decisively as 
Sextus Empiricus: 
I totally refuse the label of nihilism [ ... J Deconstruction is not an enclosure in 
nothingness, but an openness towards the other. [ ... J to distance oneself thus from 
the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common 
assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond 
language.8 
As with Pyrrhonian scepticism suspenseful inquiry, in every sense of the word, is still 
defended. In addition, Derrida retains something of the Pyrrhonist's conservatism, in so 
far as he continues to work within the philosophic system as he knows it, questioning its 
claim to offer a direct or authoritative perspective on the world, but recognizing its 
inevitability as a framework for thought in which he is accustomed to operate (see p148 
of De la grammatologie: "[ ... J to us les concepts proposes jusqu'ici pour penser l' articulation 
d'un discours et d'une totalite historique sont pris dans la clOture metaphysique que nous 
questionnons ici"). Derrida's scepticism, then, would seem not to be a negative enterprise, 
any more than Pyrrho's, so much as a readiness to rethink fundamental philosophical 
concepts. 
This still begs the question of what the criteria are that stimulate the awareness of 
limits, and spur the deconstructionist on to reconsider ways of thinking and writing. 
Derrida maintains that deconstruction is "not an enclosure in nothingness, but an openness 
towards the other". This suggests that the 'other' is what provokes the deconstructive 
process of subversion within the philosophical system. The following comments on the 
'other' confirm this and are perhaps the closest Derrida comes to identifying his 
criterion, but as this 'other' is outside the boundaries of philosophic and linguistic 
convention it remains indefinable: 
8 
Deconstruction certainly entails a moment of affirmation. Indeed I cannot conceive 
of a radical critique which would not be ultimately motivated by some sort of 
affirmation, acknowledeged or not [ ... J I do not mean that the de constructing subject 
or self affirms. I mean that deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an 
alterity which necessarily calls, summons or motivates it. [ ... J The other, as the 
other than the self, the other that opposes self identity, is not something that can 
be detected and disclosed within a philosophical space and with the aid of a 
In Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, p124. 
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philosophical lamp.9 
Derrida himself approaches a "moment of affirmation" here, and then veers away, 
leaving the nature of his criterion still in doubt. It is not clear whether the consciousness 
of alterity for Derrida is perceived as an orientation towards an unnameable other and an 
indication, at the same time, of the 'subject's' incompleteness, or whether alterity is to be 
seen as yet another fictional effect of the sign-system,lO However, deconstruction's 
acknowledgement of the unsettling effects of alterity on the signification process means 
that, unlike Pyrrhonism, it embraces a form of intellectual restlessness that is difficult to 
account for in empirical philosophic terms. It remains undecidable whether this 
criterion "under erasure" can also provide the basis for change or social criticism, 
whether deconstruction has the power to transform as well as to subvert)l But in the 
face of its openness towards the other, which opposes the coherence of self-identity, 
deconstruction cannot be described as a writing practice subscribing to philosophical or 
ideological acquiescence. 
I.H. The problem of the criterion in recent dialogic theory: Bakhtin, Kristeva and Robbe-
Grillet 
The problem of the criterion endemic to these two forms of scepticism, ancient and 
modern, is heightened in recent theory of textual dialogue, in which the notions of 
conflict, debate and challenge are of central importance. The restlessness that marks 
deconstruction as a result of its "response to an alterity" is magnified into something more 
conflictual and, in Robbe-Grillet's case, more aggressive. Certainly, Bakhtin's 
polyphony, Kristeva's intertextuality and semiotic/symbolic interplay, Robbe-Grillet's 
"langue" and "parole" conflict, are all in some way concerned to subvert conventional 
discourse, even though they sometimes reflect a Derridean reluctance to advance 
authoritative criteria for doing so. Consequently all three writers are caught up in the 
9 
10 
11 
p118. The problem of the other in relation to sceptical questioning is 
considered, in one of its aspects, in Chapter 3. 
Note, however, that Derrida rejects the idea of a fundamental lack actually 
structuring the subject as in the Lacanian model of desire. See French 
Philosophers in Conversation, plOl. 
Derrida acknowledges the same problem of a hiatus between intellectual position 
and social participation I referred to earlier (see note, p56). "But the difficulty is 
to gesture in opposite directions at the same time: on the one hand to preserve a 
distance and suspicion with regard to the official political codes governing 
reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical and engage manner 
whenever the necessity arises. This position of dual allegiance, [ ... J is one of 
perpetual uneasiness. I try where I can to act politically while recognizing that 
such action remains incommensurate with my intellectual project of 
deconstruction". (Dialogues, p120) 
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Scylla and Charybdis of relativism, on the one hand the dogmatism of institutionally 
acceptable thinking, and on the other, the lawless freedom they seem to promote and 
which may lead back, via anarchy, to acquiescence to the status quo. Each of these 
writers merits examination in turn for the illumination they provide on the same problem 
of subversion and anarchic affirmation in Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's novels: 
-
Robbe-Grillet supplying much of his own theoretical commentary, Bakhtin, and Kristeva 
after Bakhtin, propounding the theories of polyphony and intertextuality, or dialogism, 
for which Dostoyevsky is one of the most significant models. 
I.m. Bakhtin and polyphony 
"Polyphony", meaning many voices, is Bakhtin's metaphor for the interaction between 
different styles and viewpoints in the novel. In the thoroughly polyphonic novel, the 
different perspectives are not presented as abstract ideas so much as lived ideas 
embodied in the novel's characters, whose combined dialogues and self-commentaries 
cannot then be reduced to a single idea, or associated directly and unambiguously with 
the viewpoint of the author. The emphasis is not on subversion for subversion's sake, but 
on an unsettling of the notion of a dominant perspective, either from the character's or 
the reader's point of view, in the light of human incompleteness and complexity. The 
reminder of the limitations implicit in individual perspectives and the invitation to 
attempt a transcendence of this limitation through interaction with others,12 makes 
Bakhtin more of a traditional humanist than either Kristeva or Robbe-Grillet. Verbal 
give and take between characters, what Bakhtin calls the "coexistence without 
confusion" of opposite voices, is illustrated primarily with reference to Dostoyevsky. 
Dostoyevsky's novels, according to Bakhtin, vibrate with polyphonic exchanges among 
the characters, and between the characters and their author, who becomes another 
character whose unique point of view has been written into the novel. 
Bakhtin's theory is appealing, particularly since it appears to correlate perfectly with 
its mercurial literary counterpart. Reinforcing the sense of appropriateness is the fact 
that Bakhtin's conscious ambivalence has, like the ambivalence in Dostoyevsky, 
sometimes elicited accusations of relativism - one possible outcome of sustained 
sceptical debate. Rene Wellek, for example, who sees Dostoyevsky as a writer of 
passionate conviction, is critical of a tendency towards ideological pluralism in Bakhtin, 
concluding in a 1980 essay: "It is disconcerting to think that Bakhtin propounded a theory 
which renders Dostoevsky somehow harmless, neutralizes his teaching, makes him a 
12 See my following chapter for a discussion of the role played by the interpersonal 
in the signification process. 
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relati vist".1 3 Similarly, Victor Terras expresses reservations about the relativistic 
implications of Bakhtin's argument, suggesting that polyphony is "merely an artistic 
flaw" characterizing the earlier works of Dostoyevsky, while the later ones demonstrate 
a clear hierarchy of voices,14 Christopher Pike conceives a slightly different solution to 
the problem, interpreting the ambivalence of Dostoyevsky's writing as a sign of two 
different personalities in the author, the open-minded liberal and the dogmatic 
believer, making Dostoyevsky polyphonic and monologic at the same time. This fact, he 
insists, is "of the essence in understanding his work and its appeal to diverse minds".15 
Both critics appear to share Wellek's assumption that commitment to belief is not merely 
exclusive of relativism, but is also incompatible with the radical form of argumentation 
Bakhtin advocates. All three thus question the congruence between Bakhtin and 
Dostoyevsky's thinking, on the grounds that their assumptions are entirely different. 
It is true that in the first chapter of Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, where Bakhtin 
lays the groundwork for his thesis, it is suggested that all contradictory viewpoints are 
vindicated in Dostoyevsky, (pI4) that his novels are "unresolvedly pluralistic", (p22) 
and that the many consciousnesses of his characters do not merge in "the unity of a 
developing spirit". (p21) Even more marked is the apparent hostility to religious belief 
in art which Bakhtin expresses in The Dialogic Imagination. In the same work Bakhtin 
argues that the religious point of view which makes itself heard in a Dostoyevsky novel, 
whether or not it is preferred above others, constitutes a flaw in novelistic discourse, 
being incapable of what Bakhtin calls "double-voicedness": 
[ ... ] images of official-authoritative truth, images of virtue [ ... ] have never been 
successful in the novel. It suffices to mention the hopeless attempts of Gogol and 
Dostoevsky in this regard. For this reason the authoritative text always remains, 
in the novel, a dead quotation, something that falls out of the artistic context 
[ ... ].16 
From being a non-committal relativist Bakhtin seems almost to take up the position of a 
dogmatist here, such is his discomfort with an ideological position that is too clearly 
delineated in a literary context. 
Bakhtin's position on the issue of belief is perhaps more difficult to ascertain even than 
13 
14 
15 
16 
'Bakhtin's view of Dostoevsky: "polyphony" and "camivalesque'", p35. 
New Essays, p35. Terras reverses this judgement in his 1990 work on The Idiot. 
Suggesting that the "polyphonic qualities characteristic of Dostoevsky's major 
works appear to a much lesser extent in The Idiot" (p91) he then argues "as 
Bakhtin's analysis has made plausible, the peculiar polyphonic energy of 
Dostoevsky's texts is a cardinal factor of his creative achievement". (p92) 
p199. 
The Dialogic Imagination,p344. 
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Dostoyevsky's. For elsewhere in his writings, Bakhtin argues against the relativist 
attitude he sometimes appears to adopt and, more importantly, defines truth in such a 
way as to avoid dogmatism of either positive or negative kinds. In the second chapter of 
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics Bakhtin explicity rejects relativism and makes a 
similar distinction to the one made by Sextus Empiricus between dogmatist, academic and 
sceptic: 
It should be noted that both relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all 
argumentation and all genuine dialog, either by making them unnecessary 
(relativism) or impossible (dogmatism). (p56) 
Bakhtin also admits the centrality of the Christian voice to Dostoyevsky's novels when 
he suggests that it is another and his word (namely, Christ), which supplies a possible 
authoritative orientation in Dostoyevsky's polyphony, which is then crowned by this 
"highest of voices". (p80) In acknowledging the latent authority of this voice in 
Dostoyevsky Bakhtin does not necessarily equate it with the image of "official-
authoritative truth" he disparages in The Dialogic Imagination. The notion of personal 
truth Bakhtin details in Problems (p8I) is one which entails personal engagement rather 
than solely intellectual acknowledgement and, according to Bakhtin's understanding of 
things, such engagement with the other is an important guarantee against the closure of 
individualism and ideology,17 Hence Bakhtin's interpretation of Dostoyevskyean 
polyphony would appear to incorporate the double possibility of ongoing critical debate 
as well as some form of criterion for criticism which could be defined as truth-as-
relationships - a criterion which preserves the unfinalizable nature of Dostoyevsky's 
world as Bakhtin interprets it. 
!.iv. Kristeva: intertextuality and the ambivalent "word" of the novel 
Intertextual analysis, of which Kristeva is the best-known exponent, shifts the focus of 
interest from the story and its characters, and so from the criterion of truth-as-
relationships, to the various meaning systems interacting within the novel. This textual 
polyphony is a borrowing from Bakhtin and his view that every word or word-group 
retains a 'memory' of its former contexts, and therefore resonates with a number of 
different associations over and above those attributed to it in the new context. The 
indirect reference to other perspectives through a word or phrase ensures a complex play 
of interrelationships within the text, whose meaning is then implicity challenged by 
17 Derrida also refers to the "other that oposes self-identity" but without giving it 
the strong interpersonal orientation it has in Bakhtin. This is a point I am taking 
up in my next chapter. 
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other discourses. Hence Laurent Jenny's assessment that: "Le regard intertextuel est done 
un regard critique, et c'est ce qui Ie definit",18 For example, when lines from a 
sentimental love poem are transposed into a diatribe of pettiness and egotism (in 
Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground), or when a mythical character is included in a 
family history (Corinthe in Robbe-Grillet's Le miroir qui reuient), one 'text' modifies and 
relativizes the meaning of the other, so that egotism is sentimentalized, and history 
mythologized. 
For Kristeva, however, this dialogue between texts is underwritten by a far more 
pervasive dialogue, namely, the interaction between what she terms the semiotic and 
symbolic orders and which is the basis for all writing practice, in her view, as well as 
being responsible for the formation of the speaking/writing subject from childhood. More 
specifically, this interchange concerns, on the one hand, psychic drives and impulses (the 
semiotic), and on the other, the structures of family and society to which a child is 
initiated when it gains access to language (the symbolic). In so far as literature could be 
said to represent an alternative discourse to the one sanctioned by society it offers an 
arena par excellence for the interaction of the occluded chaotic impulses with the 
formalized structures of language, where the latter is undermined and enlivened by the 
"anarchic revolt" of the former,19 As each of these forces is interdependent of the other 
in the signifying process there is a sense in which each also relativizes the other's 
influence in the text, and from this grows the Kristevan idea of a dialectic which 
literature realizes "Ie plus completement" and which functions "sans absolutisation du 
thetique susceptible de s'eriger en interdit theologique, sans denegation du thetique 
fantasmant un irrationalisme atomiseur".20 
Kristeva's earlier thinking on the dialogic text seems to be even more relativistic in its 
implications than Bakhtin's theory of polyphony. In Desire and Language, she describes 
the thoroughly dialogic novel as one free from all values and moral distinctions,21 
particularly the value associated with a theological referent. The latter is judged too 
restrictive on the dialectical play between language and the "logic" of the unconscious. 
Ironically, she lists Dostoyevsky among those "polyphonic" novelists who have 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Laurent Jenny, 'La strategie de la forme', p260. 
Leon S. Roudiez's term in his introduction to the English translation of La 
revolution du langage poetique, p3. 
La revolution du langage poetique, pBO . Note that "Ie thetique", or, 'thetic break' 
in Kristeva refers to the moment of separation of the child from its mother 
(and the formless drives and impulses of the semiotic she represents), and the 
accession, at the same time, to the ordered, normative structures of 
language and society. 
pB2. This comes through in Kristeva's description of Menippean discourse, an early 
literary genre which Bakhtin has suggested prepared the way for the novel form. 
61 
participated in the struggle against Christianity, for example, and its representation in 
art, (pp79-80) concluding, "Only modernity -when freed of 'God' - releases the 
Menippean force of the novel".22 This seems to contradict her own statement about the 
place of the the tic ("thinking within a proposition") in writing, and about the dialogue 
in the text between value and its transgression, between meaning and instinctual 
"jouissance". Her comment echoes Bakhtin's remark on images of "official-authoritative 
truth" in The Dialogic Imagination, and reveals her own apparent preference for semiotic 
revolt over symbolic legalism, despite the interdependence of the two in her theory of 
signification. 
For the semiotic is what Kristeva ultimately associates with the critical power of the 
text and the force of its protest and the liberating effects of its transgressions. The 
semiotic operates in a space that is "rythme, sans these, sans position" and is itself 
"jamais definitivement posee" .23 In so far as Kristeva can be said to offer any criterion, 
then, for the critical aspects of the dialogic text it is, like Derrida's notion of alterity, 
essentially unnamable even though, in Kristeva's case, the 'unnameable' seems to have so 
many verbalized attributes. Anarchic, amoral, associated with destruction as much as 
with creativity, the semiotic concerns an endless subversion of the prohibitions and 
potential narrow-mindedness of institutionalized thinking. Yet Kristeva recognizes the 
potential dangers of these anarchic forces and the necessity, therefore, of that which 
keeps them in check. If, then, Kristeva breathes the same "air du temps" as Robbe-
Grillet and Derrida, maintaining a similar attitude of revolt against authority, she is 
careful to acknowledge the role of both 'semiotic' and 'symbolic' forces in the 
signification process. One cannot exist without the other, even though the emotive 
nature of her language still betrays a preference for the former.24 
I.v. 'Langue' and 'Parole' in Robbe-Grillet: novelistic discourse as conflict and evasion 
22 
23 
24 
Desire in Language, p85. Kristeva seems to have modified her view of 
Dostoyevsky, to whom she devotes a chapter in her later psychoanalytic study Le 
soleil nair. Here she refers to him as "Ie chretien DostoYevski", exploring the 
theological dimension of his writing in considerable detail and making a 
connection between polyphony and some of the religious concepts in Dostoyevsky. 
However, faith is still seen primarily in rational, and ultimately repressive, 
ideological terms. 
La revolution du langage poetique, pp 25 and 23. Terms used in a discussion of what 
Kristeva calls here "la 'chora' semiotique". 
A preference which is much more marked in the language of Barthes, for example, 
for whom authority always and of necessity assumes the guise of a repressive 
father-figure. 
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Robbe-Grillet's description at a 1982 colloquium of the conflict in his novels reads as a 
repeat, in less psychoanalytic terms, of Kristeva's scenario of the interaction between the 
symbolic and the semiotic in writing practice: 
books are where the fight of the world takes place because it is in the text that 
the world creates itself in the form of a fight between irreconcilable forces -
forces, let us say, like the prevailing ideology and revolution [ ... J and more 
generally, order and disorder.25 
However, of all the writers discussed thus far, Robbe-Grillet is the most exuberant 
iconoclast when it comes to committing himself to statements of value. When expressing 
reservations about the place of conventional meaningfulness in literature he once 
translated the question onto a plane of spectral authoritarianism by referring to 
"l'ennemi du sens".26 The artist, it seems, is always a player of games, never an arbiter of 
values, and when once challenged about his apparent championing of an alternative 
order to the one upheld by conventional ideology, he hastened to explain that this did 
not commit him to a statement of value or truth: "it is never a question of replacing the 
Tsar's statue by a statue of Stalin. It is a question of never placing any statue in position, 
but continuing to slip" .27 
The reluctance to align himself with any sort of a metanarrative is therefore clear, but 
what is equally clear is that Robbe-Grillet sees his novels as "sites of conflict" which 
theoretically engage with and unsettle the metanarratives they do not want imposed on 
them - the paradox of criticism without criteria recurs once again. The ambivalent 
notion of art as play that is both arbitrary and purposive is a theme running through 
nearly all of Robbe-Grillet's critical writing. On the one hand, the artist's ludism is 
associated with the privileging of invention over social responsibility to the point of a 
categorical exclusion of political, moral, psychological or religiOUS concerns. As Robbe-
Grillet writes in a 1957 essay: 
25 
26 
27 
28 
l'artiste ne met rien au-dessus de son travail, et il s'apen;oit vite qu'il ne peut creer 
que pour den; la moindre directive exterieure Ie paralyse, Ie moindre souci de 
didactisme, ou seulement de signification lui est une insupportable gene [ ... J 
l'instant de la creation ne peut que Ie ramener aux seuls problemes de son art.28 
Three Decades of the French New Novel, p26. 
See pp35-36 of Alain Robbe-Grillet: analyse, theorie. cf Pour un nouveau roman, 
p40: "si l'art est quelque chose, il est tout, qu'il suffit par consequent a soi-meme, et 
qu'il n'y a rien au-dela". 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, 'Order and disorder in film and fiction', p16. Some of the 
consequences of this way of thinking to the law of contradiction are discussed in my 
previous chapter on contradiction and difference. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p35. 
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The desire to concentrate exclusively on things aesthetic, and the tendency towards self-
reference that results from such discomfort with "la moindre direction exterieure", 
constitute the evasive aspects of Robbe-Grillet's ludism. Any revolution in the text is 
limited, in this case, to stylistic experiments which may dazzle without necessarily 
challenging, or even attempting to challenge, habits of thought. 
On the other hand, however, Robbe-Grillet clearly seeks to authenticate play in relation 
to the discourses he is excluding, and even to make a space for it within their boundaries. 
He reacts strongly to suggestions of escapism despite the fact that some of his own 
comments seem to defend precisely this attitude. A desire for authentification, then, and 
for a certain relevance, necessitate engagement with social practice and a readiness to 
confront and question. Thus we find the inventiveness which characterizes ''l'ecriture 
romanesque" in 'Du realisme a la realite' is also a "remise en question",29 and the 
gratuitousness of art that retreats from political statements is elsewhere made the key to 
the novelist's social engagement, as Robbe-Grillet argues that man must playas well as 
work and, more basically still, that man's capacity to fantasize is what distinguishes 
him from the animals.30 The two contrary impulses are 'synthesized' in the following 
remark: 
Notre parole ludique n'est pas fait pour nous proteger [ ... J mais au contraire pour 
nous mettre en question nous-memes et ce monde, et par consequent Ie transformer.31 
The aesthetic revolution is to be given social relevance as well by virtue of its power to 
challenge and transform our perceptions. 
In the end, Robbe-Grillet's criterion has more in common with the indeterminate criterion 
of Kristeva and Derrida than with the practical criterion and "plain language" of the 
Greek sceptics. In fact, Robbe-Grillet and the nineteenth-century Dostoyevsky could both 
be said to be in conflict with the notion of practicality upheld by the earlier sceptics in so 
far as this places undesirable limits on the irregularities of their imaginative worlds. 
For while the novelists, like the sceptics of antiquity, may adopt a critical stance 
towards the attitudes of their day, their methodology is, not unnaturally, different from 
the reasoned argumentation favoured by Sextus Empiricus, as is their perception of the 
target of criticism, and the nature of that which attracts their curiosity and attention. 
29 
30 
31 
pl38. 
cf Dostoyevsky's insistence in Notes that caprice rather than rational analysis is 
what distinguishes man from the "sprig on the cylinder of a barrel-organ". 
Nouveau roman; hier, aujourd'hui, p97. 
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In the four works chosen for analysis in the chapter, Dostoyevsky's Notes from 
Underground and The Devils, Robbe-Grillet's Projet pour une revolution iT. New York and 
Le miroir qui revient, there is some argumentation but much, too, of Kristeva's "anarchic 
revolt" and Derrida's playful subversion of logical concepts. Imagery, interrupted 
sequences, the evocation of atmosphere and emotion signify the special methodology of 
the novelist while also implying one possible object of his criticism, namely, the 
exclusion of such manifestations of desire and emotion by institutions that allow no place 
for their disruptions. In this respect, it could be argued that art itself represents the 
novelist's criterion, and even that art is 'naturally' subversive in so far as it represents a 
permanent reminder, as Auden once phrased it, that homo laborans is also homo ludens,32 
that play and creativity are suppressed to society's, and the individual's, mutual 
impoverishment. Furthermore, if the methodology and object of criticism are different 
from those of a classical philosopher the arena for inquiry is also elsewhere in the 
novels. The scepticism defined by Sextus Empiricus seems to imply that to go beyond the 
empirical world of common-sense was to indulge in pure fantasizing)3 Yet it is this 
shadowy world of inapprehensibles that, in some way special to each, fascinates and 
intrigues the two novelists. In Dostoyevsky, the dynamic energy associated with 
creativity is perceived to have negative as well as positive aspects, and in The Devils, 
we are shown the almost imperceptible, yet significant, turning point at which wonder 
and "jouissance" become wanton destruction. This introduces a moral criterion that is 
absent from Notes and alien to Projet and Le miroir. Because of the intangibility, 
however, of the imaginative and metaphysical worlds in which both novelists operate, 
the problem of the criterion is particularly ambivalent. It is one thing to fight logic with 
logic, but quite another to subvert, negate and affirm in the name of what Sextus 
Empiricus calls "non-evident things". 
The Devils 
ILi. Polyphony: the impact of personal interaction 
Polyphony seems an appropriate metaphor for the opening pages of The Devils where 
the build-up to the "extraordinary events" of later chapters begins with a gleefully 
32 
33 
'The poet and the city', pp88-89. 
Note, however, that while Sextus Empiricus suggests that "concerning non-evident 
things the Pyrrhinian philosopher holds no opinion" (p36) he concedes there are 
times when perception is strangely altered, in times of sickness, for example, or 
when sleeping. In such cases it can be said that "although our dream images are 
unreal in our waking state, they are nevertheless not absolutely unreal, for they do 
exist in our dreams". (Sextus Empiricus. Selections from the Major Writings, p60) 
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speculative portrait of one of the novel's main characters. The circulation of different 
rumours concerning Stepan Verkhovensky creates a strong effect of polyphony, whose 
initial purpose, however, is to create an atmosphere of suspense and excitement at the 
anticipated loss of control associated with the "extraordinary events" hinted at in the 
opening lines. In other words, polyphony has no strongly Bakhtinian connotations at its 
first appearance, being suggestive, rather, of the technique of the thriller novel where 
deliberately obscure hints are used to capture, and thereafter play with, the reader's 
attention.34 ("He stopped his lectures on the Arabs because someone (probably one of his 
reactionary enemies) had somehow or other intercepted a letter to someone giving an 
account of certain 'circumstances' as a result of which someone else had demanded some 
kind of explanation from him".) (p23) The narrator, whose task is to decipher the riddles 
concerning Verkhovensky and the disturbing social trends with which he seems in some 
way affiliated, declares it "impossible to accommodate oneself to these ideas or to find 
out exactly what they meant". (p35) 
Nevertheless, for all their vague suggestiveness, these "ideas" gradually take shape in 
the lives of the characters. It becomes clear that the arena for the critical exploration 
and testing of an idea is an interpersonal one, in which voices of a different tenor and 
personality are juxtaposed. The interpersonal element is thus crucial to demonstrating 
the absence of any indisputable, self-evident point of view in Dostoyevskyean 
polyphony. The poetic enthusiasms of Mr Verkhovensky are cut short by the aggressive 
little stabs of Mrs Stavrogin; Peter's "smooth-grained" patter contrasts with Shatov's 
clumsy outbursts. The bringing together of these characters, many of whom have an 
indefatigable love of confrontation, ensures continuous verbal warfare. At the same time, 
the close interaction between the characters and the numerous meeting points in their 
lives, past and present, results in a mutual relativizing of each other's position, or at 
least, an awareness that each other's attitudes are not infallible or invulnerable to 
change. 
The dilettante Stavrogin, for example, has instilled opposing beliefs of Christianity and 
atheism into Shatov and KiriIov, who then act as permanent reminders of values he once 
toyed with and discarded, while he, on the other hand, represents to them the 
possibility of a philosophical indifference without hope or desire. (pp666-667) In the 
encounter between Shatov and Stavrogin, Stavrogin's indifference casts a shadow over 
34 Beletskii summarizes the function of such techniques in what he calls the 
"boulevard novel" as "making it possible to hold the interest of a reader who was 
in a state of extreme excitement and was not overly concerned with verisimilitude; 
these motifs made him swallow a book in one gulp and wait in nervous agitation for 
its sequel". Cited in 'Dostoevsky'S The Devils and the antinihilist novel', p446. 
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Shatov's vision of truth (already somewhat dimmed by the latter's own hesitations), 
while Shatov discomforts Stavrogin by stirring his memory of a former crime (p260) and 
leaves him with a suggestion to visit Bishop Tikhon (which Stavrogin later takes up). 
Similarly, the lethargic Stavrogin is impressed by Kirilov's fanaticism, and he agrees 
with the latter's insistence that everyone is "basically good" even though he himself 
has pursued a life of wilful and sometimes destructive dissipation. (pp241-244) After 
insisting that he is "not. looking for anyone's approval", he asks Kirilov, with almost 
childlike anxiety: "You're not angry with me are you?", (p295) demonstrating his need of 
the other's recognition and acceptance. Thus while each character's position is 
differentiated, the interrelationships between them and their susceptibility to each 
other's responses results in something approaching the mutually contradicting and 
qualifying process associated with polyphony and intertextuality. 
II.H. The novelist's criterion? Play and chaos in the text 
One of the prerequisites for an exchange of views is that the respective parties listen to 
one another as a preliminary to understanding what each other is saying. But polyphony 
of this egalitarian nature is not always to be found in the novel. Frequently characters 
fail to listen, and talk around rather than to each other as if interested only in exploring 
their own ideas. Peter Verkhovensky is perhaps the most skilled at ignoring other 
points of view to the extent that he will "invent a man himself and live with him", 
(p364) and, despite the fact that he is increasingly proved wrong, persists in his 
opinionated inventions. Even in the more intensely dialogic scenes between Stavrogin and 
Kirilov there is a sense in which each pursues his own private thoughts where the 
other's speech figures as an interruption rather than a challenge ("Let us suppose that 
you had lived on the moon, Stavrogin interrupted, without listening and continuing to 
develop his idea"). (p242) Hence in Dostoyevsvsky's world of interacting characters all 
characters do not, as Bakhtin suggests in Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, always 
understand other points of view "perfectly" (p60) because they are not always interested 
in them. 
Polyphony, however, can accommodate this kind of miscomprehension and it is 
noteworthy that all of the characters in the novel at some point confound the 
expectations others have of them, thus reestablishing an awareness of other 
perspectives. (A point I will develop in my next chapter.) What places most strain on 
the concept of polyphony as an inquiry into other points of view is the deliberate 
frustration of the desire for understanding reflected in the characters' love of invention, 
and their use of language to deceive rather than illuminate. Polyphony becomes 
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cacophony in the shift from ideological uncertainty to an elaborated and artful confusion. 
Mr Verkhovenskys speech, for example, is often garbled because of his emotionalism, an 
outpouring of feeling which suggests an intense desire to communicate.35 Yet Mr 
Verkhovensky obviously enjoys the sensationalist effects of his incoherence as, grandly 
and maniacally, he rehearses possible roles, mesmerized by the impression he is creating 
in his own and other people's minds.36 It is the seductiveness of these different self-
images that absorbs Mr Verkhovenskys attention more than the desire to understand and 
respond to the other. Resolutions to act and communicate sincerely are constantly swept 
aside in the wake of "some new and tempting train of thought", (p220) suggesting, in a 
more lighthearted vein, the infinitely digressive potential of language that Derrida 
explores, the impossibility of ever beginning or arriving 'in one piece'. Even after he has 
turned his back on civilisation, and run off with only an umbrella to protect him from the 
elements, Mr Verkhovensky cannot resist clothing himself in the accoutrements of 
fantasy, thus warding off more mundane considerations. (pp534-535) Pouring his heart out 
to the timid little bible-seller he meets on the road he revives under the spell of his own 
rhetoric, "almost believing in the story he was telling her". (p642) 
With Mr Verkhovensky, however, there is a passing awareness of deceit in relation to 
truth, (p645) whereas with Stavrogin, who in some respects is Mr Verkhovensky's 
ideological offspring, verbal masks and deceit have become a way of being. Stavrogin's 
challenge to rational communication, unlike Mr Verkhovensky's, is controlled and 
sometimes vicious, so that, when questioned about his motives for pulling a man by the 
nose, in mocking enactment of that gentleman's favourite expression (/1INo sir, they won't 
lead me by the noselll), (p58) he bites his interlocutor's ear by way of reply. (p63) Shatov 
recognizes the challenge to "common sense" that is also implicit in Stavrogin's marriage 
to Mary Lebyatkin, (p267) and in his confession to Bishop Tikhon, Stavrogin hints he 
may have told "a lot of lies". (p700) It is this sustained artfulness in Stavrogin that 
Robbe-Grillet singled out for approving comment in the Canterbury lecture and which, 
ultimately, has more to do with the defiant evasion of structured meaning associated 
with the fear of being finalized (Bakhtin), and the semiotic (Kristeva), than with any 
form of ideological or philosophic debate. 
Is the characters' wayward humanity, then, their love of deceit and flights of fancy, the 
sign of authentic value in the novel, and even, the real reason behind the broad and 
changing spectrum of ideologies in this "polyphonic" novel? Is it perhaps that no point 
35 
36 
See, for example, ppl04, 131-134. 
See pp21, 30, 40. 
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of view can adequately contain this all-important creative excitement? 
Bakhtin's theory in many ways envisages such a conclusion. In Chapter 2 of Problems of 
Dostoevsky's Poetics polyphony is linked to the hero's desire to escape final meanings. 
Man is free, argues Bakhtin, and can therefore "overturn any rules which are forced upon 
him". (p48) This would seem to imply that the desire to be free of the restraints implicit 
in ideological thinking is even more fundamental than the desire to examine the 
respective merits of particular ideologies, or, "ideolectes", as Bakhtin sometimes calls 
them. In Kristeva the release of what she terms semiotic impulses is even more strongly 
linked to something of vital importance in the text, namely, the breaking down and 
reformulating of theses which, if unchallenged, limit perception and stifle spontaneity 
and life. The dynamic element in the text is related to the possibility of renewal in so far 
as semiotic anarchy forces reappraisals of habitual concepts and attitudes. But Kristeva 
is careful to introduce no moral imperatives, no distinctions between good or evil, in her 
analysis of this irruption of psychic forces into rational discourse. Moral imperatives, as 
already indicated in the introduction to the chapter, belong to the domain of the 
symbolic.37 
There is plenty of evidence in The Devils that the characters are drawn to the state of 
primitive chaos which Kristeva associates with pre-symbolic experience, namely, the 
undifferentiated realm of instincts and desires the child represses when it enters the 
symbolic order of language. A passage from the novel she herself quotes in Pouvoirs de 
l'horreur records Mr Verkhovensky's fascination with the destructive effects of a fire 
which acts as a lure to his own sOcially-contained destructive forces: 
A real fire is quite another matter: there the horror and a certain sense of personal 
danger, combined with the well-known exhilerating effect of a fire at night, 
produce in the spectator [ ... ] a certain shock to the brain and, as it were, a 
challenge to his own destructive instincts [ ... ] This grim sensation is almost always 
delightful. 38 
In the novel as a whole, however, there is no guarantee that impulses such as these 
contain the promise of renewal as an inevitable part of their outworking, any more than 
the fantastic posturings of Mr Verkhovensky constitute an effective defence against the 
negations of nihilism. The physical damage caused by the fire is as appalling as the 
37 
38 
In Bakhtin this compulSion is qualified by the relation to the other and hence a 
form of ethical responsibility that is not equatable with the legalism of Kristeva's 
symbolic, which is also, however, an effect of the relation with the other. (See La 
revolution du langage poetique, p29.) 
The Devils, p512, cited in French in Pouvoirs de l'horreur pp25-26. I am grateful to 
Simon Dickie for drawing my attention to this particular passage. 
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psychological effects of the invasion of "semiotic" anarchy in the character of Lembke, 
who collapses mentally and emotionally under the strain of his failure to either contain 
social chaos, or communicate with his wife who insists on dabbling in it. (p441) And in so 
far as they participate in this anarchy Dostoyevsky's characters must be seen to be 
complicitous with the chaos instigated by the revolutionaries, and thus, with the 
nihilism Dostoyevsky is ostensibly attempting to refute in the noveI.39 
To a certain extent this is precisely what happens. The characters who distance 
themselves from Peter Verkhovensky's programme of chaos nonetheless acquiesce to it in 
their determined evasion of ideological fetters, and thus, of the barriers that might help 
contain chaos. Stavrogin, the prince of intellectual doodling, admits in his suicide letter 
that: "One can go on arguing about anything for ever, but from me nothing has come but 
negation with no magnanimity and no force. Even negation has not come from me". (p667) 
This is, in its most extreme expression, the sceptic's problem of an unqualified refusal to 
affirm or deny. Not to make any distinctions from a fear of final statements means 
acquiescing to every manifestation of folly, since all things are equal (an extreme which 
the Pyrrhonist sceptics avoid through the practical criterion). 
I believe, however, that at different moments in the narrative and through different 
characters, this same amoral creative/destructive orientation Kristeva identifies with 
the semiotic is related to a sense of value, and so, to a metaphysical dimension that has 
a more ethical definition than Kristeva's semiotic anarchy, without being reducible to 
the legalism and repressive intellectualism she associates with the symbolic order. The 
value in question is beyond unrestrained personal expression, since it involves 
confrontation with an alterity, and it is something other than anarchy, since it has to do 
with a celebratory embrace, an explosive affirmation. 
Two key passages which focus attention on this ambivalent but metaphYSically oriented 
value, are the encounter between Kirilov and Stavrogin, where the former explains his 
"man-god" philosophy, (pp238-45) and Shatov's response to the birth of Marie's child. 
(pp587-92) Kirilov's philosophy is anything but metaphysical in so far as he plans to 
commit suicide in a bid to eradicate limits and any form of value-as-limit that challenge 
his self-will. For death and the fear of death represent the ultimate obstacle to freedom 
and can only be defeated, Kirilov argues, through being willingly embraced. ("Full 
freedom will come only when it makes no difference whether to live or not to live"). (p25) 
Such determined indifference is to be further demonstrated by Kirilov's writing of a 
suicide note, to Peter Verkhovensky's dictation, in which Kirilov will accept 
39 See Serge Gregory's' Dostoevsky'S The Devils and the anti-nihilist novel'. 
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responsibility for crimes perpetrated by Verkhovensky and the revolutionaries. 
Complicating this collusion with violence, however, is Kirilov's statment that "All's 
good", which enables him to both justify crime as part of a total picture (p243) and to 
crowd it out of that picture through a joyful response to the beauty of the natural world. 
For at the heart of Kirilov's philosophy is not a reasoned position but an image: an image 
of a leaf with the light shining through it and whose imagined freshness provides quite 
a different "shock to the brain" from the one administered to Stepan Verkhovensky by 
the fire. It stirs in Kirilov a belief in the possibility of an overwhelming happiness, 
however bizarrely he then reasons his way towards this end: 
I saw a [leaf] recently, a yellow one, a little green, wilted at the edges. Blown by 
the wind. When I was a boy of ten I used to shut my eyes deliberately in winter 
and imagine a green leaf, bright green, with veins on it, and the sun shining. I used 
to open my eyes and I couldn't believe it because it was so beautiful, and I used to 
shut them again. (p243) 
Stavrogin, looking for a 'message' in this asks, "What's that? An allegory?" to which 
Kirilov reples, "N-no- why? Not an allegory, just a leaf, one leaf. A leaf's good. All's 
good." Kirilov's confession cuts both ways. It contains no reasoned defence against 
nihilism. On the contrary. In philosophic and practical terms it represents a passive 
assent to it. Nonetheless it contains an inkling of Dostoyevsky's implied criterion in the 
novel's critique of nihilism. The quality of Kirilov's affirmation is such that it 
momentarily belittles the nihilist programme, and in so far as it is a response, an almost 
worshipful response to beauty, it contains a denial, also, of its negations40 
The point at which Kirilov's affirmation of life becomes the positing of a metaphysics in 
the novel occurs in the second passage where a love of life is linked to a sense of its 
sanctity. Shatov's response to the birth of Marie's child (invoking another Mary and 
child?) is mystical as well as ecstatic and his inarticulate joy is like, yet qualitatively 
unlike, the malicious frenzy of the filibusters: 
'It's a great joy [ ... 1 The mystery of the coming of a new human being is a great and 
incomprehensible mystery, Mrs Virginsky' [ ... 1 Shatov muttered incoherently, 
dazed and entranced. It was as though something were swinging about in his head 
and pouring out of his soul involuntarily, in spite of himself. (p588) 
Kirilov's embrace of life is, in fact, very similar to Meursault's in Camus's 
L'Etranger. Both characters shie away from moral distinctions (Meursault argues 
that the pimp, Raymond, is as good as the upright Celeste and that Salamano's 
dog "valait autant que sa femme"), yet both, in their passionate love of beauty and 
desire to be caught up in it, affirm a value beyond themselves which is not-yet-a-
metaphysics. 
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It is from some unconscious acknowledgement of the importance of this event and the 
happiness it brings that the small-time revolutionary, Mr Virginsky, attempts to ward 
off the planned attack on Shatov's life. (p595) From this point on Virginsky withdraws 
his consent to the murder which he suddenly sees as an act of sacrilege. His protest to 
this effect is all the more powerful for coming from the mouth of a hitherto weak and 
acquiescent man: 
But when the stones had been tied on and Peter stood up, Virginsky suddenly began 
trembling nervously and, throwing up his hands in grief and despair, shouted at 
the top of his voice: 'That's wrong, wrong! That's all wrong!' (p600) 
A love of life and a sense of its sanctity is the value in the novel that arguably modifies 
the dogmatic strain in Dostoyevsky's political and religious views. David Magarshack's 
introductory remarks on the novel suggest that Dostoyevsky's political views on Russia 
and his religious views, which were "perhaps entirely in harmony" with these (a plea 
for a return to "Christ and the Russian soil"),41 constitute "a serious blot on a novel 
which, in spite of its structural and artistic blemishes, possesses a tremendous vitality 
[ ... J". (xvii) In my view, however, the "tremendous vitality" Magarshack refers to 
interacts significantly with Dostoyevsky's political and religious views in the novel, 
balancing their potential legalism, reaching beyond the pettiness of some of the 
judgements informing them. The love of life that Zossima the elder acknowledges in 
Dostoyevsky's last novel, The Brothers Karamazov, with its potential for pantheism,42 
is also a principle in The Devils that fulfils and surpasses the negativism of the letter of 
the law and is perhaps, in this sense, truer to the voice of faith in Dostoyevsky's 
polyphony than the anti-revolutionary passages. 
One possible reading of the privileging of image and emotion over doctrine is as a 
reflection of the emphasis in Russian spirituality on the heart rather than the intellect. 
Joseph Frank documents Dostoyevsky's upbringing as a child in an atmosphere that was 
both Orthodox and folk-oriented but suggests that while he was well-versed in Gospel 
and old testament narratives the "attempt of theologians to rationalize the mysteries of 
faith [ ... J never held any appeal for Dostoevsky from the very beginning" .43 Certainly 
as a novelist Dostoyevsky often insists on the non-dialectical nature of his characters' 
41 
42 
43 
Dostoyevsky's letter to Maykov, 1868, cited in Magarshack's introduction to the 
novel, p viii. 
See The Brothers Karamazov, p269. 
The Seeds of Revolt, p44. A. B. Gibson Similarly records a comment from the 
young Dostoyevsky: "Nature, the soul, God, love - all this is understood by the 
heart not by the mind". (The Religion of Dostoevsky, p9) 
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arguments (such as Prince Myshkin's in The Idiot) and this is sufficiently pointed to 
suggest something more than nineteenth-century Sehnsucht or an adult lack of conviction 
about matters of faith. On the contrary, it is a preference which accords with what 
Tomas Spidlak suggests is one of the distinguishing features of Russian spirituality: 
"Many writers chose the heart as symbol to distinguish themselves from the 
"rationalist" West which seems to forget that the formulation of Christian and 
devotional life is the heart".44 It is true that the affirmation of religious feeling in 
Dostoyevsky is not always explicitly Christian and certainly not always Orthodox in 
the sense of conforming to Church doctrine. The love of life I have underlined in The 
Devils is often more of a Nietzschean "yay-saying" than a coherent expression of belief. 
Nevertheless in so far as the shaping force of Dostoyevsky's faith was not the laws of 
the old testament, or the church doctrine of the new, so much as a personal and emotional 
response to the beauty of Christ,45 a link can be established between the primitive 
vitality of a character like Kirilov and the more explicit religious feeling of a character 
like Shatov. The emotional generosity of both is linked to their spirituality and 
capacity to respond to something outside themselves (a capacity that Stavrogin, for 
instance, seems to have neglected.46 Hence the view of a celebratory affirmation of life 
in the novel that is also a metaphysics in the making.47 
By contrast are the passages where Dostoyevsky expounds his ideas in the light of a 
more dogmatic religious judgement. This gives the text a bias, on occasions, that is far 
from polyphonic, reacting on its readers either like an inspired or intriguing revelation, 
or like the "dead quotation" of Bakhtin's official truth, depending on the reader's own 
44 
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The Heritage of the Early Church, p363. 
See his letter to Mme N.D. Fonvison in Letters of Fyodor Michailovich 
Dostoevsky, p71. See also Diary of a Writer, p983, for a similar expression of the 
importance of an allegiance to Christ over and above any knowledge gained 
through sermons and the catechism. 
This somewhat romantic association of feeling and spirituality is confirmed in the 
later work The Brothers Karamazov where Zossima argues that "in some cases it 
really is much more admirable to give way to an emotion, [ ... ] which springs from a 
great love, than not to give way to it at all". The Brothers Karamazov, p397, 
italics mine. I return to this point in my discussion of The Brothers Karamazov in 
Chapter 5. 
See Sergei Hackel in New Essays, Lubomir Radoyce's article (especially the 
section 'Duality and faith' ppl04-120) and Roger Anderson's piece on carnival 
(pp458, 462) for further comment on Dostoyevsky's religious position. All three 
question the authenticity of Dostoyevsky's faith on grounds of its populist 
mysticism and ecclesiastical non-conformity, yet bypass the significance of 
Dostoyevsky's Christo logical confessions in diary and letters. Hackel suggests the 
teaching of characters like Zossima on the love of man, for instance, is 
"humanistic", but neglects to mention the teaching in I John that "he who says he 
loves God whom he has not seen but does not love his brother whom he has seen is a 
liar" . 
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presuppositions. Moreover, the ideas that are expounded so sincerely by Shatov (see, for 
example, Shatov's speech on pp254-255), who to some extent is Dostoyevsky's 
mouthpiece in the novel, become a weapon with which the author elsewhere rubbishes 
those of whom he disapproves. It is noticeable that victims of the author's pet hates are 
portrayed with little sympathy and reduced in some cases to derisory caricatures. There 
is an especially malicious piece of satire on Turgenev (accused by Dostoyevsky of being 
anti-Russian) in the character of Karmazinov, whose "clean little pink ears" are made to 
express smugness and a prissy ineffectualness.48 The revolutionaries are allowed the 
occasional grace of inconsistency but on the whole their portraits are equally unflattering 
(see, for example, p394) and Peter Verkhovsensky, who organizes the disturbances, is 
given a serpent's tongue. (pI88) The haste to simplify and condemn is a danger to which a 
writer seeking to assert his favourite mental attitudes at all costs is prone, and represents 
as much a threat to critical inquiry as does the undercutting of all positions by a negative 
or acquiescent relativism. 
Yet here, too, a chink in the novel's ideological armour is created by Shatov's comment on 
"that Virginsky woman" after she has come out in the middle of the night to assist his 
wife in childbirth, the same event that led to the ecstatic eulogy referred to earlier. 
Shatov's 'voice', in so far as he shares Dostoyevsky's religious persuasions and 
hesitations ("1-1 shall believe"), is arguably the one closest to the author's own in the 
novel. Yet Shatov comes to the conclusion that he has misjudged Mrs Virginsky, a 
member of the revolutionary organisation from which he himself has recently defected. 
There is no concession made to the validity of her ideological position, but rather, a 
bypassing of the whole question of ideological position in the perception of her value as a 
person and of his own human limitations: 
'So these people possess some generosity after all [ ... J A man and his convictions 
are two different things. Perhaps I haven't been fair to them. We are all to 
blame, we are all to blame and - if only we were all convinced of that!' (p580) 
Shatov thus makes a distinction between the person and her ideas, and he does so in the 
name of a more fundamental principle, namely, corporate responsibility in the face of 
human error and fallibility. This is an important acknowledgement in terms of the 
explicitly moral and religious dimension in the novel because it allows for the possibility 
that the most cherished beliefs may still be imperfectly, and eccentrically, understood. 
p98. It is intriguing that Nabokov, who was astringently critical of the 
simplifications involved in Dostoyevsky's characters when en route to conversion, 
is not averse to the simplifications involved in Karmazinov's portrait, which he 
finds one of the more convincing in Dostoyevsky's gallery. See Lectures on Russian 
Literature, ppI09-I29. 
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It also provides a different perspective from which the characters' ideological 
differences may be viewed: namely, their common need and vulnerability. For the sake of 
a "few words" with Stavrogin, Shatov appeals to the humanity that underwrites their 
differences: 
I ask to be treated with respect - I demand it ! [ .. .] Not respect for my personality 
- to hell with it! - but for something else, just this once, just for a few words. We 
are two human beings and we've met in infinity [ ... J Drop your tone and speak like 
a human being! (252) 
Through an affirmation of life and its sanctity, therefore, regardless of a person's 
ideological position, and through express reservations about the assumptions and 
preoccupations that might shape that position, Dostoyevsky maintains a "polyphonic" 
openness in a novel that is ethically and metaphysically informed. Perhaps, at the 
same time, this acknowledgement of the individual limitations that shape one's own 
perspective may be interpreted as a way of affirming a visionary criterion that is many-
sided without being relativistic. An insight one Russian Orthodox theologian has 
expressed in the following terms: 
in the age to come "Christ will behold all the numberless myriads of saints, 
turning his glance away from none, so that to each one of them it will seem that He 
is looking at him, talking with him, and greeting him", and yet "while remaining 
unchanged, He will seem different to one and different to another" - so likewise 
out of eternity God [ ... J to each one [ .. .] manifests Himself in a different way.49 
The many perspectives of human 'polyphony' are contained and reflected back through 
the one light in Florovsky's metaphor. But if all the contradictions, eccentricities and 
heresies in Dostoyevsky reflect the same need for this "light" - what Dostoyevsky, 
from his own experiential standpoint, calls the "Russian Saviour, and the Russian 
God"_sO then polyphony in Dostoyevsky nonetheless refers to a more authoritative 
judgement than is envisaged by Bakhtin. 
Notes from Underground 
IIU. The reason IIque la raison connait point" 
Chapter 1 of Dostoyevsky's narrative is more of a monologue than a polyphony of voices. 
49 
50 
Creation and Redemption, Florovsky quoting Saint Symeon, pp72-73. 
Letter to Maikov, Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky to his Family and 
Friends, p158. 
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There is no genuine discussion of opposing views, no evidence of a struggle for supremacy 
between what Bakhtin calls 'ideolectes'. Different theories of human nature and history 
are referred to in the narrative but the references are generalized and the interpretation 
of them very much the narrator's own. One could argue that the narrator's consciousness 
is dialogized as he "looks in all the mirrors of others' consciousness" ,51 calculating the 
responses of an imaginary audience to his soliloquies. But in so far as this 'other' is 
likewise allotted a subservient role in the narrator's script this, too, reads as rhetorical 
flourishing on the narrator's part rather than as an appeal to a distinctly other voice. 
The narrator's consciousness, as a result, cannot be said to be fully dialogized. There is, 
however, an important dialogical tension in part I which derives from an opening of the 
floodgates of consciousness to an anarchic creative energy in the narrator himself. The 
sweeping negatives concerning other positions (discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis), all 
implicitly refer to this force: the value that is not a value, the "best and greatest good" 
that is beyond reason and beyond, it would seem, the determinations of language also. 
A preliminary definition of terms of reference in the narrative marks its departure from 
the preoccupations of Pyrrhonist scepticism and the nature of the Pyrrhonist's doubts. For 
the Pyrrhonist sceptic is commonly understood to have challenged his opponents on 
rational grounds and to have advocated moderation of feeling and behaviour as sensible 
criteria for living. Uncertainty and the suspension of his judgement are the consequences 
of a rational process and the exercise, as Hallie phrases it, of "a set of argumentative 
techniques strong enough to enable him to refute all opinions held by anyone".52 By 
contrast, Dostoyevsky's narrator arrives at uncertainty through a response to that which 
is beyond and even opposed to reason, and in so far as his response is characterized by an 
unruly discontent, uncertainty and its effects in the narrative differ sharply from the 
ancient Greek sceptic's practical criterion as well as from his methods. 
The dissatisfaction with reason that is the first indication of this alternative criterion is 
evident in the underground man's reading of history, which he believes confirms his 
suspicion that man is not a preeminently rational animal: 
[ ... ] cast a glance over the history of mankind: what do you see? Sublimity? [ ... ] 
Variety? [ ... ] Monotony? [ ... ] In short, anything can be said of world history, 
anything conceivable even by the most disordered imagination. There is only one 
thing that you can't say - that it had anything to do with reason. (p37) 
Rational argument, then, is rejected as an appropriate methodology for understanding 
51 
52 
As Bakhtin does in Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, pp42-43. 
Sextus Empiricus. Selections from the Major Writings, px. 
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human experience, and reason is denied its privileged position as a source of enlightened 
critique illuminating the system from a point outside it. In fact the narrator implies that 
reason is inadequate to delineate anything but a limited field of inquiry and is frequently 
constitutive of the problems it attempts to illuminate. For reason helps constitute the 
systems which mediate experience for us. Reason, he maintains, obscures and diverts 
where it intends to disclose and instruct. Thus where Sextus Empiricus is prepared to 
doubt his own arguments ('We declare at the outset that we do not make any positive 
assertion that anything we shall say is wholly as we affirm it to be"),53 Dostoyevsky's 
narrator doubts the usefulness of arguments, which explain, contain, exclude, and, he 
maintains, falsify: 
[ ... J man is so partial to systems and abstract deductions that in order to justify his 
logic he is prepared to distort the truth intentionally. (p31) 
So what is the "truth" that is in danger of being distorted here? A suspicion of rational 
argumentation in Notes is in many ways consistent with the use of images and emotion in 
The Devils to represent the voice of faith. Images, in the latter instance, frequently act 
as more powerful communicators of the sanctity of life than doctrinaire speechifying. But 
the metaphysical questions of the later novel are not addressed in Notes, at least, not in 
the text as we know it. The discomfort with rationality, though characteristically 
Dostoyevskyean, must therefore be considered outside any specifically theological or 
moral framework. 
After much prevarication, this 'other' of the narrator's rhetoric that is also his criterion 
for refutation is referred to as "caprice", although the concept remains as elusive for the 
narrator to define as it is for the critic to translate.54 On p33 the underground man 
describes this "best and greatest good" that nonetheless defies analysis as: 
One's own free and unfettered volition, one's own caprice, however wild, one's own 
fancy, inflamed sometimes to the point of madness [ ... J 
Caprice, volition, self-will, then, appear to be representative terms for a form of 
wayward inventiveness which, like the discourse of Mr Verkhovensky in The Devils, 
manifests itself in a rhetoric that is both devious and contradictory: 
53 
54 
It would be better if I believed even a small part of everything I have written 
p31. 
See Julia Annas's remarks on this in 'Action and character in Dostoevsky's Notes 
from Underground. 
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here. I swear, gentlemen, I don't believe a word, not one single little word, of all I 
have scribbled down. That is, I do perhaps believe it, but at the same time, I don't 
know why, I feel or suspect, that I'm lying like a trooper. (p44) 
But caprice is not merely an affair of a calculated artfulness, for it has unpredictable 
consequences for those who follow through its promptings. It simply will not "fit into any 
classification" of appropriate responses. Those who choose to ignore it on this account, 
however, are even more defenceless against its intrusions, since its omission, says the 
narrator, always sends "all systems and theories to the devil". (p34) Hence the double 
function of "caprice" as both critique and creativity in relation to more socially 
acceptable discourse. 
llI. ii. "L'innommable": naming the unnameable 
Others besides the narrator have played with what has come to be thought of as a 
contemporary project, in other words, naming the unnameable, writing to erase, or, less 
evasively, attempting to account for that which can be neither systematized nor ignored 
as a force in the creative process. The narrator's preoccupation with something which 
cannot be defined, his restlessness and impatience of limits can, in fact, be interpreted in 
relation to several already familiar frames of reference. Romanticism is one of these. 
For the romantic is commonly conceived as one who makes a virtue of the ineffable, and 
who seeks beyond the boundaries of the finite for a more sublime space in which to think 
and dream. This finds a correspondence in the narrator's longing for "something different, 
entirely different, which I am eager for, but which I shall never find." (p43)55 Victor 
Terras points to the defence of the "irrational and intuitive principle against the 
rational and intellectual" in Dostoyevsky, as evidence of his romanticism (in the "broad 
anthropological" meaning of the term).56 Although Terras mentions Notes only in 
passing, there is, as I have already indicated, a concerted defence of the non-rational in 
the novella fundamental to the narrator's problematic criteria, which could, for this 
reason, be called 'romantic'. 
The rubric of romanticism is unsatisfactory, however. The deceits and prevarications of 
the underground man are at odds with the bias towards "intuitive goodness and wisdom" 
Terras identifies as a complementary attribute of the romantic-irrational principle in 
55 
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M.H Abrams makes a combined yearning and striving for something other a 
defining feature of the romantic, with whom "Humanity's unquenchable 
aspirations beyond its limits [ ... ] became humanity's chief glory and triumph over 
the pettiness of circumstance". (A Glossary of Literary Tenns, p116) 
'Dostoevskij's aesthetics in its relationship to romanticism', p21. 
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Dostoyevsky.57 In addition, the disparaging references in Part II to the Rousseauesque 
"homme de la nature et de la verite" (p63) and the narrator's indulgence in "a lot of 
European, George-Sandish, ineffably noble and subtle nonsense", (pl07) suggest a certain 
irritability on the narrator's part with the sublimity and grandeur frequently 
accompanying the Romantic concept of infinitude. 58 Dostoyevsky's narrator, it must be 
remembered, is the man who whinges for weeks on end with toothache. 
This is where the post-modern fascination with the unnameable, a potentially more 
elusive concept than romantic sublimity, appears to offer some more appropriate 
reference points for Dostoyevsky's narrator's criterion. Derrida's "unnameable" in the 
essay on 'La differance', the "jeu qui fait qu'il y a des effets nominaux", is too consciously 
platitudinous a concept to suit the mysterious hints let fall by Dostoyevsky's narrator 
about his wildcard. 59 Kristeva's thinking on the semiotic, on the other hand, and 
particularly the psychology of the abject associated with it in Pouvoirs de l'horreur, 
yields some appropriate theoretical metaphors for Notes from Underground (more so 
than for The Devils with its metaphysical referent). In all of her works Kristeva could 
be said to address the problem of criteria "under erasure" as she attempts a reading of the 
desires and uncertainties that disrupt an ordered, rational existence. She writes of the 
"perte inaugurale" on which meaning and subjectivity are founded; the sense of lack 
which harks back to the separation at childhood from the realm of chaotic desires and 
instincts characterizing union with the mother.60 Memory of this loss, she suggests, 
marks the subject with a permanent instability, in so far as the archaic drives may 
always reassert themselves, drawing the subject back to the place "ou Ie sens s'effondre". 
(p9) The undergound man's express love of chaos and destruction, like Mr Verkhovensky's 
excitement over the fire, indicate, in a Kristevan context, a pull towards an instinctual, 
pre-verbal chaos. (p40) Kristeva calls this the abject in Pouvoirs de l'horreur, and she 
locates it not in the other but in the subject. The "unnamable" concerns an intra-textual 
drama as the subject: 
57 
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p21. 
Note that on pp49-50, the narrator, while seeming to invite a comparison with 
romanticism, is quick to dissociate himself from German and French romantics with 
their "transcendental souls". 
"111 n'y a pas de nom pour cela': lire cette proposition en sa platitude. Cet 
innommable n'est pas un etre ineffable dont aucun nom ne pourrait s'approcher: 
Dieu, par exemple. Cet innommable est Ie jeu qui fait qu'il y a des effets nominaux, 
des structures relativement unitataires ou atomiques qu' on appelle noms, des 
chaines de substitutions de noms, et dans lesquelles, par exemple, l'effet nominal 
Idifferance' est lui-meme entraJ:ne, emporte, reinscrit [ ... ]". (Marges de la 
philosophie, p28) Elsewhere Derrida's comments on the other of language are 
more suggestive without, however, his resorting to metaphors of 'depth'. (See, for 
example, the interview in Dialogues with Richard Kearney.) 
Pouvoirs de l'horreur, p12. 
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"[ ... ] las de ses vaines tentatives de se reconnaitre hors de soi, Ie sujet trouve 
l'impossible en lui-meme: lorsqu'il trouve que l'impossible, c'est son etre meme, 
decouvrant qu'il n'esf autre qU'abjet. (pI2) 
The sense of incompleteness and revolt in Notes that is dissociated from a transcendent or 
visionary ideal may thus be accounted for in psychoanalytic terms. 
The description of the experience of abjection in Kristeva, like the account of the 
disruptive energies of the semiotic in Desire in Language are, to my mind, convincing 
theoretical models for the slippage towards unreason and mayhem in Dostoyevsky's 1864 
narrative. But I would, again, endorse a Kristevan reading only with certain 
reservations. The explanatory core on which Kristeva's analysis is based necessitates 
acceptance of the role played by a particular moment in the subjects' history, and of 
Kristeva's interpretation of this event. Kristeva's "unnamable" relies for its coherence 0 
a particular extra-textual referent that Dostoyevsky's Notes does not explicitly, or even 
coyly, recommend, any more than it does a theological referent. Furthermore, Kristeva's 
reponse as a psychoanalyst to the phenomenon of abjection envisages a form of art-as-
therapy for naming and expurgating chaos. Art, in which anarchy is more readily 
expressed than in other forms of discourse, is thought capable of sublimating the chaos it 
unleashes.61 
In Notes from Underground, however, no such relief is envisaged. The narrator's art turns 
back on itself and shouts its hollowness and dissatisfaction ("My jokes are in bad taste 
[ ... ] uneven, confused, full of self-distrust"), (p2S) while at the end of the work the 
narrator professes to a sense of shame rather than catharsis after pouring his petty 
confessions into an imagined readerly ear. (pI22) There is a quality of gnawing, grumbling 
pain, as well as revolt, in the narrator's protests and a paradoxical reluctance to abandon 
certain questions even while refusing any known framework in which they might be 
better understood. ("Gentlemen, of course I'm joking [ ... ] but you know you mustn't take 
everything I say for a joke. I may be joking with clenched teeth. Gentlemen, there are 
some questions that torment me [. .. ]"). (p39) Like Beckett's narrator in L'innommable the 
voice from the underground keeps on keeping on, yet without having been relieved of its 
burden, "sans espoir de treve, sans espoir de creve". Despite admitting to the ambivalent 
tastes of the masochist, who extracts pleasure from pain, the narrator is left lacerating a 
wound that, in the end, aches dully and stupidly, and without the dizzying release of 
61 
"Les diverses modalites de purification de l'abjet -les diverses catharsis -
constituent l'histoire des religions, et s'achevent dans cette catharsis - par 
excellence qu'est l'art, en de<;a et au-dela de la religion. Vue sous cet angle, 
I' experience artistique, enracinee dans I' abjet qu' elle dit et par la meme purifie, 
apparait comme la composante essentielle de la religiosite". (p2S) 
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Kristeva's semiotic or abject intoxications. 
In addition, there is a sense in which the narrative exposes the limits of its criteria 
while inviting the reader to feel the full force of its criticisms. The ''best and greatest 
good" which challenges systematic readings of experience with representations of their 
aridity, narrowness and abstractionism reveals, when reflected in the same mirror, a not 
dissimilar, stuffy artificiality: 
After all, we don't even know where 'real life' is lived nowadays, or what it is, 
what name it goes by. Leave us to ourselves, without our books, and we at once get 
into a muddle and lose our way - we don't know whose side to be on or where to 
give our allegiance, what to love and what to hate, what to respect and what to 
despise. [ ... J Soon we shall invent a method of being born from an idea. (p123) 
On the last page of the novella, where the above passage comes from, the underground 
man leaves the reader in considerable doubt as to the reliability of the criteria referred 
to in Part 1. What has occurred in between the first section, with which the present 
chapter has been principally concerned, and the end of Part II, which I will consider more 
specifically in the following chapter, is of considerable significance in appreciating the 
ambivalence of the criterion the underground man is so reluctant to pin down. The 'Story 
of the Falling Sleet' (Chapter 2) makes clear that the crucial factor in the challenge to 
"systems and abstract deduction", (p31) is found not so much on the inter- or intra textual 
levels, but on the level of interpersonal relationships - something I believe is closer to 
the heart of Bakhtin's concerns than Kristeva's with her interest in the "impossible 
within" . 
Even in this least of metaphysical works, then, the reader seems to be led back to a 
contemplation of some form of transcendent criterion, if not the" Archimedean point" 
scepticism and postmodernism deny. The criterion that is despairingly and playfully 
elusive in Part I of the novella acquires momentary definition in the narrator's encounter 
with Liza in the 'Story of the Falling Sleet'. Here it is grounded not in the psyche nor in 
the polyphonic clash and blend of ideas, but at the crossroads of self and other. This by 
no means excludes the idea of loss as the ground of being. But it gives the experience of 
loss an orientation and a responsibility. I wish to take up this theme in Chapter 3. 
Nevertheless, it is the aspect of Dostoyevsky's criterion which will ultimately place his 
more 'semiotic' mode in perspective. The search for something "I shall never find" marks 
all of Dostoyevsky's reuvre but the potential for destruction and introverted 
abstractionism accompanying this 'search' is placed in corrective tension with the 
criterion of truth-as-relationships, briefly experienced but not acknowledged by the 
narrator of Notes from Underground. 
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Projet pour une revolution a New York 
IV. i. Invention and the mise en question of contemporary mythology 
Images of violence and a surreal urbanism translate the question of the criterion in Projet 
into a very different context to the one provided by Notes from Underground. Likewise 
the peevishness of Dostoyevsky's narrator and the uneven texture of his prose are 
flattened in the twentieth-century text into a series of well-ordered units in which 
characters and scenes function as "les elements necessaires d'une machinerie bien huilee". 
(p7) In both their style and preoccupations, the two narratives seem to hail from 
imaginary worlds that are fundamentally alien to one another. 
Despite their dissimilarities, however, the novels are structured on the basis of a 
common principle. More precisely, Dostoyevsky's underground narrative and Robbe-
Grillet's urban underworld derive from a similar protest against the limitations of a 
rationalist framework and desire for greater scope for invention. In Projet's "avis au 
lecteur" (an extract from an article by the author) we find Dostoyevsky's exaltation of 
caprice defended in more prosaic terms: 
Apres la faillite de l' ordre divin (de la societe bourgeoise) et, a sa suite, de l' ordre 
rationaliste (du socialisme bureaucratique), il faut pourtant comprendre que seules 
des organisations ludiques demeurent desonnais possibles. 
In other words, the metanarratives of metaphysics and rationality are rejected in the 
transformation of the novel into a playground. As is obvious from essays and interviews, 
Robbe-Grillet makes this playground representative of the imaginative freedom which 
is the novelists' criterion in relation to other discourses. The "parole ludique" is the New 
Novelist's version of the ''best and greatest good" that "sends all systems and theories to 
the devil", the disorder that counters order, the revolution that declines to align itself 
with any political programme. 
Robbe-Grillet's "parole ludique" in Projet is an ambivalent concept at once conservative 
and experimental in its relationship to other discourses. For in the attempt to be free of 
restrictions, ludism withdraws from social engagement into a highly privatized space. 
In doing so, however, it is no longer in a position to challenge the system and is 
acquiescent by default to its laws. As already indicated in the introduction to this 
chapter Robbe-Grillet's essays and addresses reflect this difficulty, the need for escape 
battling it out with the desire to confront and be taken seriously. That Robbe-Grillet has 
." 
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in mind some form of confrontation between his own and society's discourse in Projet, 
however, seems clear from his prefatory remarks. Describing the assemblage of 
narrative material for the work he relates: 
Lorsque je lis les faits divers scandaleux ou criminels, lorsque je regarde les vitrines 
et les affiches qui composent la fa<;ade de toute grande ville, lorsque j' accomplis un 
parcours dans les couloirs du metropolitain, je me trouve assailli par une multitude 
de signes dont l'ensemble constitue la mythologie du monde ou je vis, quelque chose 
comme l'inconscientcollectif de la societe, c'est-a-dire a Ia fois I'image qu'elle 
veut se donner d'elle-meme et Ie reflet des troubles qui la hantent. 
Robbe-Grillet thus validates his narrative material by pointing out its correspondence 
with certain already familiar signs and images in the world around him. This is a line of 
argument which might be adopted by a realist writer, although Robbe-Grillet departs 
from the realist project when he indicates his intention to subvert rather than reflect 
society's discourse about the "monde ou [il] vis". Subversion is to be accomplished by an 
exposure of the contrived nature of that discourse as Robbe-Grillet fragments and 
rearranges its separate elements so as to undermine the authority of its coherence as a 
totality. What we call 'reality' is to be revealed as a procession of socially constructed 
stereotypes, a triumph, as Roland Barthes would say, of artifice rather than 'truth': 
Designees en pleine lumiere comme stereotypes, ces images ne fonctionnent plus 
comme les pieges du moment qu' elles seront reprises par un discours vivant, qui 
reste Ie seul espace de rna liberte. 
The revolutionary potential of Iud ism is now clarified. Through mockery of discourses 
that purport to represent the world, formalist play is to show all such discourse to be 
simply "une creation humaine, qu'une autre creation humaine peut detruire",62 thus 
freeing author and reader alike to embark on their own interpretative adventures, free of 
the ponderous grid of traditional frameworks. 
IV. ii. The parole ludique in action: a dialogue between texts? 
Two discourses that are caught up in formal play in Projet are those of the crime thriller 
and the pornography industry respectively. It is the second which is more representative 
of the socio-cultural sphere referred to in the preface, and the second, too, which has 
elicited most comment from critics. But the two 'mythologies' are closely linked and 
reference to them in the narrative ensures something of the "correlation between texts" 
Kristeva associates with the "ambivalent word" of the novel. Because Robbe-Grillet's 
62 Nouveau roman; hier, aujourd'hui, p97. 
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chief method of responding to other discourses is through stylistic permutations Projet 
could be said to correspond to the first category of "ambivalent words" Kristeva discusses 
in Desire in Language, namely, that of stylizing effects. As Kristeva explains: 
Stylizing effects establish a distance with regard to the word of another [ ... J. This 
category of ambivalent words is characterized by the writer's exploitation of 
another's speech - without running counter to its thought - for his own purposes; 
he follows its direction while relativizing it.63 
To the extent that it incorporates different styles of writing and enters into critical 
dialogue with them, the narrative of Projet approaches this level of ambivalence. For 
each 'text' theoretically challenges the authority of the other and relativizes the 
habits of perception it represents. 
A challenge to our perceptual habits is implicit in Robbe-Grillet's games with the 
thriller genre. One of his principle techniques of subversion in this regard is the use of 
rapid changes in narrative perspective, as on pp22-23, for example, where the principle 
'je' narrator watching his pursuers becomes, without warning, a "silhouette fuyante" 
watched by them. This mutability in narrative voice has the effect of weakening any 
sense of a unique event with a correspondingly unique meaning. What 'really' happens is 
not a single but a multiple phenomenon as something slightly different is seen and told by 
each narrative voice when it takes up the tale. Since none of the voices has the 
superhuman knowledge of the popular detective, there is no-one to explain the 
significance of puzzling details which must therefore remain in pointillist suspension 
unless blended by a readerly eye. What, for instance, is the rapport "entre cette 
mefiance comprehensible et Ie geste ambigu ebauche par l'autre personnage"? the 
narrator wonders. (p22) As every narrator, including this one, is engaged in the pursuit of 
his own imaginary enemies and fetishes, the other's gesture is of no relevance to him 
until he makes it otherwise, mentally appropriating it to fit his own adventure. Such an 
emphasis on subjective mind shakes the reader's confidence in the idea of a reality 
commonly understood and shared by all. When we think we are engaged in meaningful 
social transactions, the novel implies, we may likewise be engaged merely in some ludic 
activity of our own. 
Chases, escapes and other trappings of the crime-thriller novel, however, provide little 
more than atmosphere and pace in comparison with the sado-erotic material which 
dominates the book. This, it would seem, is the "multitudes de signes" of the preface, the 
"multitude" being more indicative of the number of times this sign is referred to than of 
63 Desire in Language, p73. 
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any variety in the sign itself. But, as Robbe-Grillet explains, eroticism is one of the 
images which haunt the collective consciousness, and as such, it is part of the 
contemporary mythology he is concerned to address, while distancing himself through 
the teasing mockeries of the "parole ludique". 
Some of the games Robbe-Grillet plays to break the power of the pornographic myth 
employ the techniques of discontinuity, humour and theatricality. By designating a 
formal interruption in the middle of a torture session, for example, the narrative de-
realizes the sadism involved and counters guilty fear with laughter. Asking for a 
refreshment break in the middle of proceedings ("entre les deux parties du programme, 
vous devrez me servir a boire et me preparer une collation: des oeufs au jambon, par 
exemple"), (p99) JR's executioner transforms the affair into something ludic and 
ludicrous, as if inviting derision of the salacious nature of the episode. Constant 
references to the novel's aesthetic machinery, to scenes, masks and theatre, create 
additional distancing effects, indicating that the fantasy world in which readers are 
invited to indulge is also carefully controlled in order that, as the preface informs us, "ces 
images ne fonctionnent plus comme les pieges". 
IV. iv. Revolution or complicity? 
Just how far Robbe-Grillet does, in fact, avoid these traps (and encourage his readers to 
do likewise) is a subject of contention amongst critics. Whereas most seem to agree on the 
importance of the freeplay of the imagination as a principle in Robbe-Grillet, not all see 
his treatment of sado-erotic material in Projet as convincing practice of either 
imaginative freedom or critical engagement. 
Leki and Stoltzfus both accept the author's reading of the sado-erotic discourse in the 
novel which is, essentially, that once placed in the context of aesthetic play it becomes 
ideologically and morally innocuous and susceptible of manipulation by author and 
reader alike. Leki reiterates Robbe-Grillet's claims about the inherently subversive 
nature of experimental texts, noting that lithe only revolution to which a writer can 
contribute is not a change in government but a change in the manner of perceiving the 
world."64 Her assessment of violent sexuality in Projet accords with the author's remarks 
in the preface to the novel, and with the narrative's own designation of its revolutionary 
triptych - "Ie viol, l'incendie, Ie meurtre" - as "actions lib era trices majeures" in a 
formalist playground: 
64 Alain Robbe-Grillet, p98. 
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Rather than allowing the overwhelming city to crush him, Robbe-Grillet chooses 
to recognize that the city's hold on him is one of mythology, of billboard posters; 
he too can play the game and control the city by controlling its mythology and 
using that mythology for his own ends.65 
Ben Stoltzfus similarly judges that the work's experimental nature is a means of gaining 
control over its thematic preoccupations and that Projet thus succeeds in affirming: 
different values, setting up a dialogue between the self and the other, between the 
subconscious (imagination) and language (the establishment), between the inside 
and the outside.66 
Both critics assume that the emphasis on the fantastic nature of sado-erotic images and 
the formal dislocations to which these are subject are adequate means of 'revolutionizing' 
the myth involved. 
Other critics dispute this. Suleiman, Kryssing-Berg and Clayton all judge the work to be 
complicitous rather than revolutionary in its relation to contemporary mythology. In 
their eyes the novel's formal experiments are little more than that, namely, formal 
games which effect no Significant changes on the material borrowed from society's 
"langue", and which therefore accord only too well with Robbe-G rille t' s assertion that 
form is not answerable to signification ("Ne pourrait-on avancer au contraire que Ie 
veritable ecrivain n'a rien a dire? II a seulement une maniere de dire.")67 Their principle 
objection is that the novel's obsession with one "myth" to the exclusion of others and the 
predictable way in which it is treated (the victims are always young and beautiful, 
always constrained, always prettily marked with blood, always timorous yet 
complaisant), argue a high degree of complacency and a notable absence of the 
ambivalence that might be expected to characterize the subversive text. Suleiman 
remarks that "every single sequence is centered around a sado-erotic event",68 and 
concludes, with reference to the novels' affinity with Sadean fantasies: 
Viewed in the light of the Sadean intertext, Projet pour une revolution a New York 
takes on a curiously non subversive aspect. Far from deconstructing male fantasies 
of omnipotence and total control over passive female bodies, Projet repeats them 
with astonishing fidelity.69 
Kryssing-Berg makes a similar comment regarding the repetitious nature of the text's 
material and the author's failure to represent different perspectives or even liberate his 
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p1D8. 
The Body of the Text, p147. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p42. 
Subversive Intent, p59. 
p67. 
86 
narrative from the one with which it is mainly preoccupied: 
Pourquoi dire et redire dans toutes ses interviews que, pour lui, l'artiste, en creant, 
se purge de ses propres fantasmes, et, en meme temps, libere Ie lecteur ou Ie 
spectateur, alors que la valeur therapeutique de cette creation est niee par la 
circularite du roman? 70 
Clayton goes one step further when he suggests that the formal changes, or textual 
revolutions, in the novel are themselves an extension of the ideological complacency 
Suleiman and Kryssing-Berg refer to, the rigid theatricality of narrative material 
negating the changeability implicit in creativity as well as life: 
Robbe-Grillet takes us into an aestheticized world outside of change - not a world 
of human creativity at alL71 
My own reading of the novel tends to confirm these criticisms. Touches of humour provide 
some light relief but not the refreshment of a change of perspective. The fragmentation 
of sado-erotic scenes has a similarly limited impact because the latter are replayed so 
often the effect is the same as if they had never been broken off at all. As the sado-erotic 
myth is concentrated on to the near-exclusion of others, the failure to undermine its 
meaning is all the more obvious. (Note especially the series of snapshot scenes towards 
the end of the novel, pp203-214, each of which is interrupted with the word "coupure", 
but each of which develops a thread of the same mega-narrative.) 
To the reservations of Suleiman, Kryssing-Berg and Clayton, I would add the novel's 
treatment of potentially resistant readers, and its reliance on self-reference within the 
Robbe-Grillet corpus as a substitute for extended dialogue with other texts.72 Suleiman 
70 'Onirisme et voyeurisme dans Projet pour une revolution Ii New York d' Alain 
Robbe-Grillet', p12. 
71 'The Aesthetics of sado-masochism', p116. 
72 For further comment on the problem of complicity in the mythology Robbe-Grillet 
purports to subvert see Leslie Hill's article, 'Robbe-Grillet: formalism and its 
discontents', which takes a critical stance on the subject, and Raylene Ramsay'S 
article (see O'Callaghan) 'The sadist and the siren. Modern myth in the writing of 
Alain Robbe-Grillet', which is more cautious. Ramsay asks whether Robbe-
Grillet's game is "in fact the [. .. J liberation he claims", or whether it is rather the 
"demonstration of an imprisonment?", going on to suggest that the bi-sexual 
characters in Djinn and Topologie are one way in which Robbe-Grillet would parry 
such an accusation. In her 1992 book on Robbe-Grillet, Ramsay raises an important 
point when she writes "we need to know more about the alternatives to a cerebral, 
controlled masculine erotic and the kinds of "liberating" forms the flow of feminine 
desire might take before we condemn the former in favour of the latter. As yet 
feminine desires have remained elusive, and it is not clear that they can be 
defined without reference to the masculine desires in power." (Robbe-Grillet and 
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mentions the dialogues in the novel between the narrator and a "hypothetical reader" 
and judges their main effect to be one of de-realizing the text ("The effect of these 
dialogues [ ... ] is to "de-realize" the fiction and to insert the problem of the reading of the 
text into the very space of its unfolding").73 In my view, however, a chief purpose of 
these dialogues is to anticipate and out-manCEuvre readerly criticism, thus protecting the 
narrative from a dialogue that might undermine its raison d'etre by introducing 
undesirable levels of ambivalence into its coded obscurities.74 Even the text's humour is 
sometimes employed as a method of controlling the reader/text dialogue. The self-
parody implicit in the little girl's dismissal of the taped porn drama "ils disent toujours 
la meme chose", (p65) and her bored "Oh ~a alors", (p67) deflate readerly scorn by giving 
the text the first laugh at its own foibles. But it is the mock reader/narrator 
interrogation in which the novel is put on trial that constitutes the text's real "piece de 
resistance" in this regard. 
A cross-examination of the novel by the novel would seem a means of fulfilling the 
ultimate requirement of the subversive text, namely, its own self-questioning. In this 
case, however, self-questioning is only a more concerted attempt by the 'text' to justify 
itself and defend itself from censure. Objections to the narrator's obsession with sado-
erotics - "N'avez-vous pas tendance a trop insister [ ... ] sur l'aspect erotique des scenes 
rapporh~es?" - (pp188-189) are countered with the suggestion that a lot more could have 
been said that was, in fact, discreetly omitted. Criticism is further parried with the 
hint that it is the hypothetical reader who is placing too much importance on these 
scenes, (p191) and so the reader who is guilty of seeking titillation where none is 
intended. The exchange between narrator and reader is little more than a monologue, as 
are the exchanges between the male torturers and their female victims in the novel. In 
both cases, the novels' themes of "Le viol, l'assassinat, l'incendie" (p153) are presented 
as the fulfilment of the desires (explicit or unavowed) of both parties. 
73 
74 
Modernity, p170) 
In support of this implicit reservation is a recent Express article which suggests 
that: "La litterature erotique n'est plus la seule affaire du sexe fort" but comes, 
rather, with "un seul message aux hommes: 'Je suis ton objet, mais, en retour, tu es 
aussi Ie mien"'. ('Sur Ie papier coucMes ... ', pp60-61) I am not convinced, however, 
that the phenomenon of mutual complicity such an article highlights absolves 
Robbe-Grillet from accusations of manic repetitiveness and ideological 
complacency in his 1970 novel. The novel provokes other objections besides gender-
based ones. 
Subversive Intent, pp59-60. 
In his article, 'The interrogation of the narrator in Robbe-Grillet's Project for a 
revolution in New York', Deneau does not go so far as this, suggesting simply that 
the "interrogation sequences" represent" a firm assertion" of the author's "right to 
record sado-erotic material" and a "built-in method of speaking or responding to 
some of Robbe-Grillet's less friendly readers". (p8) 
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The novel's use of intertextual references only adds to the insularity promoted by the 
reader /text dialogue. Although there is indirect reference to other literary conventions 
(the crime-thriller genre is the most obvious of these), the series of references to other 
Robbe-Grillet works are more readily identifiable with the result that the norms of the 
primary text are tacitly reinforced. The sado-erotic content in Projet refers readers to 
similar passages in Le voyeur, where sado-erotics is subtly underplayed, and to La 
maison de rendez-vous, where it is not. Reference is specifically made to the "Villa 
Bleue" from Maison on p33, while Laura is a variant of Lauren/Loraine from the same 
novel. Manneret is common to both Projet and Maison, Frank recalls the Franck from La 
jalousie and Doctor Morgan from Projet appears in the later novel Djinn. With the 
exception of Djinn, all the texts referred to rework a similar sado-erotic thematics. This 
is why William F. Van Wert's comments on intertextuality in Robbe-Grillet's Topologie 
pour une cite fantome, a similar work from the point of view of narrative material, seem 
inappropriate to the use of intertextuality in Projet: 
we can see that Robbe-Grillet's intertextuality is not mere narcissism or simple 
redundancy, but rather a game played in dead earnest with his 
readers/listeners/spectators. [ ... ] what appears to be self-indulgent repetition or 
self-allusion really engenders new meaning or "recuperates" old meanings.75 
In Projet , however, new meanings are old meanings and the game is one for which the 
author holds all the cards. The specific intertextual references in Projet are to different 
works that deal with the same themes and in a similar fashion, while the reader's 
ability to identify these represents the limits of her role in the game the author has 
invented, earnestly or otherwise. 
For these reasons Robbe-Grillet's criterion in Projet is, in the final analysis, as different 
from Dostoyevsky's as are the trappings of mechanistic urbanism from the scrufolous 
discontent of the underground. Although Dostoyevsky's narrator is comparably insular in 
his response to others, including the hypothetical reader, his insularity is flawed due to 
an uneasiness with the random freedom that is his stated criterion. The narrator's 
discourse in Notes is intermittently shattered by awareness of "something different, 
entirely different", and an impulse towards this "something different" makes the notion 
of "caprice" more ambivalent than Robbe-Grillet's "invention du monde et de l'homme" 
in Projet. Although he challenges society's utilitarianism with reminders of the need for 
creativity, Robbe-Grillet seems content to make this point and thereafter ignore any 
problems that might be inherent in the material used as counters on the playing-board. 
Such conservatism is more pervasive than that of the Pyrrhonian sceptic because it is 
75 'Intertextuality and redundant coherence in Robbe-Grillet', p253. 
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neither fully acknowledged nor critically infonned. 
If nothing matters but being able to play, Robbe-Grillet's criterion in Projet is better 
defined as evasive than as unnameable, and naIvely shocking than subversive. 
Kristeva's comments on the pseudo-transgressions of erotic literature are pertinent here 
since they allow for a distinction between the word which transgresses in order to affirm 
a value, albeit an indeterminate and puzzling one (such as the criterion in Notes), and 
the word which transgresses in order to shock the authority-figure and so proclaim its 
own perverse dependence on it: 
In fact, this "transgression" of linguistic, logical, and social codes within the 
carnivalesque only exists and succeeds, of course, because it accepts another law. 
[ ... J We should particularly emphasize this specificity of dialogue as 
transgression giving itself a law so as to radically and categorically distinguish it 
from the pseudo-transgression evident in a certain modern "erotic" and parodic 
literature. The latter, seeing itself as "libertine" and "relativizing", operates 
according to a principle of law anticipating its own transgression.76 
Thus the novel's revolutionary project founders because it fails to identify a criterion that 
is distinctly 'other' in relation to the object of criticism. Its acquiescent relativism 
derives not through the sceptical practice of attaching equal weight to different 
meanings, but through a continuum of the same meaning. 
Le miroir qui revient 
V. i. lila nouvelle autobiographie" 
si la contradiction interne [entre l'identite de l'autobiographe et son personnageJ 
etait volontairement choisie par l'auteur, elle n'aboutirait jamais a un texte qu'on 
lirait comme une autobiographie; ni vraiment cornme un roman; mais a un jeu 
pirandellien d'ambiguite.77 
Robbe-Grillet's Le miroir qui revient is precisely the kind of generic changeling that 
Lejeune is referring to here. At once "une autobiographie" and "un roman" it demands a 
more flexible framework than that provided by either the conventional autobiography 
or novel form, offering its readers an interpretative guessing game in which reality takes 
on the appearance of fiction and vice versa. An important feature of this "jeu 
pirandellien", however, is that it avoids the uncritical flamboyance of a revolt for its 
own sake against recognized literary practice. If Robbe-Grillet transgresses the nonns of 
autobiography, as Lejeune defines them, such as the division between the author as 
76 
77 
Desire in Language, p71. 
Le pacte autobiographique, pp31-32. 
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writer and social citizen, the subscription to a code of realism, the promise to tell the 
truth,78 it is because he wishes to make a different kind of autobiographical statement to 
the one usually sanctioned by the genre. 
A book which may be read as conservative - Robbe-Grillet writing unequivocally at last 
of himself and his preoccupations - or as anarchic - Robbe-Grillet causing mayhem 
again by confusing fact and fiction - may alternatively be read as revolutionary, and in 
a manner in which Projet pour une revolution a New York is not. For unlike Projet, Le 
miroir initiates authentic dialogue between texts, a critical reading of another literary 
corpus which leads to a relativizing of the genre's legalism and a renewal of its forms. 
When Robbe-Grillet marks his departure from Lejeune's autobiographical formula he 
indicates that his digressions are in the interests of recasting the autobiographical 
thesis, rather than failing to address it through unavowed complicity or systematic 
negation. With reference to the second part of his autobiographical fiction, Robbe-
Grillet explains: 
je m'oppose tres fermement aux theses sur l'autobiographie de Lejeune par exemple 
qui insiste sur la coherence obligatoire de l'autobiographie, sur son projet de 
coherence. Certainement pas! L'autobiographie doit saisir la mouvance, se 
constituer de fragments qui bougent sans cesse. Comme il y a un 'nouveau roman', il 
faudra inventer une 'nouvelle autobiographie'.79 
In this case the work is consistent with Robbe-Grillet's statements about it. 
V. ii. Robbe-Grillet as autobiographical subject: lila depouille du monstre" 
Robbe-Grillet's identification with the autobiographical mode in Le miroir is 
sufficiently close to establish the common ground necessary for dialogue between texts, or, 
signifying-systems. Indeed, so cannily has the conventional discourse of autobiography 
been appropriated that Robbe-Grillet's ludic word seems to have been transformed into 
something cosily traditional in the process. As Jerome Garcin describes this venture into 
semi-domestic terrain: 
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Finalement, Alain Robbe-Grillet est un homme touchant. Grosse tete et regard 
noir, cet Elephant Man de la litterature objective [ ... J s'evertue a prouver qu'il a un 
cceur [ ... J. Avec Ie Miroir qui revient, Alain Robbe-Grillet publiait ses Memoires, 
oui, ses Memoires. Le statisticien disait 'je' comme vous et moi, il parIaH de 
'papa', de 'maman' et du grand-pere cap-homier [ ... J.80 
pp33 and 36 respectively. 
'Conversation avec Alain Robbe-Grillet', p91. 
p104. 
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In so far as Robbe-Grillet explicitly, and with evident pleasure, talks about himself in Le 
miroir he can be said to have fulfilled a basic requirement of the genre: that of self-
reference. He even warns the reader that he is going to do this, namely, take up the 
traditional autobiographer's guise with all that implies of individualism, truth to the 
'facts', poignant memories of past experiences. Even though he may describe this guise as 
lila depouille" of an ideological monster he is intending to decapitate, (pll) he appears 
not always to shed the ideological skin with quite the alacrity we might expect. In 
setting out to subvert autobiography Robbe-Grillet cannot resist writing one himself. 
In the course of his narrative, for example, we find quite banal autobiographical 
references to Robbe-Grillet's family members (his parents, grandparents, sister Anne-Lise 
and wife Catherine); to members of his profession (Barthes with whom Robbe-Grillet 
had a special affinity, Sartre and Camus whose works were valuable reference points for 
his own). There are anecdotes describing specific places and events, such as the family 
apartment in Brest, rue Gassendi; family holidays, successes at school, and early 
professional days with the Agricultural Institute before Robbe-Grillet's writing career 
was fully established. There is an account, too, of Robbe-Grillet's experiences in a 
German labour camp during the war, this last being a real-life event experienced by 
millions. All these things from the family or a wider social context give the work a 
verifiable realism that seems to set the seal on its authenticity as an autobiographical 
document. 
In addition, giving the documented facts their prescribed air of intimacy, is the element 
of personal revelation accompanying them. Anecdotes and images are interrelated in 
such a way as to contribute to a coherent picture of the man, and one, moreover, that is 
witty, charming and sensitive. The trauma at having walked on a tiny fledgeling 
sparrow in the school playground, (pp2DO-201) and the sound years later of shattering 
glass and his wife's "cri d'oiseau blesse" when he broke the delicately tinted blue bottle 
she prized; (pp188-189) recurring nightmares as a child (p14) and the shock as an adult 
on discovering the monstrous other face of German military order; (p12S) the meeting 
with critic Bruce Morrissette and the latter's theory about Robbe-Grillet's eccentric 
mother and conviction that Robbe-Grillet's formation in this respect was in accordance 
with the patterns of literary genius. (pp194-9S) However gently self-mocking this last 
may be, like the rest of the anecdotal material in the book, it has a potentially 
explicative function in relation to the reader's understanding of Robbe-Grillet the author 
and essayist - the heightened visual sensitivity and accompanying morbid eroticism in 
the novels, the iconoclastic campaign against authority in the essays. Further, it has a 
justificatory function in relation to Robbe-Grillet the man, eliciting our sympathy and 
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liking. In the same way, then, that Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Confessions 
demonstrates a need to win readers to his side and convince them of his innocence over the 
affair of MIle Lambercier's combs, so Robbe-Grillet in Le miroir seems to seek readerly 
approval, admitting to the need to "me justifier" in the eyes of this anonymous but 
indispensable other. (p42) 
On one level, therefore, it would seem the conditions of the "pacte autobiographique" 
have been fulfilled in that the "je" of the autobiographical narrative "renvoie au nom 
porte sur la couverture" ,81 that Robbe-Grillet as subject and object of the 
autobiographical discourse is one and the same person. 
V. iii. The prism of fantasy 
And yet, forestalling complacency on this count is the evident readiness of the Robbe-
Grillet persona to assume different guises in the narrative. This effectively undermines 
the whole concept of Robbe-Grillet the man and the autobiographer as being "one and the 
same person". At one point, for example, Robbe-Grillet takes on the identity of Camus's 
narrator in L'etranger, rewriting the prison episode as if he were Meursault. (pp166-171) 
Members of Robbe-Grillet's family are made to pass through the same prism of fantasy, 
emerging refracted and double, no longer themselves. Robbe-Grillet creates a link, for 
example, between his grandfather and one of his own fictional characters, "Ie vieux roi 
Boris". (p33) Edouard Manneret, who is a reflection of the same character-type in La 
maison de rendez-vous, reappears in Le miroir in connection with Henri de Corinthe and, 
through him, with the autobiographer himself, indirectly represented at a desk working 
on material redolent of Le voyeur. (p218) Robbe-Grillet thus makes a circuitous but 
deliberate link between his grandfather's identity and his own through the 
intermediary figure of Corinthe. Into a reassuringly veracious context, therefore, 
elements of fiction are introduced, intermingling with the anecdotal material so as to 
transform it into the stuff of personal legend. So neatly, in fact, are reality and fiction 
dovetailed in the work that it is difficult to identify any personality unequivocally 
with one or other of these two dimensions. Several of the main protagonists, at least, are 
amphibious creatures, and it is the narrator's refusal to separate what are usually 
distinct categories that creates the kinds of generic problems identified in general terms 
by Lejeune. 
One of the more significant ways in which the "romanesque" impinges on the 
autobiographical in Le miroir is through the aforementioned character of Henri de 
81 Le pacte autobiographique, p27. 
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Corinthe. From the outset Corinthe is shrouded in mystery and the writer speculates 
whether his existence may not even be the product of his own inventive memory, 
"mensongere et travailleuse". (p8) The fact that memories of his visits are the result of 
brief "entrevues comme entre les deux battants disjoints d'une porte accidentalement mal 
close", enables a potential association with Robbe-Grillet's novel La jalousie, where the 
narrator's reliance on discontinuous vision forces him into complete dependence on his 
imagination. This implicit assertion of fictionality is repeated more explicitly when, 
discussing the family's reception of this mysterious gentleman, it becomes clear they 
accord the same status to Corinthe's "pale fiancee" as to characters of fairy tale such as 
the "Hollandais maudit", an admission which is followed by the first of the strange, 
episodic tableaux which give the novel its title. (p20) The importance of Corinthe in 
determining the unorthodox nature of the work is, after all, foreshadowed in the opening 
pages where the autobiographer gives as his starting premiss not a revelation of his own 
character but an inquiry into the Corinthe persona. Who was Henri de Corinthe? Why 
did he visit the Robbe-Grillet family so often? Why was Robbe-Grillet as a small boy 
discouraged from approaching him? 
Ce n'est probablement que dans Ie but - incertain - de donner a de telles questions 
ne serait-ce qu'un semblant de reponse, que j'ai entrepris il y a quelque temps deja, 
de rediger cette autobiographie. (p9) 
The writer's attention is, from the first, explicity taken up with an imaginary character 
and not an autobiographical subject. 
Once again, however, it is the crossover from fiction to 'reality' and back again, not the 
fictionalizing of the whole, that makes this autobiography-cum-novel so complex. Jean-
Jacques Brochier has already noted the inquiries, prompted by the life-like quality of 
Henri de Corinthe, into likely historical counterparts. Henri de Kerillis and Henri 
Comte de Paris are two of the historical personages that have been designated as models 
for the Count - identities Robbe-Grillet himself suggests he may have confused with his 
own Henri de Corinthe. (pI03) References to broken reports of Henri de Corinthe's 
activities after World War II; (pp70-71) to articles about him in German newspapers; 
(pI74) and to his photograph in Paris, (pI7S) are ploys which seem to tie this character 
back into the world of empirical and historical 'reality'. The effect of this intersection 
of different discourses is to lend Henri de Corinthe a lifelike dimensionality while he, in 
turn, endows the discourse of realism with his own mytholOgical status. He increases 
while it decreases in substantiality, and all the world of the narrative seems peopled 
with phantoms, the principle of whom is the autobiographer himself. Hence Robbe-
Grillet's response when asked why he wrote an autobiography: 
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Mais non, je n'ai pas ecrit d'autobiographie, du moins au sens courant du terme. J'ai 
seulement, depuis le Miroir qui revient, bouleverse la donnee de mes recherches 
romanesques en y ajoutant un personnage qui s'appelle Alain Robbe-Grillet.82 
V. iv. The criterion: the inventive activity of memory and "Ie reel" 
The qualifying "du moins au sens courant du terme" may be emphasized, however, for it 
indicates an intent to revolutionize rather than reject out of hand the autobiographical 
genre, whose basic purpose is to inquire into what it means to be a person. Robbe-Grillet's 
investment in the autobiographical project in this fundamental sense is stated in his 
admission of the need to review the role of the personal in writing, "de s'interroger a 
nouveau sur Ie rOle ambigu que jouent, dans Ie recit mod erne, la representation du monde et 
l'expression d'une personne, qui est a la fois un corps, une projection intentionnelle et un 
inconscient". (pI2) Some of the implications of this view of the personal will be worked 
through in subsequent chapters, but so far as Le miroir is concerned it is the active role 
played by the memory, one facet of intentional projection, and the interference from "Ie 
reel", linked to the world of the unconscious, that are the really significant factors in 
Robbe-Grillet's reformulation of the autobiographical thesis. Memory and the monsters 
of imagination represent Robbe-Grillet's criteria for both subverting the traditional 
genre and rewriting it according to a schema of his own. Le miroir qui revient is thus 
neither relativistic nor negatively dogmatic in its positing of a "nouvelle 
autobiographie". 
The memory in Le miroir qui revient is what provides the clue to the double nature of 
some of its characters, at once people with a civil status in society and invented persona 
who play out different roles in their own and other people's imaginations. It is the 
memory which exposes the inadequacy of the narrow definitions of the personal 
permitted by social codes and practices and to which traditional autobiography to some 
measure defers.83 The frayed ribbon of memory, discontinuous and worked over by the 
imagination, is what effectively constitutes the identity of Robbe-Grillet the man at the 
same time as it transforms him, with Henri de Corinthe, into a figure of fantasy. 
Although there are what might loosely be termed 'real' memories in Le miroir, these, 
like all memories, are imperfect, incomplete, and overlaid with different images and 
impressions over a period of time. It is well known that memory-loss deprives a person of 
identity, but it is what the mind and imagination make of memories that seems to be 
more significant in Robbe-Grillet's understanding of the personal than the gift of recall. 
After a passage of remembered childhood happiness meandering about Paris with his 
82 
83 
L'evenement du Jeudi, pIOS. 
See Le pacte autobiographique, p23. 
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mother, sampling new tastes, sights, and smells, Robbe-Grillet observes: 
L'importance des choses - greIes saucisses aux aromates ou lampes electriques 
dissimules au milieu des feuillages - ne reside evidemment pas dans leur 
signification intrinseque, mais dans la fa<;on dont elles ont marque notre memoire. 
(p177) 
The memory is thus understood to be an active and not a passive faculty acting in 
isolation from others. It is as inescapably personal as identity itself to which it is 
inextricably linked. Memory, in association with the mind and imagination, assimilates 
images and experiences, reworking, transforming, interpreting, and most importantly, 
inventing. And if the autobiographer'S identity in Le miroir is so constituted, other 
identities are likewise shown to be complex structures of "vrais souvenirs" and invented 
experience in relation to this principle 'phantom'. For since both real and invented 
characters are stored in the same "memoire mensongere et travailleuse" and subject to its 
machinations, all acquire something of the mythological shimmer from which Corinthe 
emerges in the opening pages. Hence Robbe-Grillet's suggestion in Le miroir and in 
interviews about the work that characters from novels and films belong to the same 
world as members of his own family, particularly those, like his grandparents, furthest 
removed from him in time. From this it may be seen that the memory, which plays such 
a vital role in traditional autobiography, is equally vital to Robbe-Grillet's handling of 
the identity problem and so establishes a meeting point between conventional discourse 
and the "parole ludique". Robbe-Grillet's views on the memory as constantly interacting 
with the imagination are what permit him to be both Robbe-Grillet "l'homme" and 
Robbe-Grillet "Ie personnage", telling the story of his life and the fantasies of which it 
is composed, at the same time. 
The importance of fantasy in the life of a person as well as a writer cannot be too greatly 
stressed in a reading of Le miroir qui revient. If the slightly phantasmagoric quality of 
the people in Robbe-Grillet's life draws attention to an important aspect of how the mind 
works, so the vitality of the imaginary characters from film and fiction referred to in Le 
miroir leads to consideration of the obscure world of dreams from which they emanate, a 
world the conscious mind can only begin to encompass. In AngeIique ou l' enchantement, 
the second work in a proposed 'autobiographical' trilogy, Robbe-Grillet describes this 
unconscious aspect of the self, somewhat reluctantly, in terms of "le reel": 
Et si une ressemblance avec Ie monde doH etre recherchee, que ceia soit du moins 
avec Ie reel, c'est-a-dire l'univers qu'affronte et secrete tout a la fois notre 
inconscient (deplacements de sens, confusions, imaginaire paradoxal, reves, 
fantasmes sexuels, angoisses nocturnes ou eveillees ... ), et non pas avec Ie monde 
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factice de la quotidiennete, celui de la vie dite consciente, qui n'est que Ie produit 
froid et lenifiant de toutes nos censures: la morale, la raison, la logique, Ie respect 
de l' ordre etabli. (p 182) 
Without embarking on any psychoanalytic analysis Robbe-Grillet nonetheless makes "Ie 
reel" an important reference point for his understanding of the personal in Le miroir. This 
'other' of the conscious world of linguistic and social transactions provides constant 
interjections for which Robbe-Grillet leaves a sounding-space when representing himself 
and his family. "Le reel i ' is the source of the "monstres caches" from the nightmares of 
childhood (p14) which crouch, still, at the borders of the "tableau hyper-realiste" in 
the novels of adulthood. (p69) "Le reel" is a source of vulnerability in the armour of 
conscious poses and gestures that make up the public self (and, perhaps, the self of 
conventional autobiography prepared with the public in mind), and calls for a more 
fragmentary style of representation in both autobiography and novel. After sketching in 
some of his impressions of his grandfather, commenting on the persistent elusiveness of 
the 'essential' "grand-pere Canu", Robbe-Grillet underlines the vulnerabilty of every 
human identity, not just to physical death, but also to "la mort qui hurle entre les points": 
(p27) in other words, the constant threat of disintegration experienced by a self which 
owes its existence in the "ordre etabli" to the repression of the disturbing impulses, 
nameless fears and anxieties associated with "Ie reel".84 
Robbe-Grillet's interest in "Ie reel" in his approach to the identity question enables some 
form of dialogue between this otherwise sophisticated and urbane text and 
Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground, which also struggles with the 'other' of "Ie 
langage articule", with the desires and questionings that cannot always find appropriate 
expression in language or action. "Le reel" in Le miroir qui revient is for this reason closer 
to Dostoyevsky's "caprice" than the "parole ludique" in Projet which, for all its blatant 
capriciousness, is not so manifestly other to the conventional discourse with which it 
engages and which, in its slick aestheticism, lacks the disturbing, alluring quality, that 
sense, almost, of an elaborately staged failure in the face of the unnamable this reader 
finds in Le miroir. An orientation towards something other which is allowed, as it were, 
84 The notion of a self constructed in relation to an "ordre etabli" and vulnerable to 
interjections from "Ie reel" finds an echo in Kristeva and Lacan's view of the subject 
in psychoanalysis. Stoltzfus offers a brief Lacanian-inspired reading of Robbe-
Grillet in his article, 'Towards bliss: Barthes, Lacan, and Robbe-Grillet', while 
Robbe-Grillet himself makes passing reference to Lacan in 'Robbe-Grillet: "Je n'ai 
jamais parle d'autre chose que de moi': "Le Miroir qui revient correspond au stade 
du miroir lacanien: l'enfant recolle ses morceaux dans la glace et s'apen;oit que 
l'image de lui-meme est un autre!" (p6) A Lacanian reading of Robbe-Grillet, 
however, would have to consciously take into account the Robbe-Grillet "piege a 
psycho-machine" which the writer of Le miroir qui revient so obligingly points out 
to his readers. 
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to escape the intricately controlled patterning of Robbe-Grilh!t's "parole", even while 
these escapes are designated by that "parole" ("il me faut bien utiliser ce materiau-hl, Ie 
langage, si inadapte sait-il, puisque c'est cette conscience claire [ ... J qui se plaint du non-
sens et du manque"), (p41) also makes Le miroir more than a rehearsal of the inadequacy 
of language and the contrived nature of the sign-system through which we read the 
world. It is a highly personal text where the personal is bracketted, sceptically, in a 
series of questions, but not lost in consideration of the digressions offered by any linguistic 
system. 
v, v, Footnote 
It may not be too fanciful to suggest that Robbe-Grillet beats the traditional 
autobiographer at his own game in Le miroir, taking to even greater lengths his pursuit of 
the personal, the distinctly individual, the private. For on the one hand, there is the 
intriguing remark about the act of regicide committed by one of Robbe-Grillet's characters 
as being "une methode sure pour se faire reconnaitre comme individu", (p46) a neat 
summation of one of Robbe-Grillet's possible motivations in the rebellion against the 
sometimes weighty authority of traditional literary and critical attitudes. The remark 
in Le miroir that "je n'ai jamais parle d'autre chose que de moi" then acquires an added 
significance. To be himself, and to write about himself, Robbe-Grillet the individual 
must write against the traditional autobiographical project, with its air of chronological 
and confessional verity. 
Seen in this light there is a sense in which Robbe-Grillet's challenge to one of the most 
hallowed assurances of the "pacte autobiographique" also builds on the instinct to affirm 
the personal over the anonymous that this pact presupposes. Lejeune makes one of the 
great attractions of the autobiographical genre the desire to "savoir Ie nom de I'auteur". 
He goes on to stipulate, "Qui m'empecherait d'ecrire l'autobiographie d'un personnage 
imaginaire et de la publier saus son nom, egalement imaginaire? [ ... J Cela est rare, parce 
qu'il est bien peu d'auteurs qui soient capables de renoncer a leur propre nom".85 Robbe-
Grillet is one who has carried off this renunciation with aplomb. But I wonder whether 
in his attitude to the proper name, with its implications of private ownership, Robbe-
Grillet has not demonstrated a more subtle attachment to it? In common folklore, to know 
the name of someone is to have a measure of power over them, and even, in some stories, 
the power of life and death. The age-old superstition is something New Novelist 
Nathalie Sarraute revives with her conviction that to name something is to master and 
subdue it. Perhaps the very elusiveness of Robbe-Grillet's "nom pro pre" in the multiple 
85 Le pacte autobiographique, p27. 
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changes of identity in Le miroir , arises from his desire not to make others too free of 
something that is his. Revolt against the autobiographical genre is a means of being 
recognized as an individual, but not possessed and catalogued by a reading public. 
VI. Conclusion 
The critique of conventional discourse that is implicit in the works of both novelists 
cannot be said to be "rationally grounded". It is, however, linked to a criterion which 
may be tentatively identified with a spiritual and aesthetic awareness in The Devils, 
and with a more nebulous sense of incompleteness in Notes; with the need to play in 
Projet, and with the more consciously articulated sense of the place of creativity and the 
workings of the unconscious in our lives, in Le miroir. 
The two novelists' evident reluctance to name their criterion definitively, however, a 
reluctance which shows in the circuitous and sometimes self-contradictory way in which 
they present it, demonstrates their affinity with a more contemporary form of scepticism 
than that expressed by the original Greek Pyrrhonists, who showed no such hesitation in 
their use of "Ie langage articuh~". In this sense the "metanarratives" of the two novelists 
could be said to challenge the impulse for a rational criterion as proposed by the 
traditional philosopher, whether in his implicit acceptance of such a criterion, or in his 
assumption that, without it, critical debate and the possibility of renewing habitual 
terms of reference founder. However, depending on individual assessments of the 
different roles played by the language of the reason and the language of fantasy, this 
makes Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet neither more nor less sceptical than the ancient 
sceptic philosophers. Since rational analysis and that which is beyond reason both 
arguably have the power to challenge the narratives of a society and its members, our 
assessment of the question is likely to depend, in part, on our perception of which of these 
two discourses is accepted most uncritically in the "common life" of our own era. 
In the final analysis, however, the "unnameable" criterion as manifested in works like 
Notes and Projet is shown to have a limited role in reorienting the direction of the 
narrative. More decisive, in this regard, is the interpersonal other who could be said to 
play the kind of subversive role within the text which the text theoretically plays in 
relation to the "paratext" of conventional discourse. 
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Other minds, scepticism and the solipsistic hero 
Only the objective word - the word of other equal consdousnesses - can be counterposed 
by the author to the all-engulfing consciousness of the hero. 
(M.M. Bakhtin) 
I. i. The 'identity' question: ce tenne d'humain [ ... ] quel sens possede-t-il au juste? 
As a means of throwing his own writing style into relief Robbe-Grillet represents the 
nineteenth-century novel as one in which character and novelist are sure of themselves: 
the first because he triumphs over the world, the second because he triumphs over the 
characters, accurately discerning their doubts and passions. Such a novel, Robbe-Grillet 
argues, belongs to an age which marked the apogee of the individual,1 and in which man 
was confident of his place in a world that was only waiting, like Rastignac's Paris, to be 
conquered and understood. Our own twentieth-century world, Robbe-Grillet suggests, is 
"moins sur de lui-meme" and the novelist is consequently less certain of his powers of 
representation while his characters are made to reflect his anxieties and apprehensions. 
Underwriting these apprehensions with particular insistence is the uncertainty that 
attaches to the identity question: who am I? What does it mean to be human? For, 
discovering he is no longer at home in the world, the twentieth-century character, it 
seems, finds he is no longer at home for himself or the other. Doubts about individual and 
social identities, which the retreat from humanism has entailed, are demonstrated by 
other writers besides Robbe-Grillet - Sarra ute (Portrait d'un inconnu); Simon (La route 
des Flandres); Beckett (L'innommable) - as well as being designated by contemporary 
philosophers like Derrida who writes; "personne n'est la pour personne, pas meme pour 
soi [ ... ]"2 What is at issue here, I would suggest, is a contemporary rephrasing of Sextus 
Empiricus's view that "man is incapable of forming a ready conception of himself",3 that 
doubt about our ability to know objects of sense-perception extends to doubts about our 
ability to know ourselves and other minds. 
In this chapter I propose to examine some of the implications of this aspect of scepticism 
focussing in particular on the self/other relation in Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's 
style of characterization. I hope to show that the interpersonal dramas in their novels 
demonstrate not only a shift away from essentiqlist humanism but also the important 
1 
2 
3 
Pour un nouveau roman, p28. 
De la grammatologie, p332. 
Sextus Empiricus. The Major Writings, p134. 
100 
role that may be played by the other in constituting and subverting identity, in defining 
the human and in ensuring such definitions are never completed. The term 'identity' is 
thus an inappropriate one to apply to the novelists' characters because of its connotations 
of wholeness, perfection, and consistency. The one point at which it may be used with 
some justice is when the characters are conditioned by solipsism, according to which their 
perceptions are the only reality in a world that is entrapped by the "pathetic fallacy". 
In this case thought-processes tend to become static and obsessive as the characters 
assume the identity of monomaniacs. Otherwise, 'self', 'individual', 'person' are 
preferred terms in the chapter, partly because they are used by the novelists 
themselves,4 and partly because they reflect the attachment to personhood that is 
reflected in Dostoyevsky's unruly humanity, for example, and in Robbe-Grillet's manic 
inventors.S 
Dostoyevsky's place in this discussion is assured by Robbe-Grillet's pointed interest in 
one of his more perplexing characters - Stavrogin of The Devils - and by Dostoyevsky's 
own preoccupation with the vulnerability of his character's humanity. Despite his 
frequent reference of this vulnerability to a form of transcendence Robbe-Grillet denies 
Dostoyevsky's "living life", or, the "man in man", has, by virtue of its very fragility, 
something in common with Robbe-Grillet's "homme nouveau". The questioning of Derrida 
and Robbe-Grillet, therefore, who ask - "Que veut dire 'conscience'?",6 and, "Si ce n'est 
pas un mot vide de sens, quel sens possede-t-il au juste [ce terme d'humain]?"_7 is 
foreshadowed in the underground narrator's cry: "how am I [ ... ] to be sure of myself? 
Where are the primary causes on which I can take my stand, where are my 
foundations?" ,8 and in Peter Verkhovensky's realization in The Devils that the 
characters he has been manipulating are, in the end, beyond his comprehension and 
power to control. Before examining the novels, however - Dostoyevsky's The Devils and 
Notes from Underground, Robbe-Grillet's Le voyeur and Djinn - I wish to clarify the 
frames of reference in which Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet seem to operate with 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Dostoyevsky, for example, uses terms translated as 'person', 'self', 'individuality' 
in his notebooks. See The Unpublished Dostoyevsky I, p39. Robbe-Grillet uses 
'consciousness' when discussing the phenomenological aspects of his 
characterization, but also 'self', 'other' 'individual', in Three Decades, pp19l-l92. 
This sense of the personal is not reflected in the linguistic term 'subject', for 
instance, according to which the 'I' is first and foremost the subject pronoun of the 
verb. Dostoyevsky implicity disputes this view while Robbe-Grillet rejects it 
outright. See Le miroir qui revient, pplO-12. The terminology of psychoanalysis-
the 'ego', Lacan and Kristeva's 'other/Other' - introduces another possible set of 
references which I have not explored in the chapter. Note that David Patterson 
offers a Lacanian reading of Dostoyevsky's The Double in The Affirming Flame. 
Marges de la philosophie, p17. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p47. 
Notes from Underground, p27. 
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principle reference to Bakhtin (in Dostoyevsky's case) and Husserl (in Robbe-Grillet's 
case), either because of their own or others' association of these thinkers with their style 
of characterization. 
I. ii. Dostoyevsky: an incalculable yet present 'I'1 
One of the defining features of Dostoyevsky's characters is their unaccountability, and 
hence their tendency to exceed and contradict definitions of them by the narrator, other 
characters, or even, as Bakhtin would also add, by the author.9 Some aspects of their 
nature are left indeterminate which suggests a certain freedom of definition and capacity 
for change in Dostoyevsky's conception of the personal: a freedom clamorously defended 
by the undergtound man and demonstrated by minor as well as major characters in The 
Devils. The conception of the personal as something that cannot be systematized or 
explained is apparent throughout Dostoyevsky's ceuvre, Dmitri Karamazov from the 
last novel echoing something of Peter Verkhovensky's frustrations in The Devils when he 
declares: "Yes, man is wide, too wide, indeed. I would narrow him. I'm hanged if I know 
what he really is!"lO 
This element of incalculability would appear to be associated with a deliberate attempt 
on Dostoyevsky's part to drive a wedge between his characters wayward humanity and 
the structures of ideology and language which represent it. The use of eye-contact in 
Notes, for example, and Shatov's insistence in The Devils that a "man and his 
convictions are two different things" ,11 seem to designate a humanity prior to systems of 
signification. The "man in man" is thereby endowed with an innateness that is anathema 
to Robbe-Grillet, and incongruous with contemporary thinking on the inescapability of 
(linguistic) mediation in human experience.12 It is Bakhtin who, despite his own 
9 
10 
11 
12 
See Chapter 2 of Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. 
The Brothers Karamazov, p124. 
The Devils, p580. See my Chapter 2, p74, however, for some ethical implications 
of this attitude. 
Derrida's scepticism about identity, which I referred to in the opening paragraph 
to this chapter, could be cited a little more fully as an example of this awareness of 
the role of textuality in subverting an intrinsic, "present" humanity: "a travers la 
circulation et les renvois infinis, de signe en signe et de representant en 
representant, Ie propre de la presence n'a plus lieu: personne n'est la pour personne, 
pas meme pour soi; on ne peut plus disposer du sens, on ne peut plus l' arreter, il est 
emporte dans un mouvement sans fin de signification." In other words, the meaning 
of personality, like the meaning of the text, always escapes us. It is 'deferred' by 
the duplicities of the sign-system on which it depends. 
For Dostoyevsky, however, the interpersonal encounter introduces certain limits 
into this play of signification. To use Clark and Holquist's formulation of this 
difference in approach, from the interpersonal perspective, "We own meaning", 
whereas for the personalist, "] own meaning", while for the deconstructionist, "no 
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prioritizing of the socio-linguistic sphere, offers an appropriate theoretical description 
for this "innerly unfinalizable" aspect of Dostoyevsky's characters: 
one dare not turn a living person into the voiceless object of a secondhand 
(zaochnoe) finalizing perception. In every person there is something which only 
he himself can reveal in a voluntary act of self-consciousness and expression, 
something which is not amenable to an externalizing secondhand definition.13 
Bakhtin's reference to "self-consciousness" and "revelation" in his analysis of 
Dostoyevsky might seem to lead in the direction of a metaphysics of presence, and so to 
some essential self which '"existe', soit present, soit 'lui-meme' quelque part",14 as 
Derrida phrases it, in spite of its evasiveness. Yet if, as Dostoyevsky once wrote to a 
correspondent, "you can't get rid of your'!''', the "I" in Dostoyevsky is not only 
indeterminate, it is also incomplete through its relation with the other. So although 
selfhood has a clearer definition in Dostoyevsky than it does in Robbe-Grillet the self's 
orientation towards the other keeps that definition open. 
I. iii. The other who is my neighbour versus "universal man" 
Judging by his correspondence as well as by his novels otherness for Dostoyevksy is linked 
to a quest for transcendence both in the sense of other-worldliness, and so to that which is 
beyond human experience and comprehension (the 'other' of metaphysics), and in the 
sense of other minds, and so to an experience of difference associated with interpersonal 
relations. Although the two impulses are sometimes dissociated in his characters, 
Dostoyevsky links them deliberately and persistently in his account of the personal.IS 
The otherworldly orientation he believes is endemic to humanity and a sign of 
immortality ("So you can't get rid of your 'I', you see; your 'I' will not subject itself to 
earthly conditions, but seeks for something which transcends earth"),16 is therefore to be 
realized in concrete social terms lest it become abstract and idealized; a solely private 
vision that is an escape from the difference of other people. In a letter to a group of 
students, for example, responding to their complaints of public intolerance, Dostoyevsky 
voices the concern that they themselves have turned away from society, avoiding 
13 
14 
15 
16 
one owns meaning". See Mikhail Bakhtin, ppll-12. 
Problems of Dostoevksy's Poetics, p47. Contrast this, however, with a remark in 
The Dialogic Imagination, where Bakhtin stresses that the important struggle in 
the novel is "among socio-linguistic points of view, not an intra-language struggle 
between individual wills or logical contradictions". (p273) 
Marges de fa philosoph ie, p21. 
See my Chapters 2 and 5 for fuller reference to the metaphysical orientation of 
Dostoyevsky's writing, both in the context of a discussion of his criterion (Chapter 
2), and his sceptical quest (Chapter 5). 
Letters, pp234-235. 
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involvement with their own people and folk heritage in pursuit of "the abstract realm of 
fantastic 'Universal Man'" attempting to severe "all the bonds which still connect him 
[i.e. the ideal man] with the people".17 The authentic man, on the other hand, 
Dostoyevsky implies, does not exist in isolation where his personality has no chance to 
develop and ultimately no meaning. The "I" can only fulfil its potential in community. It 
is, therefore, a nexus of relationships. 
Bakhtin makes the same point in his analysis of the characters in Dostoyevsky's novels, 
creating a distinction between the potentially unruly individualism of the "innerly 
unfinalizable" 'I' and the interpersonal difficulties arising from social contact. The "man 
in man" in Dostoyevsky, says Bakhtin, can only be worked out in a context of human 
relationships: 
Only in communion [ ... ] in the interaction of one person with another can the 'man 
in man' be revealed, for others as well as myself.18 
Bakhtin thus repeats the view Dostoyevsky expounds in his correspondence, which is 
that personality is a collective rather than an individual affair, a process that evolves 
in the course of social interaction rather than a concept existing in the abstract. 
I. iv. The other as disruption of identity 
Despite, then, the desire to retain the indeterminate freedom of the "I" by evading the 
"finalizing perceptions" of others, interpersonal relations are the key to the "man in 
man" in Dostoyevsky. For this reason Dostoyevsky's notion of selfhood, for all its 
intrinsicality, is not equatable with essentialist humanism since in every encounter with 
the other the self can be remade. This principle of interdependence has psychological 
implications: to refuse the other means to negate the self also. Hence the appearance of 
arrested movement that, on one level, is associated both with Stavrogin (The Devils) 
and with the underground man (Notes from Underground), their mutual loss of a sense of 
reality and purpose being related to a withdrawal from personal engagment. If, then, as 
Bakhtin suggests, the "affirmation of another man's 'I' - 'Thou art''' is: 
17 
18 
19 
the task which Dostoevsky'S heroes must fulfil in order to overcome their 
solipsism, their reclusive "idealistic" consciousness, and to transform the other 
person from a shadow into a true reality"19 
p241. 
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p213. 
p7. 
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it is a task they must perform to retrieve themselves from the realm of shadows also. 
The fact that characters in Dostoyevksy frequently refuse to perform this task, however, 
betrays the extent to which Dostoyevsky makes the self! other relation an ethical 
problem and not just a philosophical or perceptual one. The other that can be ignored 
introduces a different set of problems from the unknowable other who is closed to inquiry 
and questioning. As Michael Fischer suggests, following the lead of Stanley Cavell, such 
radical other-minds scepticism can even be an evasion of some of the practical 
difficulties of personal interaction: 
Failure to acknowledge others - to read them as human - may indicate not the 
absence of something in them but the presence of something in us: confusion, 
indifference, callousness, exhaustion, coldness, spiritual emptiness, among many 
other possibilities.20 
Dostoyevsky is evidently aware of these practical and ethical difficulties. A degree of 
responsibility is involved in the process of authoring selves in his novels, the readiness to 
acknowledge mutual vulnerability and reciprocal freedoms being understood as an affair, 
in part, of choice. The ethical dimension Dostoyevsky gives this question establishes his 
affinity not only with Bakhtin, but also with thinkers like Martin Buber and, more 
recently, Emmanuel Levinas who writes of the self/other relation: 
I am defined as a subjectivity, as a singular person, as an'!', precisely because I am 
exposed to the other. It is my inescapable and incontrovertible answerability to 
the other that makes me an individual'!'. So that I become a responsible or 
ethical 'I' to the extent that I agree to depose or dethrone myself [ ... ] in favour of 
the vulnerable other.21 
Levinas, with Dostoyevsky, stresses the extent to which engagment with the other 
involves a disruption of one's being in the world, and, ultimately, sacrifice, as the other's 
demands for acceptance and recognition require a suspension of the individual's claim to 
preference. The self's need for recognition must therefore be temporarily set aside, and 
lost, or "deposed" as Levinas phrases it, in the movement towards the other. 
In Dostoyevsky's novels, as I hope to demonstrate, the movement of generosity towards 
the other is rarely carried out and, when it is (by Liza in Notes for instance) it is not 
always accepted and reciprocated. The balanced, polyphonic exchange as expounded by 
20 
21 
Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism, p68. 
Dialogues, p62. Clark and Holquist note Bakhtin's introduction to the thought of 
Martin Buber in the first chapter of their work on Bakhtin (see Mikhail Bakhtin, 
p27). Bakhtin's discussion of interpersonal relations has something in common 
with Buber's thinking on the relationship of interdependence between self and 
other as explored in his work, Ich und Du, or, I and Thou. 
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Bakhtin and Levinas must first be understood as a theoretical and ethical ideal rather 
than as a fully realized given in Dostoyevsky's world. As Dostoyevsky phrases it, it is 
the "law of our ideal" rather than "the ideal law".22 For, as Dostoyevsky observes in 
his notebooks, the desire to preserve one's individuality intact, one's "identity", in fact, 
constantly interferes with the movement towards the other so that, ironically, the 
individual is unable to realize its full potential: 
To love a person as one's own self according to the commandment of Christ is 
impossible. [ ... J The law of individuality on earth is the constraint, "I" is the 
stumbling block. [ ... J Christ alone was able to do this, but Christ was eternal, an 
eternal ideal toward which man strives and should by the laws of nature strive. 
Meanwhile, after the appearance of Christ as the idea of man incarnate, it 
became as clear as day that [ ... J the highest, final development of the individual 
should attain precisely the point [ ... J where man might find, recognize [ ... J that 
the highest use which he can make of his individuality, of the full development 
of his I, is to seemingly annihilate that I [ ... J In this way the law of the I merges 
with the law of humanism [ ... )23 
Dostoyevsky's novels are to some extent a record of the failure to achieve the "highest 
final development of the individual". The relationship between characters in both 
Notes from Underground and The Devils are unbalanced and fraught with the silence of 
miscomprehension and rejection. Solipsism is thus maintained through ethical as much 
as ontological barriers. But the problem of relationships is not thereby relinquished and 
the implied author repeatedly forces his characters into situations where their ethical 
complaceny is under threat. He does not, in other words, leave them in peace with their 
individualism, but allows them, on occasions, to "glimpse the ideal through all [their] 
falls,"24 and thus experience a momentary disruption of their isolated being in the world 
as well as relief from the stagnation that goes with it. 
I. v. Robbe-Grillet, HusserI and the void of self 
Robbe-Grillet's conception of character is based on premisses that are totally different to 
Dostoyevsky's: a difference that is all the more apparent because of the black and white 
metaphors Robbe-Grillet sometimes uses in his theoretical statements. Lacking the 
sceptical caution of a Derrida, for example, who presents consciousness as a structure of 
differences which excedes "l'alternative de la presence et de l'absence",25 Robbe-Grillet 
presents his readers/auditors in a 1982 colloquium with a choice between two extremes-
presence or absence, or, a full humanist consciousness and the empty Husserlian 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The Unpublished Dostoevsky, p41. 
p39. 
p39. 
Marges de la philosophie, p21. 
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consciousness he identifies with New Novel characters: 
What is strange is that readers remain completely conditioned by a transcendental 
philosophy which maintains that consciousness is full and that it diffuses fullness 
and meaning around itself, while what we call a modern consciousness, or a 
Husserlian consciousness, is an empty consciousness. There is nothing within 
consciousness, Hussed claims. Consciousness is simply a movement of outward 
projection, what he calls phenomenology. [ ... J This consciousness never has 
anything inside itself, but is unceasingly projecting itself out of itself, away from 
this self in which there is nothing, toward the world where there is nothing 
either.2 6 
A preoccupation with absence is also evident in the 1986 lecture, 'Le vide comme 
generateur du texte', where the image of a gold ring became an anology for consciousness 
as a "phenomene de vide et de contradiction". What is important in the constitution of 
the ring, Robbe-Grillet suggested (following Sartre), is not the band of gold but the empty 
space it designates so that one might conclude, "ce n'est pas l'or qui constitue l'anneau, 
c'est Ie vide". Likewise, with the consciousness, what is important are the lacunae, the 
lack of identity and defining limitations, not the individual manner of receiving and 
responding to things. Hence Robbe-Grillet's fascination with Dostoyevsky's Stavrogin 
for his role in Dostoyevsky's novel as "Ie demon absent" who creates what Robbe-Grillet 
calls elsewhere "Ie 'centre vide' bougeant sans cesse a l'interieur des Possedes".27 
A degree of simplification is often consequent on making a point and making it clearly, 
and part of Robbe-Grillet's notoriety as a critic, of his own and others' novels, derives 
from his readiness to make statements in provocatively bold type. In fact, however, the 
tabula rasa theory of consciousness and world as devoid of attributes misrepresents 
Husserl as well as giving a false impression of Robbe-Grillet's overall views of the 
mind/world relation, particularly as this concerns the role of the other (the material 
world, other minds), in stimulating creative thinking. 
Husserl's phenomenological epoche, for example, which has some affinity with the 
Pyrrhonist epoche, or, suspension of judgement,28 does indeed eliminate the thing-in-
itself, and with it, the reality of the objective world and the concept of the self as an 
"individual man".29 But Husserl does not equate this bracketting of external and 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Three Decades, pp191-192. 
Le miroir qui revient, p215. 
The phenomenological epoche is concerned, as is the Pyrrhonian epoche, with a 
"ubiquitous detachment from any point of view regarding the objective world." The 
Paris Lectures, p8. 
See pp 10 and 8 of The Paris Lectures. 
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personal reality-concepts with an absence in either self or world. The life of 
consciousness, he proposes, is "in flux" and "devoid of fixed last elements", but this flux is 
governed by what he calls a "highly pronounced 'class structure'" in which he includes 
perception and recollection, for example. More emphatically Husserl concludes that: 
the central ego is not an empty point or pole, but [ ... J it experiences, with each act 
that radiates from the ego, a lasting determination. For example should I have 
decided the nature of something through an act of judgment, then this fleeting act 
disappears, but I do remain the ego which has thus decided. I find myself 
continuous [selbstJ and enduring, as the ego of my enduring consciousness.3D 
The consciousness, then, through the exercise of its capacities to perceive and respond to 
sense-objects, experiences a sense of 'personal' continuity and consistency, and thereby 
'discovers' itself. 
I. vi. A matter of relation 
In fact, the phenomenological consciousness is presented by Husserl in terms neither of 
absence nor of presence but of relation; of the mind's continual response to things outside 
it, and the reflection of these things in the mind perceiving them. If, in this scheme of 
things, the mind is seen not to function independently of the objects of perception (see p18 
of The Paris Lectures: "the stream of consciousness is permeated by the fact that 
consciousness relates itself to objects"), then nor can these objects be said to exist 
independently of the way in which they are perceived. Thinking and feeling are thus 
not internal, self-sufficient processes that occur without some kind of complement in the 
world of appearances. Wanting the best of several philosophical worlds, Robbe-Grillet 
himself claims to subscribe to the phenomenological ideal of interdependence, whereby 
all things function in relation to each other. He follows through Husserl's remark, for 
example, that "Consciousness is always consciousness of something",31 by defining desire 
in relation to its object. Olga Bernal repeats a remark to this effect made by Robbe-
Grillet in 1959: 
Si tout etat de conscience est conscience de quelque chose, l'homme est bien oblige de 
sortir de lui-meme, de chercher Ie complement,l'objet de sa conscience dehors, dans 
Ie monde material auquel i1 est lie indissolublement. "Ie desir qu'un enfant a d'une 
bicyclette, c'est deja l'image nickelee des roues et du guidon".32 
If this frame of reference negates the idea of independent psychologies, Robbe-Grillet 
30 
31 
32 
The Paris Lectures, p26. 
p13. 
Le roman de l'absence, p12. 
108 
sees that it also negates the thing-in-itself. For if it is impossible to perceive anything 
apart from acts of perception there is no evidence of a thing's having reality outside the 
mind. Robbe-Grillet indicates that some critics of his novels have overlooked this 
salient point: 
Les critiques qui, a l'epoque du Voyeur ou de La Jalousie utili sent ce mot semblent 
penser que Ie phenomene est une chose en soi. Or Husserl montre bien que Ie 
phenomene est au contraire une chose sur laquelle se projette une conscience.33 
Lvii. The appearance of solipsism 
Yet the principle of interrelationships in phenomenology is as fraught with ambivalence 
and contradiction as the ideal of interdependence proposed by Bakhtin in his reading of 
Dostoyevsky. The phenomenological equation, whereby consciousness functions in 
relation to objects, is, of Husserls own admission, vulnerable to solipsism.34 For although 
phenomenology allows for a certain experience of alterity this alterity always passes 
through the medium of the mind in which alone it has existence and validity. Hence, 
while Husserl insists that objects of appearance have certain "specific determinations" 
and "such-and-such factual content"; and although he allows that we do experience 
other minds ("It is a fact that I experience other minds as real [ ... ] Not only do I 
experience them as spatial presentations psychologically interlaced with the realm of 
nature, but I also experience them as experiencing this selfsame world which I 
experience"),35 he makes it clear that the consciousness, or, what he calls the "ego 
cogito", is the mediating centre in which everything finds meaning.36 Hence he can say 
that: 
33 
34 
35 
36 
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Through this ego alone does the being of the world, and, for that matter, any being 
whatsoever, make sense to me and has possible validity.37 
From an interview in Qui suis-je?, p149. 
"If I, the mediating "I", reduce myself through an epoche to my absolute ego and to 
that which constitutes itself therein, then, do I not become the solus ipse? The 
Paris Lectures, p34. Note that solipsism was a spectre that haunted the Ancient 
sceptic also. See A.J. Cascardi's 'Skepticism and deconstruction', p6: "For the 
skeptic, the world is a dream, a vision, an hallucination [ ... ] madness for him takes 
the form of solipsism, the spectre against which Wittgenstein guarded throughout 
both periods of his career. The skeptic's greatest worry is that what he thinks he 
sees as the external world may also be a product of his consciousness". 
The Paris Lectures, p34. 
Validity is not equated by Husserl with 'reality', however, for, as he observes in 
The Paris Lectures, there is no absolute guarantee of the "trustworthiness of my 
experience". (p 15) 
cf p35 for Husserl's interpretation of intersubjectivity and his remark on pll 
concerning the external world: "Once I have banished from my sphere of judgments 
the world, as one which receives its being from me and within me, then I, as the 
transcendental ego which is prior to the world, am the sole source and object 
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If, then, other minds may be experienced by the 'ego' they are experienced through an act 
of empathy which reaffirms the primacy of the 'ego' in relation to which everything 
else is understood - not vice versa. In other words there is a structuring of the other in 
relation to the self and not a structuring of the self in relation to the other. 
This understanding of other minds always and of necessity in terms of the paradigm of 
the self is closely mirrored in a remark by Robbe-Grillet when speaking of his perception 
of his father, namely, through discontinuous memories and images, "une constellation 
d' etoiles mobiles, qui serait constamment en train de chercher sa forme, comme si mon pere 
eta it en train lui-meme, dans rna tete, de rechercher sa propre figure". To which the 
interviewer responds, "Dans ta tete?", and Robbe-Grillet reiterates: "~ui. Et par 
consequent, dans Ie monde, puisqu'en fin de compte, i1 n'y a d'autre chose au monde que rna 
tete, que ce qu'il y a dans rna tete",38 This is a continuation of a much earlier remark 
concerning Robbe-Grillet's conception of "l'homme nouveau", namely, the passionate 
voyeur for whom the objects of the material world are the vocabulary of his desire. 
Things are seen to be meaningful for the "new man" only when they are translated into 
his own highly subjective discourse, since the "objets de nos romans n'ont jamais de 
presence en dehors des perceptions humaines, reelles ou imaginaires" so that the novel, in 
effect, "ne vise qu'a une subjectivite totale",39 The phenomenological equation is thus 
unbalanced as the solus ipse in Robbe-Grillet deprives objects, and other minds it would 
seem, of their "specific determinations". 
There is thus already a tendency in phenomenology to solipsism of which Robbe-Grillet 
appears to take full advantage. As a result, there is a sense in which the hero-narrators 
in his novels are in undisputed control of the meaning of the world in which they find 
themselves, a state of affairs that is very little advance on the anthropomorphic 
humanism Robbe-Grillet disparages in Pour un nouveau roman, and according to which 
man looks on the world only to see in it his own reflection.40 Yet Robbe-Grillet's novels 
reveal inconsistencies in his use of the phenomenological model of consciousness. They 
show tensions, for example, between the phenomenological principle of relation (and its 
vulnerability to solipsism), and a fascination with a concept of otherness that is quite 
contradictory to phenomenological principles. 
38 
39 
4D 
capable of judgment". 
'Conversation avec Alain Robbe-Grillet', p91. 
Pour un nouveau roman, pp116,117. 
See the essay 'Nature, humanisme, tragedie' for Robbe-Grillet's assessment of 
humanism "Sous pretexte que l'homme ne peut prendre du monde qu'une 
connaissance subjective, l'humanisme decide de choisir l'homme comme 
justification de tout"; and, "L'univers et moi, nous n'avons plus qu'une seule arne, 
qu'un seul secret". (Pour un nouveau roman, pp48 and 51) 
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I. viii. The other and the experience of strangeness 
These tensions, I would suggest, already have a precedent in Robbe-Grillet's essays. In 
1956, for example, Robbe-Grillet drew attention to the medium of film and its primarily 
visual rendition of objects that, in a novel, are more overtly subservient to interpretative 
commentary. The impact of their visual presence on the viewer, Robbe-Grillet reasoned 
in this early essay, acts ~s something of a revelation of the strangeness, the otherness, of 
the material world to the mind of man: 
L'aspect un peu inhabituel de ce monde [du recit filme] reproduit nous revele, en 
meme temps, Ie caractere inhabituel du monde qui nous entoure: inhabituel, lui 
aussi, dans la mesure ou il refuse de se plier a nos habitudes d'apprehension et a 
notre ordre. [ ... ] Que ce soit d' abord par leur presence que les objets et les gestes 
s'imposent, et que cette presence continue ensuite a do miner, par-dessus toute 
theorie explicative qui tenterait de les enfermer dans un quelconque systeme de 
reference [ ... ].41 
Thus in the process of distinguishing between perceiver and perceived, between things as 
they exist, or appear to exist in the world, and the commentaries imposed on them, 
Robbe-Grillet upholds the idea of physical presence at the same time as he posits a more 
radical separation between self and other, consciousness and world, than that envisaged 
by Husserl. Moreover, Robbe-Grillet declares his intention to restore this very 
unphenomenological otherness in his novels by showing the objects and gestures his 
narrator-heroes perceive asserting their difference, and indifference, to the latter's 
imaginative projections. A world in which "there is nothing", is incapable of such 
resistance. 
Underlining the same point is a reference to a personal as well as a material other in 
Robbe-Grillet's description of 'strangeness': 
What do I call strangeness? [ .. ] Unheimlichkeit, the fact that the individual feels 
his nature to be different from that of the things and people which are before him. 
[ ... J It is precisely at that moment when a thing becomes incomprehensible that the 
liberating shock is born within the awareness and body of man. [ ... J there is the 
rest of the world, which is the familiar world, and then, suddenly, there is a 
strange being who is precisely the other .42 
What are we to make of this contradiction in Robbe-Grillet's thinking between absence 
and interrelationships, the void of self and personal difference/otherness? 
41 
42 
ppI9-20. 
Three Decades, p29. Note that this comment comes from the same colloquium 
where Robbe-Grillet elaborated his fullness/emptiness duality. 
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I. ix. A struggling consciousness 
Robbe-Grillet suggested in Three Decades that Husserl's account of the consciousness 
remains an imperfectly realized ideal rather than established practice for the modern 
novelist. For the most part, the novelist continues to be influenced by beliefs in 
transcendence and humanism at the same time as he seeks to adapt to new ways of 
understanding himself and his characters. Hence Robbe-Grillet's description of the 
novelist as a "struggling consciousness" at the intersection of 'old' and 'new' texts. Robbe-
Grillet's novels reflect something of this struggle. In my view, however, this is not a sign 
of any failure to conform to a philosophical ideal so much as evidence of the grace of 
inconsistency and the demonstration by Robbe-Grillet the novelist of the complexity of 
the mind's response to the world, and itself, and the inadequacy of any philosophical 
model to appropriately convey this complexity. In Le voyeur and Djinn , therefore, we 
see something of the phenomenological equation of mind and world interrelating. But we 
also see the extreme unbalancing of this equation, and the tilting of the scales towards 
solipsism and appropriation at one moment, and a registering of the power of the other to 
disturb this mental stronghold, the next. 
This is where the most significant meeting point between the two novelists lies - not in 
their stated philosophical or ethical views of character, which are vastly different, nor 
in their technique of characterization generally. But in their demonstration of a complex 
humanity that is at odds with theories about it and always, and especially, at odds 
with itself. I will argue that the (interpersonal) other contributes significantly to this 
complexity, challenging the perceptions of the self while remaining, in itself, 
inapprehensible. My understanding of the other in this regard is more informed by 
Bakhtin, than by Husserl, and by Levinas, than by Derrida. In my analysis of' the two 
novelists style of characterization I am interested in testing the validity of Levinas's 
hypothesis that perhaps the very "capacity for interrogation and unsaying" is "derived 
from the pre-ontological interhuman relationship with the other".43 
Notes from Underground 
I. i. Identity in the abstract 
In Part I of Notes from Underground, which I have discussed in the two previous 
chapters, mental uncertainty is put on stage for the benefit of an imaginary audience. 
Emotions and reasons are subject to the "damned laws of consciousness", and evaporate 
43 Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, pS8. 
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"into thin air", as the underground man loses himself in a kind of deconstructionist 
labyrinth: 
But how am I [ ... ] to be sure of myself? Where are the primary causes on which I 
can take my foundations? Where am I to take them from? I practise thinking, and 
consequently each of my primary causes pulls along another, even more primary, in 
its wake, and so on ad infinitum. (p27) 
This experience of unceitainty is seen to be cultivated as well as spontaneous as it is 
consciously preferred to the restrictions imposed by rational categories. Part I reads as a 
manifesto for an unruly humanity that expresses itself in negatives so as to avoid the 
finality of definitions. But in Part II, which I wish to focus on in the present chapter, the 
narrator is exposed to what proves a far more disturbing uncertainty, and one over which 
he has much less control, namely, the uncertainty that is created by another character 
when she invades his mental seclusion. When the hero-narrator is confronted in this 
manner by another, he is forced to drop his twittering protestations of non-entity and 
confront himself also. And this sudden consciousness of self proves more discomforting 
than any of the abstract uncertainties with which he has tortured himself in his 
underground shelter. 
The narrator's social underground has come about partly as a result of a double rejection: 
he both dislikes himself, and he attributes this feeling to others, convinced that he is 
"regarded with loathing". (p47) This feeling is confirmed when he meets up with a party 
of school fellows in Part II of the story. Instead of acknowledging him as an equal they 
respond to his vulnerability with distaste, excluding him from the society he needs for 
his personal survival. Bakhtin's judgement that the solipsistic hero must learn to affirm 
others must be qualified by such an episode. It shows the responsibility of affirmation to 
be a communal affair and the underground man's failure to be a corporate as well as a 
private problem. Not surprisingly the narrator's response to rejection is to withdraw and 
seek solace in a life of fantasy: 
But I had one resource that reconciled all these contradictions - escaping into 'all 
that is best and highest', in my dreams, of course, I dreamed endlessly. (p58) 
An underground dream-world is thus the narrator's defence against the hurtful difference 
of others. The attractions of underground fantasy are such that they corne to replace, and 
not merely compensate for, the interpersonal other. In his mind's eye, the narrator 
performs heroic exploits without effort or competition, discourses on saintly and 
revolutionary ideas without having to put them into practice, and experiences a warm 
desire to "embrace all mankind", without being inconvenienced by real people. When he 
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needs stimulus he turns, not to the interpersonal other, but to books to furnish his mind 
with the "external impressions" he craves. For books can be assimilated and absorbed 
into the underground in a way that people can not. Dostoyevsky's narrator observes that 
"beautiful ready-made images of life" may be "forcibly wrenched from poets and 
novelists and adapted to every kind of service and requirement". (p60) 
A deliberate distinction seems to be made in the narrative, therefore, between the 
'intrapersonal' and the interpersonal, or, between the other of a discourse that may be 
internalized, and the other who is the narrator's equal and whose signification is less 
susceptible of manipulation. The contemporary textual sceptic may not agree with the 
validity of this distinction. One of Derrida's best-known arguments is that there is no 
'differance' between speech and writing as our mode of receptivity is, in both cases, 
conditioned by language and hence subject to the same delays and deferrals of meaning. 
But Dostoyevsky's assumptions about meaning are quite different from Derrida's 
precisely because of his concern with the ethical problems that qualify the linguistic and 
ideological picture. In Notes Dostoyevsky seems to both maintain, and shift the 
boundaires of, Bakhtin's distinction between novelistic and scientific discourse. The 
latter, Bakhtin suggests, is "directed towards mastery over mute objects, [ ... J that do not 
reveal themselves in words, that do not comment on themselves",44 while the former is 
enlivened by the interacting commentaries of a novel's characters. Dostoyevsky arguably 
confirms this view but in the context of his own novella, and as if to expose its limits, he 
indicates that such powers of disruption belong primarily to the sphere of interpersonal 
relations, and so, strictly speaking, neither to novelistic nor scientific discourse. 
Certainly, without the personal other to introduce an element of incalculability and 
challenge, the thrill of the underground man's imaginary despotism soon palls and his 
dreams become bland, repetitive, and suffocating. Mental and emotional lethargy set in 
and he confesses to sometimes being "bored ... to death". (pSI) The private sanctuary has 
turned into a prison. He experiences an "hysterical thirst" for the "contradictions and 
contrasts" he has so carefully screened out, and longs for human society. His contacts 
with former school friends have proved a failure. He is unable to open the door from the 
inside. It is not until he meets Liza that a chink appears in the wall of the underground. 
II. ii. Self in the eyes of another 
The narrator is first aware of Liza as a person through her eyes, which prove more 
important than spoken language in first establishing contact. Dostoyevsky's use of the 
44 Discourse in the Novel, p3Sl. 
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gaze suggests an almost mystical view of the eyes as "the lamp of the soul", in other 
words, as something both expressive and communicative of the person. Hence Liza's eyes 
are said to be "full of life and capable of reflecting both love and sullen hatred", (p101) 
even though they do not fully reveal her to the narrator. U~vinas offers one possible 
reading of the phenomenon when he discusses the role of the human face in initiating a 
response and mode of interaction between people that is quite different from that 
permitted by spoken dialogue: 
Rencontrer autrui, c'est d'abord accueillir un visage [ ... ] Le visage n'est-il pas, 
avant tout, expression et appel, precedant Ie donne du connaitre? [ ... J Ie visage 
d'autrui [ ... ] signifie une demande. Le visage vous requiert, vous appelle au-
dehors.45 
One of the demands that Liza's face signifies for the narrator is the demand for self-
awareness. With Liza's eyes on him, the narrator becomes aware of himself as a result of 
being looked at with unaccustomed curiosity and attention. Although Liza's expression is 
at first sullen and indifferent it implies an acknowledgement of him as another, equal, 
human being which he has not had before: 
Suddenly, beside me, I saw two eyes, open, regarding me with curiosity and fixed 
attention. Their look was coldly indifferent, sullen, like something utterly alien; 
it irked me. (p86) 
Secondly, and as a corollary of this self-awareness, is the narrator's awareness of Liza as 
another person who is different from himself to the point of strangeness, "something 
utterly alien", as he puts it, evoking Robbe-Grillet's description of the "strange being 
who is precisely the other" .46 
This sense of strangeness seems vital to the whole experience of otherness in Dostoyevsky 
and its ability to stimulate a healthy scepticism about the self's perceptions and 
judgements. For it is the strangeness of the other that is the most effective reminder of 
the limits of the self's mastery over the world: that which is strange is that which is 
"not one's own". Hence the distinction between the use Dostoyevsky makes of the notion 
of personal presence and the reasoning Derrida maintains informs the "phonocentric 
necessity", or, the priviliging of the voice over writing. For this, Derrida argues, assumes 
the possibility of "perfect self-presence", and of the "immediate possession of 
45 
46 
'Levinas au nom d'autrui', p63. Victor Terras also notes the importance of the face 
as a revelation of the divine in iconography. The "Orthodox belief that ideally 
the human face has retained the divine features of God's face" is "a belief on 
which the worship of icons is based [ ... J". (The Idiot' An Interpretation, p82) 
Three Decades, p29. 
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meaning".47 One of the things to emerge from the narrator's confrontation with Liza, 
however, is that the interpersonal other cannot be reduced to one's own mental 
conceptions and expectations, cannot, in other words, be 'possessed.' Rather, the personal 
other keeps the mind awake to that which is irreducible to the paradigms of the self. 
On several occasions, Dostoyevsky uses terms that emphasize this notion of strangeness: 
We lay there for a long time looking at one another, but she did not lower her eyes 
or change her expression, and at last I was filled with an eerie feeling. (p86) 
And when he first sees her: 
Mechanically I glanced at the girl who had come in: before me gleamed a fresh, 
young, rather pale face, with dark level eyebrows and a serious and, as it were, 
slightly wondering expression [ ... ] There was something kind and simplehearted in 
that face, but also something so serious as to be strange. (pp84-85) 
Furthermore, Dostoyevsky seems to imply that it is only in the context of such direct, 
personal interaction that language, too, is at its most provocative and disturbing. For in 
this story, at least, the hero is largely unchanged by the other of language until he is 
brought face to face with another speaking person. From the first, the narrator tries to 
manipulate Liza as he has manipulated the contents of books and adapted them to suit 
his purposes. But when he attempts to gain power over her by playing on her fears and 
taunting her with visions of domestic security, she responds unexpectedly. With some 
astuteness she remarks that his story "sounds just like a book". "The remark stung me 
painfully. That was not what I had expected", (p95) he comments, for of course, unlike 
the books he has been reading, Liza reserves the right to supply her own commentary. He 
does not immediately grasp that she herself is hiding behind a defensive mask to protect 
her vulnerability. When this vulnerability is revealed to him, it shocks and unnerves 
him even more than her mockery of his abstract ideas: 
my nerve failed all at once. No, never, never had I witnessed such despair! She 
was lying face downwards, with her head buried in the pillow and her arms 
strained tightly round it. (pl06) 
Liza is thus momentarily acknowledged as a 'real' person, permanently and disturbingly 
other to the narrator in a way that books and ideas in the abstract can never be. As 
Bakhtin explains, she is a "living person", and as such, cannot be turned into "the 
voiceless object of a secondhand (zaochnoe) finalizing perception" with impunity.48 
47 
48 
In Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, pllS. 
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p47. 
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The result of Liza's unexpectedly loving response is a momentary transformation in the 
narrator. His self-enclosed world is shattered by unfamiliar feelings of pity for someone 
besides himself, and her pity for him startles him into exposing himself and the 
wounded pride that has come to define him. The fact that she does not withdraw her 
acceptance after his confessions shocks him into a state of sincerity which enables him to 
experience 'real' emotion for the first time. (pp117-118) A special space has thus been 
created, in which a stripping away of masks and posturings culled from others is a 
prelude to a moment of sincerity, and even, of truth. 
For because of Liza, the narrator now has a face. A shadowy self-image has begun to take 
shape in a way not possible when he was confined to his own reflections and fantasies. 
Notes from Underground confirms the view that personality is not complete and self-
sufficient but is constantly worked out in relation to other personalities. Yet this is not a 
comfortable process. In the course of his interaction with Liza, the narrator is conscious of 
tendencies in his "character" that threaten to define him with distasteful clarity. These 
are nothing like the grand brushstrokes in a nineteenth-century portrait, having more to 
do with a shabby meanness and smallness of spirit. Not surprisingly, he is as anxious to 
be rid of this "self" as he was earlier to deny its existence. Having insisted in the first 
part of the novella that he has no identifiable attributes, he is brought to admit in the 
second part: "Well, I know this; I'm a blackguard, a scoundret an egotist". (p116) In 
addition, he intimates that Liza's exposure of him constitutes the grounds for resentment 
which he claims to have lacked in the underground rhetoric of the first part of the 
novella ("Resentment, of course, might [ ... J serve quite successfully instead of a primary 
cause [ ... J But what can I do if I don't even feel resentment?"). (p27) In Liza's presence, the 
narrator becomes a 'real' person in the grip of bewilderingly real emotions that threaten 
to overthrow him, so he is "half dead with mental pain - I have never experienced such 
pain and penitence." (p 122) 
This painful self-awareness could be the beginnings of the narrator's healing and 
restoration to society. For the other has the power to heal as well as hurt in its 
interaction with, and development of, the self. But the narrator in Notes decides the 
price is too high and, in the final pages, the narrative comes full circle and he is once 
more heard sounding forth from the underground. He conceives a loathing for the shocks 
and contingencies of what he calls "real" life: 
It simply was intolerably burdensome to me that she was there. I wanted her to 
disappear. I wanted 'to be left in peace', alone in my underground. I had grown so 
unused to 'real life' that I could hardly breathe for the oppressiveness of it. (p119) 
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"Real life", the "living life", or, "ce terme d'humain": Notes from Underground shows 
the crucible of humanity to be interpersonal relations. These, at least, are what 
arguably feed the most significant "furnace of doubt" for Dostoyevsky's underground man. 
To refuse responsible relations with other people is an option he takes in the narrative, 
but it is judged as a retreat from "reality", and a failure to wrestle with experiences 
outside his immediate mental and emotional capacities. In Part I, the narrator would 
have us believe that the imagination, "inflamed to the point of madness", is the most 
fundamental "truth" about human nature. Part II demonstrates that the imagination can 
represent an escape from the even more fundamental "truth" of interpersonal relations, 
according to which the personality that is left to its own devices atrophies and becomes a 
static identity. By finally choosing to shut Liza out of his world, the narrator cannot 
develop but only repeat himself. 
The Devils 
TIL i. The other as object of "secondhand definitions" 
The power of invention is a significant generating force in the narrative of The Devils. 
Although the story itself is presented by a single narrator, who also participates in 
events, the story-telling instinct is by no means restricted to him alone. The small town of 
which he writes seems buoyed up by a barely suppressed imaginative excitement which 
finds a surprising number of outlets: speculation and gossip are compulsive activities and 
these are complemented by melodramatic correspondence and novel-writing, theatrical 
posturings and buffoonery, even model-making, which, in its own way, enables a 
character to tell a story and define an alternative world. The narrative begins, for 
example, with rumours and hearsay about Mr Verkhovensky; the novel's ambivalent 
hero, Stavrogin, is made the subject of numerous rewritings by society throughout; Mrs 
Tarapygin, associated with the climactic events of the fete, is found to be a product of the 
crowd's overexcited imagination; Lembke, governor of the province, compensates for a 
lack of social achievement by making things - a cardboard theatre and model railway 
in his youth, later, a Lutheran church and a novel when the church, with its miniature 
people and organ, is confiscated by an apprehensive spouse who has more prosaic 
ambitions for her husband. 
What is of particular interest in this world of burgeoning narratives, however, is the 
way in which the characters' obvious capacities for invention effect the nature of their 
relationships with others and their ability, therefore, to perceive and respond to 
personal difference. The Devils extends the theme from Notes where the gift of 
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creativity that gives the individual the freedom of self-definition is used to negate the 
freedom of others, the "law of personality" and attachment to one's own "fantastic 
daydreams" thus obstructing mutual comprehension and commitment to a shared vision. 
A number of characters in the novel exercise their faculty for invention on other people, 
appropriating them to play certain prescribed roles in dramas of their own. Mrs 
Stavrogin does this most notably in her relationship with Stepan Verkhovensky, once 
engaged as tutor to her son, thereafter retained in a state of precarious and ambivalent 
friendship. Verkhovensky is forcefully guided by Mrs Stavrogin, who deals 
peremptorily with his eccentricities in the attempt to erase his irritating difference to 
her social ambitions. She dictates his style of dress, designing all the clothes he wears 
herself (in possible imitation of a dramatist whose portrait she fell in love with as a 
school girD, (pp33-34) and corrects his habits of speech, his vocabulary and choice of 
quotation. To the point where, as the narrator remarks, Stepan Verkhovensky almost 
becomes: 
her creation, one might almost say her invention [ ... J She had invented him, and 
she had been the first to believe in her own invention. He was, in a way, a sort of 
dream of hers [ ... J. (pp29-30) 
Unlike Mrs Stavrogin, Mr Verkhovensky's inventive ability is almost entirely centered 
on himself and his own personna. In this particular field, however, he excels, showing 
himself an irrepressible experimenter with poses and gestures. He enjoys his early role 
as a 'marked man', and manages to turn the loss of status after his expulsion from the 
university into a sign of distinction, a form of persecution that proves him to be a 
dangerous and important figure. He romanticizes his two former marriages (both wives 
having since deceased) and his attachment to his son whom he has hardly seen. Before 
going on stage the night of the fete to deliver his speech the narrator finds him excitedly 
pottering behind the scenes, oblivious to the real and destructive chaos about to erupt and 
taken up with "trying on different smiles and constantly consulting a piece of paper on 
which he had written down some notes". (p472) 
But it is Stepan's son, Peter Verkhovensky, who is the main plotter and organizor in the 
novel. The chief difference between himself and other characters in this respect is that 
he does consciously and with malice aforethought what they seem to do blindly and 
sometimes to their own undoing. For Peter is aware of all the sub-plots with which the 
other characters are preoccupied: Mrs Stavrogin's exasperation at Stepan Verkhovensky 
and her fears about Stavrogin; Julia Lembke's thwarted ambitions. Peter makes use of 
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them all to achieve his own ends which concern creating anarchy in a small town prior to 
introducing (rather vaguely defined) socialist ideals. (Peter himself admits he is more of 
a "rogue" than a "socialist"). (p421) 
In order to make best use of the available material Peter has to familiarize himself with 
the characters and their particular foibles. For this reason alone he is perhaps more 
intent on the different personalities than any other character in the novel as he subjects 
each of them in turn to scrutiny, looking for weak points and trying to predict their 
reactions in order to manipulate them more effectively. Difference is thus registered the 
better to be annihilated. Peter soon comes to feel he has got to the end of the characters' 
meagre secrets and this assumed knowledge gives him a feeling of power. He delivers up 
the minor revolutionaries verbally in a few dismissive sentences to Stavrogin, prior to 
their both attending one of the meetings: 
They're waiting with gaping mouths, like young rooks in a nest, to see what 
present we shall bring them. A hot-headed lot. They've got their notebooks out 
[ ... ] Virginsky - a cosmopolitan, Liputin a fourierist with a strong leaning towards 
police work; an indispensable man, let me tell you, in one respect, but demanding 
strict treatment in all others [ ... ]. (p229) 
Even the enigmatic Stavrogin finds his reactions closely analyzed as Peter attempts to 
forge a little intimacy between himself and the man who is most vital to his plans, the 
central motif in the whole design: 
[ ... ] I can't give you up now. There's no one like you in the whole world! I invented 
you abroad; I invented it all while looking at you. If I had not watched you from a 
corner, nothing of all this would have occurred to me! (p424) 
Peter Verkhovensky's persistent invention of the people he observes and his attempts to 
enmesh them in what turns out to be a mythical political organization would seem to 
make him more of a New Novel hero than Stavrogin. For Stavrogin is so aloof from 
others as to have lost interest, it seems, even in fantasizing about them. 
But perhaps their responses have the same effect as Stavrogin's allofness. For, by a 
process of adaption to private dreams (Mrs Stavrogin), through the self-preoccupation 
that keeps a character in front of the mirror "trying on different smiles" (Mr 
Verkhovensky), or, because of a determination to manipulate in the pursuit of personal 
ends (Peter Verkhovensky), the other in The Devils becomes an increasingly imaginary 
composition subservient to the limited interpretation placed on it by the individual and 
his/her needs and wants. This seems to bear out Louis Allain's criticism that the 
Bakhtinian thesis of polyphony "n'est gu'en leurre" wheras, in fact, the novels' 
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characters, for all their avowed openness to the challenge of the other, follow their 
author, who, Allain claims: 
pratique une forme raffinee et pratiquement inedite de solipsisme: celIe qui 
consiste non pas a nier l'existence d'autrui, mais au contraire a la reconnaitre, a 
l'affirmer meme, sous les especes de sa propre monade.49 
If this is the case, then each character in the novel must be seen to be closed to the other 
not because of the impenetrable barrier of difference but because of a fundamental 
indifference in the perceiver - an indifference that is responsible at the same time for 
turning all the characters' inventions into so many forms of self-projection. 
III. ii. Overturning the rules 
Allain identifies a real problem in Dostoyevsky of which no-one was more aware than 
Dostoyevsky himself. Hence the despair expressed in the notebooks that human egoism 
will always be an obstacle to the full recognition of the other the law of Christ demands. 
But since Allain makes little attempt to modify his thesis that "Parler d'autrui" for 
Dostoyevsky is always equivalent to "parler de lui-meme"50 (and his characters 
likewise), and that the author's celebrated polyphony hides "l'homme-de-l'une-seule-
pensee",51 it seems to me that Allain himself could be accused of a simplifying reduction 
of Dostoyevsky's 'otherness' as a writer, his capacity for self-contradiction and, indeed, 
his insistence that this capacity is one of the most vital elements in the human picture. 
In The Devils, especially, the themes of manipulation and self-preoccupation are 
pointedly counterbalanced by some of the most effective demonstrations in Dostoyevsky's 
ceuvre of the characters' resistance to being manipulated by others through their 
capacity to break through the circle of self-preoccupation. Allain's application of his 
theory to The Devils seems all the more inappropriate, therefore, given the fact that all 
of the characters in the novel are at some point shocked by someone who resists their 
solipsistic readings of them. Each of the characters previously mentioned for their 
readiness to manipulate others and surround themselves with creatures of their own 
invention may be re-:examined in turn for the way in which their invented characters 
rebel against them, either in flat contradiction, or in a reminder of their 'creator's' 
vulnerabili ty. 
Mrs Stavrogin, for example, remains proprietal to the last in her relations with Mr 
49 
50 
51 
Dostoei'evski et l'autre, p149 and pp156. Note Allain's specific reference to The 
Devils in this regard on p154. 
p160. 
p21. 
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Verkhovensky. When he runs off to find Russia, as he puts it, hoping to step free of his 
past life and its problematic allegiances (not the least of which is his allegiance to his 
benefactress), Mrs Stavrogin tracks him down at the inn, breathing gargantuan vengeance 
and taking over space and people in her usual manner -"I'm Mrs Stravrogin, the widow 
of a general, and I'll take the whole house". (p649) He is terrified at the sight and sound 
of her. She is in predatory mode. But when she tries to evict the timid bible-seller, Mrs 
tnitin, his collapse and obvious weakness shock her into something of a change of face. 
She nurses him, still bullying, and takes Mrs Ulitin under her protection (again, in 
character, "as a vulture seizes a chick"). What then emerges from the strange dialogue 
that follows is that each has tormented and disappointed the other because each has 
needed and wanted the other's confession of love. Neither the ideal other of Mrs 
Stavrogin's fantasies nor Mr Verkhovensky's flattering self-reflections can satisy this 
basic need. The need is, at last, acknowledged by them both, although perversely: he 
admits to having loved her for twenty years (an admission which is made insulting by 
his little story about the woman who was in love with him for twenty years but afraid to 
say so because she was too fat) while she admits, "I, too, was a fool", (p651) after 
referring resentfully to the evening he proposed to her because he thought it was 
expected of him. It also seems clear from this exchange that Mrs Stavrogin is aware of 
Mr Verkhovensky's ineradicable difference to herself, and so, of his irrepressible 
sentimentality (she guesses he will have made a declaration of love to Mrs Ulitin), and 
his manic changeability ("Father, [. .. ] he's such a man - such a man that in an hour 
you'd have to give him absolution again!"). (p655) 
The relationship between the two could be compared with the relationship between old 
Salamano and his dog in Camus's L'Etranger, in that it is strange, unbalanced, painful, 
yet necessary to both parties. Love in this case is not a matter of charity and sentiment 
but of the indispensable presence of another person who is not oneself. Salamano and his 
dog come to ressemble one another. Mrs Stavrogin and Verkhovensky, however, remain 
emphatically different and both are aware of it. She is a bully who is usually in tight-
lipped control of her spiteful aggressions. He is timid, hysterical and as vain as he is 
self-abasing. Neither "deposes" themselves in favour of the "vulnerable other" with the 
generosity of spirit Levinas evokes. Mrs Stavrogin's admission of need is forced out of her 
so she chokes on it while Mr Verkhovensky is all too ready to throw himself at people's 
feet in an excess of melodramatic humility. Such a relationship lacks the balance of a 
truly polyphonic exchange as much as it lacks the transfigured charity of the Christian 
ideal. But there are two distinct voices involved in the relationship and each is 
sufficiently engaged to shatter the other's self-possession, and to prevent the unqualified 
appropriation of personal difference Allain describes so blightingly. 
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Mr V erkhovensky' s meeting with his son Peter is further evidence of the impossibility 
for Dostoyevsky's characters of emerging intact from their interpersonal encounters. 
Propelled forward, perhaps by imaginary sentiment fostered in absence, Stepan 
Verkhovensky rushes to embrace his son. Peter, however, pushes his father aside -
"Now, now, don't be naughty, don't be naughty!"- and proceeds to expose him, thus 
dusting his hands of a distasteful intimacy while making flattering overtures to Mrs 
Stavrogin. (The exposure concerns absolving her son of some accusations Stepan has made 
about the former's philandering). The shock of being repulsed in this manner jolts Mr 
Verkhovensky into an uncharacteristically dignified silence, which surprises the 
narrator into observing: 
Where did he get so much spirit from? [ ... J he was undoubtedly deeply grieved at 
his first meeting with his darling Peter [ ... J That was a deep and real grief to his 
heart and in his eyes at least [ ... J And surely a real genuine grief is sometimes 
capable of transforming even a phenomenally irresponsible person into a resolute 
and determined one for a short time, at all events [ ... J. (p209) 
Like the underground man's momentary transformation by Liza's compassion, Mr 
Verkhovensky is suddenly changed into someone unlike himself who is nevertheless 
more authentic ("real", "genuine"), because of a newfound apprehension of the 
weaknesses in himself the other has exposed. The interpersonal other is, once again, 
shown to have a more radical impact on perception than the mirror of self-reflection 
before which it is all too easy to pose and play with "different smiles". And if Peter 
demonstrates his difference from the image his father has cherished of him as his 
''beloved son", so Mr Verkhovensky demonstrates in this incident his (temporary) 
difference from the image the narrator has of him as a self-dramatizing poseur with 
little self-awareness. 
In the end, however, it is Peter who receives the most surprises from others because he is 
the one who reduces them most severely to "secondhand definitions". It is, in fact, the 
unruly otherness of the characters he has tried to organize that finally subverts his 
planned chaos so catastrophically, in a dramatic exposure of the folly of surrounding 
oneself with imaginary people. He is wrong about Lembke ("But he was wron& his idea 
being merely based on the fact that from the very start he had invented for himself once 
and for all a Lembke who was a complete simpleton"); (p364) and his boastful statement 
about Lyamshin -"he is completely in my hands"- (p418) is ludicrously reversed when 
Lyamshin panics after Shatov's murder and starts screaming and stompin& attacking 
Peter bodily ("'It's very strange', observed Peter, looking at the madman with uneasy 
astonishment. He was obviously taken aback. 'I had quite a different idea of him' [ ... ]"). 
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(p600) Virgin sky and Liputin similarly defy him in the end. When the latter refuses to 
take tea with him at Kirilov's for (to Peter's mind) obscurely superstitious reasons of his 
own, Peter bursts out in a moment of grudging illumination: "Smells of mysticism! I'm 
damned if I can make out what sort of people you all are!" (p553) 
In the face of all this pointed textual evidence it would seem that Bakhtin is closer to 
the truth about Dostoyevsky's characters than Allain even though, as we have seen, 
Dostoyevsky vindicates and contradicts both critics, thus retaining his own "innerly 
un finalized" characteristics as a writer. Peter's experience suggests, however, that the 
more concerted the appropriation of the other, the more dramatic is the eventual impact 
of personal difference when it occurs. This confirms the Bakhtinian view of 
Dostoyevsky's characters that "in every person there is something which only he 
himself can reveal in a voluntary act of self-consciousness and expression, something 
which is not amenable to an externalizing secondhand definition". Peter, the skilled 
plotter and analyst, is perhaps not the New Novel hero after all so much as the 
traditional novelist (as Robbe-Grillet represents this unimaginative animal) out of his 
element, who discovers that he has made insufficient allowances for the fact that "man 
is not a final and determinate quality upon which stable calculations can be made; man is 
free and therefore can overturn any rules which are forced upon him".52 
III. iii The elusive crown prince: demon of romance ... ? 
If, however, the majority of the characters in the novel affirm their otherness by 
revealing themselves to each other and the reader, there is one character who maintains 
his difference by seeming to reserve this right of expression. In other words, he remains 
other, in part, because he remains silent, because he finally refuses to show himself 
either to other characters or to the reader. This character is Nicolas Stavrogin whom 
Robbe-Grillet has appropriately called "Ie demon absent", or, '1e demon qui manque", for 
his physical absence from many of the key scenes in the narrative and for the omissions 
and discrepancies which characterize his personal story: 
52 
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Ainsi revient Nicolas Stavroguine, qui est Ie 'centre vide' bougeant sans cesse a 
l'interieur des Possedes. 11 n'est pas un demon parmi les autres demons, il est Ie 
demon des demons: Ie demon qui manque, celui qui fait defaut. Presque toujours 
absent de la scene actuelle du recit, on ne connait ses agissements (hors champ, a 
}' etranger) que par d' etroits lambeaux rapportes de seconde ou de troisieme main 
par des messagers douteux, qui n'en devoilent ni n'en comprennent jamais Ie sens.53 
Problems of Dostoevsky'S Poetics, p48. 
Le miroir qui revient, p215. 
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Robbe-Grillet makes a direct correlation here between the phenomenon of absence and 
Stavrogin's importance as a character. His reasoning seems to be based on the assumption 
that the character who remains unknowable provokes greater interpretative effort than 
the character driven by the urge to self-expression to show himself, however obliquely, 
to other characters and to the reader. Where the latter demands recognition, the former 
calls for a degree of inventiveness. The gap between Stavrogin's aloof otherness and our 
understanding of him thus becomes the space in which we are free to invent and 
hypothesize, attempting numerous methods of approach to a problem whose secret 
eludes, and so continues to intrigue us. The equation of absence with creative freedom 
implicit in this reading of Stavrogin refers to something of importance in Robbe-Grillet's 
own novels, such as Le voyeur (which he mentions in connection with The Devils),54 
where a gap in the characters' timetable creates the speculative interest which, Robbe-
Grillet suggests, drives the whole novel, the lacuna thus becoming the "generateur du 
texte entier". This, Robbe-Grillet adds, "n'est pas Ie cas chez DostoYewsy".55 
The responses of other characters in Dostoyevsky's novel nevertheless gives weight to 
the idea Robbe-Grillet expresses that Stavrogin's centrality to the narrative derives 
from his elusiveness. His indeterminacy could, in fact, be seen as the raison d'etre for 
much of the inventive activity referred to earlier. When he arrives in the town with 
Peter Verkhovensky, for example, he is preceded by rumours about his debaucheries 
which are sufficiently recurrent to be convincing yet insufficiently authoritative to be 
established as facts. Kirilov is reputed to have noticed something strange about him but 
when questioned replies "I'd rather not talk about it", while Lebyatkin, who has been 
insulted by Stavrogin, is uneasy about something besides his own grievances and equally 
hesitant about offering an opinion on Stavrogin's character. (See pp112-113.) Such 
reservations have a piquancy about them conducive to gossip, and, since Stavrogin 
frequently declines to explain himself when he is physically present, the fabrication of 
stories about him goes unchecked. The ladies of the town respond with "raptures" to the 
opportunity of making Stavrogin a reflector of all their wildest fantasies, (p56) thrilled 
by the hint of power contained in reports of his excesses, and titillated by the possibility 
of some dark secret motivating them. Then, when Stavrogin inexplicably accepts a 
challenge to a duel from Gaganov while refusing to react at all to Shatov's blow in the 
face, the townsfolk cast him in a new role - again, in the absence of explanations from 
54 
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Stavrogin's crime is made the subject of the "fragment de journal" mentioned in Le 
voyeur, as represented in Le miroir. Note that Stavrogin's confession is the portion 
singled out in the 1986 lecture as "une espece de nouveau roman". The preoccupation 
Stavrogin has with temporal measurements and other minutia, as he waits, half 
consciously, for the little girl to commit suicide, could be compared to Mathias's 
preoccupation with similarly detailed observations in Le voyeur. 
p216. 
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Stavrogin himself - that of a man sensitive to the niceties of social etiquette and with a 
deep sense of responsibility: 
'Is there anything surprising in the fact that Stavrogin fought a duel with 
Gagonov but took no notice of the student? He couldn't possibly challenge one of 
his former serfs to a duel could he?' [ ... J Those words put an entirely new 
complexion on the affair. A new person appeared on the scene, a person everyone 
had misjudged, a person with an almost ideal severity of social standards. (pp301-
302) 
In such instances as these Stavrogin's reserve makes others garrulous; his disinclination 
to comment on himself and his motives makes them analytical and inventive. 
But it is Stavrogin's confession which foregrounds the problem of absence, according to 
Robbe-Grillet, and ensures that readers also are drawn into the interpretative 
hyperactivity absence seems to encourage in the novel's characters. Initially the chapter 
in question, 'Stavrogin's Confession', or, 'At Tikhon's', was excized from the original 
serialized version of the novel on grounds of impropriety, the problem of absence being 
thus dramatized by an editorial decision to withhold 'evidence'.56 This gap in the 
reader's understanding of Stavrogin has since been closed with the inclusion of the 
chapter in most recent editions of the novel. The difficulty of interpreting Stavrogin 
remains, however, and this could be ascribed, in part, to the fissured quality of the 
Petersburg version of the chapter with which Robbe-Grillet seems to be familiar. For 
there are, in fact, several different versions of the missing chapter which are referred to 
as the Moscow and Petersburg versions. 57 In the Moscow version, (which seems to have 
been used by the translator for the Penguin edition for the crucial, second part of the 
chapter), the pages of Stavrogin's confession (three) are handed in one piece and in their 
entirety to Bishop Tikhon. The nature of Stavrogin's crime against a small girl, the main 
subject of the confession, is obvious without its having been directly described. In the 
Petersburg version, on the other hand, which is preferred by the translator of the French, 
Gallimard edition, there are five pages to the confession and these are given singly to 
Tikhon with the exception of the second page which is withheld by Stavrogin on the 
grounds that it is "censure". 58 While it is still evident from the French edition what 
56 
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Katkov, the publisher of The Russian Messenger in which the novel was first 
serialized, refused to include the chapter for its reference to the abuse of a young 
girl, and possibly for political reasons also. See pp81-82 of Dolinin's article, 
'Stavrogin's Confession'. 
Just over forty years after Dostoyevsky's death two versions of 'Stavrogin's 
Confession' were made available to the public: the Moscow text, found in the 
galley proofs for the journal in which the novel was first published; and the 
Petersburg text, found amongst Dostoyevsky's wife's papers and copied out in her 
hand. See Dolinin, Mochulsky and Lord for details. 
Note that Robbe-Grillet highlights the act of censorship further by making 
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may have occurred in the missing interval the 'event' arguably assumes greater 
speculative and interpretative importance for its having been omitted. If it may be an 
exaggeration to see it as being of "exorbitante importance", as Robbe-Grillet phrases it,59 
the episode nonetheless may be said to acquire, through the tactics of restraint, an 
additional suggestion either of something too strange or terrible to be talked about or of 
some compulsion in the hero to deceive, and hence evade definition, for reasons of his 
own. 
Robbe-Grillet is not the only reader to use the silence in Stavrogin's narrative as a means 
of embellishing this character with an additional mysterious allure. Jechova gives the 
missing piece in his confession a spiritual dimension of major importance ("Au niveau de 
la lecture, cet endroit vide provoque un inassouvissement, un sentiment de l'impossibilite 
de dire, et meme de penser, d'imaginer tout. Au niveau spirituel plus large, il communique 
au Iecteur une angoisse, la conscience d'une menace indefinie, d'une incomprehension 
incurable");60 while Marthe Robert, in her preface to the Gallimard edition of the 
novel, takes the tendency to romanticize Stavrogin to an extreme: 
Chatov ne peut eire Ie vrai heros du roman [ ... ] II doit ceder Ie pas a Stavroguine, Ie 
seducteur irresistible, Ie prince des tenebres hisse par son orgeuil au-dela du bien et 
du mal, Ie surhomme tare et noble malgre tout en qui Dostolewski se donne la 
jouissance raffine de commettre les crimes les plus vils. Image du grand pecheur 
dont !'arne refiNe a l'infini les jeux gratuits de la perversite, Stavroguine permet 
au romancier de s'abandonner aux sombres beautes de la transgression absolue, c'est-
a-dire de seduire toutes les femmes sans en aimer aucune, d'etre partout fauteur de 
scandales inouls, a I' occasion violenteur de petites filles et meme incendiaire par 
personne interposee - tout cela sans revoIte, ni raison, ni passion, avec un desespoir 
glace d'archange dechu qui l'accule finalement au suicide.61 
Jechova and Robert give two convincing examples of Robbe-Grillet's maxim that absence 
provokes greater inventive effort than an overly delineated 'presence'. What happens 
as a result, is that Stavrogin's 'absence' is then appropriated in a particular way, so 
that, in the end, he is not absent at all. In Jechova and Robert's commentaries he is 
transformed into a very specific personality of tremendous romantic and spiritual stature. 
III. iv .... or humbug? 
The contrast between the Gallimard presentation of Stavrogin and the English Penguin 
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Stavrogin, in a reworking of the episode in Le miroir qui rement, tear out two 
pages of the confessional document "sous les yeux etonnes de I' eveque". (p216) 
Alain Robbe-Grillet describes it as such in Le miroir qui revient, p216. 
'La Representation par l'absence', p469. 
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reading of his character is so extreme as to be almost humorous. Instead of the "prince des 
h~nebres hisse par son orgueil au-dela du bien et du mal", Magarshack, in his introduction 
to the English translation, describes Stavrogin, along with Peter Verkhovensky, as one of 
the "pegs on which Dostoyevsky hung his two most violent dislikes: his dislike of the 
Russian aristocracy and his dislike of the revolutionaries".62 After this unpromising 
encomium Magarshack concedes that Dostoyevsky's 'crown prince' is an "obscure and 
enigmatic figure" but puts this down, firstly, to Dostoyevsky's changing his mind about 
the role Stavrogin was to play in the novel (see pix of Magarshack's introduction), and, 
secondly, to the omission of the confessional chapter from the original 'Russian 
Messenger' edition. The inference seems to be that the inclusion of the said chapter in 
current editions has simultaneously removed much of the (falsely) mysterious 
dimensionality that adorned the original "peg". 
The problem of Stavrogin is explored from a similar angle only alot more fully in an 
article by R.M. Davison who also considers in his presentation the related issues of 
absence and enigma intriguing to two of the aforementioned French readers. Like Robbe-
Grillet and Jechova, Davison remarks on the way the "spirit of Stavrogin broods over 
everything" while he himself is "curiously absent".63 And, like them, Davison sees this 
absence as not merely a physical matter but also a psychological one, as a zone of 
indeterminacy resulting from a disinclination to explain on the part of the character and 
his implied author. ("Again there is an area of instability, of enigmatic half suggestion 
where any sort of definitive explanation is carefully kept hidden from the reader. [ ... J 
We must resign ourselves to being kept at a distance").64 But, like Magarshack, 
although for more specifically formulated reasons, Davison goes on to interpret this 
"absence" in a completely different way to the French readers I have referred to. 
Basically, Davison approaches the problem from three points of view: the aesthetic, the 
self-perceptions of the character concerned, and, lastly, the perceptions of the other 
characters in the novel. In each case, Davison reads the indeterminacy of Stavrogin's 
character in terms of non-entity rather than mysterious allure. From the point of view of 
aesthetic impact, he notes the delayed entrance of Stavrogin, both behind Peter 
Verkhovensky and, finally, unnoticed, as an example of the literary anticlimax which 
characterizes Stavrogin's role throughout the novel, deflating even his suicide and 
suicide note at the end of the narrative. From the point of view of Stavrogin's self-
commentary Davison highlights, not the omissions, but the occasions when Stavrogin 
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The Devils, Penguin edition, pxii. 
'The Devils: the role of Stavrogin', in New Essays, p95. Note, however, that 
Davison does not refer to the missing chapter at all in his article. 
p99. 
128 
clearly and explicitly declines to recognize himself as the important figure others make 
of him. ('What the hell do you want me for? Once for all, have a good look at me: am I 
your man? And leave me alone".) (p416) Lastly, Davison exposes the ambivalence in the 
response of the other characters to the man who is at once their demon and idol, and a 
rather ordinary mortal who has failed to come up to their expectations. Kirilov and 
Shatov, Davison points out, both use the past tense when speaking of how much 
Stavrogin has meant to them, while Peter, who has made Stavrogin into something of a 
personal divinity, is momentarily thrown into a rage by the realization that Stavrogin is 
unwilling and unable to fill the role specially cast for him. 
Thus where Robbe-Grillet, for example, revels in the glorious "foisonnement" of illusions 
allowed by Stavrogin's indeterminacy, Davison points up the contrast between these 
illusions and the disappointing figure who is hidden behind them. He does not intepret 
this as an aesthetic oversight, however, seeing in it a fitting mise en abyme of the 
"gradual souring of hopes and loss of ideals" that is, in his view, the novels' prevalent 
theme.65 
TIl. v. Absence and ambivalence: some distinctions 
This diversity of opinion amongst critics reflects, as Robbe-Grillet has already implied, 
some of the perceptual and interpretative problems with which the text engages on the 
level of its characters and their interrelationships. In other words, the 
inapprehensibility of Stavrogin, which gives other characters in the novel the incentive 
to invent, prompts critics to do likewise by exploring different avenues of interpretation. 
The potential variety of such avenues would seem to be further assured by the indecisive 
attitude apparently adopted by the author towards this particular character. In his 
introduction to the Notebooks for 'The Possessed' Wasiolek draws attention to the 
numerous sketches of Stavrogin in Dostoyevsky's notes for the novel. These Wasiolek 
describes as "a record of wrong Stavrogins, of trial upon trial of a different Prince 
(Stavrogin)", with the result that this became the longest of all Dostoyevsky's 
preparatory notebooks and yet the one futherest removed from the final version.66 The 
groundwork is thus laid for the perfect 'writerly' text as even the authorial signature 
seems not to provide its usual theoretical limit on the play of meaning suggested by 
Stavrogin's 'text'. 
Yet if the emphasis in the writerly text is on the multiplicity of perspectives then is not 
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this interpretative feast reduced in a different way if the character's own perspective 
has been excluded? If it is impossible for one reading to embrace all a character's 
possibilities there is still room, in other words, for distortion when the reader-writer's 
text ceases to double back to the self-commentary of the character concerned, causing the 
latter to recede and be forgotten. In this case, inapprehensibility translates as absence, 
not ambivalence, and the critic's enrichment is seen to be achieved through a depletion of 
the character's 'otherness'. 
For this reason I find Davison's reading of Stavrogin more convincing than Marthe 
Robert's. If Davison, for example, downplays Stavrogin's terrifying powers of self-
control and the mesmerizing effect he has on others, Marthe Robert simply excludes all 
those moments in the text where Stavrogin threatens to become ridiculous, where her 
"prince des tenebres", "surhomme tare et noble", "archange dechu", is revealed (in one of 
his roles), as a banal figure who is, moreover, wryly conscious of the fact. Tikhon's 
premonition, expressed in both Moscow and Petersburg versions, that the confession may 
be received by the public with derision rather than shock and horror exposes the limits 
of Stavrogin's superhuman mystique. For although his crime, real or invented, is 
represented on one level as the ultimate "proud challenge by an accused to a judge", 
(p699) on another level, it is represented as despicable and belittling, transforming its 
perpetrator into someone who is in need of a nurse. Stavrogin himself has already 
expressed a similar idea when, in a blackly humorous moment (Part II chapter 4), he 
wonders whether perhaps it is a nurse he really needs after all (see p299). Only a very 
tired devil will contemplate delivering himself into the mundanely practical hands of a 
"hospital nurse". More significantly still, in this respect, is Stavrogin's own description 
on this occasion of his personal devil not as an absent demon casting enigmatic shadows 
but as a "nasty, scrofolous little devil with a cold in his head, one of the failures". (p299) 
Thus the "crownprince" lets fall, for a moment, the mask of the handsome sophisticate to 
reveal the alter ego of the underground man: an utterly incongruous metamorphosis. 
Admired and sought after, Stavrogin seems rather to embody the underground man's 
ideal than his sabre-rattling personna. But the text indicates the two share a common 
weakness. Bakhtin has already laid the groundwork for such a linkage when he draws 
attention to the two characters' ambivalent movement towards and away from the other 
in their respective 'confessions'. Hence: 
Stavrogin's confession, like that of Ippolit and the "underground man", is a 
confession intensely oriented toward the other person, who is indispensable to the 
hero, but whom he at the same time despises and whose judgement he does not 
accept. [ ... ] Without recognition and affirmation by the other person Stavrogin is 
incapable of accepting himself, but at the same time he does not want to accept the 
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other person's judgment of him.67 
Bakhtin sees the confessional chapter, then, as an opportunity for dialogue that 
Stavrogin, after seeking out, finally turns down, despite the fact that Bishop Tikhon is 
represented as the ideal dialogic partner and a fitting confessor. For, like Stavrogin, 
Bishop Tikhon has unexplained omissions in his personal narrative which make his 
detractors scornful and his admirers protective "as though they were anxious to conceal 
something about him, some kind of weakness or even aberration" . (p672) Stavrogin begins 
to respond to this unexpected mental alignment and is represented, at the beginning of the 
encounter, in that state of surprised bewilderment provoked by the sudden intrusion of the 
other into the solipsistic consciousness. At the same time he is surprised into exposing the 
other in himself when he temporarily relinquishes his tight self-control and talks, 
momentarily, with a "strange frankness" that is "out of character" with his former self. 
(p676) There is even a moment of psychological and emotional contact between the two 
("I love you"). (p680) But, as with a similar moment in the underground narrative, the 
contact proves unbearable and Stavrogin pushes Bishop Tikhon away, closing the door 
again on his secrets and his poverty. 
The encounter shows a Stavrogin who is unwilling, and perhaps unable, to sustain the 
gaze of the other, or the attention of another mind focussed so closely on his own. In this 
context, the failure of his love affair with Lisa appears to be just that: a drastic 
revelation of impoverishment rather than evidence of a masterful, if passionless, 
prowess. It is "in despair", the text tells us, that Stavrogin cries: 
I had a hope - I've had it a long time - my last hope ... I could not resist the 
bright light that flooded my heart when you came to me yesterday of your own 
accord, alone, first. I suddenly believed that I loved you. Perhaps I believe it 
even now. (p522) 
As Lisa herself asks prior to this, "And is this the vampire Stavrogin?", (p521) to which 
we might add, is this the character in whom Robert sees the "Image du grand pecheur" 
who, in his reflection of the "sombres beautes de la transgression absolue" is capable of 
seducing "toutes les femmes sans en aimer chacune [ ... ]"?68 
The uncertain space Stavrogin appears to occupy between the sublime and the ridiculous, 
the masterful and the vulnerable, prevents him, I believe, from fulfilling the role of a 
Mephistopholes out of a nineteenth-century melodrama. It makes him a more complex 
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character and one, moreover, who experiences his own complexity as problematic.69 
Stavrogin, too, is sometimes frustrated by the insurmountable barriers of incomprehension 
and mistiming between self and other in Dostoyevsky. It is said of him that he is 
"looking for a burden". It could also be surmized that he is looking for an addressee he 
does not find, partly because he cannot or will not recognize them (Tikhon), but partly 
also, because others cannot or will not recognize in him anyone but a stranger - a stranger 
they have tried to appropriate, ironically, by disallowing him to shed the strangeness 
that separates him from them and is an essential part of his mystique. As Peter says to 
Stavrogin after Lisa has left him: "I may be a clown; but I don't want you, my better half, 
to be a clown! Do you understand me?" (p530) Stavrogin, it seems, is not to be allowed the 
'sin' of ordinariness. In this way he exposes the poverty in others, besides himself, 
which motivates their eager transformation of him into the god that is to fill their 
small world and illuminate it. 'Absence' then, is not simply allied with invention or 
romantic mystery. It is also a sign of need, fear, inadequacy, and of the ongoing imbalance 
in the self! other relation which never finds its perfect equilibrium or yields the 
satisfaction which is the emotional and psychic equivalent of knowledge. 
But one can err too far in this direction also. Something which is highlighted by a 
prioritizing of the theme of absence in the novel is the sense of uncertainty which close 
readings can write out of existence. This is one of the strengths of Robbe-Grillet and 
Jechova's readings that both re-emphasize the silent spaces in the novel and so save 
Stavrogin's incalculability from over-definition. And not only Stavrogin's. For all the 
main characters struggle alternately with negation and signification as if suspended 
hazardously over the emptiness that, on another level, is interpreted in narrow political 
terms. The work of devestation, therefore, that Peter allies with his own anarchic brand 
of 'socialism', which has "destroyed the old forces, but hasn't put any new ones in their 
place", (p423) is reflective of an apolitical experience of instability that helps define 
Kirilov and Shatov, Peter and Stepan Verkhovensky, as well as Stavrogin. If 
Stavrogin's experiments of the will are threatened by futility - "But what to apply my 
strength to - that's what I've never seen" - (p666) then Kirilov, too, with his suicide 
philosophy, embraces a void that he parries with a love of beauty and a fragile hope -
"All my life I didn't want it to be only words. [ ... J Now, too, I want it every day not to be 
words". (p611) Shatov's faith is paralyzed by unbelief and momentarily rekindled by 
69 It also makes him a more "double" character than Davison represents him. Tikhon 
observes Stavrogin's potential as well as his failure, while the juxtaposition of 
ridicule with romantic glorification in others' perceptions of Stavrogin (Lisa's for 
instance) makes him perhaps the ultimate illustration of the ironic shadows that 
accompany idealism in Dostoyevsky's novels. If the fallen angel might tum out to 
be a shabby devil with a cold, heaven, as Svidrigaylov cruelly remarks in Crime 
and Punishment, might tum out to be a bathhouse with spiders in it. 
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the miracle of a child's birth; Peter Verkhovensky is cynically allied with a central 
committee he knows does not exist, yet asks Stavrogin to give meaning to his odd personal 
mythology. And Stepan Verkhovensky, whose erratic and excited discourse is sometimes 
as opaque as Stavrogin's silence, receives the last sacrament, expresses his eagerness to 
live his life over again, and admits: 
My friend, all my life I've been lying. [ ... ] Savez-vous perhaps I'm lying even now. 
The trouble is that I believe myself when I am lying. The hardest thing in life is 
to live and not to lie, and - and not believe your own lie. (p645) 
Lacunae in the reader's understanding and the characters' perceptions, of themselves and 
of each other, are clearly an important feature of uncertainty in Dostoyevsky. Yet, in the 
end, absence is a misleading metaphor to apply to the fantastic deceits and desires, the 
spasmodic illuminations, that are equally responsible for preserving the characters' 
inapprehensibility in the novel. The "ring" of consciousness in Dostoyevsky is as much 
defined by the nature of the metal surround as by its "absent" centre, so that, in the end, 
ambivalence in The Devils is seen to be concerned with neither presence nor absence so 
much as with the ongoing movement between the two. 
Le voyeur 
IV. i. The solus ipse: this "self in which there is nothing" 
In Robbe-Grillet's 1955 novel, the discourse of solipsism has reached a state of refinement 
inconceivable in a Dostoyevskean context. The narrator of Notes from Underground, 
Dostoyevsky's most solipsistic hero, was at least aware of the existence of other minds 
even if, after fleeting engagement with them (and attempted manipulation) he 
withdraws from their difference. In Le voyeur, however, the narrator's mental processes 
are so devoid of social reference points as to seem without personal definition at all, as if 
in perverse demonstration of Levinas's rhetorical question: "Si je ne reponds pas de moi, 
qui repondra de moi? Mais si je ne reponds que de moi, suis-je encore moi?"70 Confirming a 
sense of psychological attenuation is the fact that the crime supposedly perpetrated by 
the hero-narrator is nebulous to the point of unreality (in an esoteric moment Robbe-
Grillet once described it as "rien de plus qu'une faille de l'espace et du temps"), 71 while 
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the concept of personal responsibility essential to defining a criminal is undermined 
throughout the novel by the use of disembodied voices, and the unstable identity of the 
presumed victim of Mathias's erotomania (Jacqueline/Violette). 
This lack of definition is partly a result of the overtly aesthetic function Robbe-Grillet 
gives to his characters. Their mode of operation as characters is to be seen in relation to 
the author's creative freedom, and so, as an expression of his inventive humanity first 
and foremost rather than theirs. This is one reason why the characters in the novel 
frequently appear less as personalities than as textual leitmotifs which have an 
aesthetic rather than a psychological coherence. In this respect it is inappropriate to 
talk about them as 'characters' in the sense of the word used in an analysis of a 
Dostoyevksy novel. At the same time, however, the style of characterization Robbe-
Grillet adopts in Le voyeur indicates his departure from traditional ideas about the 
human personality as a coherent entity. Mathias is the product of a concerted 
dismantling of all the adornments and eccentricites that define the nineteenth-century 
Balzacian character, according to Robbe-Grillet, beyond possibility of change. The 
ambivalence of the characters in Le voyeur relates to a problematizing of the identity 
question, therefore, and not a bypassing of it or a reduction of its problems to 'merely' 
formal effects. Unlike in some of his later novels Robbe-Grillet appears to maintain the 
scaffolding of traditional characterization in Le voyeur, at the same time as he 
reorganizes it to suit his own purposes, thus both subverting and rewriting the meaning of 
lice terme d'humain". 
Mathias is the uncertain shadow that is left when a character is stripped of titles and 
heredity, property and position. Doubts and a lack of conviction about what he is doing 
are the signs of a character who is unsure of himself and his place in the world he 
inhabits. However, as with Dostoyevsky's underground narrator, only in a more extreme 
sense, the effect of persistent doubt is to destabilize the character concerned to the point 
where uncertainty becomes a form of psychosis. Mathias appears hopelessly out of 
control of things and suffers from a paralyzing anxiety that may be only partly accounted 
for by guilt feelings about a crime that mayor may not have been committed. He is 
obsessed with alibis and the fear that other characters may expose him: Julien and 
Marie, for instance. And this neurotic uneasiness dominate his speech and behaviour 
even when these are not obviously related to criminal fears and fancies. He is hesitant in 
conversation, timorous in plying his trade and a frequent victim of Beckettian 
misadventures. 
Lacking any stable reference point that might anchor these uncertainites, Mathias's 
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'character' seems to be in limbo outside the boundaries of a rationally articulated doubt, 
and held in suspension for himself as well as for the reader. This unfinished aspect of 
Mathias's character, again, recalls some of the evasions by Dostoyevsky's underground 
man of the defining power of names, attributes and emotions. In both cases, the two 
novelists' demonstrate the relative importance of the imagination in constructing the 
personality when this is no longer conceived as a fixed entity. However, the more 
radical experience of instability in Le voyeur and the inventive activity that goes with 
it, means that the latter is a rather desperate and comfortless affair with none of the 
brag and boast, or the gibbering excitement, of the underground man's discourse. The 
'self', in so far as it exists at all, is a frail construct, put together to meet the needs of the 
moment. It becomes especially vital to achieve the impression of personal stability, for 
example, when Mathias is trying to sell his watches. Setting out in pursuit of custom he 
must create the right mood of confidence to attract a clientele. But: 
Sa confiance - fabriquee avec so in, mais trop fragile - en etait deja ebranlee. II 
cherchait encore a voir dans ce tremblement - dans cette rature propitiatoire - un 
gage de succes, il sentait en realite vaciller sous lui toute l'entreprise. (p52) 
And: 
A peine lancee, sa bonne humeur mal simulee s'eteignit d'elle-meme. (p64) 
Robbe-Grillet implies in his essays that the place of artifice is not restricted to the 
psychology of buying and selling but extends, rather, to all human transactions and 
behaviour. But if Robbe-Grillet believes, with the existentialists, that man is nothing 
until he invents himself, he also shows that, having invented himself, man can also be 
unmade, and not always at will. The novels reveal, in a way the essays cannot, the 
continued experience of uncertainty that haunts a character for whom identity is an 
affair of the mind, particularly when others do not respond affirmatively to the identity 
he projects. This intense psychic insecurity is something I wish to explore more fully in 
my next chapter. But it needs to be seen first in the context of Robbe-Grillet's technique of 
characterization and the problem of solipsism this reflects. For, like the teetering 
structures in a Paul Klee painting, character, and the concept of humanness that informs 
it in Le voyeur, is threatened with imminent collapse. Uncertainty and the imagination 
thus feed on one another and with often destructive effects. Mentally living out his 
hypothetical sales-encounters, Mathias suddenly gives in to panic and experiences 
dizziness after a failed attempt to communicate (did he even get beyond imagining what 
he was going to say?): 
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II s'agissait maintenant de mettre sur pied quelque chose d'un peu moins 
fantomique. II etait indispensable que les clientes parlent; pour cela i1 fallait 
d'abord leur adresser la parole [oo. ] 'Bonjour, Madame, dit-il... Comment allez-
vous?' La porte lui claqua au nez. La porte n'avait pas claque, mais elle etait 
toujours fermee. Mathias eprouva comme un debut de vertige. (p38) 
It could be argued that this demonstration of instability at least avoids the pseudo-
fragmentation of consciousness Robbe-Grillet laments in the traditional novel, where the 
"calm voice of the novelist",72 relates and simultaneously expurgates the incoherence of 
the characters. But it could also be argued that, alongside this gain in terms of 
psychological 'realism', there is a corresponding loss in terms of breadth of vision so that, 
in a sense, one simplification replaces another. The circle of consciousness of the main 
character in Le voyeur is never broken into by another voice, whether of another 
character or a narrator who is not Mathias, so that the reader, as well as Mathias, is 
trapped and limited by Mathias's neuroses. This raises questions concerning the nature of 
Robbe-Grillet's representation of otherness in the novel. 
IV. ii. The separation of hero and world 
As suggested in the theoretical introduction to the chapter, Robbe-Grillet is explicit 
about his intention to preserve the relation of difference and strangeness between the 
hero in his novels, and the world in which he finds himself: 
s'B arrive aux choses de servir un instant de support aux passions humaines, ce ne 
sera que temporairment, et elles n'accepteront la tyrannie des significations qu'en 
apparence - comme par derision - pour mieux montrer a quel point elles restent 
etrangeres a l'homme,73 
Thus, theoretically speaking, the world in the novel is to be cut free from the web of 
human interpretation in which it is momentarily entrapped so that it retains its 
otherness and marks the limits of the hero's solipsistic discourse. Indeed, it is arguably 
the very positing of such a world which enables the discourse of solipsism to be defined 
as such for the reader, as if the "connaissance subjective" of humanism is consciously 
assumed that its arbitrariness may be exposed. 
In the preoccupation with "passions humaines" in Le voyeur, therefore, the difference 
between Mathias and the physical world, in which he finds the correlatives of his 
passion, is constantly affirmed. This is particularly obvious in some of the descriptive 
passages where things have a cleanness and clarity of line that focusses the attention but 
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is not immediately suggestive of any particular pattern of significance. Such as when a 
fine rain purifies the air, for example, and gives things, like the gull, an added 
brilliance, the moisture acting as a reflector: 
On aurait dit [ ... ] que dans cet air lave les objets les plus proches beneficiaient d'un 
supplement d' eclat - surtout lorsqu'ils etaient de couleur claire, comme la mouette. 
11 avait reproduit non seulement Ies contours de son corps, I'aile grise repliee [ ... ] 
mais aussi la commissure sinueuse du bec et sa pointe recourbee, Ie detail des plumes 
sur Ia queue, ainsi que sur Ie bard de l'aile, et jusqu'a l'imbrication des ecailles Ie 
long de la patte. (p19) 
The object is thus verbalized without being harnessed to any anthropomorphic frame of 
reference, and this enables it to retain a foreign quality in relation to the narrator-
voyeur, that is reproduced in his drawing. 
The fact that the physical environment does have certain fixed properties in the novel 
also means that it occasionally frustrates Mathias's designs: the bar counter, for instance, 
is too high to permit convenient display of his wares; the bicycle he hires gives him 
considerable trouble and he has to make a mad rush for the boat which is leaving 
without him. These details suggest a world not entirely fashioned according to the 
desires and manias of the narrator. At times, passing awareness of a different order of 
reality to Mathias's own, is registered by the narrative voice. In the midst of 
hypothesizing about the ideal sale, it is acknowledged that: 
Bien entendu, [Mathias] savait par experience que Ies chases se passaient 
differement dans la pratique. (p31, cf p178) 
Confirming this pattern is the way the novel begins and ends with a near-photographic 
registering of form, as if to mark off all that comes between as disturbing but arbitrary 
fantasy that has strayed, for a moment, over the unyielding and foreign surface of things. 
For the most part people, too, seem to be treated with a similar detachment to the gull on 
the post, the registering of form and position taking precedence over analysis of thoughts 
and feelings. These are sometimes guessed at, but the opaque surface of the face in Le 
voyeur, as opposed to the face of Liza in Notes from Underground, gives no clue as to its 
meaning. When Mathias confronts a prospective client, for example, he tries to guess 
something of what she is thinking from her facial expression, which, however, "fuyait 
sans cesse devant les references dans lesquelles Mathias tentait de l'emprisonner". (p40) 
The other, in the novel, whether material or interpersonal, is represented as radically 
inapprehensible. 
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IV. iii. The problem of obsession 
In effect, however, the inapprehensibility of the other is so radically conceived in Le 
voyeur that differences between self and world, and between self and the interpersonal 
other, in particular, have no specific meaning. The other is thus negated through a lack 
of definition which means there is no alternative to the narrator's obsessive perspecitve 
on the world. Sado-erotics are the unremitting theme of a fantasy world that displaces, 
rather than being bracketted off from, a 'real' one. The lining of Mathias's suitcase, for 
example, seems to be adorned with "de minuscules poupees"; (p23) the discarded crab-
claws on the beach recall Mathias's own nails that have dubious connotations in the 
story; the paraphernalia in a hardware shop is remarkable for a circle of knives around 
an obscure but sexually suggestive trade-mark, and so on. Because of the repetitive nature 
of the fantasy, the "creux interdit" in Le voyeur, in which a gap in Mathias's timetable 
signals an interval when he may have raped a small girl, may be filled with less 
imaginative effort than the gap in Stavrogin's confession.74 For if Stavrogin's reserve on 
other occasions may suggest different meanings to the one reader, to pursue Barthes's idea 
of the writerly text, Mathias's omission suggests, for all its uncertainty, one meaning to 
many readers.75 
If the appropriation of objects is consistent with Robbe-Grillet's phenomenological bias, 
according to which objects are the necessary vocabulary of the mind, the appropriation of 
other characters in the same way nonetheless makes the representation of 'otherness' in 
the novel seem superficial. For no distinction seems to be made between things and other 
minds with their capacity to define, refute, and comment on themselves. In this respect, 
the narrative of Le voyeur could be said to approach Bakhtin's definition of scientific 
commentary in its "mastery over mute objects, [ .. ] that do not reveal themselves in words, 
that do not comment on themselves."76 Inapprehensibility, it would appear, has the 
same effect on the hero-narrator's response to the other as absence. 
Is, then, "the fact that the individual feels his nature to be different from that of the 
things and the people which are before him", ultimately irrelevant to this novel? The 
74 
75 
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See p216 of Le miroir qui revient: "Je n'avais pas lu Les drolOns a l'epoque OU 
j' ecrivais Le voyeur. Tout se passe cependant comme si j' avais voulu reproduire Ie 
meme creux interdit, la meme cavite centrale, Ie meme silence au CCEur de mon 
propre roman, mais en me servant cette fois - ce qui n' est pas Ie cas chez 
DostoYewsky - de ce vide comme generateur du texte entier". 
See my next chapter, however, for a discussion of the kind of uncertainty Robbe-
Grillet's hero-narrators represent, not so much in relation to other minds as in 
relation to themselves and their own mental labyrinths. 
The Dialogic Imagination, p351. 
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repeated emphasis on Mathias's separation from the rest of the world does appear to 
entrench the hero more firmly in his fantasies rather than keep him alert to differences 
around him. Mathias starts the novel "legerement a l'ecart" from other people, and 
remains so, his isolation from the other characters locking him into an underground as 
impenetrable as Dostoyevsky's. As was also the case in Notes, this seems to be a result, 
in part, of the nature of the world his author has put him into, which is one rigged 
against sociability. But where Dostoyevsky makes this an ethical failure Robbe-Grillet 
presents it in as an ontological given, a condition of one's being in the world. Looking 
round for the owner of a stray piece of cord at the beginning of the narrative, Mathias 
finds that "personne ne s'occupait de lui ni de sa trouvaille", (p22) and what is true on 
this occasion is true throughout. The difference between Mathias and the other 
constitutes a wall of silence, or of an indifferent miscomprehension, that amounts to the 
same thing in the end. 
The sense of distance between hero and world thus enables the reader to define the hero's 
discourse as solipsistic, but the lack of significant differences between the hero and the 
world of other minds gives that discourse a spurious authority. Mathias is never 
challenged by others about his guilty anxieties. In the middle of inventing alibis for the 
missing hours in his timetable, for example, Mathias wonders whether it might not be 
dangerous to falsify any of the details in his account. Maria, the young girl's sister, was 
in the environs at the time and may have seen him. But Maria only corroborates his 
story. Julien, another voyeur figure in the novel, is in apparent possession of even more 
information about Mathias's guilty secret. Yet again, fearing the other's exposure, 
Mathias finds that Julien only reinforces his own version of events. (See p199: "Tout cela 
ne faisait, en somme, que renforcer son propre alibi".) Other characters are complicitous 
in Mathias's fantasies in less subtle ways. Violette/Jacqueline's mother, for example, 
condemns the girl as a precocious bimbo, who deserves to be burnt at the stake, thus 
indirectly lending approval to Mathias's proclivities towards violence. Significant in 
this regard also, is the fact that the girls in the novel are mostly docile and co-
operative, described in such terms as "obeissante", "poupee", and as having an "air 
vulnerable". For these reasons, it may be concluded that the other is only a potentially 
threatening presence in the novel that never actually materializes. 
It could even be argued that the opacity of the characters in Le voyeur that initially 
reads as an indication of their otherness is really the key to their ineffectiveness in 
resisting appropriation. For, as with the "surface lisse" of objects, facial expressions pose 
pseudo-enigmas that are invitations to invent, not inquire. More explicit in this regard 
than the example cited above, is the description of the cafe proprietor's face, which is: 
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fermee, dure, cireuse, sur laquelle on pouvait lire l'hostilite, ou Ie souci - ou 
seulement l' absence - selon les penchants de chacun; on avait aussi bien Ie droit de 
lui preter les desseins les plus tenebreux. (p60) 
The other in Le voyeur that wears a face that is "fermee" and opaque is also without the 
necessary attributes to make an impact on the hero's consciousness, becoming instead a 
mirror of his desires. And if the interpersonal other is thus reduced to a mental construct 
shaped by the "penchants de chacun", it ceases to be other and becomes a more egocentric 
possession than all the collective knick-knacks of a Balzacian drawing-room. 
Robbe-Grillet's interpretation of phenomenological thinking may thus be seen in this 
novel to involve an emptying of the other prior to filling the gap between self and other 
in any way one likes, which, in Le voyeur, means according to the limited paradigms of 
the 'self'. The incompleteness of Mathias's character that is, on one hand, related to his 
existential uncertainty, may also be related, I believe, to a perceptual and psychological 
impoverishment as a result of his isolation from other characters, an isolation, however, 
from which there is no exit. For these reasons I find Robbe-Grillet's representation of 
otherness in Le voyeur unconvincing. The world may be liberated from its nineteenth-
century anthropomorphic associations, but only in preparation for its being more closely 
enmeshed in a narrowly human and individualistic scheme of things. Moreover, it is 
largely because the world has been emptied of prior social and cultural meanings that it 
is so vulnerable to the hero-narrator's manipulations. When Robbe-Grillet jokingly 
concedes that his novels are more subjective than Balzac's,77 he is right, but not merely 
because his novels are narrated by a fallible human observer. It is because in a novel such 
as Le voyeur he has silenced the world in which he has put that observer, smoothed its 
surfaces so they reflect his desires and fears, deflected the shock waves of "cette realite 
tetue" 78 that is of as little significance to the hero as it is to Balzac's monomaniacs. 
Because of a lack of contact with other characters, who, like things, appear to have "rien 
a l'interieur",79 Mathias functions similarly to the character in the tradition of Pere 
Goriot. Consequently, the odd lack of focus initially associated with his character could 
be compared with the effects of an extremely short range close-up, in which exclusive 
concentration on the subject matter distorts its nature and all but disguises the fact of its 
overwhelming presence. 
I suggested in my brief analysis of Husserl that the distortion of the self/other relation 
in Robbe-Grillet may already be implicit in the phenomenological philosophy Robbe-
Grillet claims an affinity with. Robbe-Grillet reaches the impasse of solipsism 
77 
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Pour un nouveau roman, pl18. 
p18. 
p48. 
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circuitously, however, by radically splitting consciousness into the categories of mind and 
other, and then emphasizing the former at the expense of the latter. This seems 
effectively to annul a distinction that could have qualified the solipsistic trend implicit 
in the phenomenological model. Or is the separation between hero and world in Le 
voyeur already a sign that Robbe-Grillet has no intention of resisting the solipsistic 
temptation? Volosinov's comments on subjective psychology would suggest that this is a 
common pattern: 
Thus, subjective psychology [ ... J inevitably leads to dualism, that is, to the 
splitting up of being into two incompatible aspects - the material and the mental 
- or leads to a purely idealistic monism. 80 
Volosinov would thus argue that the kind of duality we find in a novel like Le voyeur is 
not an attempted evasion of solipsism so much as a manifestation of it. The splitting up 
of being in the novel into two theoretically interrelated aspects, one of which, however, 
is deprived of substance, is, in effect, an expression of a subjectivism that already inclines 
to monomania. The unbalancing of the self/other relation in Robbe-Grillet's novel thus 
seems to exaggerate the difficulties of perceiving other minds, translating its 
uncertainties into impossibilites. 
Djinn 
IV. i. The encounter with the other: "l'etrangere" 
While each of the works following Notes could be said to reflect Dostoevsky's concern 
with the self/other relation, it is not until Djinn (1981) that, in my view, Robbe-Grillet 
provides his most convincing rendition of the encounter with the "strange being who is 
precisely the other". After the flamboyant textual games of the 60's and 70's, in Djinn 
Robbe-Grillet returns to a more conventional style of characterization. The illusion of 
characters as separate entities is maintained, as it was in Le voyeur, with the difference 
that in the later novel, more use is made of interpersonal dialogue. While dialogue is not 
necessarily reflective of mutual comprehension, or even mutual interest, interaction 
between characters could be said to provide a deterrant to monomania and a means of 
keeping discourse about the other, and self, open. As it happens, the encounter between 
self and other is, according to Robbe-Grillet, one of the central themes in Djinn. The 
drama is presented in all its stages: from the initial awareness of difference, to the 
reassessment of habits of perception and the inauguration of new ways of thinking and 
being that emerge from the encounter. As might be expected from Robbe-Grillet's other 
80 Freudianism: a Marxist Critique, p25. 
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writings, the new ways of thinking represented in the novel have primarily to do with 
the free play of the imagination in what is essentially a dream-world. But the 
narrator's experience of the dreamworld has alot to do with his encounter with another 
mind and another way of reading the world that challenges his own. His initiation into 
the school of fantasy is thus motivated by curiosity and the taste for discovery as well as 
by the readiness to use his imagination. The other in Djinn is not reduced to a passive 
screen onto which he projects his own reflections. 
The narrator-hero's first experience of difference occurs when he meets Djinn at a 
prearranged rendez-vous near the beginning of the novel. On confronting a trench-coated 
figure in dark glasses he assumes, on the basis of his knowledge of certain cultural 
indicators, that the figure is blind and male. In fact, contrary to expectation, the figure is 
neither blind nor male nor, strictly speaking, human. The 'real' Djinn observes him from 
elsewhere, and is a woman, while the minion in front of him that ressembles Djinn is a 
robot. His prior assumptions have deceived him and he reacts with surprise: "Ma 
surprise est si forte que je la dissimule a grand-peine". (p12) Djinn, who is to be his boss on 
an unspecified mission, also comes to the encounter with "idees toutes faites", which are 
found to be happily inadequate to the reality of the other: "Vous etes assez joli gar<;on, 
dit-elle, mais vous etes trop grand pour un Fran<;ais". (p13) Thus from the very first scene, 
gentle mockery of conventional readings of the other is implied. The fact that the 
incident doubles as an introduction to cultural stereotyping, a frequent component of 
language teaching courses, is a reminder of an original generating motive for the novel, 
namely, as a text that could be used by French teachers to present problems of grammar 
and idiom in an accessible literary from. Unlike the lion in Barthes's latin grammar 
sentence, however, Robbe-GriIlet's mythico-grammatical creatures provide a 
commentary that exceeds their linguistic and cultural definition, the increasingly crazy 
nature of their embroilments distracting attention from the increasing complexity of the 
grammar used in narrating them.81 Robbe-Grillet's reclaiming of the text from its 
teacherly origins in the Minuit edition further establishes the 'otherness', not so much of 
his characters in relation to each other, but of the text in relation to its readers. (The 
Minuit edition adds a prologue and epilogue in which the status of the 'original' 
American pedagogical text is deliberately fictionalized). On several different levels, 
then, the other in Djinn is shown to exceed the familiarizing boundaries of cultural, 
psychological and literary categories. 
81 See 'Le my the aujourd'hui': "quia ego nominor leo. [ ... ] la phrase [ ... ] me dit 
clairement: je suis un exemple de grammaire destine a illustrer la regIe d'accord 
d'attribut. [ ... ] elle cherche fort peu a me parler du lion et de la fa<;on dont il se 
nomme [ ... ]". Mythologies, p201. 
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As one of the protagonists in a love-story (cum thriller, cum science-fiction, cum spoof of 
all of the above), Djinn is the main representative of an unfamiliar reality in relation to 
the narrator-hero in the novel. It is with Djinn that Simon Lecceur is chiefly preoccupied 
because he is attracted to her and because hers is the mastermind behind the odd 
adventures he engages in. But other characters also help to shake him out of his usual 
habits of thought, notably the two children, Jean and Marie. Both the children represent 
a different way of thinking to his own that could be described as whimsical since fanciful 
games, which force the mind out of its mundane and unimaginative grooves, are of 
paramount importance in their world. Simon pursues his acquaintance with the children 
in a strange abandoned building that turns out to be the children's favorite "terrain de 
jeu", and which is, fittingly in this case, cut off from communication with the outside 
world. Jean, whom Simon Lecceur meets first, is dressed in period costume, underlining his 
removal from everyday reality and the place of role-playing in the dimension of reality 
which he inhabits. Marie, who seems to be the leader of the two, is pert and 
irrepressibly mendacious. As she muses on the identity of the man in the portrait, Simon 
has difficulty keeping up with her lively conversation. Like Liza in Notes, her 
responses are always in excess of the narrator-hero's mental calculations: 
Mais, en fait, ses reponses de<;oivent toujours mon attente. Et, cette fois, elle se 
contente de rectifier, comme une institutrice corrigeant un eleve: 'Peri en mer', ce qui 
est l'expression juste quand il s'agit d'un naufrage. (p38) 
Simon's impression of being a pupil corrected by his teacher is appropriate in the 
circumstances. For in fact Marie, Jean and Djinn all consecutively assume the role of guide 
and teacher in this world where there is a "functioning (both of consciousness and of the 
world) which is not the one with which [Simon is] familiar."82 These characters are the 
key to another way of thinking that Simon endeavours to learn. One of the things he 
observes about this other dimension is that all the usual markers and reference points are 
either absent or of no use in coming to terms with it. The silence and darkness of the house 
and its removal from 'normal' human activity seems to transport Simon into another 
time-frame. He feels "hors du temps". Clock-time is, of course, a significant organizer of 
experience in Western European culture since the parcelling out of hours and days in an 
orderly fashion helps create a sense of security and control. Simon faces the problem of 
orienting himself without such rules of measurement to assist him. Time has no meaning 
here, and when he asks how long the little boy has been 'dead', Marie replies: "Une 
heure peut-etre, ou une minute, ou un siecle. Je ne sais pas. Je n'ai pas de montre."(p35) 
Despite this warning, Simon Lecceur keeps on trying to apply rationalist logic to the 
82 Three Decades, p30. 
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situations in which he finds himself in an effort to remove, or domesticate, some of their 
strangeness. He tries, for example, to explain the boy's periodic losses of consciousness: 
Je saisis, a present, Ie sens probable de tout cela: Ie gar<;;on doit avoir des syncopes 
frequentes, sans doute d'origine nerveuse; l'eau froide sur son front sert de revulsif 
pour Ie ranimer. (p35) 
But as he discovers Jean's "death" is part of an elaborate comedy the children are 
playing, and Simon is invited to join their magic circle rather than remaining on the 
outside carrying on the search for explanations. In his acquaintance with the children 
Simon must leave behind his Cartesian logic (of which Djinn is also critical) and exercise 
his imagination instead. For instance, the children encourage him to read out his latest 
"clue" as though he were on stage, and in Chapter 4, Marie instructs him in the art of 
story-telling. 
The process of adjusting to another reality is both fascinating and disturbing. Robbe-
Grillet reproduces the feelings of desire and fear that accompany an encounter with the 
other that Lacan, for example, has formalized in psychoanalytic theory. In erotic 
relations in particular, says Lacan, the human subject is disturbed, because he "fixes upon 
himself an image that alienates him from himself".83 So while Simon Lecceur is under 
the influence of a "trouble fascination" in Djinn's presence, he also feels alienated and 
threatened by the world with which Djinn is associated. Particularly when he discovers 
the seemingly absurd and artificial ruses Djinn employs to communicate with her 
favoured ones. When he finds out that he and his look-alikes have been listening not to 
Djinn in the flesh but to a recorded message, he is disconcerted and uneasy: 
De nouveau, la mefiance m'a envahi. Je sens comme un danger inconnu, obscur, qui 
plane sur cette reunion truquee. Cette salle remplie de faux aveugles est un piege, 
ou je me suis laisse prendre ... (p79) 
Frequently, however, when he abandons himself to this rather hazardous joy-ride, he 
experiences a sense of liberty and adventure. The constant need to invent as he adjusts his 
thinking to accommodate the other (Djinn, Marie), is surely the opposite of the obsessive 
train of thought that characterizes Robbe-Grillet's isolated hero, Mathias. Le voyeur 
and Djinn thus offer readers two extreme versions of the difficulties besetting 
interpersonal relations: an insecure solipsism (Le voyeur) or the happy muddle of a 
highly sociable fantasy party (Djinn). At the same time, the lighthearted nature of 
interpersonal encounters in Djinn finds no equivalent in Dostoyevsky's works, where the 
83 Ecrits, p19. 
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miscomprehensions and incongruities of human relations tend to leave the characters 
maniacally laughing on the edge of an abyss which Robbe-Grillet's Simon Lecceur 
euphorically sails over - despite knocks on the head, kidnapping and personality 
changes. 
IV. ii. No questions in wonderland? 
A possible reservation about the novel from a sceptical point of view, is that although 
Simon is required to exercise his imagination, and so to make considerable mental effort, 
asking questions about the other is, on occasions, actively discouraged. As I am assuming 
here that scepticism about other minds is as much about inquiry as it is about suspended 
judgement, the old two-headed monster of sceptical reasoning, the rebuke to Simon's 
inquisitiveness, juxtaposed with the constant invitations to play, suggest an epicurean 
rather than a sceptical philosophy informing the novel. For example, when Simon asks 
the young student a string of questions about her identity in relation to his mission he is 
rebuffed with: "Vous parlez trop", (p24) while Marie makes him feel quite idiotic as he 
tries to grasp what has happened to her playmate, Jean. Sometimes, it is the dream-like 
atmosphere of the place that frustrates his attempts at speech: 
Mes syllabes tombent, elles aussi, sans eveiller de reponse ni d'echo, comme des 
objets inutiles, prives de sens. Et Ie silence se referme. Ai-je vraiment parle? Le 
froid, l'insensibilite, la paralysie commencent a gagner mes membres. (p32) 
More radically still, the narrator-hero loses consciousness completely on several 
occasions, either from the effects of enchantment, or because he has been physically 
cashed on the head, as at the end of Chapter 5 for instance. The goal towards which he 
is propelled in the novel thus seems to be that of total abandonment of rational control in 
order to gain entry to a wonderland of riddles and dreams. It is significant in this regard 
that, after submitting to Marie's orders, he agrees to take up the dark-glasses and cane of 
a blind-man and to be led about by the young Jean who is more at ease in the dream-world 
than he is: 
Et je me suis vu bientot, cette fois, obeissant a une gamine de dix ans a peine, 
menteuse et my tho mane de surcroit. En demier lieu, j' ai fini par accepter de perdre 
aussi l'usage de mes yeux, apres avoir perdu successivement celui de mon libre 
arbitre et celui de mon intelligence. (p60) 
On the other hand, it could be argued that Simon's education in the irrational is in itself 
an answer to his questions about the other. The phenomenon into which he is inquiring-
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Djinn and the world she belongs to - does not belong to any rational scheme and so is 
better understood by participation. Considered in this light, Simon's questions must be 
rebuffed because they are misguided, being based on the assumption that full control and 
comprehension are necessary before he can begin to appreciate another way of being. 
Simon is being taught to accept uncertainty as an ever-present factor in any equation, and 
in this respect, he is potentially a far more enlightened being than Peter Verkhovensky 
from The Devils who insists on relating to others in the limited terms of his own 
understanding. The Pyrrhonian sceptic ackowledges that all inquiries are conducted on 
data of which it is impossible to be absolutely sure. When Simon admits at the beginning 
of the novel, "J'aime comprendre ce que je fais", (p19) he speaks for all human beings, 
whose instinct is to sort everything out before pursuing a given project: an instinct 
Margaret Wiley has so nicely formulated as man's insistence on "tidying up his world so 
that he may sit down in it". 84 The uncertainty principle that is introduced into Simon's 
mind through his encounter with the other, however, would seem to be deliberately not 
explained away by Djinn or by the implied author of the novel, so that, indeed, inquiry 
and discovery may be ongoing. Simon is to imitate the pattern described by his author in 
Le miroir qui revient as one befitting "une sorte d'explorateur, resolu, mal arme, 
imprudent", who questions as well as invents, and always, "a nouveau".85 Thus 
epicureanism does not displace, but is combined with, sceptical attitudes in the novel. 
A more likely threat to the encounter between different consciousnesses within the novel 
is Robbe-Grillet's foregrounding of aesthetic conundrums in the later chapters, 
particularly after the change in narrative voice in chapters 6 and 8 where the reader's 
attention is sollicited to compare different versions of the story and the minor variants 
within it. In the process our interest is directed away from the characters and towards 
the novelist, who then becomes the only character of any importance. The difference 
between self and other fundamental to the experience of strangeness is forgotten in a "jeu 
d'images" in which both the identity and past experiences of the protagonists are 
refracted in a host of simulacra. Although doubled identity has been a theme throughout 
Djinn from the very first chapter, by the end of the novel it transpires that all the 
characters can be connected to Simon, alias Djinn, alias Jane, alias Jean, alias Jeanne, etc. 
Nevertheless, even in the latter half of the novel, the voice of Simon LecCEur can still be 
heard registering bewilderment and annoyance at this complicated "mise en scene". This 
means there is an outlet for the reader's own possible frustration at this point, at the 
same time as the illusion of a character grappling with unknown quantities is revived. 
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The Subtle Knot, p279. 
See Le miroir qui revient, pp12-13. 
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Face to face with the ethereal creature calling herself Djinn in Chapter 7, all Simon's 
desires and fears are reawakened: 
Simon etait envahi par des sentiments contradictoires. D'une part, cette jeune fille 
etrange Ie fascinait et, sans se l'avouer, il redoutait de la voir disparaitre; meme si 
elle venait du royaume des ombres, il avait envie de rester pres d'elle. Mais, en 
meme temps, toutes ces absurdites Ie mettaient en colere: il avait l'impression qu'on 
lui racontait, pour se moquer de lui, des histoires a dormir debout. (p114) 
In the Epilogue the reader is left with a trail of question marks about the narrator and 
the status of the story itself. With the reappearance of Marie on the last page, who "De 
tous les personnages [ ... J existe sans nul doute", and is last observed disappearing down 
the cul-de-sac Vercingetorix, the action seems about to start all over again. The reader is 
thus discouraged from reducing the text to a piece of aesthetic engineering, and the tale 
and its characters are allowed to exercise their "trouble fascination" over the readers to 
the last. 
VI. Conclusion 
Scepticism about our ability to know other minds is upheld in Robbe-Grillet's novel Djinn 
yet without its lapsing into the kind of intellectual and imaginative indifference 
towards the other that assumptions about inapprehensibility seem to entail in Le voyeur. 
Indifference, attempted manipulation and obsession are some of the responses to other 
minds represented in both Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's style of characterization, 
and these suggest the difficulties of interpersonal understanding have become a 
justification for self-projection. In other words the other is treated as if it were absent, 
mute, inapprehensible, while the "I" garrulously explores its own fantasies. But 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's novels also tend to confirm the thesis that fantasy that 
is not informed by corporate freedoms (Notes, Le voyeur), tends to be obsessive and 
repetitive, and so, a denial of the agility and unfinished aspect of characters more 
readily associated with a problematic style of writing. 
It would be simplistic, however, to see the interpersonal other as the only significant 
source of difficulty and disturbance in the characters' worlds. Although Notes from 
Underground shows the retreat from the other as a simultaneous retreat from the 
challenges of "real life", Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's novels also show the other to 
be something of a safeguard from the lonely destructiveness of a Stavrogin, for example, 
or from the dizzying imbalance of a Mathias. The 'other' in the self, the "flaw" in 
consciousness, which undermines from within, is a problem I wish to explore in my next 
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chapter. 
The significance of the interpersonal other in revolutionizing habitual attitudes, as 
indicated by Levinas, may, finally, be emphasized on a paratextual level. It could be 
argued that the critical impact of Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's novels, for example, 
is closely associated with the stylistic idiosyncracies of each author. In other words, the 
implied author of the novels is the reader's other, seeking to engage with and challenge 
the norms of the reader's 'text' with its assumptions and preferences. It may be that, on 
occasions, the novels posit a hypothetical reader we refuse to become, at which point the 
communication between author and reader, which Wayne C. Booth tells us is the 
"ultimate problem of the rhetoric of fiction",86 breaks down. The extent to which we are 
prepared to engage is perhaps an indication of the extent to which we as readers are 
prepared to become, as Montaigne phrases it, "tousjours autre d'un autre" .87 It is 
intriguing to find Donald Marshall suggesting that this distinctiveness, this fascinating 
and baffling strangeness of another voice, is what also draws readers to the writing of a 
philosopher like Jacques Derrida. Of the philosopher who wrote that "personne n'est 1ft 
pour personne", Marshall writes: 
in conversation we do not wish simply that our partner be an echo of ourselves, nor 
do we even seek a mere exchange of experiences and opinions. In conversation, we 
acknowledge a claim: the point of talking with Derrida is gained by having 
Derrida be and sound like Derrida. Otherwise, why talk with him at all? The 
great art of introduction is not the bare bringing together, but finding the few well-
chosed words whose offering starts a conversation that can continue of itself. Such 
a never-stabilized circulation of positions is [ ... J the excitement of deconstruction.88 
Although Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet are 'absent' to us, displaced by their texts, yet 
our conversation with them as readers can, in the manner designated by Marshall, 
"continue of itself" as the "active (modifying) influence" of another's word on our own. 
86 
87 
88 
The Rhetoric of Fiction, p396. 
'Apologie de Raimond Sebond', Essais, Livre II, p267. 
Philosophy Beside Itself. On Deconstruction and Modernism, pxxii. 
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4 The flaw in the case against tragedy 
Vne interrogation persiste: est~il possible d'echapper a la tragedie? 
Aujourd'hui son regne s'etend sur to us mes sentiments et touies mes pensees, elle me 
conditionne du haut en bas. Mon corps peut etre satisfait, mon creur content, ma conscience 
reste malheureuse. J'assure que ce malheur est situi? dans l'espace et Ie temps, eomme tout 
malheur [ ... ] J'assure que l'homme, un jour, s'en liberera. Mais je ne possede de eet avenir 
aucune preuve. Pour moi aussi, c' est un pari. 
(Alain Robbe-Grillet) 
I. i. The ease against tragedy 
The response of the Pyrrhonist sceptic to suffering is both reasonable and practical. 
Acknowledging his human susceptibility to adversity he nonetheless attempts to limit 
the effects of adversity by divorcing the experience of pain from any metaphysical 
associations. Thus "cold" and "thirst" for Sextus Empiricus are "unavoidable" 
disturbances, but not threatening to his peace of mind because they are recognized as 
physical phenomena with no relation to an ethical, spiritual or psychological state of 
affairs. The ability to make this distinction is what gives the philosopher the 
advantage, says Sextus Empiricus, over the "ordinary" man: 
Two circumstances combine to the detriment of the ordinary man: he is hindered 
both by the feelings themselves and not less by the fact that he believes these 
conditions to be evil by nature. The Sceptic, on the other hand, rejects the 
additional notion that each of these things is evil by nature, and thus he gets off 
more easily) 
Robbe-Grillet pursues a similar line of argument in 'Nature, humanisme, tragedie', where 
he attacks the metaphysical referent in tragic art. His principle objection is that it 
clothes human pain with a false sonority, but where Sextus Empiricus sees the 
"additional notion" of evil as something making suffering more difficult, Robbe-Grillet 
sees it as a palliative which makes pain easier, by clothing suffering with a spurious 
meaningfulness and indirectly reminding people of the "good" they have "lost". Robbe-
Grillet opens the case against tragedy, therefore, with a quotation from Roland Barthes: 
1 
2 
La tragedie n'est qu'un moyen de recueillir Ie malheur humain, de Ie subsumer, donc 
de Ie justifier sous la forme d'une necessite, d'une sagesse ou d'une purification [ ... J. 2 
Sextus Empiricus. Selections from the Major Writings, p42. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p45. 
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This extreme view of tragedy, not just as an explanation but as a justification of human 
suffering, is a position Robbe-Grillet reaches in the essay by virtue of the following 
argument. Firstly, he assumes tragedy to be based on a humanistic view of the world 
which implies faith in a given human nature and in a pre-established universal order. 
Faith in the givenness of things is, he suggests, accompanied by the conviction that 
everything shares the same nature and purpose, and that a link may thus be forged 
between man and world. Secondly, as tragedy is allegedly based on confidence about 
man's place in a wider scheme of things, conflict, pain and separation need not be seen as 
calamities but as temporary estrangements from an ideal. Robbe-Grillet then takes his 
argument further by insisting that the dream of lost unity is so powerful in tragedy that 
the most radical departures from it are reminders, and even guarantees, of an ultimate 
reconciliation: 
La tragedie apparait donc comme la demiere invention de l'humanisme pour ne 
rien laisser echapper: puisque I' accord entre l'homme et les choses a fini par etre 
denonce, l'humaniste sauve son empire en instaurant aussitot une nouvelle forme de 
solidarite, Ie divorce lui-meme devenant une voie majeure pour la redemption.3 
Lastly the emotions associated with tragedy - pity, fear, alienation - are discredited 
on the grounds that they are fostered by tragedy's covert promise of reconciliation, which 
is so confidently anticipated, in Robbe-Grillet's view, that the difficulty itself may be 
read as a back-to-front reflection of it: 
Le malheur, l'echec, la solitude, la culpabilite, la folie, tels sont les accidents de 
notre existence qu' on voudrait no us faire accueillir comme les meilleurs gages de 
notre salut. 4 
Robbe-Grillet seems to be saying two quite different things in the essay. On the one hand 
he is representing tragedy as the simplification of a more complex phenomenon. By 
placing it in a meaningful context (which is passed off as 'natural'), tragedy, he implies, 
masks the problematic aspects of suffering and encourages acquiescence to it as part of a 
universal order. Tragedy is not 'tragic' enough. On the other hand, making the preceding 
argument redundant, Robbe-Grillet asks whether the unhappy consciousness, or, man's 
'tragic' disposition, may itself be an illusion based on an erroneous perception of man's 
situation in the world. Tragedy is an illusion masking another illusion: metaphysical 
malaise. Cold and thirst are the only "unavoidable disturbances" we have to confront 
after all. 
3 pp33-34. 
4 p54. 
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Robbe-Grillet's essay is the starting point in this chapter for an examination of the 
representation of suffering in his own and Dostoyevsky's novels. It is immediately 
obvious that the definition of tragedy given in Pour un nouveau roman is a narrow one. 
Accordingly the first requirement is to emphasize the complexity of a genre which, 
according to R.P. Draper, "is impossible to define satisfactorily".5 The link Robbe-Grillet 
establishes between the terms of the problem and its resolution seems unnecessarily 
perverse in the light of much Greek, Shakespearian or Racinian tragedy, for example. 
But the most effective qualification of Robbe-Grillet's essay is provided by his own and 
Dostoyevsky's novels. Fear and uncertainty in Les gommes and Dans Ie labyrinthe 
highlight the superficiality of dismissing tragic experience as merely the product of 
philosophical error, while Dostoyevsky's The Idiot and The Gambler, more openly 
preoccupied with suffering, illustrate the difficulty of explaining or resolving it, despite 
the strongly metaphysical bias of the former. A preliminary definition of terms 
postulates what the novels affirm, namely, that tragic vision is not dependent on a given 
philosophical or metaphysical scheme, being rooted, rather, in an experience that defies 
schematization, a 'reality' that may also be disconcertingly nebulous, an emotional and 
imaginative vulnerability that subverts doubts on the rational level. 
This vulnerability is clearly not the "unavoidable" disturbance associated in Sextus 
Empiricus with man's basic physical needs, or with what Philip Haillie, in his 
introduction to Sextus Empiricus, calls the "massive, unyielding forces of nature".6 The 
level of tragic experience I intend to explore in Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's novels 
has more to do with the pain of a psychic insecurity, a threat of dissolution associated 
not so much with the 'other' who is my neighbour as with the 'other' within. From this 
inner threat, the demands and uncertainties of the interpersonal other provide an almost 
welcome form of relief - were it not for the fact that this refuge also may be transformed 
by some alchemy of the mind into a fearful chimera. This is what past writers have 
often associated with the power of the imagination, and so, with what Montaigne has 
called "cette liberte de l'imagination et ce desreglement de pensees" which enables man 
alone among the animals to represent to himself "ce qui est, ce qui n'est pas, et ce qu'il 
veut, Ie faux et Ie veritable [ ... J".7 But perhaps "imagination" is too categorical a term for 
such an elusive phenomenon. Derrida writes in Marges de la philosophie of "une certaine 
alterite" which interferes with the regulated interplay of signs, and to which Freud 
gives the metaphysical name of the unconscious. Derrida prefers not to name this other 
except by default and so as not "une presence a soi cachee", and "pas plus une 'chose' 
5 
6 
7 
Tragedy: Developments in Criticism: a Casebook, p11. 
Sextus Empiricus. Selections from the Major Writings, p12. 
'Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Essais, Livre II, p126. 
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qu'autre chose", and yet which "envoie, [ ... ] delegue des representants, des mandataires 
[ ... J".8 In Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet this susceptibility to something other is almost 
on as tenuous philosophic and rational grounds as Derrida's "alterite", while the 
capacity of this "alterite" to throw their hero-narrators off balance with its mandatory 
interjections is insistently "certaine". 
Does this make them gullible perpetrators of the tragic myth? Or unhealthy minds 
incapable of practising moderation in the face of a groundless uneasiness? Both writers 
are undeniably fascinated by the processes of unravelling and destruction, and by a 
perversity, therefore, which Montaigne insists is the true psychic equivalent of the 
philosopher's interest in contrary arguments.9 If we pursue Montaigne's idea further, then 
the practice of moderation of feeling advocated by Sextus Empiricus is better associated 
with the stoic than the sceptic philosopher for whom doubt and uncertainty are 
challenges to be relished, not evils to be feared. Furthermore, Dostoyevsky and Robbe-
Grillet's readiness to conjure up labyrinths of fear in their writing is closely associated 
with their strategies of defence. The imaginative faculty that is responsible for 
generating the "desreglement de pensees" in their novels is made to work backwards, 
devizing verbal patterns and metaphors to contain the fears it has helped generate. In 
this respect, however deviant in their particularity, the two writers fall back into line 
with past tragedians as they resort to tragedy'S most celebrated antidote to disorder -
aesthetic form, to which Dostoyevsky adds a distinctly metaphysical dimension. 
I. ii. Tragedy as the dramatization of the incongruous 
It is reasonable to argue that tragedy is thrown into relief through comparison with an 
ideal or preferred state of affairs. Some perception of value is fundamental to a sense of 
loss, outrage and grief. The sacrifice of Iphigenia in Euripides and Aeschlyus, for 
example, is tragic, in part, because it deprives of life a girl who has no desire to leave 
"this sunlight [ ... J our dearest love", and destroys a whole family in the round of bitter 
plotting and revenge that follows her killing. The murder of Shakespeare's Desdemona 
by Othello, and his own suicide, are all the more poignant for being the bitter fruit of a 
powertullove, an admirable yet "unwise" passion that has been soured by jealousy. The 
'meaningful' context in which these acts are perpetrated, does not mitigate the appalling 
8 
9 
Marges de fa philosoph ie, p21. 
See Montaigne's essay, 'Que nostre desir s'accroit par la malaisance', Essais, Livre 
II. "11 n'y a raison qui n'en aye une contraire, dict Ie plus sage party des 
philosophes. Je remachois tantost ce beau mot qu'un ancien collegue pour Ie mespris 
de la vie: "Nul bien nous peut apporter plaisir, si ce n'est celuy a la perte duquel 
nous sommes preparez. [ ... J Car il se sent evidement, comme Ie feu se picque a 
l'assistance du froid, que nostre volonte s'esguise aussi par Ie contraste [ ... J".( p276) 
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sense of waste involved nor resolve a sense of helplessness and anger provoked by the 
bungling absurdity of human affairs. One might add to this the arbitrary 'bunglings' by 
destiny and the gods whose role in tragedy is often to reinforce a sense of futility rather 
than to clothe suffering with a redeeming sense of purpose. Racine's Phedre, for example, 
suffers all the agonies of a guilty desire that "Ie ciel" has seemingly implanted in her 
and others have helped foster ("Le ciel mit dans mon sein une flamme funeste; La 
detestable CEnone a conduit tout Ie reste"). At the end of the play her feelings of resigned 
defeat to an absurd destiny are unalleviated by metaphysical comfort. 
While there are critics who would still affirm tragedy is consolatory in its approach,10 
others see it as the representation of an incongruity rather than the resolution of one. 
Certainly there is no easy formula for its treatment of suffering. R.P. Draper, while 
acknowledging a "dual core of suffering and its meaning" at the heart of tragedy,l1 does 
not interpret this to mean that an explanation is always forthcoming: 
Some tragedies do precisely this, but by no means all. The effect of a tragedy may 
well be to underline the inexplicability of suffering, to ask the question to which 
no answer is expected: 
Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life, 
And thou no breath at all?'12 
In his meticulously researched Towards Greek Tragedy Brian Vickers is even more 
dismissive of facile definitions of such a "remarkably varied genre". He believes values 
in Greek tragedy are more often relative than absolute and rarely stated with the kind of 
confidence that could alleviate the pain involved. There is little evidence, in his view, 
that the Greeks subscribed to "such a generally agreed concept of cosmic justice", as 
implied by the Aristotelean terms of "dike" or "hybris", the tragic flaw which "goes 
hand in hand with belief in a cosmic order". 13 Moreover the suffering that is portrayed 
in a tragedy may be so intense as to be dehumanizing and, in support of this, Vickers cites 
B.M.W. Knox's remarks on the extremes of suffering that cannot be satisfactorily 
translated into language: 
10 
11 
12 
13 
See, in particular, Ekbert Fass's remarks in Tragedy and After: Euripides, 
Shakespeare, Goethe, pp4-5: "In dealing with man's most urgent problems, death 
and suffering, it brings to a focus the teleolOgical bias of mainstream Western 
thought. For tragedy [ ... ] is Western man's most daring effort to justify the human 
dilemma under the guise of some metaphysical scheme. [ ... ] Even suffering and 
death [ ... ] are shown somehow to serve a meaningful purpose". Note that mention 
is made of Robbe-Grillet in Fass's chapter on "Post-tragedy". 
Tragedy: Developments in Criticism: a Casebook, p13. 
p12. 
Towards Greek Tragedy, pp25-26, 30. 
153 
There is a pitch of physical suffering which words are inadequate to express, and 
when human beings reach it they make sounds like animals, which convey nothing 
but the extremity of their pain.14 
Tragedy, then, does not always provide answers or even expect them, and the most that 
can be said is that it still, perhaps, reflects the need to ask why, to exclaim at and 
therefore not acquiesce to the suffering that is so inextricable a part of the human picture. 
This appears to be the only consistent 'proof' of tragedy's alleged affirmatory aspects. 
!.iii; The 'flaw' of consciousness 
As well as encompassing a variety of contemporaneous works tragedy needs to be defined 
to accommodate changing perspectives in art and its cultural context. Although 
separated by a century, Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet arguably belong to a novelistic 
era in which attention tends to be focussed more on private dramas of the mind than on 
characters interacting on the wider stage of society. "Greek tragedy", suggests one critic, 
"has its meaning realised in the action", while in the dramas of Chekhov and Beckett, 
"the mental world fills the stage, and action reaches a condition of frustrated stasis". 15 
While interpersonal action is of major importance in Dostoyevsky the private world of 
his characters often dominates the narratives and makes action, and especially 
interaction with others, intensely problematic. 
The irritable intelligence of Dostoyevsky's underground man exemplifies the 
withdrawal into the vertiginous world of the consciousness witnessed in some 
contemporary tragedies and brought to its most extreme form of expression in Beckett's 
Molloy trilogy, for example. Like the anonymous voice in L'innommable, the underground 
man's capacity for reflection seems paradoxically to reveal that he has no self that can 
be reflected on. Having isolated himself from others, and being without a set framework 
for thought and action, he feels devoid of identity and conscious, as it were, only of his 
consciousness. "Tragic flaw" is too definite a term for this kind of precarious selfhood. 
But the underground man's state of limbo is represented, in the first part of the novella at 
least, as a more insidious agony than that experienced by the man of action or the man of 
passion whose projects help define them and give them a sense of purpose. The narrator's 
14 p66. cf Montaigne's remarks in 'De la tristesse' and his reference in this instance to 
the Roman poet, Ovid, whose heroine is turned to stone, in both literal and 
figurative senses, because of her pain: "Voyla pourquoy les poetes feignent cette 
miserable mere Niobe, ayant perdu premierement sept fils, et puis de suite autant 
de filles, sur-chargee de pertes, avoir este en fin transmuee en rochier, Diriguisse 
malis, pour exprimer cette morne, muette et sourde stupidite qui nous transit, lorsque 
les accidens nous accablent surpassans nostre portee". (Livre II, p44) 
15 Tragedy: Developments in Criticism: a Casebook, p15. 
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freedom of definition and his heightened self-awareness rob him of such ready-made 
meaningfulness, representing a crippling source of weakness as well as a potential means 
of transcending the limits constraining the so-called "ordinary" man. 
The combination of freedom with a capacity for reflection and a psychic vulnerability, 
with making and with unmaking, constitutes a significant meeting point between 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's view of the consciousness - more so than their 
perception of how this consciousness interrelates, or ought to interrelate, with other 
minds. A viable theoretical touchstone for their mutual linking of incompleteness, 
freedom and creativity may be found in the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, whom 
Robbe-Grillet openly berrates in his essay 'Nature, humanisme, tragedie' for the former's 
complicity in tragic malaise. For in Sartre the gap between the consciousness (pour-soi) 
and the physical world of objects in which it finds itself (en-soi) is experienced in terms 
of "nausea", as the "pour-soi" covets the fixed nature of the "en-soi" which is like, yet 
unlike, itself. Free to define itself and yet unable to author its own identity in any 
comparably permanent form, the "pour-soi" remains uneasily aware of its unremitting 
obligation to choose: "la liberte qui se manifeste par l'angoisse se caracterise par une 
obligation perpetuellement renouvelee de refaire Ie Moi qui designe l'etre libre". 16 If the 
association of freedom with anguish is something Robbe-Grillet rejects in the essay on 
tragedy, and if the Sartrean equation of nothingness with freedom is consequently less 
equivocal in Robbe-Grillet than in Sartre, Robbe-Grillet's novels nonetheless reveal the 
enduring ambivalence of imaginative freedom. As Olga Bernal suggests, linking the two 
writers in her analysis of Robbe-Grillet's Dans Ie labyrinthe, "Le 'pour-soi' sartrean est 
une fissure dans la surface robbe-grilletiene. La fissure est une image de detresse [ ... J")7 
Hence the anti-space of the mind, Wallas's "deux millimetres carres de reve", is what 
permits Robbe-Grillet's characters to hypothesize and dream outside the boundaries set 
by convention. But, at the same time, the anguish that is denied philosophic credibility 
in Pour un nouveau roman, reasserts itself in the characters' anxious search for cIues and 
reassurance in the labyrinths of Robbe-Grillet's narratives. 
In Dostoyevsky's case there is a considerably more positive assessment of the self/other 
relationship, for example, than there is in Sartre, for whom other selves are always and 
of necessity reduced by the perceiving consciousness "to the status of an object".1 8 
Moreover, Dostoyevsky's understanding of the development of the consciousness is 
16 
17 
18 
Jean-Paul Sartre, L 'etre et Ie mEant, p72, cited in 'The presentation of consciousness 
in Sartre's La nausee and its theoretical basis: reflection and facticity', p119. 
Alain Robbe-Grillet: Ie roman de l' absence, p122. 
'The presentation of consciousness in Sartre's La nausee ... ', p123. See my Chapter 3 
for a discussion of the self! other relation in Dostoyevsky. 
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significantly influenced by his belief in the importance of this relationship. 
Nevertheless, in Dostoyevsky's 1869 novel, Myshkin, the most charitably disposed of all 
Dostoyevsky's characters and the most open to the needs and demands of others, is prey to 
gloomy fears and paralyzed by a sense of alienation from others and from the 
paradisiacal dream in which he longs to be caught up. He, too, therefore, experiences the 
vertiginous freedom of consciousness that is at once a source of uneasiness and an incentive 
to create and to dream. 
Hence, where the previous chapter looked at the phenomenon of incompleteness in terms 
of a capacity to respond to other minds, the present chapter examines the same 
phenomenon in terms of a capacity for imaginative reflection and as the ability, 
therefore, to construe an imaginary other, an imaginary self, an imaginary world. While 
this capacity may be seen as a means of overcoming tragedy through the creation of 
alternative patterns of significance, it is also the weak link in the mind's defences 
against tragedy, the 'flaw' in consciousness that is a permanent reminder of its 
inadequacy and need: 
et s'il est ainsi que [l'homme] seul, de tous les animaux, ait cette liberte de 
l'imagination et ce deresglement de pensees, luy representant ce qui est, ce qui n'est 
pas, et ce qu'il veut, Ie faux et Ie veritable, c'est un avantage qui luy est bien cher 
vendu et du quel il a bien peu a se glorifier, car de la naist la source principale des 
maux qui Ie pressent: peche, maladie, irresolution, trouble, desespoir,19 
In Dostoyevsky's The Idiot this "liberte de l'imagination et ce deresglement de pensees" 
is of primary importance in understanding the nature of the characters' personal 
narratives. 
The Idiot 
II. i. Suffering and the "additional notion of evil" 
All the extremes of tragic experience Robbe-Grillet refers to in his essay, "Le malheur, 
l'echec, la solitude, la culpabiIite, la folie",20 are present in Dostoyevsky's 1869 novel: 
Myshkin suffers from epilepsy and IppoIit is dying from consumption; Rogozhin is 
animated by a "morbid passion" consummated in the murder of Nastasya; Nastasya is an 
outcast from society and there are hints she is bordering on insanity in the latter part of 
the novel. Throwing these calamities into relief, and as if in confirmation of the "tragic" 
pattern Robbe-Grillet traces, is the novel's metaphysical hero, Prince Myshkin. "Prince 
19 'Apologie de Raimond Sebond', Essais, Livre II, p126. 
20 Pour un nouveau roman, p54. 
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Christ", as Dostoyevsky referred to him in his notebooks for the novel,21 thus drawing 
attention to the redemptive vision with which the novels' main character is 
intentionally associated. Through Myshkin, suffering is to be represented alongside the 
promise of its cure or, to use Robbe-Grillet's metaphors, the file for divorce is to be read in 
conjunction with the plan for reconciliation. 
The coexistence of these two possibilities in the novel, and the inference that some form 
of "malaise" is endemic to the human condition, suggests a close res semblance with the 
scenario envisaged in 'Nature, humanisme, tragedie'. The obvious interest of 
Dostoyevsky himself in the phenomenon of suffering and its functioning in nearly all his 
characters' lives, from the underground man (as a source of stimulus) to the heroes of his 
last novel (Mitya, as a path of redemption), further confirms the suspicion that his 
characters may be imprisoned in a "malediction ronronnante". Nevertheless, the 
interrelationships between light and darkness, beauty and terror are shown in The Idiot 
to be extremely complex, as if to equally demonstrate that it is in the avoidance of the 
"additional notions" of good and evil, and not in their exploration, that the easier path 
lies. The tragic pattern in Dostoyevsky's Idiot is one of "malheur" yet without the 
certainty of Robbe-Grillet's "gage du salut". 
This reaction is one which seems to be shared both by the novels' enthusiasts and its more 
sceptical detractors. Panichas, for example, who admires Myshkin as "a commanding 
presence", a "radical and provocative" character, nonetheless describes this as the "most 
terrifying" of Dostoyevsky's works: 
it is the least protective or comforting [ ... ] No utterly redemptive figure here 
appears to cushion spiritual contradictions, ambiguities, doubts, ambivalences, 
shocks. [ ... ] For here the experience of terror is superior even to Myshkin, who is 
preeminently Dostoyevsky's most Christ-like symbo1.22 
Keller, more cautious, sees Myshkin as a "good" character with a "host of noble 
qualities", but although he begins his essay by suggesting Myshkin is not "condemned to 
failure at the start of the novel", he ends it by saying Myshkin's "inability to 
communicate" and his "real lack of understanding", "ultimately destroyed not only 
himself but his mission".23 Elizabeth Dalton in her psychoanalytic reading of The Idiot 
points out that Myshkin even contributes to the problems he is supposed to resolve (the 
"abyss of meekness that accepts everything and resists nothing is a seduction to loss of 
21 
22 
23 
See pp198, 201, 205 of The Notebooks for 'The Idiot'. 
The Burden of Vision, pp51 and 55 respectively. 
'Prince Myshkin: success or failure'?, pp17 and 22. 
157 
control"),24 and she concludes, as a result, that the meaning of the novel fIresides in the 
tension and conflict rather than in the resolution".25 Simon Lesser is another who uses a 
psychoanalytic framework for his interpretation while representing the opposite 
extreme of reaction to Panichas. He damns outright both Myshkin's character and his 
role as a redeemer figure in the novel: 
Myshkin's goodness, his moral masochism, rests on a denial of his lusts and 
hatreds; it is an extension of his personal or, using the term broadly, his sexual 
masochism. A man whose goodness has this kind of underlying structure can be an 
active and wholly credible agent of destruction.26 
Whatever the particular bias no one reading of the novel makes a straightforward 
connection between the novels' teleological element and a resolution, or even a softening, 
of its problems. On the contrary, Myshkin is sometimes seen as a complicating factor in 
the novels' tragedies. Starting, then, with the assumption that suffering and redemption 
in The Idiot are at least problematic and only uneasily related terms, I wish, building on 
previous critical readings, to offer an additional account of the difficulties which 
confront the novel's main character and in which he is in some measure complicitous. The 
notion of a "flaw" in consciousness will be explored to this end with reference to the 
characters' constant changeability and their susceptibility equally to dreams of beauty 
and the kind of nightmare related by Ippolit. The reptilean horror that dominates 
Ippolit's nightmare is a reminder that the problem of consciousness in the novel is not 
merely an abstract one of definition nor an ethically neutral one of realizing man's sundry 
potentialities. It is a reminder that for Dostoyevsky the mind of man is sometimes a 
"dark place", that the flaw of consciousness is sometimes also a disfigurement. I will 
begin my discussion therefore by considering the characters' perverse attachment to the 
"additional notion of evil" which puts them as much out of reach of the sage optimism of 
philosophy as it sets them against the spiritual imperatives of faith. 
II. ii. The love of suffering: "une sublime necessib!"? 
One of the most blatant obstacles to redemption in the novel is that the characters are 
shown to be suffering, in part, willingly. Their personal tragedies are ones they have 
24 
25 
26 
Unconscious Structure in 'The Idiot', p77. (cf Leatherbarrow in Fedor Dostoevsky, 
p96: "[ ... J Myshkin's naivete destroys the lives of Rogozhin [ ... J and Nastasya 
Filippovna [ ... J Myshkin's compassionate admiration for Nastasya Filippovna 
provokes the jealous Rogozhin first to an assault on the Prince himself, and then 
[ ... J to the murder of Nastasya Filippovna. Faced with the awareness of his own 
complicity in the tragedy, Myshkin lapses again into idiocy".) 
p145. 
'Saint and sinner - Dostoyevsky's Idiot -1958', p390. 
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helped to author themselves so that they are adding to suffering not so much the 
additional burden of a metaphysical anxiety as the additional inducement of pleasure in 
pain. The novel thus appears to bear out Robbe-Grillet's judgement of tragic vision 
according to which: 
II n'est plus question de rechercher quelque remede a notre malheur, du moment que 
[la tragediel vise a nous Ie faire aimer.27 
As Dostoyevsky indicates, however, the tendency to glorify suffering is not necessarily 
dependent on tragic humanism or any other philosophic perspective. It appears to grow 
from a muddle of perversity (although its interpretation as perversity implies some 
normative frame of reference) in the "animal malade" itself, which neither 
Dostoyevsky's metaphysical hero, nor the optimistic philosopher implicit in Robbe-
Grillet's essay, is able to accommodate or overcome. 
Nastasya, for example, sustains a real wound to her personal integrity because of her 
exploitation as a girl by Totsky. She bears a social stigma because of his mistreatment, 
being subjected to either moralizing disapproval or a glamorizing acceptance of her role 
as a 'fallen woman'. Nevertheless, in a spirit of revenge, on others and herself, or as a 
means, perhaps, of anticipating and controlling society's judgement, or for neither of these 
reasons, Nastasya often embraces the role she despises, wilfully imprisoning herself in a 
fatal pattern of behaviour. When Rogozhin comes to bid for her favours, declaring his 
passion with the same recklessness with which he throws down the rolls of money, 
Nastasya encourages him in his degradation of himself and, implicitly, of her. ("The 
scene was becoming more and more disgusting, but Nastasya Filippovna went on laughing 
and did not go, as though she were deliberately prolonging it".) (p136) Ganya, who is 
engaged to Nastasya at the time of this exhibitionism, displays a similar perversity by 
storing up Nastasya's disdain for his family, and exploding irritably when the latter 
pay too close attention to his possible feelings and motives: 
The note of irritation in Ganya's voice had reached that pitch when a man is 
almost glad to let himself go and give himself up to it without restraint and 
almost with ever increasing delight, regardless of any consequences. (ppl22-123) 
Ganya's offence at having the nerve endings of his pride exposed turns into a vicious 
gesture that is as much designed to hurt himself as his imagined persecutors. Lastly, 
Ippolit, severely weakened by the physical ravages of consumption and the nervous 
apprehension that accompanies awareness of approaching death, suffers major 
"unavoidable disturbances". But his experience of pain becomes, by the same twist of 
27 Pour un nouveau roman, p55. 
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perversity observable in the other characters, a dramatic gesture that is necessary to his 
self-esteem. After a grand public tirade against the terms of his existence Ippolit 
suddenly recoils, humiliated by the thought of appearing a fool in front of others and 
angry at Myshkin's sympathetic comprehension of his confusion: 
I 'd kill you, if I remained alive! I don't want your benefactions, I won't accept 
anything from anyone - do you hear? - not from anyone! I was delirious and 
you've no right to triumph! May you be damned, every one of you, for ever and 
ever. (p314) 
To accept Myshkin's compassion as salve for his grief would necessitate abandoning the 
self-posturing that is Ippolit's main defence against it. But Ippolit chooses not to 
abandon the suffering self he has become, withdrawing into its protective familiarity 
and observing with fascinated interest all its gradations of feeling. In so doing, he gives 
some credence to Florovksy's interpretation of the love of suffering as "a kind of delirium, 
a self-erotic obsession, a spiritual narcissism", where suffering, with its reminder of the 
individual's capacity for pain, becomes a means of exacerbating the character's self-
preoccu pation. 
The relation of Ippolit's suffering to what Jackson has similarly called an "aggressive 
imperialism of the ego"28 complicates the nature of Dostoyevsky's affinity with the 
Russian kenotic tradition, according to which suffering "in and of itself may be 
transforming and salvific" .29 An obsession with the theme of suffering and its 
redemptive powers undoubtedly runs through Dostoyevsky's ceuvre showing him, in the 
manner of Robbe-Grillet's tragic humanist, to be acquiescent to something from which 
Robbe-Grillet (the essayist) seeks unqualified liberation. But Dostoyevsky shows in The 
Idiot that suffering is not always a redeeming experience. It is accompanied by a 
"kenotic" humility in Myshkin but in other characters it is an arena for maniachal self-
reflection. Thus, while Myshkin is profoundly attracted to Nastasya and Rogozhin 
because of their suffering, his interest is accompanied by a concern for their release from 
what is clearly a destructive unhappiness.30 If, then, there is a degree of "fascination 
with suffering" in Myshkin (Keller) and even a certain "moral masochism" (Lesser) the 
nature of human responses to suffering in the novel is more varied and complex than 
either of these judgements allow. 
28 
29 
30 
'Dostoevskij and the Marquis de Sade', p32. 
'Fullness and emptiness: the development of a Russian spiritual vision', p3Sl. 
See p247: 'Was not Rogozhin capable of freedom and happiness? [ ... J Yes, yes! 
Rogozhin was not quite fair to himself; he had a great heart that was capable of 
suffering and compassion"; and pS38:"what do my grief and my troubles matter, if I 
have the power to be happy? [ ... J think how many beautiful things there are at 
every step, things even the most wretched man cannot but fail to find beautiful!". 
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Certainly it is too complex for Myshkin, as the characters' perversity puts them out of 
reach of his simple faith and beyond the grasp of his conscious understanding. In 
Myshkin, Dostoyevsky has perhaps too successfully portrayed the "truly perfect" and 
beautiful man,31 since the innocence that is the guarantee of Myshkin's particular beauty 
seems to be accompanied by an ignorance that leaves him without a common language to 
communicate with the other characters. Myshkin's naIve dreaminess is an impenetrable 
defence against the contradictory mix of malice and generosity, for example, in Aglaia's 
jokes about Nastasya - "how could such a genuine and beautiful feeling be combined with 
such obvious and malicious mockery?", he asks himself - (p269) and blinds him to the 
jealousy he provokes in Aglaia by making her the confidant of his feelings for Nastasya. 
As Aglaia observes with some exasperation: 
With your quietism one might live happily for a hundred years. Whether one 
showed you an execution or a little finger, you'd be quite sure to draw highly 
laudable conclusions from either, and remain happy and contented, too. To live 
like that is easy. (pBS) 
Myshkin thus attempts to combat the moral ambivalence of his world through bypassing 
it as if it were possible to step directly into the radiance of an earthly paradise and take 
the other characters with him. But by failing to sufficiently acknowledge the reality of 
their vices he offers no bridge of passage between their condition and his own 
unattainable purity. Forgiveness is preceded in Christian orthodoxy by an 
acknowledgement of sin, or, by what Hartman in a non-theological context has referred to 
as the "wording" of a wound,32 the simultaneous naming and purging of a spiritual 
sickness. But Myshkin does not forgive so much as excuse, as if to trivialize offences of 
which the characters themselves are acutely conscious. As Ippolit wryly observes of 
Myshkin's response to Lebedyev's part in writing a defamatory article about him, "the 
prince will most certainly forgive him, [ ... J He may even have thought of an excuse for 
. him. Haven't you, Prince?". (p306) It is due to this naIve idealism more than to any 
obscure masochistic impulse, that Myshkin is helpless before the "voluph~" of suffering in 
the novel. For idealism creates an irredeemable gulf between sin and regeneration, 
infecting desire with bitterness so that, if anything, it is the other characters who are 
cast in a sado-masochistic role in relation to Myshkin. Ippolit's repulsion of the Prince's 
compassion may be better understood from this perspective. For on the one hand, Myshkin 
represents the love Ippolit himself longs for in his dream of reconciliation, but on the 
31 
32 
See Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky to his Family and Friends, pp142-
143. 
Saving the Text, p133. cf Murray Krieger's remarks on Myshkin in The Tragic 
Vision: I/[ ... J Myshkin has refused to give his beloved humanity the human 
privilge of sinning, of being offensive and arousing moral indignation." (See pp220-
223.) 
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other, Myshkin's impossible and indiscriminating niceness puts that dream out of reach so 
that, following a typical Dostoyevskean pattern, it becomes the spawning ground for 
cynicism and vengeful hatred - "1 hate you more than anyone and more than anything in 
the world - you jesuitical, treacly soul, you damned idiot, you philanthropic 
millionaire, you!". (p314) 
In this respect Dostoyevsky's metaphysical hero places an additional pressure on the 
other characters. But this pressure does not come through his promising a "rEkuperation 
finale de toutes les distances, de tous les echecs, de toutes les solitudes, de toutes les 
contradictions" .33 It comes, rather, through the attempt to deny these distances and 
contradictions through adherence to the quietist view that man has only to tell himself 
he is happy in order to be so. For this reason Myshkin ironically approaches Robbe-
Grillet's own position at the end of his essay on tragedy where the latter insists we must 
learn to identify "ce qui ne l'est pas [separe], ce qui est un, puisqu'il est faux que tout soit 
double [ ... ] ."34 There is a sense in which both Myshkin, the character, and Robbe-Grillet, 
the essayist, attempt to circumvent tragedy by denying the gravity of its wounds. 
II. ii The flaw 
On one level, then, Myshkin represents a remote and untouchable icon. On another, 
however, he is brought very close to the other characters and as a result, closer to the 
mediatory role suitable to a redeemer figure. For Dostoyevsky bestows on his innocent 
Prince the humanizing qualities of changeability, and of an imaginative susceptibility to 
the darkness and doubts, the "double thoughts", which his idealizing self refuses to 
acknowledge. Through the susceptibility of his imagination the Prince, too, is confronted 
with his freedom and hence the "obligation perpetuellement renouvelee de refaire Ie Moi 
qui designe l'eire libre". And because of this freedom Myshkin finds himself a stranger to 
the adamantine perfection of his own idealism, and his choice of the good is subjected to 
the temptations and pressures of change. 
A curious ressemblance is set up between Myshkin and Ippolit, with Myshkin sharing in 
Ippolit's anguished longing to be rescued from mutability. In a public confession Ippolit 
has expressed a desire to triumph, once and for all, over the insidious spiritual depression 
that heralds his death, attacking his mind with fearful images. He decides, by an effort 
of will, to close his mind to such "humiliating forms": 
33 
34 
Pour un nouveau roman, p60. 
p67. 
162 
It is impossible to go on living when life assumes such grotesque and humiliating 
forms. [ ... ] I cannot submit to a dark power which assumes the form of a tarantula. 
And it was only at dusk, when I felt at last that I had reached the final phase of 
full determination, that I felt better. (p422) 
However, as the scene which follows attests, a "final phase of full determination" is as 
unattainable as Myshkin's visions, so long as Ippolit's consciousness continues to function, 
and the imagination continues with it to be swayed by inexplicable feelings and 
premonitions. Ippolit's plan to assert his will by committing suicude is a failure as he is 
twice betrayed by the flaw of consciousness - by the fear that makes him faint as if 
already dead, and by the instinctive recoiling from death which earlier prevented him 
(it is not certain) from putting the cap in the pistol so that it does not fire at the crucial 
moment. (pp430-431) Ippolit's will for a lasting defence against his "existential" 
mutability would appear to have been sapped by the same unconscious mechanisms that 
slay the man on the scaffold in Montaigne's anecdote: 
II yen a qui, de frayeur, anticipent la main du bourreau. Et celuy qu'on debandoit 
pour luy lire sa grace, se trouva roide mort sur l'eschafaut du seul coup de son 
imagination.35 
After Ippolit has collapsed following his failed suicide attempt, Myshkin walks alone 
in the park and continues a train of thought Ippolit has initiated in his confession about 
the "gnat buzzing in the sunlight" and in comparison with which he feels "an outcast": 
A bird was singing in a tree above him and he began looking for it among the 
leaves; suddenly the bird took wing and flew away, and at the same moment he, 
for some reason, recalled the 'gnat' in 'the hot sunshine' about which Ippolit had 
written that 'it knew its place and took part in the general chorus', but he alone 
was 'an outcast'. This sentence had struck him forcibly at the time; he remembered 
it now. A long-forgotten memory stirred in his mind, and suddenly it all came back 
to him clearly. 
It had happened in Switzerland. [ ... ] Before him was the brilliant sky, below -
the lake, and around, the bright horizon, stretching away into infinity. He looked 
a long time in agony. He remembered now how he had stretched out his arms 
towards that bright and limitless expanse of blue and had wept. What tormented 
him was that he was a complete stranger to all this. What banquet was it, what 
grand, everlasting festival, to which he had long felt drawn, always - ever since 
he was a child, and which he could never join [ ... ] every 'tiny gnat' buzzing round 
him in the hot sunshine [ ... ] knows its place [ ... ]Everything has its path, and 
everything knows its path, [ ... ] only he knows nothing, understands nothing, 
neither men nor sounds, a stranger to everything and an outcast. (pp433-434) 
In his imagination the Prince can follow that bird and touch that "bright and limitless 
expanse of blue". But he, like Ippolit, remains outside their coveted beauty in an in-
between state of becoming where he is vulnerable, also, to the darker promptings and 
35 'De la force de l'imagination', Essais, Livre I, p143. 
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murderous thoughts of Rogozhin. Because of his proximity to Rogozhin, through 
friendship, and through the desire to understand and love, Rogozhin's morbid fancies 
have the power to infect Myshkin's imagination so that he, too, dreams of murder and of 
knives. Without losing his ethical distinctness from the other characters, therefore, it is 
nonethless clear that Myshkin shares their susceptibility to the vicissitudes of his mind 
and emotions. Unlike the "tiny gnat" that "knows its path", instinctively and 
unswervingly, he is not invulnerable to change, even though he may wish, after the poet, 
that he "past changing were, Fast in thy Paradise".36 To some purpose, therefore, Kolya 
remarks to Myshkin, ''You're an awful sceptic, Prince!", but it is made clear that this 
scepticism is not because of any conscious alteration in attitude on Myshkin's part. It is 
because of his painful vulnerability to other's moods and impulses, and his ability, 
therefore, to lose himself, through a partly subconscious act of identification, in the 
"dark places" of others' minds. There is a sense in which he is, as Kolya implies, 
"beginning to disbelieve in everything", because he is "imagining all sorts of things". 
(p328) 
III. iii. The "twilight of nothingnessfl37 
The Prince's imaginative sensitivity is thus the means by which he becomes intimately 
involved in the tragedies of the other characters as well as experiencing on his own 
account all the agonies of mutability. The flaw of consciousness, in this respect, seems 
inextricably associated with suffering. But what then exacerbates this suffering, and 
transforms it from a vague existential malaise into something more threatening, is the 
perception in the novel of some malignant force, some cosmic sickness, that is contributing 
to the characters' insecurities and weakening both the force of Myshkin's compassion and 
the ability of the other characters to respond to it. Into the locatable perversities of the 
characters is read evidence of a more universal problem, a pall of darkness of which the 
"darkness" of Rogozhin is only a part. This concern with a nameless threat confirms that 
the "nt~ant" of consciousness to which Robbe-Grillet refers is not a void in Dostoyevsky 
that can be inscribed at will, so much as an area of undecidability defined by fearful 
boundaries. Equally it indicates that the question of suffering and "additional notion" of 
evil in The Idiot is not reduced to a question of "good" and "bad" characters, despite the 
obvious symbolic contrast between Myshkin and Rogozhin. Although each responds 
differently, neither Myshkin's compassion nor Rogozhin's aggressive sensuality succeeds 
in neutralizing the oppressive sense of evil - the "void of nothingness which exists, 
36 From George Herbert's 'The Flower'. 
37 A term from Florovsky's chapter on evil in Creation and Redemption. 
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which swallows or devours beings" - 38 which the novel seems concerned to communicate. 
This "twilight of nothingness" that actively disturbs and threatens the characters' well-
being is given symbolic form in Ippolit's dream as a venomous insect "in the shape of a 
trident". (p401) The description of the repulsive invertebrate scuttling about Ippolit's 
room gives a lurid Boschean realism to the apprehension of evil that turns his 
approaching death into a thing of horror rather than a strictly physical phenomenon 
that is part of the 'natural' order of things. Soon after relating this nightmare Ippolit 
makes another attempt to crystallize the fears that haunt him, this time with reference 
to the image of a painting that has already been mentioned in a conversation between 
Myshkin and Rogozhin. Like one Dostoyevsky himself had seen and been disturbed by, 
the painting depicts Christ after he had been taken from the cross, still bearing the 
disfiguring marks of his crucifixion. By concentrating on the uglier material facts of 
death the canvas offers a physical counterpart to the horrors that prey on Ippolit's mind. 
Ippolit makes a mental connection, however, between the physical and the metaphysical 
so the two converge in his perception of the painting to the point where they are almost 
indistinguishable: 
it is nature itself [Garnett translates this as "It is simply nature"]' and, indeed, 
any man's corpse would look like that after such suffering. [ ... J In the picture the 
face is terribly smashed with blows, swollen, covered with terrible, swollen and 
blood-stained bruises [ ... J as one looks at the dead body of this tortured man, one 
cannot help asking oneself the peculiar and interesting question: if such a corpse 
[ ... ] was seen by all His disciples [ ... J then how could they possibly have believed, 
as they looked at the corpse, that that martyr would rise again? Here one cannot 
help being struck with the idea that if death is so horrible and if the laws of 
nature are so powerful, then how can they be overcome? [ ... J Looking at that 
picture, you get the impression of nature as some enormous, implacable, and dumb 
beast, or, to put it more correctly [ ... J as some huge engine of the latest design, 
which has senselessly seized, cut to pieces, and swallowed up - impassively and 
unfeelingly - a great and priceless Being [ ... J. (p419) 
In its transformation of the "simply natural" into the "dumb beast" of nightmare that 
crushes and "swallows up" the "priceless Being" the passage provides a clear example of 
the extent to which Dostoyevsky departs from the recommendations of Pyrrhonist 
scepticism. He neither confines himself to the observation of physical details nor 
encourages moderation of feeling in the face of the "non-evident things" superimposed on 
the "evident things" he is depicting. Furthermore his choice of figurative language 
indicates that certain feelings are being evoked to the exclusion of others, so that the 
metaphysical picture is also an unbalanced one. Neither the painting nor the nightmare, 
which reads like a scenario for a contemporary horror-movie, leave any space for the 
38 Creation and Redemption, p84. See also Florovsky's specific reference to 
Dostoyevsky on p89. 
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resurrection of hope, or, for the "consolation du possible" Robbe-Grillet refers to in Les 
gommes. Is Dostoyevsky, then, in his eagerness to acknowledge the power of the nameless 
fears which oppress the spirit, perhaps mesmerized, and more than a little fascinated, 
by the spectacle he has conjured up - going to the opposite extreme, in fact, to Robbe-
Grillet's one of understatement and evasion in the essay on tragedy? 
Because of the recurrence of a certain type of morbid imagery with its emphasis on 
unpleasant physical detail (the wriggling movement of the insect, its terrifying 
proximity and venom are described repeatedly), and some macabre twists at the end of 
the narrative, Dostoyevsky indeed appears to be as complicitous as his characters in the 
tragic myth. In the attempt to convey the reality of evil and so to give form to what is 
intangible and too glibly dismissed, Dostoyevsky often fails to then disengage from the 
spectres he conjures up or to dwell with equal conviction on alternative, more hopeful 
visions. Myshkin is, without doubt, a permanent reminder of innocence in the novel but he 
is too frail and too fearful, also, to offer a very reassuring defence against the horrors 
that strain the characters' sanity to the limits of endurance. It is thus not so much 
through representing divorce as a "voie majeure pour la redemption" that Dostoyevsky 
acquiesces to suffering in The Idiot as through his representing one term of the human 
dilemma at the expense of another, darkness all but overpowering and extinguishing 
light. In this respect, the novel is in danger of forfeiting the quality of uncertainty I 
associated with tragedy in the introduction to the chapter, and of slipping, instead, into 
the mire of fatalism. 
Nevertheless, Dostoyevsky offers a significant escape route from the pessimistic 
deadlock he creates in the novel. By emphasizing the mind's susceptibility to illusion 
and, hence, the unreliability of its judgements, Dostoyevksy draws attention in the novel 
to the precarious nature of all dreams and fears in relation to some ultimate, 
inapprehensible reality. Ippolit, for example, is shown to be in a state of abnormally 
heightened consciousness due to his illness (see p399-400), while Myshkin, too, it is 
suggested, is a man of excessive imagination, (p30) capable of working himself up into a 
frame of mind where he loses touch with what is going on around him. A degree of 
complicity with the power of illusion is suggested in the prince's behaviour in the 
Epanchin's drawing room, for example, where, with increasing excitement and in "a state 
of emotional rapture for no apparent reason and, it seemed, out of all proportion to the 
subject of the conversation", (p546) the prince begins to expound his ideal of paradise on 
earth - the ideological counterpart in the novel to Ippolit's nightmare of terror. The 
desperate happiness characteristic of Myshkin's state of mind on this occasion presages 
the onset of an epileptic fit so that a connection is established between the vision of 
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"harmonious joy" and abnormal perception. The boundaries between sickness and health, 
blindness and insight, light and darkness, are shown to be infinitely changeable and 
deceitful. 
The power of illusion to disturb and inspire is thus of major importance in the novel. But 
which is the shadow to the truer reality? Myshkin's dream? Or Ippolit's nightmare? Is 
redemption only an illusion in a world where death retains its sting? Or, alternatively, 
are suffering and the dreary perversities of the mind the "twilight of nothingness" that 
will finally fade with the dawning of the "beauty" that will save the world? (p394) By 
stressing the constant interplay of insight and illusion in The Idiot Dostoyevsky 
partially lightens the effects of his malediction. In the meantime, the novel seem to 
imply, there is tragedy. But tomorrow all may change, the patterns of light and dark 
may shift and undo themselves in the twinkling of an eye - the time it takes to pass from 
sleep to wakefulness. 
The fact that both Myshkin and Rogozhin are present in the final scene conveys 
something of this ongoing ambiguity despite the unequal impact of alternative dream-
worlds in the novel. Rogozhin is reduced to a state of semi-idiocy after the murder of 
Nastasya and Myshkin is also incoherent. But Myshkin's gesture of compassion towards 
Rogozhin at this moment is consistent with the moral integrity that has characterized 
his behaviour throughout the novel. Light, it would seem, is not completely extinguished 
by darkness even though it fails to overcome it. The scene thus extends the play on the 
idea of scales only in a more hopeful direction than suggested by the apocalyptic picture 
of weights and measures, falseness and hypocrisy, developed elsewhere in the novel. For 
on the one hand, there is the overwhelming evidence of human despair and failure. On 
the other, there is the weight of one frail, foolish man and his dreams. Such 
precariousness has little of Bakhtin's optimism whereby change and renewal are as 
inevitable as the turning of the wheel, and incongruities collide in a vigorously positive 
relativity. The quality of uncertainty in The Idiot corresponds more closely to the 
mistrustful hopefulness of Beckett according to whom: "It is because there is not only 
darkness but also light that our situation becomes inexplicable",39 
The Gambler 
Ill. i. liLa volupte cerche a s'miter par la douleur" 
While anticipating some of the themes and characterization techniques developed in 
39 Cited in 'Beckett by the Madeleine', p23. 
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The Idiot Dostoyevsky's Gambler concentrates on a more limited aspect of the 
phenomenon of suffering and proposes a different means of redeeming it. In The Idiot the 
problem of consciousness is also a spiritual and ethical one, the characters' potential as 
beings in process being defined in uneasy relation to both terrible forces of destruction and 
dreams of a paradise on earth. In The Gambler there are no comparable shades of 
metaphysical speculation cast on the characters' destiny, and their flaw of consciousness 
has more to do with the petty malice of wounded egotism. Furthermore, rather than 
being contrasted with an ideal of moral beauty, the addiction to pain in the 1866 novella 
is counterbalanced by the poetry of roulette. This gives the work a very different set of 
priorities to the one informing The Idiot. Elizabeth Dalton suggests, for example, that 
the fascination with "primordial" emotion in The Idiot places its artistic integrity under 
great strain. Form, in other words, is disproportionately subservient to the desire to 
engage with formlessness and chaos. Thus, "In the compulsion to lean out over the abyss 
[ ... J the novel also risks its own existence as an aesthetic object" .40 The Gambler could be 
said to reverse this pattern. Its hero, Alexis, is no apocalyptic dreamer or saint broken by 
compassion, but rather, " a poet in his own way",41 possessed by his love for a game of 
chance. With its artifical coherence and power to absorb all his creative energies the 
game of roulette displaces the metaphysical solution to the problem of tragedy with an 
aesthetic one, while giving a formal symmetry to narrative tensions (Alexis is poised to 
return to the tables in the final pages so that everything is set to start over again). In 
this respect, The Gambler anticipates the response of New Novelist Robbe-Grillet to 
tragedy, and which concerns the "goddess of illusion": namely, absorption in a private 
world of signs which imposes its own order on the "desreglement de pensees" associated 
with the flaw of consciousness. 
A perverse cultivation of suffering for its own sake is discernable in some of the characters 
in The Idiot as well as in their implied author who sometimes lingers over morbid images 
in a manner out of proportion to their representational or aesthetic purpose. In The 
Gambler this addiction is much more apparent since it is unaccompanied by the 
metaphysical questions and psychological complexity which makes characters in the 
later novel particularly difficult to analyze. The love of cruelty apparent in Alexis and 
Polina's relationship is only sketchily modified by metaphysical or ethical 
considerations. Despite its reflection of a certain kind of egotism, then, The Gambler 
seems to mirror the "voluph~" of suffering described by Montaigne more closely than The 
Idiot. In his essay, 'Que nostre desir s'accroit par la malaisance', Montaigne analyzes the 
love of suffering outside a definite ethical framework, relating it to the human need for 
40 Unconscious Structure in 'The Idiot', p141. 
41 Dostoyevsky, cited in Jessie Coulson's introduction to the novel, pl1. 
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nervous stimulus deriving from the challenge of the difficult and the painful. Thus, in a 
love affair: 
La difficulte des assignations, Ie danger des surprises, la honte du lendemain, [ ... J 
c'est ce qui donne pointe a la sauce [ ... J La volupte mesme cerche a s'irriter par la 
douleur.42 
By ascribing the ability to derive enjoyment from adversity not to the sick, but to the 
seekers after adventure and intensity of experience, Montaigne in fact foreshadows 
aspects of Nietzsche's (more strongly anti-ethical) analysis of tragedy which, as I will 
shortly consider, is of some relevance to The Gambler.43 
Certainly the moral sensitivity of the main character in the novella is secondary to his 
addiction to nervous excitement. Alexis shows both sadistic and masochistic impulses in 
his relations with Polina and derives as much enjoyment from inflicting pain as from 
submitting to it. This constant imbalance in the relationship is not a propitious 
foundation for love between two equal subjects who are capable of mutual recognition and 
affirmation. For in the vicious circle of sado-masochism the other can only ever be an 
accessory in a solitary theatre of sensationalism in which pain is an end in itself. In his 
lust for power over Polina, or for acquiescence in her power over him, Alexis loses his own 
"form" also, forfeiting all sense of self and of proportion in his abandonment to this 
intoxication of the nerves: 
'Well, yes, yes, I do enjoy being enslaved by you. There is, there really is 
enjoyment in the utmost degree of humility and insignificance [ ... J when I talk to 
you I want to say everything, everything, everything. I lose all my form [. .. J Take 
advantage of my slavery, profit by it, make use of it! Do you know, one day I shall 
kill you! [ ... J I'll simply kill you just like that, because sometimes I long to devour 
you [ ... J pleasure is always some use, and savage, boundless power, even though it's 
only over a fly, is after all a pleasure in its way. Man is a despot by nature and 
likes inflicting pain. You enjoy it terribly'. (pp46, 47, 48, 49) 
Alexis appears in such passages to be little more than a manic voluptuary while 
Mikhailovsky's criticism of his author because of his prediliection for representing this 
sort of character, and for dwelling on it, is shown to be not without point. As 
42 
43 
'Apologie de Raimond Sebond', Essais, Livre II, pp276-277. 
Because of the emphasis on nervous stimulus in The Gambler I find Alex de Jonge's 
definition of the phenomenon of intensity (The Age of Intensity) extremely helpful 
to an understanding of the work. Joseph Frank is critical of de Jonge's reading of 
Dostoyevsky for failing to give due consideration to the ethical dimension of 
Dostoyevsky's ceuvre (Through the Russian Prism). However, not only are ethical 
questions developed less fully in The Gambler (although Grandmamma and Mr 
Astley act as something of a moral gauge in the story), but also, taken in conjunction 
with The Idiot, the work shows how wide is the range of Dostoyevsky's ideas on 
the subject and how complicated, therefore, is the task of identifying his 
allegiances. 
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Mikhailovsky explains: 
the distinctive trait of our cruel talent will be the needlessness of the suffering he 
causes, its lack of motivation and its pointlessness [ ... J a temptation to 
tormentingly tickle the reader's nerves or subject any of the characters to cruel 
influence.44 
This taste for gratuitous pain, however, has a significant role to playas an alternative 
response to tragedy. For the fear that is courted, the hazard that is deliberately sought 
after, has lost some of its power to dismay as a result of being voluntarily entertained. It 
becomes instead a medium for exercising power and for exploring the individual's 
capacity to experience different sensations. By identifying the craving for excess with 
the more vital personalities in the story Dostoyevsky is, in fact, championing a 
characteristic Nietzschean trait whereby the love of suffering is a sign, not of weakness, 
but of strength, and of a zestful appreciation of life in all its facets. The "predilection for 
the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of existence", writes Nietzsche in The Birth 
of Tragedy, is prompted not by decline but by "well-being, by overflowing health, by the 
fullness of existence" .45 A Nietzschean appetite for the extremes of experience is 
certainly apparent in Alexis who sees himself defying all limits and then collapsing at 
last from exhaustion: 
[ ... J even without any promptings of vanity I really was suddenly overcome by a 
terrible craving for risk. Perhaps the soul passing through such a wide range of 
sensations is not satisfied but only exacerbated by them, and demands more and 
more of them, growing more and more powerful until it finally reaches exhaustion. 
(p32) 
Other characters similarly combine cruelty with an extravagent generosity of spirit. 
Polina, for example, is both passionate and vicious, while Grandmamma, noticeably 
stimulated by the discomforture of others, is also high-spirited and generous with her 
winnings at the roulette tables, including some unknown vagrant in the distribution of her 
largesse. 
This is a very different reading of tragedy to the one explored in The Idiot through the 
character of Myshkin. The metaphysical comfort Myshkin represents is rendered 
44 A Cruel Talent. An Essay on Dostoevsky, p29. 
45 The Birth of Tragedy, p17. The first edition of this work was published in 1872. 
Miller questions the possibility of direct influence between Nietzsche and 
Dostoyevsky in 'Nietzsche's "discovery" of Dostoevsky', p211. Most critics seem to 
discuss the two writers in terms of a philosophy of nihilism (similarities and 
differences) rather than in terms of similarity of mood, or a common fascination for 
the power of illusion, which I explore here. 
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superfluous once pain has been transformed into one of life's pleasures. The "Dionysian" 
character thus eludes the anguish of tragedy by no longer seeking to be released from it. 
The result is an upside-down justification of the "hard, gruesome, evil, problematic" 
aspects of existence, as Nietzsche phrases it, besides which the perversity of Robbe-
Grillet's metaphysical tragedian appears mere academic quibbling. 
It is the nastier aspects of some of Dostoyevsky's characters which makes the 
application of Bakhtin's carnival theory to the question of tragedy highly problematic. 
Despite the readiness to embrace expressions of "worldly evil", "baseness and vulgarity" 
in Bakhtin's conception of menippean satire, a hypothetical forerunner to 
Dostoyevskyean carnival, Bakhtin offers only a limited account of this unattracive 
psychology - noticeable in Dostoyevsky's characters and, implicity, to some measure, in 
Dostoyevsky himself. Mikhailovsky, therefore, may have omitted to mention the 
process of ethical assessment that usually qualifies this phenomenon in Dostoyevsky, but 
Bakhtin, it seems to me, fails to acknowledge its gravity. Nor, of course, does Nietzsche, 
in so far as "gravity" implies the very moral element Nietzsche, like Robbe-Grillet, is 
attempting to discredit in his own account of the anatomy of tragedy. But Nietzsche at 
least does not attempt to disguise the destructive potential of the psychology of cruelty, 
even though he glamourizes it, and this is why the idea of "Dionysian" excess is, to my 
mind, a more appropriate metaphor for the love of suffering in some of Dostoyevsky's 
characters than the Bakhtinian one of carnival. The gleeful energies in Alexis, Polina 
and Grandmamma correspond to the exuberance that typifies the archetypal carnival 
funfair, but their belligerent egotism is very far from reflecting carnival's celebratory 
attitude or its "jolly relativity". Bakhtin concludes that the "somber colors of 
Dostoevsky'S works should not confuse us: they are not the final word",46 but it seems, on 
the contrary, that there is a great deal of painful ambivalence associated with the 
perversities of Dostoyevsky's characters, and that the "somber colors" in The Gambler, 
as in The Idiot, do not come with the assurance of a "happy" outcome. Bakhtin's 
polyphony, therefore, is a helpful theoretical model for the phenomenon of uncertainty 
in Dostoyevsky but his reading of that uncertainty in terms of carnival makes 
assumptions that Dostoyevsky's novels do not always support.47 
46 
47 
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p139. 
It is also intriguing that the medieval carnival, which provides one of the 
historical models for carnival theory, had a cruel and even terrifying side to it, as 
seen in the "carnivalesque" practice of tarring and feathering, which would hardly 
have been a source of unsullied enjoyment for any of the parties involved. In my 
view Bakhtin underplays this crueller side of the carnival psyche. 
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Moreover, if carnival insufficiently accounts for the malice of some of Dostoyevsky's 
characters it also soft-pedals their mean-spiritedness and the egotism that is totally 
opposed to carnival's unitarian ideals. Alexis's showy misdemeanours in the story are 
frequently motivated by spite and a childishly wilful attitude to law and order. His 
staged confrontation with officialdom at the Roman Embassy, for example, and his 
threat to spit "in Monsignore's coffee", are motivated by his imagined humiliation after 
having been forced to wait for an audience while others are allowed to pass before him. 
The fact that he has read, while waiting, an article which makes "a dreadful attack on 
Russia" (pp22-23) adds to his growing sense of resentment. Similarly, it is not the 
carefree self-abandonment of the carnival reveller that goads Alexis into schoolboyish 
pranks in Roulettenburg so much as the contemptuous treatment he receives at de Grieux's 
hands, and, worse still, at Polina's. As Alexis sets out to insult the Baronness and 
scandalize the Baron, (pSI) he is hoping to prove his daring to Polina, and force her into 
demeaning herself, in turn, by begging him to stop what she has instigated as a test of his 
devotion: 
I've begun to want to have the laugh on the lot of them, and come out as the 
dashing hero. Let them watch me! Never fear, [Polina] will take fright at the 
scandal and call me back to her. And even if she doesn't, she will see that I'm not 
a milksop [ ... ]. (pS8) 
Such pettiness and spite reveals not extravagence but a meanness of spirit for which there 
is no equivalent in Bakhtin nor, ultimately, in Nietzsche. Dostoyevsky's perception of 
some of the more unattractive wounds that afflict the human spirit, eliciting both pity 
and distaste, excludes either an easy philosophic optimism, or the somewhat romantic 
spirit of rebellion that underlies some of Nietzsche's inspired rhetoric. Ironically, 
however, it is partly his exposure of the pettiness underlying his characters' actions that 
absolves Dostoyevsky from accusations of an unthinking glorification of their perversity. 
Alexis's momentary consciousness of the "whole loathsomeness" of his situation is a 
reminder that his author, too, is fully aware of the cost of giving in to such compulsions. 
But The Gambler does not incline too far in this distinctly ethical direction. There are 
hints of self-awareness in the characters, and of judgement on the part of their implied 
author, but the most significant response to the wayward psychology of the characters in 
the novella lies elsewhere. 
III. ii. Redemption through the "goddess of illusion"48 
On one level Alexis's obsession with roulette is simply another manifestation of his 
48 Nietzsche's term. See also footnote p190. 
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nervous excitability. Accordingly, Alex de Jonge sees roulette as a continuation of the 
pursuit of sensationalism in Dostoyevsky's narrative, in that it "[offers] an unlimited and 
essentially meaningless excitement".49 It is true that the same intensity of mood 
characteristic of Alexis's relationship with Polina is discernable in his attitude to the 
game, and that the two are actually linked in his mind, largely because he first plays, 
and wins, on Polina's behalf, leading him to dub her his Lady Luck. Yet a distinction is 
made between the nervous excitability that typifies Alexis's general mood and the 
particular fascination he feels for the game of roulette. This brings me back to Nietzsche 
and the distinction he makes between "intoxication" and "dreams", the first concerning 
primitive Dionysian energies and the second what he terms the" Apollonian" impulse 
towards order and rationality - in which Nietzcshe includes the contemplation of 
formal patterns in the world of "beautiful illusion", namely, art.50 The aesthetic impulse 
enters significantly into Alexis's enjoyment of the game of roulette. A delight in formal 
order is reflected in his mania for detecting patterns, for example, which make sense of 
what he knows to be a random series of throws: 
I am beginning to remember also that the middle twelve numbers, to which I had 
become positively addicted, turned up most frequently of all. There was a sort of 
pattern - they appeared three or four times running, without fail, then 
disappeared for two turns, then again appeared three or four times in succession. 
(p130) 
The roulette tables thus come to represent a special imaginative space in which Alexis 
may exercise his skill in prediction and analysis. Dostoyevsky himself draws attention 
to the artistry involved in Alexis's methods (what Nietzsche would term his "ardent 
longing for illusion"), when he refers to his character not as a "mere gambler" but as "a 
poet".51 When Alexis's emotions are stirred and his imagination transfixed by an idea he 
has about roulette, the combined effect is of an inexorable personal destiny laying hold of 
his mind. On receiving a visit from Polina in his rooms in Chapter 14, for example, he is 
suddenly convinced that if he plays once more on her behalf he will win back everything. 
It seems fated. Yet the sense of fate that now masters him is almost entirely conjured up 
by his own exalted imagination, by "some combination of presentiments, some 
extraordinary exertion of will-power, some self-intoxication of the imagination". (p128) 
The hallucinatory power of a "self-intoxicated" imagination is, I have suggested, of some 
importance to an understanding of The Idiot. The dreams of Myshkin and Ippolit are 
shown in the novel to be partly generated by their heightened state of mental excitement. 
49 
50 
51 
The Age of Intensity, p 113. 
The Birth of Tragedy, p39. 
Dostoyevsky, cited in Jessie Coulson's introduction to The Gambler, pll. 
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At the same time Myshkin's visions, like Ippolit's nightmares, are grounded in powerful 
desires and fears beyond his rational control, and consequently threaten to overwhelm 
both the formal order of the dream and the sanity of the dreamer. As such, dreams in The 
Idiot are a potential source of disturbance which have a divisive, rather than a 
cathartic, effect on the personalities of the characters. Alexis's fascination with 
roulette, on the other hand, has a unifying influence on his personality giving him a focus 
for his energies, while successfully screening out his painful awareness of other people 
and his own sense of inadequacy in relation to them. Thus where Myshkin's dreamy 
abstraction is constantly shaken by a compassionate awareness of others, Alexis's 
absorption in the poetry of roulette constitutes an impenetrable defence against such 
intrusions. When he wins huge sums of money for Polina, he forgets her in the process of 
stacking and counting the two-hundred thousand francs. And as he returns to the tables, 
the calculations in which he engages and the thrill of picking out patterns in the 
arbitrary sequences, dim his awareness of her even further. Thus his love for Polina, the 
one vital if perverse link with a world outside his own mind and imagination, "seemed to 
have retreated into the background". (p14D) It stays in the background for the remainder 
of the story as Alexis withdraws increasingly into a fascinating but private world of signs 
and numbers with its own inner coherence. 
Nietzsche judges that to sustain the coherence of any aesthetic illusion, exclusion of the 
other, both of metphysics and of ethics, is of fundamental importance. Thus: "to be at all 
able to dream with this inner joy in contemplation [the dreamer-artist] must have 
completely lost sight of the waking reality and its ominous obtrusiveness".52 In this 
respect the game of roulette in Dostoyevsky's story offers a possible analogy for the game 
of writing represented by the narrative itself. For the formal priorities of art similarly 
impose an aesthetic rather than an ethical order on contradictions. Accordingly, the 
emphasis is less on preconceived contradictions than on the achievement of coherence in 
an invented world, and hence on the generating and resolving of tensions on the 'purely' 
formal level. The sense of control, of "victory and power", which Alexis experiences after 
his enormous win at the tables, may be compared to the sense of mastery over adversity 
won by the artist as a result of his organizational and expressive powers. 
Dostoyevsky's narrative also intimates that one of the consequences of a perfectly 
enclosed, self-absorbed imaginative world is condemnation to a dreary eternity of 
repetition, and eternity, as Jean-Paul Sartre has shown, can be hellish. Alexis himself 
admits, "I have simply destroyed myself". (p153) But it equally hints at a more 
"carnivalesque" optimism, and so, at the possibility for renewal contained in the refusal 
52 The Birth of Tragedy, p45. 
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of final definitions. Alexis therefore considers that he can "change the whole course of 
[his] destiny in an hour!" (p161)53 With its focus on the absorbing activity of a game and 
the forgetfulness that derives from it The Gambler could be said to presage the "terrain 
de jeu" proposed by Robbe-Grillet as the novelist's principle means of denouncing tragedy. 
It also anticipates the circular structure of many of Robbe-Grillet's novels, including his 
1953 work, Les gommes. 
Lesgommes 
IV. i. Rewriting 'CEdipus' 
Dostoyevsky's world is one of fearful shadows and premonitions, dreams and longings. It 
is also a world where the characters are granted the illusion of 'life' if of a very 
particular and circumscribed sort. Minds, nerves and emotions function at painfully 
intense levels as the characters wrestle with their being-in-the-world. The transition 
from Dostoyevsky to Robbe-Grillet in this respect is disconcertingly abrupt. The high-
pitched emotionalism is displaced by narratives whose undercurrents of feeling are muted 
and denaturalized. Yet a sense of beleaguered humanity persists in Les gommes and Dans 
Ie labyrinthe, which for this reason may be described as modern tragedies represented in 
non-tragic terms. 
"L'aventure de Wallas dans Les gommes est une version moderne de la tragedie 
d'CEdipe" .54 Thus begins Morrissette's case for the CEdipus myth as interpretative key to 
Les gommes, a work which otherwise, Morrissette implies, borders on the 
"incomprehensible" .55 As references to the CEdipus myth have acquired an almost banal 
self-evidence since Samuel Beckett first drew attention to them it suffices to mention only 
the more obvious of the CEdipus clues to demonstrate the plausibility of Morrissette's 
thesis.56 Firstly, the setting of the Greek drama appears to have been deliberately 
evoked in references to the "rue de Corinthe", the "route de Delph", and the "ruines de 
Thebes". The action of the original is reproduced in codified form in references to 
Wallas's troubled childhood memories of the town (involving his mother), in the police 
53 
54 
55 
56 
It is not clear whether the change will come about as a result of his abandoning the 
game or as a result of his staking his last gulden again and becoming a winner. 
Les romans de Robbe-Grillet, p53. 
cf Ben Stolztfus's early comment on the novel in Alain Robbe-Grillet and the New 
French Novel where he argues that without the CEdipus conundrum "the novel has 
no cohesion - it lacks a center". (p71) Ilona Leki repeats this observation in her 
1983 work but qualifies it with reference to Robbe-Grillet's aesthetic priorities 
(Alain Robbe-Grillet, pp15 and 24). 
See Morrissette's account of the history of the CEdipus clues in a footnote on p53 of 
Les romans de Robbe-Grillet. 
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theory that Dupont's son may also be his killer, in Wallas's fascination with the sensual 
Mediteranean-Iooking woman in the stationery shop he suspects of being Dupont's 
estranged wife. The notion of a riddle to which the hero alone holds the answer is 
inscribed in details such as the four missing letters on the eraser Wallas buys which 
could, together with the "deux lettres centrales 'di"', spell the name of "CEdipe"; and in 
the Sphinx-like riddles addressed to him by the inebriated tramp. Lastly, the sense of 
fate that pursues Wallas as he blunders his way through an investigation in which he 
himself supplies the object of inquiry, suggests a connection with the Greek hero damned 
by the gods to blindness and murder. 
Having identified these references, which are undeniably and even overwhelmingly 
present once the reader starts looking for them, it does not follow that the reader then 
possesses the clue to the novel's essential meaning, if it has one. It is significant in this 
respect that, after linking the CEdipus myth to the "unite veritable du roman",57 
Morrissette goes on to conclude that, after all, Les gommes has "une structure trop 
diversifiee, ou l'unite de conception semble parfois sur Ie point de se perdre tout a fait".58 
Furthermore, it seems obvious that the CEdipus fragments, whatever their importance, do 
not have the same resonance in Robbe-Grillet as they do in the Greek myth. There is no 
hint in Les gommes, for example, of the searing remorse experienced by Jocaste and 
CEdipus, nor of the latter's redemption through suffering: a scheme which accords only 
too neatly with Robbe-Grillet's analysis and dismissal of tragedy in his essay. 
For this reason, Roudiez's interpretation of the CEdipus myth in Les gommes seems more 
appropriate than Morrissette's since it accounts for the superabundance of mythological 
clues (whose paradoxical effect is to undermine their own credibility),59 while 
accommodating the anti-tragic, anti-humanist bias of the author. To quote Morrissette's 
paraphrase of this view: 
Tout Ie roman des Gommes serait donc en quelque sorte une demonstration de 
l'inutilite, sinon de l'impossibilite, pour l'homme contemporain, de se nourrir 
d'archetypes ou de mythes herites du passe, et la gomme que cherche Wallas 
deviendrait un instrument symbolique destine a effacer la continuite avec Ie passe 
humaniste.60 
The reader of Les gommes is thus confronted by at least two critical options with regard to 
57 p53. 
58 p73. 
59 See Olga Bernal's comment to this effect in Alain Robbe-Grillet. Le roman de 
l' absence: "Aucun lecteur n' a besoin de tant de signes pour comprendre qu' on veut lui 
parler d'CEdipe". (p62) The fact that readers did not immediately identify the 
CEdipus references (see Morrissette's footnote p53) would seem to contradict this 
view, however. 
60 Les romans de Robbe-Grillet, p67. 
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the CEdipus theme. Les gommes, says Morrissette, is a new version of an old tragedy 
without which it is rendered unintelligible. Les gommes, insists Roudiez, is not a tragedy 
but a dramatization of unintelligibility against which humanist myths are no defence. 
It could be argued, however, that both critics are justified in their assessment of the novel 
in the light of a third interpretation of the CEdipus theme: namely, as dramatization of 
the insecurities generated by unintelligibility that is one of the grounds of modern 
tragedy. The incomprehensibility Morrissette sees as a threat to the text's coherence once 
the framework of the CEdipus myth is dismantled thus constitutes the real 'tragic' 
dimension of the novel. 
IV. ii. Unintelligibility and 'tragic' malaise 
The experience of uncertainty is endemic to the narrative of Les gommes, to the point 
where the very desire to comprehend seems sapped by a radical unknowing, by the 
"scepticisme sterilisant de maniac" associated with Fabius, head of the "Bureau des 
Enquetes" and Wallas's boss. In fact, the whole plot is constructed on an illusion. The 
object of Wallas's investigation (Dupont's corpse), is yet to be 'invented' so that the 
possibility of gaining in knowledge is frustrated by a singular lack of information. Where 
the traditional detective (and Les gommes is as much a commentary on the roman policier 
as it is on the CEdipus myth) progresses from a state of ignorance to one of superior 
understanding, characters in Les gommes get nowhere in either physical or investigative 
senses. As the narrative humorously observes: "Une fois seuIs, Wallas et Laurent font Ie 
bilan de ce qu'ils viennent d'apprendre. Le bilan est vite fait car ils n'ont rien appris du 
tout". (p197) 
This noticeable lack of progress in the acquisition of knowledge is neatly imitated in the 
perambulations of WalIas, who has no idea where he is going and so cannot ask for useful 
directions ("il ne sait pas comment poser sa quesiton: il n'a pas pour l'instant de but 
precis"). (p54) He is consequently left to walk round and round in circles in a city whose 
main street is the "Boulevard Circulaire" ("II est descendu au meme arret et maintenant, 
il suit Ie Boulevard Circulaire qui Ie ramene au petit pavilIon de brique et a la chambre 
miserable du Cafe des Allies [ ... J Wallas n'est pas plus avance que lorsqu'il est arrive 
hier, par ce meme chemin".) (p229) An impression of peripheral movement around an 
empty center is thus created, effectively anticipating the ending to the novel, where, 
instead of the detective apprehending the criminal, the detective becomes the criminal, 
creating the very problem he was trying to solve. All Wallas's preceding activity is seen 
to have been based on an illusion, and so, on a fundamental lack of understanding which 
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makes Morrissette's interpretation of him as an CEdipus figure "qui [sait] trouver Ie mot 
des enigmes, la solution des questions obscures" richly ironic.61 
What of the hero's reponse to this elaborate meaninglessness in which he is caught up? 
For to wholly escape tragedy the frustration of significance in the novel must be 
dissociated from any sense of emotional disharmony. If it is unsettling for readers, it must 
at least be accepted with equanimity by the characters in so far as they can be said to 
reflect the norms of Robbe-Grillet's imaginative world. Emotional equilibrium, implies 
Robbe-Grillet in 'Nature, humanisme, tragedie', is what distinguishes the enlightened 
anti-humanist from the (humanist) tragedian and provides the necessary ballast for the 
soundness of the former's reasoning: "Et cette absence de signification, l'homme 
aujourd'hui [ ... ] ne l'eprouve plus cornme un manque, ni cornme un d&hirement. Devant un 
tel vide, il ne ressent desormais nul vertige" .62 
The distinction made in the essay is by no means so clear-cut in the novel, however. The 
dismantling of the CEdipus myth and its reduction to odd fragments throughout the text is 
accompanied by a malaise that lingers incongruously in the absence of a metaphysical 
justification. Wallas is not simply bothered but, "tourmente", by feelings of incompetence 
and insecurity. His communication skills are inadequate, and while this leads to some 
comic situations from the reader's point of view (his interview with Mme Smite, for 
example), from WaUas's perspective these melees are highly discomforting. Having 
sollicited, on one occasion, an interview with the alleged Mme Dupont Wallas is assailed 
by "le sentiment desagreable qu'il est en train de perdre son temps". He then attempts to 
extricate himself from the interview and is disconcerted when some chance remark of his 
provokes a fruity laugh from the woman, prompting him to go anxiously over what he 
has just said: "Dans Ie doute, Wallas essaie de la reconstituer; mais il ne parvient pas: '11 
va faUoir que je ... Il va faUoir ... ' [ ... ] Je regrette, Madame, d'etre oblige de ... Une minute, 
s'il vous plait, il faut que j'aille ... 11 va faUoir que j'aille ... II va falloir ... Il va 
falloir ... " .(p 185) 
Such symptoms of near-psychotic anxiety are frequent in the narrative and Wallas's 
continued attempts to overcome them with purposeful walking ("iI marche et il enroule 
au fur et a mesure Ia ligne ininterrompue de son propre passage, non pas une succession 
d'images deraisonnables et sans rapport entre eUes, mais un ruban uni ou chaque element 
se place aussitot dans la trame [ .. ]"), (p52) and with reassurances about his importance 
and place in the world (lisa presence en ces Heux est necessaire"), (p71) testify to the 
61 
62. 
Les romans de Robbe-Grillet, p54. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p53. 
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limits of his success. The fact that he so desperately seeks confidence and control 
indicates an inability to come to terms with the "absence de signification" that 
characterizes his world, so that an element of tragedy is reintroduced into the novel. 
However it must be emphasized that it is Wallas's response to an absence of 
intelligibility that makes Les gommes potentially tragic, and not the phenomenon of 
unintelligibility itself. 
Wallas's predicament illustrates that the problem of tragic experience - of alienation 
anguish and loss - is not directly dependent on a given philosophical framework or 
related to a specific object. Although some of the character's discomfort can be explained 
with reference to professional anxieties - the need to prove himself on a mission that is 
turning out to be highly confusing - or to the sense of dislocation experienced by a man in 
a strange town, much of his insecurity is dissociated from identifiable anxieties. It seems 
to indicate some 'flaw' in perception which, however unreasonable, produces noticeable 
symptoms of distress. Thus, after Montaigne, ''No us tressuons, nous tremblons, nous 
pallissons et rougissons aux secousses de nos imaginations". There are no violent changes 
of colour to betray Wallas's uneasiness to the reader (Dostoyevsky's characters change 
from red to white, to yellow and even green in their agitation) but his 'progress' around 
the Boulevard Circulaire is impeded by vertigo and a nagging "malaise cotonneux". The 
non-specific nature of this malaise makes it all the more insidious as it imposes itself as a 
condition of his being-in-the-world, unjustifiable, inexplicable and, in this sense, 
unresolvable. 
IV. iii. "Deux millimetres canes de reve" 
Does this mean that the void at the heart of the narrative reverberates with appeals for 
a metaphysics of presence? To assume this would be to perform the same leap in logic as 
Robbe-Grillet in the essay on tragedy where he links the desire for coherence and truth to 
a conviction about the prior existence of these things. Nowhere in Les gommes is the 
chaos that confronts Wallas represented as an aberration from a norm: it is simply there, 
a condition of his world that must be reckoned with. That Wallas finds it difficult to 
accept the gap between his desire for meaning and the illogicality of events is also 
undeniable, and this creates 'tragic' tensions in the novel. But the same discontinuity 
which gives the novel its 'tragic' dimension holds the key to its optimism. For it is the 
absence of an authoritative truth in Les gommes which promotes imaginative effort as 
well as insecurity, and imaginative effort is related to the aesthetic impulse which 
holds the beginnings of Robbe-Grillet's 'answer' to tragedy. 
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It is significant that the ability to invent in Robbe-Grillet's characters is related to their 
major vulnerability. The "flottement" of human intentions and dreams in the novel is 
what introduces tiny errors into the "ordonnance ideale" and leads to its undoing. 
Throughout the narrative, a series of well-laid plans are foiled by ill-regulated 
speculations in the minds of the characters which cause them to deviate from their pre-
arranged agenda. However slight the deviation, the smallest of flaws is sufficent to mar 
perfection. Garinati, the would-be assassin, thus disables the elaborate machinery of 
assassination by adding a single move of his own to Bona's instructions: he fails to turn out 
the light. As a result, Dupont, forewarned, escapes. Marchat, succumbing to paranoid 
fears, loses his nerve at the last moment so that Dupont has to return to the house himself 
to collect his papers. Here, Wallas, busy pursuing his own misguided train of thought, 
awaits him, and, mistaking him for the assassin, shoots him. 
If misguided intentions introduce an element of chaos into the narrative it is a chaos that 
is also an expression of freedom in the face of the tyranny of the predictable. The 
vagaries of human fancy that disrupt the "ordonnance ideale" provide a necessary 
escape-route from the legalism that order represents. In the little town that is the scene 
of Wallas's peregrinations, the sea is a symbol of this escape, its intrusion into the 
monotonous township by way of canals representing the way dreams of the imagination 
insinuate themselves into the banal and depressingly regular pattern of everyday 
affairs: 
Pourtant cette ville triste n' est pas ennuyeuse: un reseau complique de canaux et de 
bassins y ramene de la mer, [ ... J l'odeur du varech, les mouettes et meme quelques 
bateaux de faible tonnage [ ... J Cette eau, ce mouvement aerent les esprits. Les 
sirenes des cargos leur arrivent du port [ ... J et leur apportent a l'heure de la maree 
l'espace, la tentation, la consolation du possible. (p19) 
That this margin of liberty often results in a miscarriage of individual projects does not 
alter the fact that imaginative activity is the characters' principle means of asserting 
themselves in a bewildering universe. A number of characters in Les gommes make a 
contribution to the final denouement of the novel through their imaginative involvement, 
which suggests a degree of control over individual destiny in Robbe-Grillet's world, or at 
least, a willing collusion with, rather than a passive submission to, fate. Dr Juard, 
Marchat and Dupont are all co-operating in a scheme that has been masterminded by 
Roy-Dauzet, (p31) and Laurent, puzzled by the case from his angle, wonders whether the 
"imagination funambalesque" of Roy-Dauzet is behind all the confusion; (p71) Bona has 
invented meticulous instructions for Garinati to follow, (p60) and refers to his elaboration 
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of the assassination plan as his special "ceuvre"; (p102) Wallas is following written 
instructions from the fanciful Fabius while he himself clearly has too much imagination 
for the ideal private investigator, as indicated in the missing centimetre in his head 
measurements - at once a lack and a special capacity, a "manque derisoire" and "Deux 
millimetres cam~s de reves". (p260) Mme Bax, who also has "un peu trop d'imagination" 
to be a reliable witness, turns inventive narrator in her interview with Wall as, (pp113-
114) while Mme Jean, Mlle Dexter and MIle Lebermann all invent 'information' at the 
unwitting prompting of the police, (pp194-196). On several occasions throughout the 
narrative the reader, too, is jolted out of studious contemplation of what has apparently 
happened, to the realization that she has been witnessing the mental acting out of an 
hypothesis in a character's mind (Laurent's, for example). (p143) 
The considerable value Robbe-Grillet attaches to the imagination leads this reader to 
the conclusion that the real criminal in the novel is Dupont. For he is the one character 
who is deficient in this respect, displaying a noticeable "manque de fantaisie" in his 
affairs, and having the deplorable habit "de n'agir jamais sans reflechir, de ne jamais 
changer d'avis, de ne jamais se tromper". (p182) It is only poetic justice, therefore, that he 
should be executed by the novel's deus ex machina. 
IV. iv. Imagination and invention: some distinctions 
The poetic justice executed at the end of Les gommes is the most definitive expression of 
the overarching purposes of the novelist, to whose control everything in the narrative is 
subject. The fate of Wallas and Dupont in Les gommes clearly has an artistic symmetry 
that is contrasted with the psychological insecurity of the preceding pages. The 
juxaposition of these two aspects of the narrative - aesthetic symmetry and the 
"desreglement de pensees" from which Wallas suffers - both of which are apparently 
generated by the power of the imagination, indicates the need for a distinction between 
different aspects of the creative faculty. For the images, sensations and fears that arise 
unprompted and throw the characters off-balance are qualitatively different from the 
formal patterning of image and sequence imposed on chaos throughout by the novelist. In 
the first instance, the characters are vulnerable to their own incalculability, while in 
the second, control is implicit, and the involuntary imaginings are transformed into 
conscious invention.63 Like the game of roulette in The Gambler the concern with formal 
63 Note that Robbe-Grillet does not make an explicit distinction between imagination 
and invention in this manner in the essays (see, for example, Pour un nouveau roman, 
p30). A distinction is implicit, however, in the reference in Angelique to "Ie reel", 
namely, that subconscious world of dreams that generates the profusion of image 
and feeling that then becomes the material of the narrative. See my Chapter 2 for 
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perfection apparent in the ending to Les gommes proclaims the power of the controlled, 
waking illusion as a defence against the unsolicited imaginings so disturbing to the 
balance of the mind. Nietzsche's insistence on the importance of the Apollonian influence 
in art provides an illuminating evocation of the role played by rationality and formal 
restraint in Robbe-Grillet's surreal playground: 
But we must also include in our image of Apollo that delicate boundary which the 
dream image must not overstep lest it have a pathological effect [ ... J We must keep 
in mind that measured restraint, that freedom from the wilder emotions, that 
calm of the sculptor god. His eye must be 'sunlike', as befits his origin; even when 
it is angry and distempered it is still hallowed by beautiful illusion.64 
The troubled "desreglement de pensees" in Les gommes is thus accompanied by pointed 
reminders of the power of illusion, not only in the production of distortions, but also in 
their control through the imposition of aesthetic form. The hints of "pathological 
effect" are carefully restrained by the "calm of the sculptor god".65 
If it is only at the close of the novel that the reader perceives this most forcefully then 
she can follow the movement of the narrative back to its beginning where, less susceptible 
to the confusions of Wall as, she is also more alert to the formal intricacies of the manner 
of their representation, to their "measured restraint", and even humour, once "hallowed 
by beautiful illusion". The theatrical language of the openin~ for example, underlines 
the conscious artistry of the narrative to come, and gently mocks the grandiose drama 
pervading high tragedy. "Trois coups de torchons" by the bar's proprietor (pl1) imitate 
the "trois coups" preceding the raising of the curtain, and the accompanying terminology 
("personnage present en scene"; "Ie decor"; "Quand tout est pret la lumiere s'allume") 
bespeaks the exaggerated and caricatured gestures of high drama. The figure three is 
picked up later in the narrative and repeated in a manner that seems suggestive, were it 
not for the ludicrous banality of the context: the three thin slices of ham on Dupont's 
dinner plate, (p23) and the three sandwiches in the workman's packed lunch. (pS6) Like 
the language of the political poster these cabbalistic signs seem to signify "beaucoup de 
choses, ou rien du tout", (pS3) reminding us that we are reading a piece of Robbe-Grillet 
drama regulated by an order of its own, both arbitrary and deliberate, a product of chance 
and necessity.66 
64 
65 
66 
comment on aspects of "Ie reel" in Le miroir qui revient. 
The Birth of Tragedy, p3S. 
Although Nietzsche acquiesces to suffering more vigorously than Robbe-Grillet, 
who denies its fascination in the essay on tragedy, Nietzcshe is closer to Robbe-
Grillet than Dostoyevsky in his analysis of the power of illusion to control 
"pathological effects", and in the priority he then gives to illusion over 
metaphysical comfort as a defence against forces of destruction. 
cf Olga Bernal's comment on Wallas's actions in Alain Robbe-Grillet: Le roman de 
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For this reason, the dislocations and repetitions of the final pages which focus again on 
the "patron" may be seen to imitate the circular movement of the crime. The disjointed 
phraseology conceivably indicates what Morrissette refers to as the "patron's" 
"paroxysme de l'anxh~te" and "une sorte d'attaque de paranoia",67 but it equally suggests 
the running together of reflections in the water of the aquarium in which the proprietor's 
image is "noyee", at the novel's close as at its opening. Like the fantastic monsters 
lurking in the town's canals the whole story, it would seem, has arisen from the troubled 
water of dreams, and given momentary coherence before it sinks back again into obscurity. 
This, after all, is neither high tragedy nor a criminal investigation but a "decor de 
reves". 
Given, then, the patent affirmation of artifice in the narrative, perhaps the 
interpretation of the CEdipus myth which best reflects the author's intentions is found, 
once more, in some comments made by Nietzsche in his Birth of Tragedy. For Nietzsche 
saw the CEdipus story as one of the most attractive and, implicity, the most artistic in all 
Greek mythology because it was based on the idea of perversity, of acting against nature. 
CEdipus succeeds in answering the "riddle of nature", Nietzsche tells us, because he 
himself resists her in wedding his mother.68 The beguiling references to CEdipus in Les 
gommes may, after all, be potentially more 'meaningful' than even Morrissette allows in 
his article on this theme. It is at least permissable to see the final pages of Les gommes, 
which bring the CEdipus theme to its conclusion, as an indictment by the implied author, 
after the manner of Nietzsche, of the so-called "natural" wisdom of classical tragedy. 
In the final analysis Les gommes both proves and disproves Robbe-Grillet's theory about 
tragedy. At one of the Cerisy colloquiums he distinguished between art that avoids 
tragedy, and art that denounces it by exposing its artificial nature: 
vous ne pouvez pas pretendre que je ne joue pour echapper au tragique puisque [ ... J Ie 
jeu denonce ce tragique comme etant une creation humaine, qu'une autre creation 
humaine peut detruire.69 
Les gommes shows that tragedy, or at least, the experience of tragedy, is not simply a 
"creation humanine" or an "additional notion of evil" contrived by culture, but an 
involuntary disturbance of mind and feeling that can be neither avoided nor easily 
eliminated. Counterbalancing this, however, are the elaborately staged formal 
67 
68 
69 
l' absence: "[ ... J si sa fonction de detective Ie conduit a un crime, ce sera non pas un 
acte-destin, mais bien plutot un acte litteraire". (p55) 
Les romans de Robbe-Grillet, p72. 
See The Birth of Tragedy, pp68-69. 
Nouveau roman: hier, aujourd'hui I, p97. 
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manCEuVres which remind the reader that the world of conscious illusion can incorporate 
these terrors and denaturalize them so that they are, momentarily, deprived of their 
power. 
Dans Ie Labyrinthe 
v. i. The "Olympus of appearance" 
Robbe-Grillet's aim to frustrate tragic significance is more concerted in his 1959 novel 
where the ability to conceptualize and articulate is undermined by the narrative's 
pointed disinclination to accept anything as a valid starting point for hypothesis. 
Certainly the narrative seems empty of that clutter of misleading signs that enables 
characters in Les gommes (and readers of the novel) to construct interesting if inconclusive 
theories about Dupont's fate. Similarly, Wallas's difficulty with asking for directions in 
the earlier novel is reduced in Dans Ie labyrinthe to a more radical inarticulacy as the 
soldier is unable to even verbalize elementary questions: "Sais-tu ou se trouve", he begins 
at one point, (p34) but leaves the question unformed because he does not know who, or 
what, he is looking for, only that he has a box which he must carry around until he finds 
someone to give it to. Looking vaguely about for street names, the soldier finds nothing, 
because the signs are not there, because they are too highly placed, or because he is too 
blinded by snow to read. And in any case: "un nom de rue ne lui fournirait guere de 
renseignement utilisable, dans cette ville qu'il ne connait pas". (p31) 
The soldier's dilemma is in many respects paralleled by the reader's. Whereas in 
previous Robbe-Grillet novels readers are encouraged to interprete an incomplete sequence 
of events, knowing that the text supports several interpretations without definitively 
sanctioning any of them, Dans le labyrinthe seems to mistrust our worthiness for such a 
venture. Circumventing forays into the metaphysical, Robbe-Grillet reminds the reader 
with particular insistence of the material properties of things and their complete 
insignificance except as motifs in his text. Anticipating, for example, the tragic 
associations of war and death which form part of the decor of the novel, Robbe-Grillet 
forewarns the reader that: "II s'agit pourtant ici d'une realite strictement materielle 
c'est-a-dire qu'elle ne pretend a aucune valeur allegorique". It is as though readers are 
being instructed to read, but not to think or dream around, the text. Only a reader 
determined to ignore this commitment to material reality could detect allegorical 
significance in the object described in the opening pages, and whose physical form is said 
to ressemble at once "une sorte de croix", "une £leur", "une figure vaguement humaine", and 
"un poignard". (p13) The proliferation seems to indicate a tolerance of multiple 
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perspectives but, in effect, it places a restrictive ceiling on all of them by presenting each 
with an indifference that underscores their complete inappropriateness. When the banal 
contents of the box are disclosed, therefore, at the end of the narrative, there is barely 
the effect of an anti-climax because the reader, at this stage, and in response to the text's 
own promptings, has stopped asking why. In fact, so carefully does the narrative avoid 
building up expectations it is in danger of losing its readers through inattention, or a 
Barthesian meandering away to some narrative of one's own. 
Such strategies of frustration on the level of interpretation extend to the flattening of the 
novel's moral and emotional landscape through references to its artificiality. Despite 
the soldier's penetration of several buildings, and hence the implication of interiority, 
the city is presented as a one-dimensional theatrical backdrop, whose closed doors open 
onto empty space: "La platitude de tout ce decor ferait croire, d'ailleurs, qu'il n'y a rien 
derriere ces carreaux, derriere ces portes, derrieres ces fac;ades". (p24) It seems an 
appropriate setting, therefore, for the soldier who, at his first appearance, is 
indistinguishable from the lamp-post against which he leans. ("Contre la base conique du 
support en fonte [ ... J s'enroulent de maigres rameaux d'un Herre tMorique, en relief [ ... J Un 
peu plus haut, une hanche, un bras, une epaule s'appuient contre Ie flit du reverbere.") 
(pI6) His bodily fatigue, deduced from the set of his face and motion of his limbs, is 
never allowed to assume the proportions of despair, and his conversation with the child 
is stilted, as if carried out between two puppets or very bad actors ("L'enfant pourrait 
croire qu'il est seul dans la salle, qu'il joue seulement a faire la conversation avec 
quelqu'un qui n'existe pas, ou bien avec une poupee, un mannequin, qui ne saurait 
repondre.") (p30) This is a world of systematically regulated platitudes, discouraging to 
symbolic readings and surely a most barren terrain for tragedy. 
It is the very stillness of the novel's surfaces, however, that contributes to its disturbing 
atmosphere. The mesmerizing tranquillity of the decor and uncommunicativeness of the 
characters creates an impression of stasis uncannily suggestive of death. A contrived 
snapshot of drinkers in a tavern, for example, who are "figes [ ... J au beau milieu de gestes 
auxquels cet arret arbitraire a enleve tout naturel", metamorphozes into a bizarre 
memento mori: I/[ ... J les traits se sont crispes, les membres raidis, Ie sourire est devenu 
rictus, l'elan a perdu son intention et son sens. II ne subsiste plus, a leur place, que la 
demesure, et l'etrangete, et la mort". (ppl09-110) Such passages are provocative in their 
contradiction of the prologue's stated exclusion of metaphysical meanings, which, as a 
consequence, can be read as a teasing piece of misinformation with the author holding out 
the lure of something he Simultaneously promises not to deliver. ("11 s'agit pourtant ici 
d'une realite strictement materielle, c'est-a.-dire qu'elle ne pretend a. aucune valeur 
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allegorique", is followed by, "Le lecteur est done invite a n'y voir que les chases, gestes, 
paroles, evenements, qui lui sont rapportes, sans chercher a leur donner ni plus ni mains de 
signification que dans sa propre vie, au sa propre mort.") It is conceivable, therefore, that 
the novel's etherized calm may be associated both with it's anti-naturalist project, and 
with the strangeness of human experience and death considered apart from conventional 
realism. In this respect, the recherche artificiali ty of the text may be compared with 
the realism of Ionesco, who once explained that "c'est en m'enfon<;;ant dans Ie banal, en 
poussant a fond, [ ... ] les cliches les plus ecules du langage de taus les jours que rai essaye 
d'atteindre a l'expression de l'etrange au me semble" that he hoped to "atteindre a 
l'expression de l'etrange au me semble baigner toute l'existence" .70 By similarly 
withdrawing the comfort of familiarity, Dans Ie labyrinthe sends the reader back to a 
contemplation of the 'reality' that on one level it denies, and so frustrates its own studied 
acquiescence to futility: a play of perspectives for which the "avis au lectuer" has, in 
retrospect, prepared us. 
v. ii. The fissure of the human consciousness 
If the surreal quality of the landscape seems to simultaneously invite and discourage a 
projection of readerly angst, its effect on the soldier is much less equivocal. As with Les 
gommes, it is in the main character's reaction to the strangeness of his world that the real 
tragic potential of the novel lies. The absence of significant communication between the 
soldier and other characters in the novel, for example, is consistent with Robbe-Grillet's 
assumptions about the lack of natural communion between one person and another, 
between one person and the environment. But the soldier is far from accepting this silence 
with the requisite indifference, filling it, rather, with his own disquiet in the manner of 
the tragic hero Robbe-Grillet describes in the essay on tragedy. Thus: "La distance entre 
[son] cri [ ... ] et l'interlocuteur muet (peut-etre sourd) auquel il s'adresse, devient une 
angoisse [ ... ]".71 This is apparent in the soldier's encounter with the woman, (pp69-72) 
and in the paranoia that nearly forces him into a run when a row of faces stare out of an 
upper window: "lIs me prennent pour un espion", he tells himself. (pI27) Similarly, while 
the soldier's fatigue fails to evoke the statuesque quality of despair in a Racinian drama, 
it bespeaks the exaggerated heaviness that might weigh down a man's steps in a 
nightmare, for example, and so acquires the phantasmic quality of a more primitive 
emotion. The fact that his constant worry about the box is out of all proportion to its 
object makes no difference to the sense of oppression that dominates his mind. It is, 
indeed, the difficulty of not knowing and of being incapable of formulating his distress -
70 
71 
Notes et contre-notes, pIS. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p54. 
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"il n'est pas encore parvenu a formuler ses inquietudes" - that seems to intensify his 
distress. 
As in Les gommes, then, "what threatens" in Dans Ie labyrinthe, "is nowhere" ,72 but the 
illusion of threat is sufficiently powerful to unbalance the character and subvert the calm 
materialism of the narrative. For it is the activity of the human consciousness that is 
responsible for throwing the immaculate planes and surfaces out of alignment. Indeed, 
their perfection only serves to highlight the "flaw" of consciousness which cannot forget 
the absence around which it is precariously constructed. The soldier who first appears as 
a strange outgrowth of the lamppost against which he leans demonstrates his difference 
from physical reality in the novel again and again. His humanity is revealed in the 
uncertainty which expresses itself in bodily gestures - when he stretches out his hand, 
for example, "en crispant les doigts, comme celui qui craindrait de laisser echapper 
quelque detail dont il se croit sur Ie point de fixer Ie souvenir"- (p1S1) and through the 
insecurity which such constant uncertainty generates, as seen in the anxious hold he keeps 
on the box. If, therefore, the box is an anti-symbol of absence, as Olga Bernal has 
suggested, a metaphor for "Ie creux" that is "au centre de la rea lite humaine" in Robbe-
Grillet, it is also a symbol of something approaching 'tragic' pathos.73 For in the gap 
between its real (un)importance and the importance the soldier ascribes to it, between the 
banality, in other words, of the letters addressed to Henri Martin, and the anxiety about 
their delivery that makes the soldier sleep with the box under his mattress, is 
designated the distance between mind and world, consciousness and things,74 And because 
of the exaggerated nature of the contrast between the two in Dans Ie labyrinthe the 
potential for experiencing their difference as alienating seems to be disproportionately 
magnified. The expulsion of tragic humanism, in other words, is so radical as to create 
the kind of mind/world imbalance Robbe-Grillet insists is endemic to tragedy. The 
surfaces are as uninformative as the faces are uncommunicative so that the soldier's fears 
remain disconcertingly nebulous, un locatable in any time/space framework, both nowhere 
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Heidegger's terms for defining "Angst" as opposed to fear, the latter being 
experienced in relation to something definite. Cited in The Two Horizons, p171. 
Alain Robbe-Grillet: Ie roman de l'absence, p122. Bernal still insists that '1e roman 
de Robbe-Grillet n'emet aucun cri de protestation, d'angoisse, aucun syrnbole de 
passion tragique". (p129) But note that her definition of tragedy (see her footnote, 
p128) accords with the narrow one offered by Robbe-Grillet in Pour un nouveau 
roman. 
"Le soldat reste la, avec sa boite dans les mains, se demandant ou il va pouvoir la 
deposer pour la nuit, craignant a la fois de s'en separer et d'attirer davantage 
l'attention sur elle. Apres beaucoup d'hesitations, il ecarte Ie traversin de la grille 
en fer peint [ ... J y depose la boite [ ... J et repousse Ie traversin contre elle afin de la 
caler plus solidement. II pense qu'ainsi, lorsqu'il aura la tete sur Ie traversin, toute 
tentative pour s'emparer de la boite Ie tirerait de son sornrneil, si lourd soit-il." 
(pp106-107) 
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and nothing -"[sans] un gouffre ou se loger" as Robbe-Grillet phrases it with ironic, but 
appropriate, poetry in Pour un nouveau roman. 
For this reason the experience of "angoisse" in Dans Ie labyrinthe is infinitely more 
understated than Myshkin's experience of alienation in The Idiot. "I have no sense of 
proportion", Myshkin says, "my words don't express my ideas [ ... ]". (p355) But at least 
the world of beauty he envisages, like the world of darkling shadows in which he 
struggles, has a certain "poids de realite" in Dostoyevsky because of their anchorage in a 
meaningful frame of reference. In Robbe-Grillet's silent fantasy world, by contrast, the 
"conscience malheureuse" is not even granted the relief of recognition. It has no validity, 
and if, as a consequence, the world and the other are too reticent to provoke its 
difficulties directly, they are also too neutral to cure it. Tragedy, it seems, is all in the 
mind. But so long as there is no way out of malaise through other minds and perspectives, 
the hero is trapped in an unrelievedly bleak mental world. 
V. iii. 'L'anti-monde contre l'angoisse' 
However, following the pattern established by previous novels (including Les gommes), 
the opening and closing pages of Dans Ie labyrinthe provide the criteria according to 
which the novel and its pathos are intended to be read. The anxious researches of 
Wallas (Les gommes), the perverse erotomania of Mathias (Le voyeur), the jealousy of 
the anonymous narrator-husband (La jalousie), are all bracketted by a formal inventory 
of the elements from which their adventures will be composed. Likewise, the soldier's 
anxiety is seen to be generated and controlled by the deliberations of the narrator-artist 
whose self-conscious word contains his own. The interpenetration of the material with 
the subjective that gives the rest of the text its uneasy calm is conspicuously absent from 
the first and formative lines, where the reader is party to the array of choices facing the 
writer as he sets about composing a world with its own coherence, its own meaning, its own 
'reali ty': 
Je suis seul ici, maintenant, bien a l'abri. Dehors il pleut, dehors on marche sous la 
pluie en courbant la tete [ ... ] dehors il fait froid, Ie vent souffle dans les feuilles [ ... ] 
Dehors il y a du soleH, il n'y a pas un arbre, ni un arbuste pour donner de I' ombre, et 
l'on marche en plein soleH, s'abritant les yeux d'une main tout en regardant devant 
soi, a quelques metres devant soi, quelques metres d'asphalte poussiereux [ ... ] (p9) 
The trying out of different climactic conditions emphasizes the arbitrariness of the 
writer's initial choices, while the strong rhythmic patterns give the passage a unity that 
has nothing to do with meaning or representation, just as "maintenant" helps structure La 
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jalousie while remaining essentially meaningless as a temporal expression. 
Then, in the final pages, and as if to mock the fears built up in the narrative that has 
followed this opening, the author performs a last sleight-of-hand, showing with all the 
guileful generosity of a conjurer the innocent items which have been used in the production 
of the illusion: the labyrinthine trail of slippers on a dusty floor; patterns on a 
wallpaper; an umbrella-cum-walking-stick in a hallway. The refrain of the opening 
("Dehors il pleut. Dehors on marche sous la pluie en courbant la tete"), returns, leaving 
the reader with neither disturbing atmospherics nor philosophical questions about 
human frailties, but with the calm voice of the novelist, asserting, in the manner of 
Nietzsche's Apollo, a god-like control over the text's uncertainties. 
The authorial voice in Dans le labyrinthe thus represents the order that prevails over 
all subsidiary orders and disorders in the text. And, like all impulses towards order, it 
indicates a desire to master and define the limits of human incertitude: a desire which, I 
would suggest, comes through as strongly in Robbe-Grillet's text as it does in the humanist 
and metaphysical-inspired writings of the "speleologists" he disparages in Pour un 
nouveau roman. What Robbe-Grillet calls the novelist of depth is berated in the essay 
for indulging in metaphysical imperialism in the attempt to conquer the unknown: 
Descendu dans l'abime des passions humaines, [l'ecrivain traditionnel] envoyait 
au monde tranquille en apparence (celui de la surface) des messages de victoire 
decrivant les mysteres qu'il avait touches du doigt. Et Ie vertige sacre qui 
envahissait alors Ie lecteur, loins d'engendrer l'angoisse ou Ia nausee, Ie rassurait 
au contraire quant a son pouvoir de domination sur Ie monde.75 
Even if in Dans Ie labyrinthe such metaphoric heights and depths have been levelled, 
the same powers of domination are coveted, only the empowering is sought not from 
metaphysics but from art. 
In so far as it articulates the irrational and then draws attention to the process of 
articulation, the author's parole achieves a measure of control over these things: they 
are "conjure", in the double sense of being called to mind and dispelled, driven back 
beyond the formal boundaries set for them by the writer. The view of art implicit in this 
is one of therapeutic remedy to "l'angoisse", a view expressed by the author more than 
twenty years later in his autobiographical fiction, Angelique. Even though Robbe-
Grillet may still subscribe to the idea that the unhappy consciousness is a hallucinatory 
product of the mind, "angoisse" is acknowledged in this later work as an illusion 
75 Pour un nouveau roman, p22. 
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formidable enough to demand a response. Accordingly Robbe-Grillet proposes the 
sublimation of human insecurites, after the manner of Nietzsche, through the creation of 
an "anti-monde" in art: 
Tandis qu'a chaque instant s'effonde devant moi l'univers quotidien l'ecriture de 
l'imaginaire construit a partir du neant lui-meme [ ... ] un anti-monde, sur lequel 
l' angoisse fondamentale ne pourra jamais avoir de prise.76 
In this "anti-monde", therefore, the reality of human fears and insecurities is to be 
"dissolved" in the unreality of the world of appearances, which then exploits instability 
by incorporating it into the formal organization of its own unity. Hence the monster of 
nightmare is diminished by being looked at by the dreamer and harnessed to his 
language. 
But there is a balance to be achieved in this vanquishing of the monstrous through the 
charm of illusion. For if chaos is too regimented, too suavely domesticated, it loses its 
capacity to infuse art with its ambivalence and its implicit excitement. It is perhaps 
significant that in the earlier works like La jalousie and Le voyeur, the hero-narrator's 
struggle for mastery over threatening elements in his world, or in himself, is intense. The 
authorial word always interjects to calm, organize and reassert its power, but the 
subjective disorder in the narrative remains a threat to this. Dans Ie labyrinthe repeats 
and intensifies this incalculability. At the same time, the "circulation of signs" in the 
1959 narrative is more readily traced to the same sign, the same voice, namely, the 
author's. For this reason, order could be said to pose a greater threat to the narrative 
than disorder, Dans Ie labyrinthe thus announcing the formal perfectionism of novels like 
Projet pour une revolution 11 New York and La maison de rendez-vous. These belong to 
Robbe-Grillet's middle and later period, and reflect a stylistic assurance, almost 
bordering on slickness, that is less noticeable in the earlier novels. It is perhaps in the 
calculated, and apparently complacent, finesse of these later works that the real source 
of malaise lies, at least, for some of Robbe-Grillet's female readers. 
v. iv. The exclusions of fila dee sse de l'illusion''77 
Robbe-Grillet has defended his preference for "perfection plastique" in novels like Projet 
76 
77 
Angelique ou l'enchantement, p126, cf p125. Note that this is a view which Julia 
Kristeva explores in Le soleil noir and Harold Bloom, also, in Agon. Towards a 
Theory of Revisionism. 
Robbe-Grillet refers to "la deesse de l'illusion" in La maison de rendez-vous, p85. cf 
also Nietzsche's terms for art as the "goddess of illusion" and a "saving sorceress" 
in The Birth of Tragedy, p60. 
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and La maison de rendez-vous in the context of a discussion of sado-eroticism in Angelique. 
In the discourse of sado-eroticism the geometrical perfection of Dans Ie Iabyrinthe is 
repeated in the "surfaces de chair a la perfection abstraite, sans passe, sans lassitude 
possible, dure et lisse pour l'eternite".78 And, as with the aestheticism of Dans Ie 
Iabyrinthe, one of the underlying motivations for the flawless erotic body, according to 
Robbe-Grillet, is the avoidance of tragic significance. He states quite categorically, 
albeit with malice aforethought, that in the sado-erotic text: 
A l'empire immense de la ride (l'empire des signes du declin, de la mort qui vient et 
s'installe en nous peu a peu, a notre insu, du poids sur nous de toutes les fatalites 
trop humaines), s'oppose ici Ie royaume du lisse, de l'inentame, vierge et 
imrnarcescible [ ... J Au monde de l'espoir desespere qui finit par se soumettre a sa 
condition tragique succede Ie ciel, ludique, de l' esprit-roi, qui sera celui de I' eros 
futur.79 
What Robbe-Grillet would perhaps not concede is that such a response to human frailty, 
through either an exclusion or a reduction to the erotically pleasurable, has much in 
common with the attitude of the humanist tragedian as defined in Robbe-Grillet's essay. 
In other words, the imposition of unity through the controlling word of the artist, and 
the reduction of pain to armchair melancoly, cushions malaise with the trappings of a 
comfortable acceptability ("It's only a game"; "no-one is being hurt"). From the evidence 
of his later novels in particular (with the exception of Djinn and Le miroir qui revient) 
Robbe-Grillet seems not to denounce tragedy so much as to leave its difficulties 
unaddressed, while continuing to evoke its agonies in the stylized portraits of pain 
suggested by sado-masochism. 
The preoccupation with the "lisse" and the "inentame", in the sado-erotic text indicates 
one of the differences between Robbe-Grillet and Dostoyevsky in their treatment of 
suffering generally. Dostoyevsky's awareness of the unattractive aspects of human 
misery (the unlovely egotism and need of his underground narrators), contrasts strongly 
with the daintily bloodied garments and pretty gestures of agony in Robbe-Grillet. Hope 
and beauty, in the first instance, must be wrested from patterns of brokenness, sickness, 
confusion and doubt. In Robbe-Grillet, on the other hand, the ideal of beauty is 
consistently pursued in terms of perfection, physical and formal, the flawless nature of 
the young girl's bodies reflecting the intricate perfection of the narrative's prose.80 
78 
79 
80 
Angelique, p164. 
pp163 and 166. 
It is significant in this regard that Nabokov, who seemingly admired Robbe-
Grillet as much as Robbe-Grillet admired him (see 'Robbe-Grillet: "Je n'ai jamais 
parle d'autre chose que de moi''', p7), and who shared Robbe-Grillet's taste for the 
beautiful and the nubile, was extremely scathing of what he saw as the lack of 
artistic integrity in Dostoyevsky's depiction of the "tragic misadventures of human 
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Robbe-Grillet's distaste for bodily signs of mortality may also be contrasted with that of 
fellow New Novelist, Duras, at the opening of her novel, L 'Amant, where she presents 
the reader with an unexpected celebration of aging beauty. Or with the way Bakhtin 
places mortality and bodily weakness in the context of a festival of life in which 
everything is renewed, or resurrected. These alternatives to tragedy at least bespeak a 
readiness to acknowledge something of the reality of suffering before incorporating it into 
a transforming vision du monde.81 Many of Robbe-Grillet's novels lack this inclusiveness 
and are consequently not as robustly humorous as they might otherwise be. For this 
reason, it could be contended that the bleakest "image de detresse" in Dans le labyrinthe 
is not the fissure, representative of the human consciousness, but the relative lack of 
flaws and discontinuities, with their suggestion that the only alternative to tragedy is 
escape into a blatantly artificial world from which reminders of one's ungainly humanity 
are excluded. If the escape-route proposed were humorous, diverting or uplifting, one 
could perhaps feel a sense of refreshment from having left behind the weight of one's 
mortality. But it is a curious fact that a number of Robbe-Grillet novels are preoccupied 
with what is essentially depressing raw material. If there is nothing obviously funny 
about the soldier's predicament in the labyrinth, several critics have pointed to a morbid 
trend running through Robbe-Grillet's ceuvre. "What [Robbe-Grillet's technique] 
implies", argues Dennis Porter, "is that something close to a psychosis is a permanent 
condition of all our lives".82 And in his 1975 study, Bruce Morrissette summarizes Robbe-
Grillet's main themes as concerning: "[les] complexes les plus intimes: crime, passion, 
erotisme, sadisme, jalousie, desorientation, suggestibilite morbide, angoisse ... " .83 The 
deinal of tragedy in theoretical terms makes this obsession with morbid sensuality in 
Robbe-Grillet all the more striking. 
VL Conclusion 
As the evidence of the novels suggests, Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's relation to the 
tragic tradition is a complex one. Despite different premisses the four novels studied in 
81 
82 
83 
dignity". (Lectures on Russian Literature, pl04) Nabokov's judgement further 
underlines Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's different attitudes to the 
interrelationships of art, ethics, and suffering, while indicating a potentially more 
appropriate line of comparison than that pursued in this thesis, namely, between 
Nabokov and Robbe-Grillet. 
Similarly, in the area of style, Samuel Beckett offers an alternative contemporary 
response to the dilemma of representing "mess" and "chaos". The writer's project, in 
his view, is to find a form that "accommodates the mess" rather than denying it or 
trying to say that "the chaos is really something else". See 'Beckett by the 
Madeleine', p23. 
'Sartre, Robbe-Grillet and the Psychotic Hero', p24. 
Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet, pp74-75. 
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the chapter depict what could be described as the imaginative dimension of doubt which 
escapes the spiritual or rational determinations of their implied authors. Through their 
tenuous self-awareness and capacity for imaginative representation and reflection, the 
novels' characters are also prey to insecurity, disorientation and fear, giving rise to 
strange dreams and visions in Dostoyevsky, to attacks of paranoIa in Robbe-Grillet. At 
the same time, however, it is this spiritual and imaginative capacity that distinguishes 
the characters from the "realite strictement materielle" which forms the decor for their 
misadventures, and which indicates the principle vein of optimism in the novels: 
Myshkin's vision of beauty illuminates the morbid passion of Rogozhin and Nastasya in 
The Idiot, and characters in Les gommes invent their own sub-plots in the absence of 
evidence concerning the 'crime'. 
The "flaw" in the case against tragedy has, in conclusion, several significant features. 
Firstly, there is the difficulty implicit in the assumption that feelings of distress in 
tragedy are also guarantees of redemption. The limitations of this view are 
demonstrated in Dostoyevsky's The Idiot which, with its overtly metaphysical 
framework, might be considered a promising source of evidence for Robbe-Grillet's essay, 
'Nature, humanisme, tragedie'. Although there is undoubtedly an atmosphere of 
oppressive fatalism in the novel, the characters' response to their dilemma is 
nevertheless more complex than the essay allows. Secondly, and most importantly, is the 
flaw of consciousness itself which ensures that, even without the kind of metaphysical 
context for suffering Dostoyevsky's novel provides, malaise persists. Indeed, without a 
meaningful framework in which they can be addressed, irrational feelings of disturbance 
are all the more difficult to dispel. Robbe-Grillet, for the opposite reason to 
Dostoyevsky, therefore, could be said to compound the tragic dilemma. 
The stronger emphasis on form in Robbe-Grillet makes him, ironically, more of a 
tragedian in the classical sense than Dostoyevsky, despite the New Novelist's 
theoretical rejection of tragic meaningfulness. For tragic vision for the Greeks was most 
often mitigated not by metaphysics, but by the beauty of the form in which it was 
encapsulated. As Krieger confirms: 
fearful and even demoniac in its revelations, the [tragic] VISIOn needed the 
ultimate soothing power of the aesthetic form which contained it [ ... ] the formal 
requirements which transcended, or rather absorbed this mentality and restored 
order to the universe threatened by it.84 
84 The Tragic Vision, p3. 
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Although Robbe-Grillet's heroes are often inarticulate, an overriding interest in the 
"formal requirements" of his art enables him to "absorb" their disorder within the order 
of his own superbly organized text. This then creates tensions between from and (implied) 
content, especially in the sado-erotic texts, where a preoccupation with instruments of 
torture and morbid passion contradicts the calm austerity of the prose. Robbe-Grillet's 
narratives, in this sense, consciously deny the reality of what they so insistently 
represent. 
Dostoyevsky's Christian ideals and Robbe-Grillet's allegiance to the "esprit-roi" of 
artifice represent different ways of responding to the irregularities, frailty and 
incompleteness I have associated with tragic experience in the chapter. However, both 
the spiritual utopia of Myshkin's dream and the purist nihilism of Robbe-Grillet's 
labyrinth are represented as imperfectly realized abstractions in texts that reflect the 
ongoing ambivalence of human experience. The fact that both novelists show a certain 
fascination for things that, on one level, they deny, points to their mutual implication in 
this ambivalence. It also gives their exploration of uncertainty a dimension that the 
scepticism of Pyrrho seems to have lacked. His repeated emphasis on common sense and 
moderation of feeling suggests either that he was better able to quell irrational 
disturbances, or, perhaps, that like Robbe-Grillet's Dupont, he suffered from a 
conspicuous "manque de fantaisie" in his perception of things. In view of the morbid 
element running through both novelists' CEuvre one could argue that he was better without 
this imaginative susceptibility.85 Nevertheless, Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet valued 
the irregularities of mind and imagination to the point of preferring their perturbations 
to the ease and tranquillity advocated by Pyrrho. The rejection of Pyrrhonian 
tranquillity is the subject of my next and final chapter. 
85 In his introduction to Sextus Empiricus. The Major Writings, Philip Haillie notes 
two traditions of thought concerning Pyrrho's attempts to free himself from 
unnecessary disturbances through the practice of detachment. 
The first, recorded by Diogenes Laertius, tells how: "he would not look where he 
was going, and that only his faithful common-sensical friends kept him alive in 
the face of his disregard for "carts, precipices, dogs or what not". 
The second, less extreme, and favoured by Haillie himself, represents Pyrrho as an 
eminently sensible man concerned for his fellow-passengers in a storm at sea: 
"at the height of the storm, when the fears of his fellow passengers were at their 
height, he pointed out for their instruction a little pig standing there on the deck 
calmly munching its food, and he told them that the unperturbedness of that pig 
was the mark of wisdom. According to this second tradition, Pyrrho did not strip 
himself, or try to do so, of his sensibilities; he was solicitous of the feelings of his 
fellow passengers enough to give them a little demonstration, and he advocated a 
life imitative of a pig calmly eating rather than imitative of an ascetic trying to 
act as if he had no body". (pp 11-13) Since Robbe-Grillet and Dostoyevsky insist 
that the capacity to fantasize is what distinguishes man from the animals as well 
as from the material universe, it is doubtful that they would be convinced of the 
merit of Pyrrho's advocation of "a life imitative of a pig calmly eating". 
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5 Writing against death: the novel as sceptical 
process 
Writing so as not to die, [. .. ] or perhaps even speaking so as not to die is a task 
undoubtedly as old as the word. The most fateful decisions are inevitably suspended 
during the course of a story. 
(Michel Foucault) 
I. i. Sceptical doubt and the pursuit of tranquillity 
In Book One of the Major Writings, Sextus Empiricus records that scepticism "has its 
inception and cause [ ... J in the hope of attaining mental tranquillity") Desiring to avoid 
the heated controversies of the dogmatists, therefore, the sceptic plays off the different 
arguments against each other, undermining the dogmatists' positions and simultaneously 
achieving tranquillity for himself as a result of suspending judgement. The scepticism of 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet seems in many ways to grow from the opposite 
motivation. What is feared is not the advent of new evidence calling for a more rigorous 
scrutiny of conflicting data, but the lack of new material, the absence of conflict, and the 
prospect of an untroubled haven away from the adventure of discovery. Tranquillity is 
shunned not sought after. If this is the case the uncertainty in their novels may be 
largely a willed uncertainty, what Bernal has called "un oubli feint, un refus de savoir et 
de reconnaitre",2 and which reflects a preference for problems and their outworking 
rather than for discovery and the 'moment of truth'. 
This chapter explores more fully the dual capacity of consciousness to undermine and 
reconstrue its own possibilities. Only where Chapter 4 concentrated on the characters' 
struggles with the destabilizing effects of their own imaginations the present chapter 
looks at responses to a quite different threat, namely, the encounter with meaning-
systems that, in providing a refuge from the problems of unintelligibility, also appear to 
impose restrictions on the impulse to explore and create. Just as the two writers' response 
to tragedy, then, indicates a departure from the practice of moderation Sextus 
2 
Sextus Empiricus. The Major Writings, p35. cf also the definition of scepticism, 
quoted in my introductory chapter, on pp32-33 of the same work: "Scepticism is an 
ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, appearances and 
judgements, and thus - because of the equality of force in the objects and arguments 
opposed - to come first of all to a suspension of judgement and then to mental 
tranquilli ty" . 
Alain Robbe-Grillet: Ie roman de ['absence, p158. 
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recommends, so their interpretation of uncertainty over "matters of opinion" reflects a 
determination to inflame rather than avoid controversy, craving the stimulus it affords 
and resisting the restrictions implicit in its resolution. Discussing the vitality of 
Dostoyevsky's work, Malcolm Jones speaks of "Dostoyevsky's belief that man and society 
are most alive when they are in the process of questing, in a state of disharmony, in 
chaos, when they are seeking an answer. When all is clear then the world stops and art 
no longer has a role to play". 3 This is an opinion readily espoused by Robbe-Grillet as is 
evident from his reference in Pour un nouveau roman to art's dependence on a constant 
"remise en question" if it is to survive: 
L' Art est vie. Rien n'y est gagne de fa~on definitive. n ne peut exister sans cette 
remise en question permanente. 4 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet thus equally react against inertia in their novels, be it 
emotional or intellectual, avoiding commitment to any final statement that might 
impose restrictions on their thinking. 
It might be objected that the Greek scepticism which is the constant reference point for 
the two writers' uncertainty was also concerned to promote argumentation, and hence 
also to avoid the cessation of activity Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet deplore. Philip 
Haillie implies this when he makes a distinction in his introduction to Sextus Empiricus 
between "tranquility" and "paralysis", a "peaceful life" and "an imitation of death".5 
A.A. Long, likewise, points to Pyrrho's encouragement of debate despite his aim to "[free] 
people from the disturbance caused by certain beliefs, especially beliefs which conflict 
with each other".6 Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction to be made between 
debate that is pursued to avoid conflict, and debate that is deliberately maintained to 
exacerbate it. Dostoyevsky's underground man explains the rationale behind an 
artificially cultivated uncertainty in uncompromising, even exaggerated terms, when he 
suggests that: "[ ... ] if the formula for all our desires and whims is some day discovered 
[ ... ] then it is possible that man will at once cease to want anything, indeed I suppose it is 
possible that he will cease to exist". 7 According to Dostoyevsky's narrator the elan vital 
of all humanity is threatened by the finality of definitions and formulae, and a 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Malcolm Jones paraphrasing V. Ya. Kirpotin in Dostoyevsky. The Novel of 
Discord, p18. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p136. 
p7. Haillie suggests all three "practical-wisdom" philosophies (i.e. scepticism, 
stoicism, epicureanism) "wanted tranquillity, not paralysis; a peaceful life, not an 
imitation of death". 
Hellenistic Philosophy, p78. 
Notes from Underground, p34. 
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subconscious recognition of this is, he maintains, at the root of people's impulse to take 
apart the "stone wall" of facts and the very projects they are working on. Advancing a 
similar theory is French philosopher and critic Michel Foucault, who refers the problem 
specifically to the writer when he proposes the energy of language, with its dual 
capacity for creation and destruction, as a means of defence against intellectual and 
psychic stasis, or, what he calls the "black wall of death". Language 'defeats' death, 
he claims, by lengthening the temporal distance between a man and his fate, or between 
a project and its completion, by talking about them, and so delaying the moment of 
realization through the backwards and forwards movement of a verbal exchange: 
The gods send disasters to mortals so that they can tell of them, but men speak of 
them so that misfortunes will never be fully realized, so that their fulfillment 
will be averted in the distance of words [ ... ].8 
It may be deduced from these responses that there is a lot at stake in the defence of the 
sceptical position. For Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet doubt seems paradoxically allied 
to faith in the value of their creative freedom, and to an almost Nietzschean will to 
power over the finality of naming and defining which prefigures the finality of death. 
This creative will requires further definition, however, before its appropriateness as a 
generative force in their novels may be assessed. 
I. ii. The creative will in Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet: "creaturely freedom" and "rna 
volonfe d'intervention" 
Philosophers, writes Nietzsche, "are in the habit of speaking of 'will' as though it were 
the best-known thing in the world. [ ... ] Willing seems to me to be, above all, something 
complicated, something that is a unity in word only".9 Defining the concept of the will 
has certainly been complicated in our own era by radically changing views of what it 
means to be human, as reflected, for example, in the reluctance to employ metaphors of 
depth or interiority because of their association with metaphysical humanism (an 
attitude frequently reflected in Robbe-Grillet's essays), and in the awareness of the role 
played by language in constituting subjectivity,lO The idea of voluntarily expressing 
8 
9 
10 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p54. Harold Bloom expresses a similar idea 
in Agon. Towards a Theory of Revisionism, p124: "Drive, for poets, is the urge for 
immortality, and can be called the largest of all poetic tropes, since it makes even 
of death, literal death, our death, a figuration rather than a reality". 
Beyond Good and Evil, p19. 
For Kristeva, for example, language belongs to the symbolic order through which 
we must pass to acquire as well as articulate our subjectivity. For Derrida, 
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one's 'self', as though the self were entirely independent of its medium of expression, is 
qualified, if not discredited, by this change of emphasis. Nevertheless, a suspicion of 
humanism and consciousness of language has not eliminated the notion of creative 
intentionality, which is, moreover, strongly championed by the novelists in question, 
however complicated it may prove to be in their works. 
What is interesting in Nietzsche's definition of the will is his suggestion that "in every 
willing there is first of all a multiplicity of feelings: the feeling of a condition to get 
away from, the feeling of a condition to get to", and his conclusion that the will is "above 
all [ ... J a passion - the passion of commanding".11 The "feeling of a condition to get away 
from" and "to get to" which Nietzsche refers to may be related to the contrary effects in 
writing of the impulse to evade - in the text's avoidance of formulae, for example, its 
refraction of simple, mono logic perspectives and diversifying of the signifier - and of 
the impulse to master - in the text's recreation of a unity and coherence in its own 
terms.12 There is arguably a double movement of dispersal and reconstruction in all 
writing, as elements are reformulated according to the stylistic and thematic priorities 
established by the writer. For Nietzsche, certainly, this double action is directly 
associated with the "will to power" implicit in the creative drive. The "will to power" 
in this context concerns not so much the idea of a self attempting to appropriate other 
selves as the self's drive to create its own values and impose them on a world which is 
otherwise perceived as indeterminate: "To stamp the character of Being on the process of 
becoming - that is the highest will to power [. .. ] It is the impulse behind the 
acquisition, ordering and creation of knowledge, and behind creativity itself")3 
A rather different interpretation of Nietzsche's movement "towards", and "away from", 
is offered by the Russian Orthodoxy which forms part of the ideological backdrop to 
Dostoyevsky's texts. The Orthodox notion of freedom, as theologian Georges Florovsky 
explains, is "disclosed first of all in the equal possibility of two ways: to God and away 
11 
12 
13 
however, language is a play of signifiers which disperses the notion of 
subjectivity, while for Foucault, written language can be a labyrinth in which we 
lose ourselves and our identity "d'etat civil": "Ne me demandez pas qui je suis et ne 
me dites pas de rester Ie meme: c'est une morale d'etat-civil; elle regit nos papiers. 
Qu'elle nous laisse libres quand il s'agit d'ecrire". (L'archeologie du savoir, p28) 
Beyond Good and Evil, p20. 
Harold Bloom would call this activity "misprision", (Agon) while Roland Barthes 
engages in it in his writings by breaking up ethical and ideological unities and, 
increasingly, proposing a new ground for the text's meaning in his preoccupation 
with words as fetishes in a private code (Le plaisir du texte, Fragments d' un 
discours amoureux). 
Cited in A Study of Nietzsche, pl18. 
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from God", or, towards the other and towards the self.14 Florovsky describes this 
freedom not as a once and for all choice so much as an ongoing capacity for choice and 
creativity that acts as a "supra-natural challenging goal" to which humanity responds: 
This challenging goal is an aim, an aim that can be realized only through the self-
determination and efforts of the creature. Therefore the process of created 
becoming is real in its freedom, and free in its reality, and it is by this becoming 
that what-was-not reaches fulfilment [ ... J In it is room for creation, construction, 
for re-construction ~ not only in the sense of recovery, but also in the sense of 
generating what is new. 15 
Some of the costs of the creaturely incompleteness of which Florovsky writes were 
examined in Chapter 4 in terms of tragic experience. In the present chapter the 
phenomenon of incompleteness is discussed principally in terms of the capacity for self-
determination, concentrating, therefore, on the voluntary initiatives of the characters 
rather than on the involuntary mechanisms that disrupt those initiatives. In 
Dostoyevsky's novels the capacity for self-determination is not without ambivalence, 
however, being as important to Nietzschean power-games as it is to the drama of faith. 
As far as Robbe-Grillet is concerned, Nietzsche's analysis of the creative impulse is 
singularly appropriate. In every phase of Robbe-Grillet's dialogue with different 
theories of meaning one of the points to remain constant is his confidence in the human 
ability to impose form and order on the world - "nous reportons sur l'homme tout notre 
espoir: ce sont les formes qu'il cree qui peuvent apporter des significations au monde"16-
even though this form and order is seen as arbitrary rather than absolute in relation to 
the world's otherness. What most concerns Robbe-Grillet is the individual freedom to 
create in which the other plays a significant but secondary role. A passing interest in the 
structuralist-inspired notion of language as the prime generator of the text, and the 
writer as product, therefore, of his own writing, has effected no noticeable change to 
Robbe-Grillet's belief in the artist's powers of manipulation and control. In more recent 
years Robbe-Grillet has explicity repudiated the idea of the writer as anonymous 
scriptor.17 
I have suggested in previous chapters that there are similarities between Robbe-
Grillet's understanding of consciousness and the principles of both phenomenology 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Creation and Redemption, p48. 
p73. 
Pour un nouveau roman, p120. This remark appears in an essay published in 1961. 
See his 1985 interview with Jean-Jacques Brochier and his 1984 work, Le miroir qui 
revient, ppIO-II. 
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(Chapter 3) and of existentialism (Chapter 4). The present chapter, however, assumes a 
closer affinity between Robbe-Grillet and existentialism, despite Robbe-Grillet's obvious 
predilection for phenomenological terminology.18 This is because of the increasingly 
confident emphasis in Robbe-Grillet on the hero-narrator, and, more especially, his 
implied author, as "centralizing masters" of meaning; something which, strictly 
speaking, phenomenology disallows but which existentialism accepts as axiomatic.1 9 
More important to Robbe-Grillet than the interaction between subject and object, mind 
and world, is the writer's indisputable power to organize and control his material, and 
this comes through in a 1972 comment, where he describes writing as an expression of his 
"volonte d'intervention",20 and in a later public address, where he defines the writer's 
role as that of a "creator of forms, an organizer of forms".21 
In order to analyze the phenomenon of volition in association with creativity, and to see 
how this, in tum, relates to the cultivation of doubt, I have selected four novels: 
Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov; and Robbe-Grillet's 
La jalousie and La maison de rendez-vous. In Dostoyevsky I wish in particular to 
concentrate on the problem of belief as presented in an earlier and in the last of his 
novels; and in Robbe-Grillet, on the way the organizing centre of earlier narratives is 
displaced, to be identified increasingly with the authorial voice in later works. In both 
novelists there is something of Nietzsche's "feeling of a condition to get away from" and 
"the feeling of a condition to get to", as each writer attempts to transcend the particular 
limits within which they think and create. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Note, also, Kaufmann's comparison between Nietzsche and Sartre in 
Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre,where Kaufmann suggests that both 
Sartre and Nietzsche evaluated man in terms of "passion and its mastery, 
independence of convention, and that creative freedom which finds ultimate 
expression in being a law unto oneself." (p42) 
The term "centralizing master" of meaning is RiCCEUr'S. See Dialogues with 
Contemporary Continental Thinkers, p27. Note, however, that RicCEur attributes 
this tendency to Husser! himself, a principle contributor to the phenomenological 
heritage. See my comments on the solipsistic implications of Husserl in Chapter 3. 
Colloque de cerisy II, 1972, p159. 
'Order and Disorder', p3. Translated and published in 1977, from an oral 
communication given in 1976. 
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Crime and Punishment 
II. i. The "will to power" 
Crime and Punishment could be read as an anticipation of Nietzsche's commentary on the 
will to power.22 The murder of the old pawnbroker is an attempt by the hero to prove to 
himself that "everything is in a man's own hands", (p20) and that anything that stands 
in the way of self-expansion must be appropriated or set aside. In fact, Alyona poses no 
real threat to Raskolnikov and he gains nothing from her death. Although in a state of 
abject poverty he does not use the money or articles stolen from her flat after the murder, 
hiding them first in his room and later under a stone in the street. Like the murder itself 
these have a symbolic function in relation to Raskolnikov's self-will, representing a 
testing of his theories about an elite class of people to which he aspires to belong. 
Six months earlier on leaving the university, Raskolnikov has written an article in 
which he expresses the idea that people are roughly divided into two categories: the 
ordinary and the extraordinary. As Porfiry, the examining magistrate summarizes: 
The ordinary must lead a life of strict obedience and have no right to transgress 
the law because, you see, they are ordinary. Whereas the extraordinary people 
have a right to commit any crime they like and transgress the law in any way just 
because they happen to be extraordinary. (p276) 
Because of their exceptional originality the extraordinary class of people, Raskolnikov 
goes on to explain, need to be able to pursue their ideas without the confining pressure of 
the laws that govern other people's actions. There can be "no question here of any 
permission or prohibition", says Raskolnikov, or of the scruples that hold a man back 
from the pursuit of his goal and dictate the style of its achievement. The impulse for 
mastery carries the extraordinary man beyond such limitations, to the point where he is 
ready to commit crime if it serves his purpose. What is important, Raskolnikov insists to 
Sonia later in the narrative, is "Freedom and power - power above all. Power over all 
the tumbling vermin and over all the ant-hill. That's our goal. Remember that ... " 
(p345) 
Raskolnikov's division of society into two classes of people, the law-abiding and the 
self-assertive, is comparable to Nietzsche's categories of the weak and strong-willed 
and his identification, with Raskolnikov, of the strong with an elite class of being. In 
22 Crime and Punishment was published in 1865-1866. The Will to Power is based on 
selections from Nietzsche's notebooks from 1883-1888. 
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"real life", says Nietzsche, there is only "strong will and weak will", and the latter is 
identified with feelings of "constraint, necessity, having-to-obey, pressure, and lack of 
freedom" ,23 while the former is associated with the readiness to create one's own 
constraints and necessities, acting always for one's own advancement and the 
"enhancement of a similarly elect portion of mankind".24 As a student Raskolnikov has 
already set himself apart from his fellows, despising their company and interests and 
giving the impression of someone who is "keeping something to himself". (p69) The 
murder of Alyona is his first attempt to actively identify with the "extraordinary" class 
of person. 
II. ii. Self-regulated doubt 
Doubt plays a significant role in Raskolnikov's bid to identify himself with the 
Nietzschean superman by committing a crime. Described as "a sceptic [ ... J fond of abstract 
reasoning", (p338) Raskolnikov employs casuistry to remove moral obstacles to his plan 
to kill the old woman. The plan takes shape in his mind gradually, having been helped 
at its inception by a conversation Raskolnikov overhears between a student and an army 
officer about Alyona and her sister Lizaveta. After agreeing the old woman is a 
malicious old harridan "of no use to anybody and who actually does harm to everybody", 
the pair amuse themselves with moral quibbles and discuss the advantages to mankind 
of killing the old pawnbroker, questioning at the same time the meaning of the moral 
code that would contradict their proposal: "People talk of duty or conscience. Well, I 
have nothing against duty or conscience, but are you quite sure we know what those words 
mean?" (p8S) Hearing this echo of his own nascent idea, Raskolnikov is encouraged in 
the speculative activity that enables him, too, to reduce another human being to "a 
simple sum in arithmetic" as he tries out different perspectives on the question of human 
value: "What if man isn't really a beast", he asks after witnessing Sonia's exploitation 
by her family, "for if he is not, then all the rest is just prejudice, just imagined fears, and 
there is nothing to stop you from doing anything you like, and that's as it should 
be!"(p44) Raskolnikov uses the same subversive generalizations to goad himself to 
murder when, anticipating a possible weakening of resolve, he relegates his fears to the 
realm of disease and conveniently dissociates his act from ethical considerations: "there 
was [ ... J no danger of his reason or will-power being in any way affected during the 
carrying out of his plan, simply because what he intended to do was 'not a crime'''. (p90) 
23 
24 
Beyond Good and Evil, p24. 
Cited in A Study of Nietzsche, p123. 
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This is the beginning of the movement of evasion and dispersal that presages the 
Nietzschean "passion of commanding" in the will to power. For Raskolnilov is 
manipulating doubt in the interests of self-assertion, undermining conventional codes and 
definitions the better to impose his own significations. Through the intellectual 
quibbling of his hero, Dostoyevsky illustrates the way doubt can become a "self-
regulated indetermination",25 enhancing the individual's capacity to define the world 
according to his/her own predispositions, rather than expressing intellectual curiosity. 
Curiosity can only be uneasily yoked with the will to power since it may always lead to 
the apprehension of things which oppose one's own theories and projects. If Raskolnikov 
were open to the challenge of sceptical inquiry it is possible that, like the underground 
man in Notes, he would do nothing at all, being continually distracted by objections to his 
plan: 
to be sure of everything seemed to him absolutely impossible [ ... ] He could never, 
for instance, imagine that the time would come when he would stop thinking, get 
up and - just go there. (p89) 
Recognizing, however, that the capacity for speculation could weaken his will and 
prevent action, Raskolnikov deliberately subdues the doubts which undermine his 
challenge to conventional morality. In the first part of the novel, then, Dostoyevsky's 
hero entertains doubts which serve his purpose, while suppressing doubts which 
undermine his confidence by reminding him of meanings and values not of his own 
invention. 
II. iii. An aesthetic rather than an existential superman 
But how truly Nietzsche spoke when he wrote that willing is a "complicated" thing, as 
Raskolnikov discovers that the strength of his resolve, the will to will, is sapped by the 
confusion of its own allegiances. Does Raskolnikov really want power, or only the 
illusion of power? "I only wanted to dare" he remarks later to Sonia by way of 
explanation, (p431) indicating a certain hesitation, not so much over the ethics of his act, 
but over the "passion of commanding" which ostensibly motivates it. Richard Peace 
suggests that Raskolnikov has misread his own 'text' in so far as the "mere fact that he 
had to prove himself" by committing the murder in the first place, "shows that he 
secretly had doubts about his being a Napoleonic man, and this alone shows that he was 
not entitled to commit the crime")6 In other words, Raskolnikov is a man of "ordinary" 
25 
26 
Coleridge's assessment of Cartesian doubt, cited in Saving the Text, pI. 
Dostoyevsky. An Examination of the Major Novels, p48. 
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rather than "extraordinary" abilities who has simply (and disastrously) overreached 
himself. 
It could also be argued that Raskolnikov has mistaken the nature of the real "passion of 
commanding" which animates him. In the early stages of the narrative it is made clear 
to the reader that Raskolnikov is uncomfortable with the idea of consequences, and so, 
with the incalculable errors and calamities that attach to human decision (the fact, for 
example, that Lisaveta turns up unexpectedly at the flat so that Raskolnikov is 'forced' 
to kill her as well as her sister). At times he does not wish to be associated with his act 
of rebellion, being anxious to transfer responsibility for it onto something, or someone, 
else, such as fate or the devil, suggesting that he wants power in temporary and 
reversible forms but not if it is to be attached to lasting effects for which he may be 
answerable. The earlier, accidental meeting with Lisaveta, through which he learns 
when her sister will be alone in her appartment, is greeted like a blow of doom: "he 
suddenly felt with all his being that he no longer possessed any freedom of reasoning or 
will"; (pSI) and when searching for reasons to give to Sonia for the murder he comes up 
with the idea that the "devil did it" ("the devil dragged me there [ ... J It was the devil 
who killed the old hag, not I"). (p433) Raskolnikov wants the abstract powers of the 
underground man and the freedom to defer meaning interminably, rather than the 
existential powers of the man who uses his freedom to define himself through action. 
This makes Raskolnikov not an existential but an aesthetic superman whose "passion of 
commanding" is associated with the desire to unmake and subvert rather than with the 
desire to define and to then commit himself to his affirmations. In a discussion of 
Nietzsche and Hegel, Geoffrey Hartman makes an intriguing distinction along these 
lines between the will to power associated with the desire to monopolize 'truth', and the 
will to power associated with the "artistic illusion". In the latter case, "The wit of art" 
may be seen as "a will to power over the will to power"P In other words, art's play with 
fantasy-worlds and definitions allow it to undermine the authority of recognized 
allegiances, while, watchful of the tyranny implicit in this process, it offers only the 
arbitrary, changeable coherence of its own forms. The process arguably bears some 
ressemblance to the "wit" of the Pyrrhonist who, in his balancing of contrary arguments, 
sidesteps commitment to truth-statements. But whereas the Pyrrhonist's "wit" is 
deployed in the interests of withdrawing from the fray, the dreamer-anarchist 
perversely seeks the effects of a conflict whose terms of reference he denies, entertaining 
subversive ideas, while declining to involve himself in subversive action. Raskolnikov, 
27 Saving the Text, p47. 
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who calls himself an "aesthetic louse", seem to conform more readily to this latter 
pattern than to the pattern of behaviour appropriate to a character who wants 'real' 
power "over all the tumbling vermin and over all the ant-hill". His enjoyment is the 
intellectual and aesthetic one derived from playing with ideas, not executing them, and 
so, when the "time for thinking" is exchanged for the "time for reality", like the 
underground man, he "funks" it ("You funked it, you were scared of reality, you 
panicked!").28 
Raskolnikov's existential squeamishness and impulse to be master of a fantasy-world 
would seem to render his dreams of power innocuous and even 'innocent'. Raskolnikov is 
an artist who temporarily 'forgot' himself, or, who, in failing to make the necessary 
distinction between reality and fantasy betrays a familiar form of psychosis. For art is a 
play-ground, an arena for hypotheses and experiment that is kept separate from the 
world of social consequences and responsibilities.29 It may consequently be seen as a 
refuge from the extremism of murder, and the religious mysticism that seems to be the 
existential alternative to crime in the novel. But Dostoyevsky refuses to divorce his 
characters' aesthetic needs from their ethical responsibilites. Furthermore, ideas and 
fantasies do lead to action in Raskolnikov's case, suggesting that, while there is an 
enormous gap between theory and practice, dream and reality, and while the inability to 
make any distinction between the two is indicative of psychosis, yet to keep them 
permanently separate requires a form of contorsionism emasculating to one's humanity. 
So Dostoyevsky's underground man reasons when he reaches the end of his monologue: 
"we don't even know whose side to be on or where to give our allegiance [ ... ] We even find 
it difficult to be human beings, men with real flesh and blood of our own [ ... ] Soon we 
shall invent a method of being born from an idea".30 
28 
29 
30 
Notes from Underground, p70. Note the distress of the underground man as he 
realizes that he, like Raskolnikov, does not 'really' want the powers he enjoys in 
his fantasy-world: "They would desert Zvertov; he would sit in a corner, silent and 
shamefaced, and I would annihilate him. Then, perhaps, I would be reconciled 
with him and drink to our intimate friendship, but the worst and most shameful 
thing was that even then I knew, knew very well, knew for certain, that in reality 
none of this was what I wanted, in reality I had absolutely no wish to either 
subjugate or captivate them, and that I wouldn't give a farthing for such a result 
even if I did attain it". (p70) 
The definition of art as a "terrain de jeu" is Robbe-Grillet's although the 
respective roles of 'dulce' and 'utile' in art differ according to the preferences of the 
writer / critic. Note, for example, Volosinov's statement that aesthetic . 
communication must participate "in the unitary flow of sociallife". (Freudianism: 
a Marxist Critique, p98) 
p123. 
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n. iv. The fear of finality 
If ethical concerns qualify the will to power endemic to both artist and superman, 
Dostoyevsky nonetheless remains hesitant about delivering his hero, with his sophistry 
and his "wit", into the arms of a settled, religious assurance. It is a simplification to say, 
as Nabokov does in a moment of irritation, that "for the untying of every psychological 
and psychopathic knot [Dostoevski] inevitably leads us to Christ".31 It is certainly true 
that the path of conversion seems coextensive with the plot of crime and punishment in 
the narrative. Especially since both the murder and the process of regeneration that 
follows are caught up in the same voluntary movement towards, and away from, the self 
which Florovsky tells us is indicative of man's spiritual destiny. The moment of 
confession, when Raskolnikov decides to tell Sonia about the murder, is seen in terms of 
the same concerted effort of will as that required by the crime itself: "To his mind that 
moment was uncannily like the moment when he stood behind the old woman and, 
disengaging the hatchet from the sling, felt that there was not a moment to lose". (p422) 
Appropriately, the movement from confession to repentance, and from repentance to a 
confession of faith, is then attended by a comparable degree of anguish and uncertainty to 
that experienced during the period leading up to the crime. 
Yet while we witness the crime, we donnot witness the untying of the "psychopathic 
knot". If Raskolnikov turns increasingly to Sonia and so, to involvement with others, he 
does not lose his predilection for an infinite deferral of meaning, with the result that his 
'repentance' takes the form of a continual changing of mind, rather than the decisive 
change of mind and heart that is associated with conversion. For where the confession to 
Sonia enables him to retain some control over the telling and interpretation of his own 
narrative, repentance requires that, ultimately, Raskolnikov also accept the 
interpretation another gives it; namely, in the admission of wrong, submission to the 
other of the law is also implicit. The contemplation of the ultimate abandonment to 
Christ's love, however, for which the other of the law which says "thou shalt not kill" 
is only a shadow in Dostoyevsky, brings with it the fear of a limit placed on 
Raskolnikov's will and of an unbearable finality being imposed on his personal 
narrative. 
The novel thus seems to create an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, there is the 
movement away from God and the other which is associated with murderous egotism and 
the will to power. On the other hand, there is the movement towards God which is 
31 Lectures on Russian Literature, p127. 
206 
associated, in Raskolnikov's mind at least, with oppressive restrictions on his freedom. 
Given Raskolnikov's insistence, almost to the last pages of the narrative, that his crime 
was only a crime because it was not successful, (p552) it would seem as though the 
prospect of putting an end to his struggle against the law and against conscience is more 
intolerable to him than the prospect of isolation from others which, according to his 
author, is also unbearable (Magarshack cites Dostoyevsky's comments to this effect in 
his introduction to the Penguin edition: "The feeling of separation and dissociation from 
humanity which he experiences at once after he has committed the crime, is something 
he cannot bear" .)32 On discovering that Porfiry has no conclusive proof for his suspicions, 
Raskolnikov, who, at one moment hankers after punishment, at the next, is stimulated by 
the reflection that he has yet another chance to exercise his ingenuity and reassume 
control: 
'There's nothing definite now, nothing definite', Raskolnikov kept repeating [ ... J 
feeling more cheerful than ever. 
'Now we can carry on with the fight!' [ ... J he remembered his 'lack of spirit' with 
a feeling of shame and contempt'.(p373) 
Raskolnikov's delight at being released from anything "definite", which Foucault tells 
us is symbolic of the "black wall of death", is suggestive of a fundamental preference for 
the "everlasting process of discovery" to the "supra-natural challenging goal" of faith. 
n. v. Talking around and to the truth 
How far can Dostoyevsky be identified with his hero in this preference? Malcolm Jones 
suggests there is a close correlation between the doubting heroes in the novels and their 
implied author. After referring to Fernandez's contention that Dostoyevsky's novels are 
so many attempts on the author's part to prove to himself that Orthodoxy was right, 
Jones goes on to argue: "This may be correct, but of no less importance is the fact that this 
proof was never secured: it is the search, the probing, the process of discovering, the 
'dialectic', which characterise Dostoyevksy's novels, and which ensure their continued 
appeal to those who do not share his private values". And, finally, "Dostoyevsky seems 
to share Ippolit's view that: 'It is life that is important, life alone, the continuous and 
everlasting process of discovery, not the discovery itself'" .33 Jones thus defends the 
opposite case to Nabokov's, the implication being that the final step of faith that is 
feared by the hero of Crime and Punishment represents the last word that the author, as 
well as the hero, must never speak. This reluctance is not due to any incapacity, but to 
32 
33 
Introduction to Crime and Punishment, p13. 
Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, ppl0 and 127. 
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the apprehension that, as Raskolnikov rather grumpily puts it, "if you drag in God's 
intentions then there is nothing more to be said about it". (p422) The intensity with 
which Dostoyevsky portrays his doubting heroes, from Raskolnikov right through to 
Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov, supports this thesis, suggesting an uncommon degree of 
understanding for, and also considerable enjoyment of, the "furnace of doubt" through 
which they pass. 
Nonetheless, I believe it would be a mistake to then conclude that, because of the obvious 
importance Dostoyevsky attaches to the "process of discovery", the "discovery itself" is 
without importance. The abruptness of the ending to the novel suggests a real discomfort 
with the final laying down of arms associated with conversion, as the author 
approaches the 'moment of truth' ("That day it seemed to him that the convicts who 
had been his enemies looked at him differently; he had even begun to talk to them 
himself, and they replied to him in a very friendly way. He remembered that now, but 
then it was all as it should be: for was not everything going to be different now?") (p558) 
and then draws back onto a more nebulous terrain of hints and promises ("But that is the 
beginning of a new story, the story of the gradual rebirth of a man, the story of his 
gradual regeneration, of his gradual passing from one world into another [ ... J"). (p559) At 
the same time, the determination to keep such an end in view, on the part of 
Raskolinikov as well as his author, gives the strategies of avoidance in the novel an 
inescapable sense of purpose, creating the impression of a circling round a common centre 
rather than a pursuit of endlessly receding horizons of meaning. Razumikhin puts into 
words the quality of purposeful chaos which characterizes the narrative when he 
suggests that: 
People who tell lies can always be forgiven. There's nothing wrong about a lie, for 
it leads to the truth. No, what makes me so wild is not that they talk a lot of 
nonsense, but that they are full of admiration for their own nonsense. 
I like people to talk rot. It's man's only privilege over the rest of creation. By 
talking rot, you eventually get to the truth. I'm a man because I talk rot. [ ... J Talk 
rot by all means, but do it in your own way, and I'll be ready to kiss you for it. For 
to talk nonsense in your own way is a damn sight better than talking sense in 
someone else's; in the first case, you're a man; in the second, you're nothing but a 
magpie! Truth won't run away, but life can easily be boarded up. (pp153 and 219) 
Here, then, is the anxiety that life should not be "boarded up", and that creative 
eccentricities should not be bullied into shape by formulae or suppressed in favour of the 
"magpie" repetition of socially acceptable (or religious) platitudes. But, at the same 
time, the irrepressible delight in "talking rot" is connected to "getting to the truth". Not 
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a clearly defined truth, in this instance, for Razumikhin is extremely vague on the 
subject, but a truth that is related to an attitude of mind that is impatient, not merely of 
limits in general, but of its own limits in particular. The preferred movement of 
consciousness is thus outwards, and away from underground sophistry and the 
imperatives of the will to power. 
Razumikhin's point is confirmed in the Epilogue to the novel, where, in Raskolnikov's 
dream, society is reduced to anarchy by "spirits endowed with reason and will" which 
possess people and send them mad with the illusory belief that "the truth resided only 
in [them]", Unable to agree on anything they kill each other "in a kind of senseless 
fury". (p555) In the midst of this burgeoning and terrrible polyphony the ordinary 
business of living is neglected: 
The most ordinary trades were abandoned because everyone was propounding his 
own theories, offering his own solutions, and they could not agree; they gave up 
tilling the ground [ ... ]. (p555) 
Creativity and doubt which have become an end in themselves are thus judged in the 
Epilogue in the light of the imperatives of community and of the relationship with the 
other which are the basis of the faith towards which Dostoyevsky is leading his 
reluctant hero. The process that has lost all connection with a goal is represented as 
being destructive to individual potential as is the passive acceptance of definition 
associated with the 'death' of the creative drive. 
Dostoyevsky forces readers of Crime and Punishment into a corner. The consequences of 
active decision lead relentlessly to the imperatives of faith or to the tyrannies of a 
solitary fantasy world. Yet the middle ground between these two extremes is equally 
unsatisfactory, being represented in the novel not by the tranquil wise man but by the 
destructive cynic Svidrigaylov. Svidrigaylov's scepticism has led to a form of moral and 
psychic inertia that is the ultimate condemnation for Dostoyevsky, if lethargy is indeed 
the "cardinal sin" in his world34 (note Svidrigaylov's apathetic voyeurism, p479, and 
the comparison of his face to a mask, pSI5). It has deprived him of his enjoyment of life: 
"I find it frightfully boring sometimes", and although he confesses to Raskolnikov, "I did 
hope you'd tell me something new", (p481) it is clear he does not want to hear anything 
"new", for fear this would disturb his lethargic detachment (The "horrible thing" about 
34 As both Jackson and Jones attest, see The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and 
Nocturnes, p342 (the "cardinal sin in Dostoevsky's world is inertia"), and 
Dostoyevsky. The Novel of Discord, p47 ("lukewarmness [ ... ] is an even worse 
spiritual malady than the most intense experience of cosmic darkness"). 
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the beauty a man encounters on his travels, says Svidirgaylov, "is that it really makes 
you yearn for something"}. (p30l) There is no alternative, it would seem, but to "carry on 
with the fight", as Raskolnikov puts it, even though the fight will look suspiciously 
like a wild beating of the air if we do not accept the terms of Dostoyevsky's tentatively 
offered resolution. 
The Brothers Karamazov 
III. i. Prevarication for effect 
The prevarication of Raskolnikov in his jousting with Porfiry, his fear of anything 
"definite" and determination not to be confined by anyone else's narrative, is extended 
and modified in The Brothers Karamazov. The sense of momentum and of impatience 
with formulae that runs through Dostoyevsky's ceuvre is sustained in this last novel, and 
yet, at the same time, it is articulated more clearly than previously in relation to the 
"supra-natural challenging goal" of faith. 
This is not to say that the characters are deprived of their inconsistencies or of their love 
of equivocation. Nor have they been made to relinquish their power of self-definition. 
Mitya, for example, shows his determination to avoid being finalized by his actions, or 
by other people's interpretation of his actions, when he keeps back half the three 
thousand roubles he stole from Katya, deferring expenditure of the sum until the last 
moment by which time he has 'decided' to take his own life. As he later explains to the 
court: 
I kept saying to myself [ ... ]: 'No, Dmitry, you may not be a thief as yet. Why not? 
Because next day you may go and give back the fifteen hundred to Katya.' And it 
was only yesterday [ ... ] that I made up my mind to tear my amulet off my neck [ ... ] 
as soon as I tore it off, at that very moment, I became definitely and finally a thief 
[ ... ]. (p580) 
The insistence here on the individual's freedom to change and to choose (Mitya 'becomes' 
a thief at the moment determined by himself) is unmistakable. 
Similarly, Mitya's implied author has not abandoned his comparable delight in the 
excitement of possibilities, nor his preference for this excitement over the bland 
certitudes that admit of no discussion, no hypothesis, no creative reformulation. 
Dostoyevsky's love of argumentation, and of artistic flourishing, approaches the nervous 
mannerism of someone incapable of keeping mentally still, even in this more 
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ideologically conservative of novels. He is like the debater who doggedly pursues an 
idea after he has lost interest in it and long after he has begun to be convinced by the 
reasoning of the other party. The inability to resist those little extra touches that have 
little to do with one's central idea is nicely illustrated, in mise-en-abyme fashion, in one 
of the many anecdotes that branch off the main narrative. The anecdote in question 
concerns the "tradesman in our town" who threw a party. Finding he could not obtain any 
more vodka, the man grew angry but, once having begun to express his rage, found he was 
unable to resist the temptation of taking it further to the point where he started to 
gratuitously to "smash up his own crockery, to tear up his own and his wife's clothes, and 
finally, to break his windows, and all for the sheer beauty of it". (pllS) Apart from 
being a fine example of the childish wilfulness that typifies some of Dostoyevsky's 
characters, this is also an illustration of the wayan idea can be extended and distorted 
beyond any obvious meaningfulness in the interests of achieving a desired effect. There is 
always something of this gleeful tinkering in Dostoyevsky. It should not, however, 
distract us from the consolidation of his main themes in The Brothers Karamazov. 
II. ii. The "feeling of a condition to get to": the will to believe 
Dostoyevsky's main theme in the novel is, according to his own foreshadowing in a 
letter, "one that has tormented me, consciously and unconsciously, all my life long: it is 
the question of the existence of God" .35 The Brothers Karamazov does not attempt a 
formulation of irrefutable proof for this thesis, and it is the narrative's implicit 
recognition of the impossibility of doing so (or, alternatively, of providing evidence to 
the contrary) which gives it an assurance earlier works lack. The challenge of Ivan 
concerning the appalling horrors that have devestated the innocent as well as the guilty 
in human history ("[The tears of that tortured little girl] must be expiated, for otherwise 
there can be no harmony. But how, how are you to expiate them? [ ... ] Not, surely, by their 
being avenged? But what do I want them avenged for? What do I want a hell for 
torturers for? What good can hell do if they have already been tortured to death? And 
what sort of harmony is it, if there is a hell? I want to forgive. I want to embrace. I don't 
want any more suffering"), (p287) is allowed to stand. It is met with Alyosha's reminder 
of the sacrificial sufferings of Christ, the one being who "could or had the right to 
forgive" (p288) but it's protest is not mitigated or rationalized into an acceptable form. 
Allowing such problems to retain their resonance, Dostoyevsky turns his attention 
instead to the question of faith that adds to their trouble the additional note of an 
incongruity. And, rather than deny the incongruity, Dostoyevsky shifts his ground to 
35 Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky to his Family and Friends, p190. 
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consider the role played by active love and willing assent in generating and sustaining 
that faith despite inadequate, or contradictory, evidence. 
The relationship between belief and a commitment to active love is a significant one in 
the novel. At the heart of Alyosha's faith, for example, is a deep affection and respect 
for Zossima, the elder, and it is this love that is resurrected in the dream he has about 
the miracle at Cana, creating a groundswell of affirmation that mitigates the 
intellectual confusion he suffers after the elder's death. The love that has hitherto been 
concentrated almost exclusively on the old man is regenerated and extended to his 
brothers, to Grushenka and to the earth that he embraces with tears on wakening from 
the dream. ("It was as though the threads from all those innumerable worlds of God met 
all at once in his soul [ ... J He wanted to forgive everyone and for everything, and to beg 
forgiveness [ ... J with every moment he felt clearly and almost palpably that something 
firm and immoveable, like the firmament itself, was entering his soul".) (p427) 
Alyosha's emotional experience of love is qualified by the emphasis on practical charity 
elsewhere in the novel. Zossima's response to the deadlock created by the equilibrium of 
(absent) evidence for and against the existence of God is to emphasize the importance of 
active compassion in transcending intellectual uncertainties. The existence of God and 
immortality of the soul are, Zossima agrees with Ivan, things "one cannot prove. One can 
be convinced of [themJ though [ ... J By the experience of active love". (p61) In other words, 
testing the imperatives of faith experientially is a way of discovering their 'meaning'. 
Active love is certainly needed to prevent Ivan's compassion and desire to "embrace" and 
"forgive" mankind from being an intellectual pose. Significantly, Ivan prefaces his 
exposition on suffering with the admission that he finds the sufferings and anxieties of 
his immediate neighbours unsympathetic and uninteresting. 
As well as reflecting a biblical principle,36 Dostoyevsky's stress on the role of action in 
affirming value despite intellectual reservations recalls the ancient sceptic recognition 
that action involves the thinker in a form of assent his intellectual judgment may 
disallow. Discussing Arcesilaus and the Stoic conception of action in relation to personal 
judgement, Gisela Striker emphasizes that as it is "logically impossible to act 
voluntarily without assent", the sceptic, strictly speaking, is abandoning "his 
theoretical attitude of suspension of judgement" with every action.37 Without accepting 
36 
37 
See in particular 1 John 4:20: "If anyone says 'I love God', yet hates his brother, he 
is a liar. For anyone who does not love his brother, whom he has seen, cannot love 
God, whom he has not seen". This particular epistle is devoted to the 
interrelationship of faith and love Dostoyevsky explores in The Brothers 
Karamazov. cf my footnote on this in Chapter 2, p73. 
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this logic at face value (Svidrigaylov's acts of charity in Crime and Punishment are 
voluntarily undertaken, but they are evidence of perversity, not expressions of the 
"active love" that affirms value), Dostoyevsky nonetheless shows the intellectual 
aspect of belief to be only one part of a more complex set of human needs and responses. 
Scepticism is qualified by one's involvement with other human beings, on other than 
rational, academic levels. 
A second method of approach to the problem of belief in the novel is developed in 
references to the will. As in Crime and Punishment, volition is made the cornerstone of 
that which it also denies. In Ivan's legend, for example, Christ is represented as having 
"hungered for a faith based on free will", (p300) and of having rejected, therefore, the 
lure of miracle, (300) mystery (301) and authority, (302 and 304) as a means of winning 
people to himself. The Church, by contrast, is represented as having used these things to 
enslave people, relieving them of their burdensome gift of freedom: "The most tormenting 
secrets of their conscience", the Grand Inquisitor explains to the silent Christ, "they will 
bring to us, and we shall give them our decision for it all, and they will be glad to believe 
in our decision, because it will relieve them of their great anxiety and of their present 
terrible torments of coming to a free decision themselves". (p304) By contrast, the 
example of doubting Thomas is referred to as someone who, when confronted with a 
miracle, believed not under compulsion but because of a willing attitude of heart: indeed 
it is recounted in the gospel accounts of this story that in the presence of the same 
miraculous presence of Christ, "some believed while others doubted", suggesting that no 
evidence is sufficient to eradicate the need for individual response and assessment. One 
of the implications Dostoyevsky seems to draw from the story of Thomas is that not only 
is faith dependent on free choice in the absence of indisputable proof, but that even were 
such proof available it would be insufficient to convince. As the devil says to Ivan, 
repeating the substance of Ivan's own legend: "What's the good of believing against your 
will? Besides, so far as faith is concerned, no proofs are of any help, particularly 
material proofs. Thomas believed, not because he saw that Christ had risen, but because 
he wanted to believe before that". (p748) 
This notion of a willing embrace, independent of intellectual hesitations, is of paramount 
importance in appreciating Dostoyevsky's own symbol of faith, and helps to explain its 
enduring relevance in his writing despite the spirited sabotage to which it is subjected. 
Describing his "creed", as the unsurpassed perfection of Christ, Dostoyevsky goes on to 
stipulate that "If anyone could prove to me that Christ is outside the truth, and if the 
truth really did exclude Christ, I should prefer to stay with Christ and not with 
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truth" .38 Will and emotion are thus united in an affirmation of something that is 
logically undemonstrable as Dostoyevsky, both in the formulation of his credo and in the 
particular emphasis in his last novel, bears out the validity of Hume's celebrated 
challenge to the sceptical position. As Bumyeat paraphrases and amplifies this 
challenge: 
when a belief or a practice is genuinely based on reasons, it is given up if those 
reasons are invalidated. Since we do not give up the inferences and the beliefs in 
the face of overwhelming sceptical objections, there must be other factors at work 
in our nature than reason - notably custom and imagination - and it is to these, 
rather than to man's much-vaunted rationality, that the beliefs and inferences 
are due.39 
Faith, then, is sustained by impulses other than rational ones in Dostoyevsky's novel and 
is, for this reason, seen to be no more exclusive of intellectual uncertainties than 
intellectual uncertainties are exclusive of faith. But what is the point of doubt in such a 
context? It would appear that, in this case, Dostoyevsky is imitating the sceptic who, by 
"[adhering] strictly to appearance", is also "withdrawing to the safety of a position not 
open to challenge or enquiry".40 
This, in the end, is an unanswerable criticism, if only because the precise relation in a 
writer's thinking of doubt and faith, negation and affirmation is impossible to gauge 
with accuracy. It certainly appears that doubt plays a vital role in Dostoyevsky's 
thought right up until the last, suggesting, at the very least, that it is a spur to the 
constant reformulation of the writer's preconceptions in relation to the "challenging 
goal" of faith. Since neither the characters nor their implied author ever seem to have 
that serenity of mind which distinguishes the Pyrrhonian sceptic, their hold on the 
vision of faith would appear to be too tenuous, and too eager, for doubt to have lost its 
power. Hence Mitya can still say, "God torments me. [ ... ] What if he doesn't exist? What 
if Rakitin is right that it's a fiction created by mankind", (p695) admitting the 
possibility both of error and of a total misconception of what the ultimate 
"philosopher's stone" is like. What can, with justice, still be said of this last novel is 
that the quality and effect of doubt seems to have undergone a modification. Rather 
than the psychotic kind of doubt which aims at defying the "trope" of death in the 
manner of Foucault, doubt is associated in The Brothers Karamazov with a sense of 
impatient urgency and purpose. 
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Richard Peace refers to this urgency when he discusses Dostoyevsky's relativistic 
tendencies, suggesting that for all their apparent pluralism, "the overriding impression 
created by [Dostoyevsky's] novels is certainly not neutrality, it is rather that of a 
passionate and ill-contained urgency [ ... ]."41 It is this phenomenon which I identified, in 
embryonic form, in Crime and Punishment, and which I now wish to consider, in its 
maturer expression, in The Brothers Karamazov. It is noteworthy that all three brothers 
are possessed with a sense of urgency that comes through in their impassioned response to 
the natural world and in the forward momentum of their thinking which, as a result, is 
also charged with emotional energy. Alyosha works through the "violent shock" of 
doubts that arise after he has seen the corrupting body of the elder, with a burning 
indignation and eagerness ("why should this indignity have happened, why should this 
disgrace have been permitted, [ ... ] Where was Providence [ ... ]? Why did it hide its finger 
at the most critical moment [ ... ]?, p398, and, "I did believe, I do believe, and I want to 
believe!", p480), and Zossima has earlier noticed a thirst for understanding in the 
atheist Ivan ("You have not made up your mind what answer to give to that question and 
therein lies your great grief, for the question urgently demands an answer"). (p78) The 
violence that often characterizes Mitya's physical reactions enters into his subconscious 
questioning also. In a dream he sees an emaciated peasant woman holding a crying baby 
and is so shaken he starts shouting at the driver: 
Why are people poor? Why's the babby poor? Why's the steppe so bare? Why 
don't they embrace and kiss one another? Why don't they sing joyous songs? Why 
are they so black with misfortune? Why don't they feed the babby?' 
And he felt that, though he was asking wild and senseless questions, he could not 
help asking them and that, indeed, that was the way they had to be asked. 
(p596) 
This is not the tranquil inquiry of the sceptic who is "neutrally disposed, without 
belief" .42 It bespeaks the urgency of thinkers striving towards a goal rather than 
everlastingly circling around it for fear of the limitations it might impose. The author 
seems to share in the urgency of his characters in this regard as a comparable attitude 
comes out in comments made in Dostoyevsky's notes and letters. ''What terrible torments 
has this thirst to believe cost me and does still cost me, becoming the stronger in my soul, 
the more there is in me of contrary reasonings", Dostoyevsky writes in the same letter in 
which he described his symbol of faith. 43 This is the same desire to attain and 
41 
42 
43 
Dostoyevsky. An Examination of the Major Novels, p301. 
Doubt and Dogmatism, p30. 
The translation here is taken from the English edition of Mochulsky. (Dostoevsky. 
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comprehend found in the three brothers, and which doubt serves only to intensify rather 
than abate. 
In a letter to Ivan Aksakov, Dostoyevsky writes: "I often realize with pain that I have 
literally failed to express one-twentieth part of what I had wanted to [ ... ] The thing 
that comforts me is the constant hope that one day God will grant me so much inspiration 
[ ... ] that I shall be able to express myself more fully [ ... ]",44 A sense of restless striving 
and dissatsifaction characterizes Dostoyevsky's prose on the aesthetic as well as the 
ideological level. This helps explain why, even in The Brothers Karamazov, there is 
little of that quiet fatigue of spirits described by Pascal, for instance, where the thinker, 
wearied in his search for truth, "[tend] les bras au liberateur" .45 The overwhelming 
length of the work further testifies to a continuing sense of a goal that is always ahead, 
always just out of reach, as the writer presses on to lay hold of that which has laid hold 
of him in a series of re-workings and re-presentations. 
In The Brothers Karamazov, then, the strong movement away from 'truth' and 
'authority' in Crime and Punsihment is subject to a reversal. Binswanger's notion of the 
dialectic of rest and restlessness, of tranquillity anxiously sought after, is helpful in 
throwing the pattern of this movement into sharper relief. The artistic consciousness, as 
de Man paraphrases, is perceived by Binswanger in relation to the concept of "der 
Bedrangte", which "combines an idea of being locked up in too narrow a space, with the 
temporal ordeal of being steadily urged on, of being unable to rest". 46 Binswanger thus 
provides a possible rephrasing of the Nietzschean idea of the double movement involved 
in volition, of a desire to get away from the restrictions of fixed laws and destinies, and 
of a desire to get to, to reach forward and strive after, the accomplishment of one's 
creative idea. Binswanger combines the idea of a near-claustrophobic limitation with 
an urgent desire to break away in a search for a more spacious and extending form of self-
expression. Both Pascal and Baudelaire are cited by de Man as writers who reflect 
Binswanger's image of the driven thinker who, like Baudelaire's man, "Pour trouver Ie 
repos court toujours comme un fou!". In its attempt to transcend its own febrile activity, 
Dostoyevsky's creative drive offers a similar paradoxical image of a peace that must be 
pursued to be attained, striven after, to be enjoyed.47 
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Restlessness in Dostoyevsky thus finally contradicts itself. And where images of 
authoritative truth are associated in Crime and Punishment with ideas of "being locked 
up in too narrow a space", to use de Man's phrase, in The Brothers Karamazov, truth is 
the goad that spurs the thinker on to transcend limitation, and, especially, to transcend 
the limitations associated with his own sophistry. 
III. iii. 'I' and the 'other: the beginnings of a quest 
This brings the argument back to the question of the other raised in Chapter 3. For it is 
the sense of expectancy in relation to an other - whether human or divine - that is the 
chief distinguishing mark of Dostoyevsky's scepticism in relation to Robbe-Grillet's, 
exposing a different attitude to writing from the one put forward by Foucault. "La 
derniere demarche de la raison", writes Pascal, "est de reconnaitre qu'il y a une infinite 
de choses qui la surpassent [ ... J" .48 Openness to the other, and to that which surpasses and 
transcends the self's mastery, enables Dostoyevsky's characters and perhaps 
Dostoyevsky himself to "turn their profession of ignorance against itself" and continue to 
inquire and affirm in the face of their own doubts.49 The 'true' meaning of the other is 
unknowable but space is left in which that other - the "sticky leaves of spring"; the 
love between Mitya and Grushenka, the humility of Christ - may make its impact on 
the consciousness. This is one interpretation of the silence of Christ in Ivan's legend, 
namely, as a gap the author does not wish to close, and a silence in which a person may 
be registered rather than an abstract creed recited. This mode of waiting on the other is 
also the crowning expression of the will for Dostoyevsky, something Nietzsche lays the 
groundwork for when he comments that: "Learning to see [ ... J is almost what, 
unphilosophically speaking, is called a strong will: the essential feature is precisely not 
to 'will' - to be able to suspend decision".50 'Seeing' the other in Dostoyevsky demands 
just such a suspension, or bracketing, of the self s preconceived doubts and judgements. 
The question is asked, however, whether the two poles implicit in the double movement 
of the will may not, after all, be only projections of the subjective imagination. It is 
certainly significant that, as in The Idiot, Dostoyevsky uses dream-scenarios to represent 
the extremes of good and evil- Christ and the miracle at Cana in Alyosha's dream, the 
shabby and cynical devil of Ivan's nightmare - and that he has Ivan's devil ask the 
question underlying the whole orientation towards the other in Dostoyevsky: 
48 
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As for everything else around me, all these worlds, God and even Satan himself -
all that hasn't been proved to me. Does it all exist of itself or is it only an 
emanation of myself, a logical development of my I, [ ... ]. (p7S6) 
This, essentially, is Ivan's dilemma, and the dilemma also of the Greek sceptics who 
concluded that, given the impossibility of knowing things as they really are, any 
"statements which seek to go beyond the experience of individuals" must be 
repudiated.51 For Dostoyevsky, however, the refusal to wrestle with and attempt to 
transcend the limits of one's experience as an individual is the most stultifying strategy 
imaginable, intellectually as well as spiritually. Hence the importance attributed in 
Dostoyevsky's faith to personal relationships rather than logical certainties.52 
To accept the responsibility involved in personal relationships and the notion, therefore, 
that 'my' freedom must be held in tension with 'yours' means to accept, as well as to 
reach beyond, a limitation. Dostoyevsky's choice of epigraph for The Brothers 
Karamazov is significant in this regard: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of 
wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much 
fruit". The quotation encapsulates the ambivalence in the movement towards and away 
from the other in Dostoyevsky's drama of faith. To subjugate one's narrative to another's 
is to court 'death'. Yet without 'death', in this scheme of things, there is no regeneration. 
The incorporation of the death-motif in Dostoyevsky's last novel marks his departure 
from the thinking of Foucault with which we began the chapter, and according to which 
the ''black wall" of death must not be traversed so much as rendered impotent through 
the infinite self-reflections of language: 
[ ... ] to stop this death which would stop it, [language] possesses but a single power: 
that of giving birth to its own image in a play of mirrors that has no limits.53 
In his refusal to relinquish the "tormenting" questions of faith, Dostoyevsky seems to 
solicit, albeit fearfully, the very limitations Foucault would deflect through writing's 
"play of mirrors", as if, like the poet, Dostoyevsky hopes that in this ultimate 
confinement there may yet be freedom.54 
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"Take me to you, imprison me, for I 
Except you enthral me, never shall be free, 
Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me." (John Donne's 'Divine Meditations, no. 14) 
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La jalousie 
IV. i. The gaze and the quest for power 
In Robbe-Grillet's novels the "will to power" implicit in the organizing impulses of the 
artist are strongly in evidence. There is no attempt to address possible ethical 
implications of the process of imprinting one's values on the "process of becoming", as 
there is in Dostoyevsky. The question of order is, as far as possible, an aesthetic one. 
This brings Robbe-Grillet's preoccupations closer to Nietzsche's. Indeed, there are 
passages in the fictional autobiography, Angelique ou l' enchantement, which mirror the 
tone and import of Nietzsche's Will to Power, and this is nowhere more evident than in 
the memoires being written by Henri de Corinthe, Robbe-Grillet's autobiographical 
phantom and alter-ego. Nietzsche defines our "love of the beautiful" in the Will to 
Power as admiration for "our shaping will": 
The two senses stand side-by-side; the sense for the real is the means of acquiring 
the power to shape things according to our wish. The joy in shaping and reshaping 
- a primeval joy. We can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have 
made. 55 
Likewise, Henri de Corinthe writes of the pleasure of the artist in contemplating his own 
invented forms, his own image, in the world of illusion he has made: 
L'artiste, en eifet, au sein meme du travail createur qui Ie constitue comme tel, 
prend sans cesse conscience de son moi propre (singulier, monstrueux, solitaire) 
comme constituant l'unique origine possible du sens, c'esHt-dire non seulement 
comme incomparable source creatrice de sens, mais a la limite comme unique source 
pensante. (p36) 
La maison de rendez-vous, with its technical exhibitionism, accords well with this 
Nietzschean pattern. In the earlier novel, La jalousie, however, the narrator-hero is less 
confident of his "power to shape things according to [his] wish", having not yet fully 
withdrawn into the world of "beautiful illusion" because he is still attempting to impose 
his "being" on the external world of an exotic environment and an elusive woman, A .... 
In the opening phrase of La jalousie, Robbe-Grillet once observed, there is already 
manifest "a voluntary concern on the part of someone, a narrator, who wishes to organize 
the world at a glance [ ... ]".56 As this remark attests, much of the fascination of visual 
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detail in a Robbe-Grillet novel derives from what it reveals about the creative 
intelligence observing it. An earlier theoretical analysis of the importance of the gaze in 
freeing the world from its entrapment in the vocabulary of tragic humanism thus seems 
wilfully misleading: 
Le regard apparait aussitOt dans cette perspective comme Ie sens privilegie, et 
particulierement Ie regard applique aux contours (plus qu'aux couleurs, aux eclats, 
ou aux transparences). La description optique est en effet celle qui opere Ie plus 
aisement la fixation des distances; Ie regard, s/il veut rester simple regard, laisse 
les choses a leur place respective.57 
In the light of different critical commentaries on the function of the gaze in writing and 
some of the author's own remarks on his novels, the notion of a "simple regard" defended 
here is highly ironic. According to feminist and marxist readings, for example, the gaze 
is indeed a "sens privilegie" employed not only to 'fix' distances but to impose them, and, 
in so doing, to annihilate difference and reinstate a more virulent form of 
anthropomorphism than even tragic humanism achieves. For Anne-Marie Dardigna, the 
gaze in the erotic novel (a genre to which La jalousie ostensibly belongs) is usually a 
means of limiting and controlling the feminine other, while for Jacques Leenhardt, it 
represents an imperialist attempt at mastering a foreign environment, or, to use Robbe-
Grillet's own words, at "organiz[ing] the world at a glance". What is significant is that 
in both these accounts the gaze in Robbe-Grillet is associated with the desire to impose 
one's personal mode of "Being" on the world of becoming, which I, in turn, have 
associated with Nietzsche's will to power. 
The terms of Dardigna's definition of the phenomenon of erotomania confirms the role 
played by the intelligence and the will in the subject's perception. In her view, 
erotomania is to be distinguished from a spontaneous, instinctual expression of sensuality. 
Erotics, she argues, presupposes "une activite de l'intelligence, de la volonte, appliquee 
aux choses du corps; elle refuse labandon a une sensualite spontanee et irreflechie" .58 The 
attitude to sexual difference it entails is thus revealed as the product of a particular way 
of looking at the world (a "representation symbolique de to ute action sur Ie monde") that 
is characterized by an insistent need for order and symmetry (of the subject's devizing) 
and for keeping things "a leur place respective". The impulse to control Dardignas insists 
is endemic to erotomania is easily discernible in the narrator's obsession with the 
whereabouts of A. .. in and around the plantation. While her physical attractiveness 
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makes her a likely object of desire, recognition of her allure is so hemmed about with 
calculations and measurements that a sense of intense confinement is created, disallowing 
the expression of a more spontaneous pleasure and so confirming Dardigna's thesis. A ... 's 
exact placement within the narrator's field of vision is a matter of concern immediately 
she enters the scene and it is noted, very precisely, that she may be observed from "ce coin 
de terrasse" where the narrator himself is presumably situated. His gaze pursues her to 
her room, onto the terrace, into the courtyard, and when he is forced to physically 
withdraw on an errand to fetch ice for drinks he is still unable to mentally release her, 
doubling back, en route, through the office, where he can peep through the blinds and spy 
out a portion of her hair. (pp48-52) The opposite of the traditional cliche, 'out of sight, 
out of mind', is therefore true in the narrator's case, as in A ... 's absence he resorts to 
mental reconstructions and rationalizations of her behaviour in the attempt to keep her 
in her "place respective". 
Like Dardigna, Leenhardt sees the quest for domination in the novel as reflecting a 
certain mentality associated with Western rationalism, although he foregrounds the 
socio-ideological implications of the attitude rather than its sexual motivation.59 
Robbe-Grillet has rejected the imposition of a socio-ideological grid on this, or any other 
of his novels, but Leenhardt's comments on the gaze are convincing in their account of the 
obsession for order in the narrative to which Robbe-Grillet himself has drawn attention. 
For Leenhardt, the narrative reflects the crisis of the Western imperialist faced with 
the gradual disintegration of his colonial conquests. The inclination to "me surer, cerner, 
decrire" is thus translated as the colonizing impulse to domesticate what is foreign. 
Sight and the reason both assist in the process of "la maitrise de la terre" by extracting 
different elements from their original context and dividing them up, with the land 
itself, into more familiar and manageable fragments. While the narrator's mental 
cataloguing does not immediately suggest a colonial crisis it does at least betray a strong 
desire to render the environment intelligible through a series of spatial and temporal 
measurements. The enumeration of banana trees confirms this, as does the hypothetical 
tabulating of "la position et les deplacements respectifs" of wild animals moving around 
outside the house, and the retelling and interpreting of the centipede incident, which is 
caught up in the narrator's jealous suspicions about A. ... 
The leitmotif of the centipede, however, and the manner of its representation shows how 
the novel effects its own subversion and undermines the "will to power" implicit in the 
principle narrative voice. It did not need the later confirmation from the author to 
59 cf earlier comments on Leenhardt's analysis of La jalousie in my Chapter 1, p44. 
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expose the very deliberate undermining by the narrative of its own ordering processes 
both through the direct challenge represented by A ... and the native environment -
organizers, as Robbe-Grillet phrases it, "of disorder, that is of another order which 
attempts to penetrate the text" - 60 and, indirectly, through a continual metamorphosis 
throughout the narrative of order into disorder, and vice versa. There is a sense, for 
example, in which the precise calculations indicative of "une activite de l'intelligence, 
de la volonte" are contrasted with A ... 's more spontaneous sensuality and imagination, as 
revealed in her instinctive rapport with the natives, and her enjoyment of fanciful 
literature. At the same time, however, these contrasting patterns of order and disorder 
show their propensity to become their opposite, as, following the Derridean pattern of 
'differance', one term proves to be the other differed. The narrator's concern for detail, 
for example, betrays a mounting hysteria when he calculates that ten centimetres 
separate A. .. and Franck's hands as they sit together on the terrace. And the centipede 
that is so minutely observed grows from a largish insect to a monstrosity the size of a 
plate because of its association in the narrator's mind with A ... 's infidelity. A ... 's 
'disorder', on the other hand, reflects the competence and mastery that eludes her 
observer. She is presented as self-possessed and serene, completely at ease in a tropical 
climate, a dominant party in both domestic and more intimate relationships. Her voice 
giving orders to the cook is "nette" and "mesuree"; (p16) the orange trees in the grounds 
have been planted at her advice; (p38) the railings are to be painted in the colour of her 
choice: a vibrant yellow. (p40) 
Perhaps the most ironic reversal so far as the erotic "will to power" is concerned, is that 
the narrator's attempts to gain control over A ... deprive him of his own freedom of 
thought so that, as a result of his obsession, A ... ends up controlling him. It is perhaps 
inappropriate, therefore, to speak of control in connection with the narrator at all 
except, as was the case with Raskolnikov, in terms of his own fantasy world in which he 
imagines an inferno of retribution for the lovers. Even the mode of the gaze that is 
principally employed in the narrative - namely, the one-way vision created by looking 
through venetian blinds - indicates a vulnerability, as the narrator seeks to avoid being 
exposed to the gaze of those he watches. 
IV. ii. Doubt and "shaping things according to our wish" 
All of Robbe-Grillet's early novels, in fact, represent this fundamental dichotomy 
between uncertainty and a frantic attempt to maintain control. In the previous chapter I 
60 'Order and Disorder', p9. 
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looked at the element of psychotic insecurity in this, and how this was then regulated 
through a foregrounding of aesthetic form. In the present analysis of La jalousie, 
however, I wish to attempt a redefinition of uncertainty from the point of view of its 
complicity with the creative drive. Or, to put this another way, I wish to isolate the 
point at which uncertainty ceases to reflect doubt, or an uncontrollable anxiety, and 
expresses instead that manic form of creativity Foucault speculates is our best defence 
against death, the anxiety "narcissistically intoxicated with itself, an anxiety 
determined to go on being anxious".61 
On one level, narrative uncertainty in La jalousie is a response to the unknowability of 
things due to incomplete data, reflecting a sceptical readiness, therefore, to suspend 
judgement. Descriptions of A ... 's facial expressions are, accordingly, hypothetical and 
speculative in tone, implicitly acknowledging the opacity of the other's thoughts and 
intentions to the inquiring gaze. Her smile could express a variety of sentiments: "Ie 
meme sourire ou se lit, aussi bien, la derision que la confiance, ou l'absence totale de 
sentiments". (p42) This principle of uncertainty is confirmed by certain key terms 
throughout the narrative as reminders that hesitancy must attend all calculations about 
the other, since knowledge is partial and understanding inevitably flawed, hence: "sans 
doute"; "peut-etre"; "ou bien", suggesting a conscious attempt to leave interpretation of 
phenomena open. A ... is glimpsed near a chest of drawers, "tenant sans aucun doute une 
feuille de papier entre les mains"; (pI4) Franck is dimly heard exchanging a few words 
with A ... on the terrace, "un remerciment sans doute"; (pIS) while A ... hums an indistinct 
dance tune that Franck recognizes "peut-eire" even if the narrator does not. (p29) The 
venetian blinds and flaws in the glass effect visual distortions and discontinuities on the 
landscape, the house, and the people being surveyed through them, all adding to the 
impression of incomplete data, visually, aurally and mentally, that is being analyzed, 
of necessity, with sceptical caution. 
The flaw in all this, of course, is that the mind that sees these things is not sceptically 
predisposed in the first place, being already possessed by an idea that colours its 
perception with prejudice and suspicion. What reads as a cautious assessment of the 
incalculable is soon transformed into the psychotic doubting of jealous suspicion that has 
already decided what it will find before it starts looking. Minor observations, viewed in 
the context of this suspicion, begin to appear as 'evidence' that A ... and Franck are 
having an affair. It is noted that A ... has arranged the chairs on the terrace in such a 
61 Agon. Towards a Theory of Revisionism, p114. Bloom's discussion of Freud in 
chapters 4 and 5 are pertinent to Robbe-Grillet's conception of the artistic will. 
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way as to permit herself and Franck to sit together, (p19) and that she later asks for the 
light to be removed, plunging them both into a semi-obscurity Franck describes as "Plus 
intime, bien sur". The insertion of a "dit-elle" in A ... 's reported reason for this removal, 
namely, that the lamplight is uncomfortably bright, then reads as an equivalent of a "so 
she says" and draws attention to the ambivalence of the other 'cautionary' expressions in 
the text. The gap between inadequate evidence, on the one hand, and hypothetical 
interpretation, on the other, becomes a vacuum that jealous suspicion rushes into and 
closes so that partial observations come to be read as direct 'proof' of guilt. The blue 
letter paper that is seen on A ... and Franck's person becomes likely 'evidence' of private 
correspondance; the dance tune A ... hums and Franck presumably knows becomes 
'evidence' of common interests or of time already spent together; the obscured view of A ... 
leaning over Franck's car after the trip to town becomes 'evidence' of a kiss; A ... 's 
omitting to describe the hotel room where they were forced to spend a night becomes 
'evidence' of a shared bed, and so on. 
A question presents itself in the mind of the practical reader: why does the narrator not 
confront A ... and end the uncertainty that has grown into a tormenting suspicion? Or, 
alternatively, why does he not emulate the tranquillity of the Greek sceptic who, faced 
with scanty evidence, refuses to draw conclusions one way or another and does not distress 
himself with the reflection that one solution may be more 'true' than another? One of 
the achievements of Robbe-Grillet's novel is that it shows the difficulties of 
maintaining this pose of intellectual sang-froid, especially in interpersonal relations, 
and the reader is allowed to feel that the question of A ... 's infidelity matters, and 
matters intensely (to the narrator), so that incomplete evidence will inevitably be 
examined with a highly subjective attention. This is a rephrasing of a point made in The 
Brothers Karamazov concerning the role of the will in relation to belief and doubt where, 
as in the story of doubting Thomas, the predisposition of the thinker influences the way 
incomplete, or puzzling, evidence is assessed. The final decision is not always a purely 
rational one. But where Dostoyevsky attempts to transcend self-determined doubts and 
values, Robbe-Grillet's narrators, like Raskolnikov, are shown deliberately prolonging 
their subjective illusions. Indeed, the 'answer' to the narrator's anxiety in La jalousie 
must never be found for, otherwise, the whole narrative collapses. This is why the 
narrator's anxiety is "an anxiety determined to go on being anxious": because the novel 
would not exist without it. And this is one reason why Jean-Pierre Monnier's remarks on 
the paucity of interpersonal dialogue in the New Novel provide an inappropriate 
assessment of Robbe-Grillet's writing: "Ie refus de la rencontre", claims Monnier, "ne peut 
aboutir a l'institution du dialogue, et, par consequent, ne peut conduire a l'art du roman 
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[ ... ]".62 In La jalousie it is in the absence of direct dialogue that the true 'artfulness' of the 
narrative lies. 
The circumstances of the novel and its overall theme are therefore closely linked to its 
functioning as a work of the imagination. Uncertainty and doubt are aesthetically 
determined indeterminations which stimulate the creative hypothesizing on which 
Robbe-Grillet's narrative depends. 
La maison de rendez-vous 
V. i. The detour of discontinuity and the Nietzschean movement "away from" 
For me, the turning point in my work is Dans Ie labyrinthe where [ ... J there 
appears a kind of rupture within the narrative word. Le Voyeur and La Jalousie 
are, in fact, strongly centered novels which, in the case of La Jalousie, means that 
whether called 'husband' or 'pure anonymous presence' , there is something which 
is an organising center of the whole text [ ... J Starting with Dans Ie labyrinthe, 
books like La Maison de rendez-vous [ ... J represent a clearer and clearer tendency to 
refuse that someone take over in the text [ ... J In La Maison de rendez-vous, one 
might already have the impression - and I think this would be a good reading of 
the text - that there are numerous narrative forces, one of which is called 
Johnson, another Lady Ava, a third Edouard Manneret, and there are a lot of 
others. It is not only characters but also places [ ... J which tell a story, as if each 
element of the narration tended at each moment to seize the narrative power.63 
According to the author's perception of his 1965 work, La maison de rendez-vous 
represents a break away from the strongly centred discourse of the earlier La jalousie. 
Instead of a bid for mastery on the part of a dominant narrative voice which is then 
challenged by a counter-order there are now numerous voices, or narrative elements, 
attempting to "seize the narrative power", and so creating a state of permanent rupture 
within the text. The body of Robbe-Grillet's writing published in the 1960's and 70's 
seems to me to bear out the author's claims about increased narrative instability. In La 
maison de rendez-vous, which I wish to examine as a representative work of the period, 
there are a greater number of contradictions and changes of perspective, all of which 
make the novel more difficult to analyze in terms of an individual's experience of 
uncertainty than was La jalousie, for example. 
The frequent recurrence of a "je" narrator in the novel with a consistently similar 
perspective suggests an anonymous observer or persona of Edouard Manneret (or Ralph 
62 
63 
L'age ingrat du roman, p123. 
Three decades of the French New Novel, p27. 
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Johnson), or, alternatively, but not necessarily exclusively, the voice of the novelist 
recounting a private journal of sexual fantasies, and doubtless answering with pleasure to 
the description in the text of a "Narrateur peu scrupuleux". Since narrative perspectives 
shift repeatedly, however, the idenitity of the principle "je" narrator is remains 
nebulous, the "I" of the opening being displaced by a gentleman with a florid complexion 
recounting his travel experiences, who is, in turn, interrupted by a number of images 
focussing on a young woman and a large black dog. Later the original "je" narrator 
returns, promising to "essayer maintenant de raconter cette soiree chez Lady Ava", but 
then being diverted from his task by the sight of scenic groups of sculpted figures, all 
telling their own story, in Lady Ava's garden. The same narrator fades into the 
background again when the reader's attention is solicited for the 'narrative' of Kim. 
This pattern, established in the first 30 or 40 pages, is maintained throughout. 
The numerous dislocations in La maison de rendez-vous strongly evoke the Nietzschean 
strategy of evasion preferred by Foucault, but with a difference. In Foucault the 
frustration of the drive towards unity is carried to the point where there no longer seems 
to be what Nietzsche calls a "centre of power" organizing the text, whether in the guise 
of narrator, writer, or writer as narrator. Indeed, a predilection for strategies of 
avoidance in Foucault is linked to a desire for personal effacement,64 indicating a refusal 
of the "total and final responsibility" for one's signifying activities Nietzsche links in 
Beyond Good and Evil with the strong will. In La maison de rendez-vous, by contrast, the 
detours and interruptions which distract attention from anyone voice represent a 
circuitous, but sure, route to a 'centre', namely, the self-reflections of the narrator-author. 
V. ii. Unity through self-reference: the movement towards a centre 
In a 1988 interview Robbe-Grillet drew attention to a paradox in his work which sheds 
light on the drive towards unity in his 1965 novel: 
64 
65 
C'est une contradiction, et j'y suis tres sensible. D'une part cette mouvance, ceUe 
mobilite [ ... J et en meme temps Ie vieux reve de Flaubert de constituer un objet 
totalement inattaquable: l'estMtique du chef d'CEuvre, l'objet ferme sur lui-meme, 
qui ne tient que par sa propre coMrence. Objet ouvert, plein de trous, de 
contradictions, et objet clos, malgre tout [ ... J65 
A desire, figuratively speaking, for the obliteration of the face, see L' archeologie 
du savoir, p17: "Plus d'un, comme moi sans doute, ecrivent pour n'avoir plus de 
visage". Note, however, the personal initiative implicit in this. See Bloom's 
remarks to this effect in Agon. Towards a Theory of Revisionism, p48. 
'Conversation avec Alain Robbe-Grillet' with Jean-Jacques Brochier, February, 
1988. 
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The linkage here of instability with a coherent design and purpose perfectly 
encapsulates the paradox of La maison de rendez-vous. What Robbe-Grillet does not 
consider in the interview is the way aesthetic coherence is directly reliant on th~ 
failure, or instability, of more conventionally readable means of unifying the text, in 
other words, the "objet ouvert" holds the key to the "objet ferme", and conversely. 
This may be illustrated with reference to the use of contradictions to create an artificial 
instability which is then used to draw attention to aesthetic problems with the reader 
being sometimes referred to the decisions confronting the writer of the scene in question. 
The flickering representations of Kim climbing up and down the staircase with or 
without the envelope, tying or not tying up the dog, cohere, therefore, because of the 
compositional logic that subtends them. In fact the greater the disruption of the unity of 
mimetical realism, the more acutely conscious does the reader become of the novel's 
preoccupation with its own processes and its determination, in fact, to create an "objet 
ferme sur lui-meme". Underlining the self-referentiality that unifies the 'disorder' of 
the text are the number of references to other Robbe-Grillet works, and favorite Robbe-
Grillet persona. This gives the novel a monumental extra-textual unity that bears 
comparison with Balzac's technique of the recurring character in La comedie humaine.66 
Leki has traced some of these references: Boris from Un regicide; a man in dark glasses 
walking his dog from L'immortelle; a bicycle from Le voyeur; to which one might add 
Marchat from Les gommes, and an obsession with ceiling patterns from Dans Ie 
labyrinthe. Whole passages from La maison de rendez-vous will in turn be used, with 
minor alterations, in Projet pour une revolution a New York, published in 1970.67 The 
technique by which several characters in the novel are interlinked (see p210) and 
circuitously related to an author-figure named Manneret (also identified with the "vieux 
roi fou" with whom Robbe-Grillet and his 'mad' grandfather from Le miroir qui revient 
share an affinity) suggests the ultimate self-referential ploy, namely, the inclusion of 
the author in his own story, whose unity is then guaranteed through all the characters 
being related to the author's fictional persona. La maison de rendez-vous thus conforms 
to Foucault's idea of the text as "giving birth to its own image in a play of mirrors that 
has no limits",68 but with the writer, rather than the anonymous energy of language, 
being revealed as the ground of this activity. 
66 
67 
Another indication of affinity with a novelist who exemplifies everything Robbe-
Grillet dislikes about bourgeois literature. 
cf p205 "chacun connaissant desorrnais son role avec exactitude" and p7 of Projet, 
"chacun connait son role par CCEUr". 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p54. 
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The black wall that is the reverse side of Foucault's mirror - namely, death - seems to 
have miraculously painted itself out. I have discussed in the previous chapter the way 
artifice averts the violent and potentially tragic consequences of sado-eroticism in 
Robbe-Grillet, and subdue the pathos in Dans Ie Iabyrinthe. In La maison de rendez-vous 
artifice is employed to even greater effect to challenge the notion of finality by 
representing death, also, as a "figuration rather than a reality", as Bloom phrases it.69 
By frustrating linear time with its irrevocable advance towards decay, by surrounding 
death with the trappings of the theatre, and by having the characters talk about it and 
work it into a story, death is caught up in the same game of mirrors as the rest of Robbe-
Grillet's novel. Towards the beginning of the narrative a story is told about Edouard 
Manneret's death, (p46) but, as with the dying prima donna of opera, this is not the last 
we hear of him. He comes to life and dies several times, and is then fittingly associated 
with the goddess of illusion. (p85) Similarly, while he, as a writer-figure, is in a special 
position to manipulate imaginatively the destinies of others, his own death-bed scene 
is, in turn, organized by another "metteur en scene" who adds contrivances of his own to 
the corpse so that the scene reflects his signification: 
Par saud de decoration plus que de vraisemblance, Ie metteur en scene erueve encore 
les chaussures du cadavre et les lui remet en les intervertissant: la chaussure droite 
au pied gauche, et la chaussure gauche au pied droit. (p175) 
The "volante subversive" in La maison de rendez-vous is thus clearly represented as a 
"volonte d'intervention" seeking to impose its order on the world and declining to yield to 
any established order that might threaten its freedom with finality and silence. 
V. iii. Autobiographical fiction in the light of fictional autobiography 
Robbe-Grillet's autobiographical fiction (Le miroir qui revient, Angelique ou 
l' enchantement) is the culmination of all his arguments since Pour un nouveau roman 
about the organizing powers of the writer and the dramatization of his "volonte 
d'intervention" in the novels. Robbe-Grillet has always been aware of a link between 
his characters and his own mercurial identity, and between his fiction and the life-
experience he remembers and interprets in a highly imaginative way. Hence, after 
describing childhood fears and phantoms in Le miroir, he can turn and address the 
reader with: 
Agon. Towards a Theory of Revisionism, p124. 
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J'ai l'impression d'avoir raconte tout cela, depuis longtemps, dans mes livres 
comme dans mes films, et d'une fa~on beaucoup plus juste, plus convaincante. (pI6) 
His deliberately outrageous statement in the same work, "Je n'ai jamais parle d'autre 
chose que de moi",70 confirms, for all its provocation, that the sense of unity in such works 
as La maison de rendez-vous derives in large part from its conscious inscription with the 
author's insignia. 
Thirty years prior to Le miroir Robbe-Grillet was already taking exception to theories of 
literature which saw the writer as a mediator of something beyond himself and, by 
implication, beyond his absolute control. He explains, for example, his distaste for 
nineteenth-century ideas about the novelist as "une sorte de monstre inconscient", whose 
work is produced "comme a son insu" and as if at the dictation of "quelque force 
superieure". For in that case, Robbe-Grillet insists, "Le romancier, plus qu'un createur au 
sens propre, ne serait alors qu'un simple mediateur entre Ie commun des mortels et une 
puissance obscure [ ... J" .71 Years later in Le miroir qui revient a similar concern is 
expressed, only this time it is the structuralist/marxist view of the writer as a 
depersonalized "avatar local de la lutte des classes", and of his text as the anonymous 
"travail du scriptor", which Robbe-Grillet feels the need to refute?2 While continuing to 
acknowledge the generative power of language, and the interdependence of language 
with the self it articulates, Robbe-Grillet seeks to reverse what Hartman calls the 
de constructive "turn" taken "against the will of the author" which transfers the burden 
of authorial intention from "une puissance obscure" to the "aphoristic energy" of 
writing?3 Robbe-Grillet prefers to assume this responsibility, consciously and explicity, 
for himself. 
Responding to the depersonalizing of language in recent decades, Harold Bloom, who in 
many ways assumes a position similar to Robbe-Grillet's, points out that ''Personality in 
any case cannot be voided except by personality",74 implying that the absence of a 
controlling idea in relation to authorial intention is an effect, not so much of language, as 
of the subject manipulating language. This argument refocusses attention on the way 
contrived disorder in La maison de rendez-vous ultimately strengthens the sense of 
authorial control rather than diminishing it. Similarly, while in his assumption of the 
autobiographical "skin" Robbe-Grillet metamorphozes many times, succeeding, 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
Le miroir qui revient, pIa. 
Pour un nouveau roman, ppIO-It. 
Le miroir qui revient, pIt. 
Saving the Text, p7. 
Agon. Towards a Theory of Revisionism, p48. 
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therefore, in decapitating the "monstre" of conventional identity, it is still his own 
reflection we see in the autobiographical glass. This is no accident but consistent, rather, 
with Robbe-Grillet's belief in the need to appropriate meaning to serve one's own ends, 
and to usurp other identities so they reflect one's own preoccupations. Hence Robbe-
Grillet can write, teazingly yet pointedly: "C'est un autre probleme qui se pose, du fait 
que je parle aussi de moi; ou meme: uniquement de moi, comme toujours. Mes parents c' est 
deja moi en train de prendre forme" . 75 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Robbe-Grillet interprets the accusations of "imposteur" 
addressed to Roland Barthes in the course of the Barthes/Picard debate on Racine as a 
compliment to Barthes, and a sign of his creativity ("iI etait un imposteur, parce que 
justement il etait un veritable ecrivain").76 Robbe-Grillet's own Henri de Corinthe, that 
arch-impostor and self-styled Nietzschean superman, is represented in Angelique in the 
process of writing a personal manifesto on the need to overturn laws in the expression of 
the writer's "volonte subversive": 
Se connaitre soi-meme comme Ie plus grand L .. ] voila sa raison d'etre [ ... ] Car il ne 
suffit pas de sortir vainqueur d'une partie - meme mortelle - dont quelqu'un 
d'autre aurait fixe les regles (un prince, une assemblee ou un dieu) - Ie dernier 
. ecrivain se mesure d'abord au desir, a la necessite de devenir l'unique createur de 
toute loi ecrite.77 
Thus, where the discontinuity that is a condition of the characters' being-in-the-world 
marks the text with the trace of a psychic fragility, the absence willed by the author 
betrays the will to power that is associated with the artistic illusion. 
VI. Conclusion 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's novels show them both to be passionate sceptics who 
embrace doubt as a means of eluding both the limitations represented by conventional 
discourse, and of maintaining their creative elan as writers. Raskolnikov's attempts to 
escape the consequences of his action and avoid the finalizing judgements of the law 
provide the impetus in Crime and Punishment which drives the narrative forward to its 
conclusion. In La jalousie, uncertainty is even more crucial as a generating device for the 
narrative. In both instances doubt appears as a "self-determined indetermination" 
which is employed to avoid the finality implicit in certain definitions and decisions. 
75 
76 
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p37. 
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The different manner in which each writer works through what might be termed a 
psychic and intellectual claustrophobia is increasingly evident in their later novels. In 
The Brothers Karamazov doubt and uncertainty are caught up in the drive towards a 
goal, as the characters, like their implied author, attempt to lay hold of that which 
has laid hold of them: a desire for possession which is also, ultimately, a movement of 
submission to the other. This involves a confrontation with, and an acceptance of, a 
limitation on their will to power. Robbe-Grillet continues in his novels to refuse the 
limits implicit in recognition of another's discourse. Nevertheless, it could be argued 
that, by breaking free of the restrictions implicit in 'bourgeois' ideology and morality in 
La maison de rendez-vous, Robbe-Grillet has simply created another confining space that 
is equally claustrophobic due to its excessive absorption in its own image. The "primal 
joy" Nietzsche tells us derives from the "power to shape things according to our wish" is 
subject to its own ambivalent reversals. 
In the final analysis, the hall of mirrors that is Foucault's analogy for the game of 
writing is more appropriate to Robbe-Grillet than it is to Dostoyevsky. The title of 
Robbe-Grillet's autobiographical work, Le miroir qui revient, suggests an ongoing delight 
in self-reflection that echoes Nietzsche's delight in the eternal circle: 
78 
This world [ ... J my Dionysian world of eternal self-creation and eternal self-
destruction, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my 'beyond good 
and evil' without goal unless the joy of the circle is a goal [ ... J do you want a name 
for this world? [ ... J This world is the will to power . .?8 
Cited in A Study Of Nietzsche, p119. 
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Conclusion 
Des trous se depla~ant dans sa texture, c'est grace a cela que Ie texte vit, comme un 
terri.toire au jeu de go ne reste vivant que si l'on a pris soin d'y menager au moins un espace 
libre, une case vacante, ce que les specialistes appellent un reil ouveri, ou encore une 
liberte. 
(Alain Robbe-Grillet) 
i. A sceptical playground 
The novels of Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet exhibit a common delight in and 
exploitation of uncertainty. Doubt in their narratives is not merely an agent of 
instability it is also a stimulus that conduces to the kind of intellectual excitement 
characteristic of the two writers' scepticism. In their relish of the self-defeating aspects 
of the text's logic, Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet may thus be seen to reject the sense of 
detachment associated with Pyrrhonian scepticism. Equally, however, their cultivation 
of the irregular achieves a pathological note at times that is foreign to deconstruction 
linguistic scepticism. The sense of a misplaced malaise in Robbe-Grillet has less in 
common with Derrida, therefore, than with Bloom, who writes of the need to cultivate 
anxiety in the interests of maintaining a self-regulating creative euphoria. 
Dostoyevsky's scepticism has perhaps a closer affinity with Bakhtin's carnivalism, 
which has been as important as deconstruction in defining the tenor of contemporary 
scepticism and in drawing attention to the sceptical potential of past literary practice. 
Dostoyevsky's experimentation with eccentric ideas, poses and masks in the novels can be 
read as an almost gluttonous receptivity to heterogeneity, corresponding to carnival 
extravagence. 
The excitement engendered by doubt in both Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet is neither 
meaningless nor entirely without motive. Although enjoyed for its own sake, uncertainty 
is as much about a bid for freedom as it is a consequence of Robbe-Grillet's generative 
"vide" and Dostoyevsky's underground quibbles and "tormenting" questions. Dostoyevsky 
and Robbe-Grillet strive against the restrictions of institutional legalism in any form and 
their scepticism reflects a fear of the mental and psychic claustrophobia that is induced 
by enforced submission to laws, practices and codified ideologies. The difficulty with 
reactions to external pressure, however, as seen in the attitude of their hero-narrators, is 
that the attempt to preserve a creative space free of intrusive limits implies some form 
of withdrawal from the other. This means not only the other of laws and institutions but 
also the other who is the narrator's equal, and whose freedom at some point must 
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intersect with and challenge the narrator's own, if freedom is to escape the perversions of 
monomania. 
ii. A room of our own 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's novels show that to some extent withdrawal into "une 
arriere boutique toute nostre" (Montaigne's phrase for the reflective space needed by the 
thinker) is a preliminary to creative activity in so far as the mind, cut off from the 
immediate registering of phenomena, is free to remember, imagine and invent. The notion 
of a discontinuity between mind and world that is physical as well as mental is 
fundamental to Robbe-Grillet's aesthetic, and implicit also in the responses of his own 
and Dostoyevsky's narrators to the world in which they find themselves. The type of 
fantasizing which Dostoyevsky's underground man enjoys, for example, is largely 
dependent on his being just that, an underground man released from the norms and 
exigencies of everyday social behaviour. If he craves external stimulus he is quick to 
discover that close involvement with others and their narratives impairs his ability to 
fantasize. Similarly, the brooding speculation in Robbe-Grillet's La jalousie is 
maintained largely because of the narrator's estrangement from A.... In both these 
instances the whole impetus of the narratives would be lost if any prolonged encounter 
with the other were to be introduced into the text. There seems, therefore, to be a 
deliberate equation on the part of the authors of withdrawal and intense imaginative 
activity. 
On the one hand, then, movement away from the other in pursuit of unrestricted freedom 
of thought stems from an attitude that is consciously sought after by the implied author, 
and his narrator's solipSism reflects the inherited dilemma of the sceptic in relation to 
the world. Is it possible, the sceptic of ancient Greece somewhat resignedly asks, to grasp 
anything beyond the enclosures of the mind, or are the limitations of experience, 
temperament and cultural conditioning such as to prevent significant gains in 
understanding? The question is implicit in Pyrrho's bracketing of the external world as a 
subject of inquiry, as it is in our own age in Derrida's reminder of our dependence on 
linguistic mediation, thus: "il n'y a pas de hors-textel/. Is the room of our own, then, not a 
creative space after all, but a prison that we can choose neither to leave nor enter? 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet's response to this dilemma indicates the point where 
they diverge most significantly as sceptical thinkers. 
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iii. "Truth to another and his word" and lice qu'il y a dans rna tete" 
When all is uncertain the sceptic may nonetheless prefer certain criteria above others as 
suitable guides in the exercise of personal judgement: Pyrrho's goal of equanimity; 
Carneades' degrees of probability; Montaigne's "sound judgement"; all these could be 
described as principles to which past sceptics have adhered, in their endlessly cautious 
fashion. The nature of what the sceptic is prepared to concede is likely to be as much the 
product of the sceptic's mental makeup and experience as are the nature and extent of 
his/her doubts. The will to affirm something is nonetheless not as hostile to the sceptic 
disposition as might be supposed by the premiss of unknowability. 
What, then, is the preference of the two writers under examination? Is it to be 'truth' to 
sense-perception? To the intellect or the conventionally reasonable? For Dostoyevsky, as 
Bakhtin has effectively phrased it, the ultimate criterion is "truth to another person 
and his word". Fidelity, in other words, not to an idea or a capability but to a person. 
When Dostoyevsky states that: 
If anyone could prove to me that Christ is outside the truth [ ... J I should prefer to 
stay with Christ and not with truth 
he marks his departure from the rationally-oriented scepticism of a thinker like 
Montaigne, as well as from the phenomenologically-oriented scepticism of Sextus 
Empiricus. The 'rational' scepticism of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment is 
criticized by the implied author because it is without the necessary flexibility to 
respond to the other. Raskolnikov's feelings of alienation are as much about a self-
imposed intellectual limitation as they are about moral guilt, for he has tried to 
construct an impenetrable theory that nothing could contradict and which would enable 
him to manipulate experience according to his own "sweet will". The underground man is 
a recurrent theme in Dostoyevsky's scepticism as is Dostoyevsky's critique of the 
underground mentality, on the grounds that "the law of the 1" must merge "with the law 
of humanism". 
Alain Robbe-Grillet's theoretical statements on the other are as contradictory as the 
behaviour of Dostoyevsky's narrators often is in relation to the stated ideological 
preferences of their author. Robbe-Grillet has claimed, for instance, that the other 
consistently defies the perceiver's attempts to contain and manipulate it ("[Ie mondeJ 
refuse de se plier a nos habitudes d'appn§hension et a notre ordre"). But, complicating 
this express recognition of the role of otherness in perception is the obvious preference for 
invention over inquiry: "ce sont les formes [que l'homme] cree qui peuvent apporter des 
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significations au monde". While in novels like La jalousie tension between the world's 
otherness and creative perception decentres narrative subjectivity, the bias in Robbe-
Grillet's 02uvre as a whole tends towards the imposition of meaning rather than inquiry 
into the other's meaning. For one thing, Robbe-Grillet's conception of the other most 
often concerns a material other that has certain formal properties (the famous 
parallelepiped, for example), but which can only act as a neutral reflector of fantasy. In 
the case of the personal other in the novels, a similar effect is achieved, either through 
the use of the femme-objet figure, or through the other's automatically sharing the 
dominant narrative fantasy, thus failing more directly to challenge the text's primary 
vision. Because the other frequently lacks the ability to reverse habits of perception it 
cannot be said to play an important role in Robbe-Grillet's scepticism as represented in 
the mentality of his hero-narrators. 
It is nonetheless inappropriate to speak of failure in connection with modes of perception 
in Robbe-Grillet's novels. For the otherness of the world which yields to the narrator's 
"habitudes d'apprehension" is not the other that Robbe-Grillet is principally interested 
in. The other that fascinates Robbe-Grillet is refracted in multiple images by the "reel", 
identified in Angelique with his ownsubconscious world of dreams. In this respect, self-
reflection, not inquiry into the other than self, is the chief motivation behind Robbe-
Grillet's sceptical inquiries, as is made abundantly clear in his reponse to queries about 
contradictory information concerning family members: "en fin de compte il n'y a d'autre 
chose au monde que rna tete, que ce qu'il y a dans rna tete") Interest in the other is nearly 
always circular, leading back to the self, and so to a willed and not merely accidental 
solipsism as Robbe-Grillet demonstrates his agreement with Dostoevsky's underground 
man: "what can a decent, respectable man talk about with the greatest of pleasure? 
Answer: himself".2 
Dostoyevsky has also been described as a posturer in front of the glass of self-reflection. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that, as with his character Mr Golyadkin (The Double), he is 
not happy with all he sees, so that there is an ongoing attempt to remake himself, and 
his characters, in the face of the other. Robbe-Grillet, in his acceptance of the limits of 
solipsism, is free from the anguish of this self-questioning, just as his doubt is not a raging 
protest that demands an answer, however impossible, but a muted and delicately 
'Conversation avec Alain Robbe-Grillet', p91. cf Alain Robbe-Grillet. Qui suis-je? 
p147: "si je parle de mon grand-pere a des gens qui l'ont connu, qu'ils me contredisent 
sur tel ou tel point, je ne les crois pas. Davantage, ce qu'ils me disent ne m'interesse 
pas". 
2 Notes from Underground, p17. A rephrasing of Robbe-Grillet's own celebrated 
remark, "Je n'ai jamais parle d'autre chose que de moi". 
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balanced rhetoric of uncertainty. For Robbe-Grillet, as for Nabokov, art is a game, a 
vitally important one, but a game for all that: 
Art is a game, because it remains art only as long as we are allowed to remember 
that, after all, it is all make-believe, [ ... l only as long as our feelings of horror or of 
disgust do not obscure our realization that we are, as readers or spectators, 
participating in an elaborate and enchanting game [ ... ].3 
iv. Writers in a sceptic tradition? 
Dostoyevsky and Robbe-Grillet are alike in their exploitation of uncertainty but they 
differ in their perception of its function in relation to scepticism. 
Dostoyevsky uses uncertainty in a double action to undermine doubt as well as belief so 
that, in G.K. Chesterton's phrase, doubt "is capable of becoming an uncertainty 
continually shaken by a tormenting suggestion".4 The interaction of faith and doubt 
creates ongoing tensions in the novels that provide, in turn, a rich lode of material for 
critical disagreement. Doubt is positively conceived in the novels, but it is also subject to 
criticism in the context of the self/other relation. The most effective and lasting 
challenge to our preconceived ignorance as well as to our preconceived ideas is, 
Dostoyevsky seems to imply, our neighbour, and ourselves, too, as we interact with 
others. 
Robbe-Grillet uses uncertainty to subvert conventional meaningfulness as a preliminary to 
the imposition of private fantasy. Because of the persistent recurrence of one type of 
fantasy in the novels to the exclusion of others, the gaps and silences in the text may be 
filled by the implied reader only if s/he shares the narrator's obsessions. No critique of 
doubt itself is offered in Robbe-Grillet, and in later works, where the pathological 
atmosphere of La jalousie and Le voyeur is less in evidence, scepticism is associated 
with an assured, almost slick technique suggestive of a high degree of philosophic as 
well as psychological composure. 
In the final analysis it would appear there is no single sceptical tradition with which 
the two writers may be satisfactorily compared. Both depart from the recommendations 
of Pyrrho in their rejection of tranquillity, although Dostoyevsky could be said to rejoin 
ancient scepticism in his emphasis on the ethical, rather than the purely ludic. If, then, 
there are many shades of doubt, there are also a number of different motivations brought 
3 
4 
Lectures on Russian Literature, pl06. 
'The philosophy of Browning, in The Essential G.K. Chesterton, p54. 
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into play in a sceptical practice of writing: the desire to understand, the desire to 
subvert, the desire for tranquillity, the desire for intellectual adventure, the desire for 
mastery, the desire for the other. Scepticism in the novels of Dostoyevsky and Robbe-
Grillet bears some ressemblance to the game of go described in Robbe-Grillet's Le miroir 
qui revient in that each moves their chosen pawns into the empty spaces which are also 
the guarantee of their "liberte". It must be remembered, of course, that no-one, neither 
the writer, nor the critic, can play the game with empty hands. 
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